Russian Faith Matters: Religiosity and Civil Society in the Russian Federation

Russian Faith Matters: Religiosity and Civil Society in the Russian Federation Abstract Inspired by recent studies of the relationship between religiosity and norms of civic participation in the West, the authors examined four areas of possible correlation between similar norms and values in contemporary Russian society: authoritarianism, charitable giving, volunteering, and support for NGOs. The authors obtained survey responses from 1,500 randomly selected Russian citizens from 105 urban and rural locations in 43 regions across the Russian Federation. Results emphasize that in Russia, as in much of the developed world, active religious attendance matters and that the impact of such behavior in Russia is generally prosocial, not authoritarian, and possibly driven by the moral discourses found in religious communities. Results also suggest that the impact of religiosity in Russia is diminished by the relatively small segment of the population that claims regular religious attendance. Together these results highlight the importance of further studies of pious Russians’ behavior and beliefs. INTRODUCTION Over the past several decades, sociological surveys have highlighted the role of religion in the development and function of voluntary associations. The study of this relationship began in earnest with Tocqueville’s Democracy in America in 1835 and gained new impetus after the resurgence of civil society theory in the wake of political and governance reforms that have been dubbed the “Third Wave of Democracy” (Diamond 1996). A common approach has been to analyze the civic and social impacts of religiosity and religious institutions. According to the theory, religiously affiliated citizens participate in religious services for a wide range of personal reasons (Casidy and Tsarenko 2014; Roof and Hoge 1980). Many religious attendees are then drawn into committees and small groups that support the activities of their communities (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Stark and Finke 2000; Tamney 2002). Believers emerge from this experience with the practical tools and motivations to join with others to solve communal problems in the secular civil sphere as well. These “engaged citizens” often recruit others in their religious networks to partner with them in these secular engagements. This encourages a continuation of this process through networks that maintain recruiting relationships between secular and religious voluntary associations. Scholars of this process have demonstrated that this cycle can be very complex and that belief, behaviors, and identity can have overlapping impacts (Park and Smith 2000). Studies have shown that in many ways, nominal believers (nonpracticing, though self-identifying with a faith community) often vary little from the activities and values of some of their nonidentifying (“nones”) neighbors (Baker and Smith 2009). Other studies have demonstrated that the values, norms, and practices of civic engagement, in turn, are often correlated with the frequency of religious rituals and habits of surveyed populations.1 To date, very little work has been done to study the impact of these same dynamics on the growth of civic engagement across the territory of the Russian Federation (RF). As a first step in filling this gap, we included a series of research questions in our analysis of data from the 2014 Russian national survey “Potentsial Sotsial’nykh Innovatsii” (HSE/PSI.14) which was carried out in 2014 by the Centre for the Study of Civil Society and the Non-commercial Sector (CSCSNS) of the Higher School of Economics University (HSE) in Moscow, Russia. We begin with an overview of the factors involved in the study of religiosity and civic engagement. We provide an overview of the survey and analytical work on these factors in the RF as well as a short description of the main religious options available to Russian citizens and how the interplay between national and religious legitimacy might result in increases in authoritarian values among “religious attenders.” We then explain the variables measured, describe our use of a primary religiosity scale (the HSER), and the use of binomial logistic analysis of its correlation with authoritarianism, volunteering, and giving data in the survey. We use the Helmert Contrast approach to compare the impact of a step-wise increase in levels of religiosity on each of these dependent variables. Finally, we discuss the possible civil society impacts of these attitudes in Russia and how our analysis may have applications for similar work in Russia and in other nations where religious and national identity overlap. THEORY AND LITERATURE Theories about the nature and types of motivation driving civic engagement have sparked much debate about the positive and negative impacts of civil society activism. Although religiosity itself has been defined and measured in various ways, many recent studies include discussion of its impact on civil society, the realm of voluntary and self-organized groups of citizens for purposes of mutual benefit (e.g., Caputo 2009 or Davis and Robinson 2012). These mutual benefits often include increased support for humanitarian social reforms, cultural development, leisure activities, and communal or infrastructure improvements. They can also result in increased support for narrow, ethnic, nationalist, or class groupings with, intended or accidental, negative impacts on other social groups or on the broader fabric of social solidarity. For this reason, civic engagement should not be considered as a universally prosocial category of analysis or social action. However, social and religious norms that support self-organization, that encourage joint behaviors for the common good, that discourage free-riding and encourage toleration and communal behavior across racial, ethnic, economic, and religious lines can be understood as prosocial civic values that may have direct effects on the spread of the bridging networks of socially constructive civil society (Granovetter 1973, 1983; Putnam 2000; Smidt 2003). Measuring Religiosity Social science research has long focused on several specific elements of religiosity to better measure its significance for social interaction (Hill and Hood 1999; Steensland et al. 2000). Commonly surveyed elements have included denominational identification, ideology (or belief systems), ritual activities (and their frequency), and broader behavioral consequences (charitable giving, volunteering, etc.) (Hunsberger 1989; Stark and Glock 1968). One common difficulty with survey research based on subjective personal reporting of ritual attendance (especially in the United States) has been the tendency in many countries for respondents to over-report socially approved religious behavior and under-report stigmatized behavior (like criminality or sexual deviance) (Hadaway and Marler 2005; Hadaway et al. 1993; Woodberry 1998). However, a number of studies have used combined scales of religious self-identification and frequency of religious attendance as part of their scales of a subject population’s religiosity. Versions of this scale have been shown to have significant correlation with various dependent variables including subjective well-being, life-satisfaction, social conflict, rates of substance abuse, and decreased parental dysfunction (Lun and Bond 2013; Shek 1999; Wills et al. 2003). So, while additional nuance is added to such studies by the deployment of additional objective or unobtrusive scales, the core measures of religious self-identification and frequency of religious ritual provide a baseline for scales of religiosity as an independent variable. Several studies have shown these correlations specifically as they relate to volunteerism (Monsma 2007; Wilson and Musick 1997). Measuring Civic Engagement After 1945, social scientists blended theory with ever more careful social science methods and narrowed their focus on those elements of study that might better explain why some polities seemed more successful at balancing political stability with popular control and access (Almond and Verba 1980; Dahl 1971, 1998; Davis and Robinson 2012; Diamond and Platter 2001; Putnam 1993). Onto this foundation was added a new wave of work that became available as western researchers studied the writings and movements of activists and scholars in Eastern Europe involved in the wave of democratization that followed the 1974 revolution in Portugal, the post-Franco reforms in Spain, and the wave of change after 1985 in the countries of the Warsaw Pact (Diamond and Morlino 2005). Research has shown that higher levels of religiosity (measured by commitment to traditional beliefs, salience, or attendance) correlate with higher levels of volunteering for both religious and nonreligious organizations. Two types of motivations are often connected with these higher levels of volunteering. The first of these stems from the theological context: members of many religious traditions believe that their God requires service to the needy and love for the neighbor. Survey respondents often cite specific religious texts or sermons as support for this view. Others argue that specific understandings of the nature of God as loving, generous, or merciful spark imitative behavior on the part of believers (Menken and Fitz 2013). A second type of motivation relates to the inherent civic training impact of social networks (apart from any specific religious messaging that they might impart) on members’ levels of volunteerism. Members of social networks are both trained and encouraged by their involvement, quite apart from the religious or nonreligious nature of their network commitments. Many studies have shown effects for both of these types of motivations in North America, Europe, and Asia. Some suggest that religious attenders are primarily motivated by the norms and values of their faith. Others suggest that religious attenders are schooled in the habits and techniques of civic engagement by their involvement. Still others argue that religious groups naturally include the sorts of people who sacrifice time to meet the needs of their neighbors. Do “churched” Russian believers attend because of their values or are their values shaped by their attendance? Some possible conclusions regarding this question will be offered at the conclusion of this article. Surveys of Religion and Civic Engagement in Eastern Europe Participation in NGOs is a common measure of relative civic engagement in the scholarly literature (Dhingra and Becker 2001; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Finke and Bader 2017; Putnam 1993). Russia’s Higher School of Economics has published multiple reports on this measure for the populations of the RF (Mersianova and Korneeva 2013; Mersianova and Yakobson 2010). The 2014 HSE/PSI.14 survey project was also devised with an eye toward the political culture survey work already carried on in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The World Value Survey (WVS) is a primary example of this work (1981–2010). Over the years, succeeding versions of the WVS questionnaire expanded to include a wide array of worldview questions including attitudes toward the overall meaning of life, death, and suffering. WVS surveys now include a range of questions on the role of churches in social and political debates. The WVS’ European affiliate, the EVS, has sponsored four separate waves of surveys which focus on particular social and religious values. The most recent of these, the EVS 2008: Russian Federation survey, was actually completed in 2010. This study included a number of valuable questions about self-identity, behavior, and doctrine. Unfortunately, the 2008 Russian EVS survey only included the most basic questions about the actual social and political activism of respondents. While it may provide a baseline for general religious attitudes, it provides little solid data to allow correlation directly between religiosity and civic engagement. Russian History, Religiosity, Authoritarianism, and Civic Engagement The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has formed a bedrock element of Russian national identity for most of the last millennium. It is a direct descendant of the Church of Kievan Rus’ which traces its origins to the missionary work of Saints Cyril and Methodius who brought the Byzantine faith to the Slavs in the ninth century C.E. In 988, the Kievan Prince Vladimir officially baptized his kingdom and made Christianity the approved national religion. From that point on, Orthodox Christianity has remained the dominant faith of the lands of Kievan Rus’, of Muscovy and, later, the Russian Empire. Today, large portions of the Russian populace view the ROC as a founding element in national identity. While opinions about the Church’s engagement with the Russian state today vary, for much of the population, national and religious identities are closely linked. In the HSE/PSI.14 survey, 68.7% of all respondents (1,031 of 1,500) identified themselves as Russian Orthodox even though less than 13% of the population (N = 134) identified themselves as regular attenders (more than just a few times per year). While Titarenko found 9.2% claimed to attend more than once per month (Titarenko 2008), various surveys report that nearly 70% of the population believes that “to be Russian is to be Orthodox” (Papkova 2011:183). Political scientists and political sociologists have long suspected a link between traditional religions and authoritarian systems. This work is well summarized by scholars like Anna Gryzmala-Busse (2015) in her Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy. Papkova (2011) examined similar social and political dynamics in The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics. Recent scholarship supports the view that nations with a “fused” national and religious identity (as demonstrated by popular surveys) are often subject to a significant intertwining of religious and State policy preferences. Often these policies tend toward authoritarianism and nationalism (Gryzmala-Busse 2015; Papkova 2011; Solodovnik 2014; Stoeckl 2014; Winandy 2015; Zorkaia 2014) A related element of the puzzle of religiosity and authoritarianism has to do with the impact of clerical political priorities on the values and norms of the laity. Papkova’s survey work (2011) highlighted the importance of such analysis by demonstrating a real divergence between the political values of these groups. The possible impact of these dynamics on the HSE/PSI.14 data will be discussed below. Non-Orthodox Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and Animists have lived in the lands comprising the RF for most of the last millennium. However, the actual number of respondents from each of these separate religious groups to the HSE/PSI.14 survey is so low as to be statistically insignificant. DATA AND METHODS Survey Description The HSE/PSI.14 survey was carried out in 2014 by formal personal interview according to a prepared script which included 100 questions. A full quality control system was implemented that included random checks on accuracy, completeness, and procedural regularity. The scope of research included both urban and rural adults (aged 18 and greater) of the RF. The research sample included 105 urban and rural locations in 43 regions of the RF for a total sample size of 1,500 persons. The survey sample was constructed using a multi-step stratified in-person territorial random sampling method where interviewers knocked at the doors of more than 2,500 residences. An average of approximately 60% of those who answered the interviewer’s knock were willing to complete the entire survey. The HSE/PSI.14 survey asked respondents to select among 27 different types of NGOs and to indicate their willingness to volunteer or give to each. These 27 types of NGO’s can be split into a number of separate categories based on the targets of their activities: (1) Ethnic/Nationalist NGOs, (2) Religious NGOs, (3) Professional Support NGOs, (4) Property and Consumers Support NGOs, (5) Cultural/Arts/Education NGOs, (6) General Social NGOs, (7) Benevolent or Mercy Associations (Victims’ Support Groups, Poverty Relief Collections NGOs), (8) Political and Civil Rights Associations, and (9) Other NGOs. Among these nine categories, significant positive correlations only appeared (using Kruskal’s gamma analysis) between the HSE Religiosity scale (HSER) and the Religious (#2 above), Benevolence/Mercy (#7), and Civil Rights (#8) categories. For this reason, additional analysis was focused on the NGO types of these categories. Since the HSE/PSI.14 survey provided no empirically continuous scale of religiosity, the odds differentials provided by in-depth binary logistic regression is reported below. An additional level of relative comparison was added to the analysis with the use of the Helmert contrast technique (see below for a description of this approach). Independent Variables The HSE/PSI.14 survey questions focused primarily on measuring civic engagement, attitudes toward and knowledge about NGOs, and standard demographic categories. The study included two primary questions on the religious self-identification of participants. In particular, Question 98 (Q.98) asked respondents to sort themselves into one of seven categories: Russian Orthodox, Non-Orthodox Christian, Muslim, Jew, Buddhist, Other, and Atheist. Q.99 (skipped for Atheists) then asked believers to rate themselves on frequency of attendance at their place of worship or ritual. For the purpose of this report, Q.98 was used only to single out self-described “Atheists” and to designate them as the first position in the HSER scale as the least religious group of respondents. This provided the authors with a reference or dummy variable against which to compare the other categories. Taking these two questions together, the authors created a five-step ordinal scale of respondent religiosity where self-identifying atheists were designated as group 1, nominal “never-attending” believers (of any faith) fit into group 2, occasional attenders were designated as group 3, regular attending believers were designated as group 4, and regular attenders who also viewed themselves as active “members or their faith community” were labeled as group 5. This HSE Religiosity (HSER) Scale was defined as the primary independent variable. In addition to this HSER Scale of respondent religiosity, gender, age, income, and education levels were also included in the binomial logistic regression models as independent variables to test for any covariance effects. The HSE survey does not provide an objective or unobtrusive measure of actual attendance. Our analysis makes no effort to add to the debate over actual ritual attendance in the RF nor on the gap between reported and actual attendance figures.2 Instead, we study the impacts of self-reported religious identity and attendance on giving, volunteering, and trust in NGOs in Russia. Finally, since the HSER scale is constructed from two questions (Atheism vs. Belief) and a self-reported four-point continuum of attendance frequency, simple scale reliability for these purposes is assured. Dependent Variables Participation/membership. The HSE/PSI.14 survey included a number of questions that probed respondents’ willingness to join together with other Russian citizens to “influence the situation in various spheres of social life.” Of these questions, Q.44 listed the 27 specific NGO categories described above. Respondents were asked to choose as many of these categories as necessary to indicate in which categories of NGOs and “civil or social initiatives [they] participate, membership of which” they maintain. Of course, since this question conjoined these two levels of participation (informal and formal membership), it is very likely that some participants who do not maintain formal membership might well have not selected any of the possible categories. Perhaps as a result, the actual “participation/membership” responses are significantly lower than either “volunteer,” “donate to,” or “trust in” for any of the selected categories other than the “None” category (which is consistent with the inverse relationship implied by this category itself). See table 1 for a comparison of raw response data for the relevant categories analyzed below. Table 1 Levels of Support among HSE/PSI.14 Respondents by NGO Categories and by Type of Support NGO categories HSER scale correlations No HSER scale correlations (selected sample) None Relig Victims support Pov. relief collections Civ. rights Consumer protection Trade unions Culture, arts Ecology Women’s Political parties Youth political National patriotic Valid 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 Donatea 845 30 145 243 14 11 180 20 26 8 3 4 2 Volunteerb 921 27 103 100 6 27 25 46 38 25 8 7 5 Participatec 1212 18 10 24 2 6 86 12 4 1 9 1 1 Trustd 382 118 174 183 93 253 180 135 94 53 31 18 10 Raw totalse 3360 193 432 550 115 297 471 213 162 87 51 30 18 NGO categories HSER scale correlations No HSER scale correlations (selected sample) None Relig Victims support Pov. relief collections Civ. rights Consumer protection Trade unions Culture, arts Ecology Women’s Political parties Youth political National patriotic Valid 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 Donatea 845 30 145 243 14 11 180 20 26 8 3 4 2 Volunteerb 921 27 103 100 6 27 25 46 38 25 8 7 5 Participatec 1212 18 10 24 2 6 86 12 4 1 9 1 1 Trustd 382 118 174 183 93 253 180 135 94 53 31 18 10 Raw totalse 3360 193 432 550 115 297 471 213 162 87 51 30 18 aTotal of answers to Q.47: Which of these NGOs and civil initiatives would you like to support with financial donations? bTotal of answers to Q.46: For which of these NGOs and civil initiatives would you willing to volunteer? cTotal of answers to Q.44: For which of these NGOs and civil initiatives do you participate, membership of which you maintain? dTotal of answers to Q.42: Which of these NGOs and initiatives do you trust? eSimple column summation of respondent selections of all four types of NGO support. View Large Table 1 Levels of Support among HSE/PSI.14 Respondents by NGO Categories and by Type of Support NGO categories HSER scale correlations No HSER scale correlations (selected sample) None Relig Victims support Pov. relief collections Civ. rights Consumer protection Trade unions Culture, arts Ecology Women’s Political parties Youth political National patriotic Valid 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 Donatea 845 30 145 243 14 11 180 20 26 8 3 4 2 Volunteerb 921 27 103 100 6 27 25 46 38 25 8 7 5 Participatec 1212 18 10 24 2 6 86 12 4 1 9 1 1 Trustd 382 118 174 183 93 253 180 135 94 53 31 18 10 Raw totalse 3360 193 432 550 115 297 471 213 162 87 51 30 18 NGO categories HSER scale correlations No HSER scale correlations (selected sample) None Relig Victims support Pov. relief collections Civ. rights Consumer protection Trade unions Culture, arts Ecology Women’s Political parties Youth political National patriotic Valid 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 Donatea 845 30 145 243 14 11 180 20 26 8 3 4 2 Volunteerb 921 27 103 100 6 27 25 46 38 25 8 7 5 Participatec 1212 18 10 24 2 6 86 12 4 1 9 1 1 Trustd 382 118 174 183 93 253 180 135 94 53 31 18 10 Raw totalse 3360 193 432 550 115 297 471 213 162 87 51 30 18 aTotal of answers to Q.47: Which of these NGOs and civil initiatives would you like to support with financial donations? bTotal of answers to Q.46: For which of these NGOs and civil initiatives would you willing to volunteer? cTotal of answers to Q.44: For which of these NGOs and civil initiatives do you participate, membership of which you maintain? dTotal of answers to Q.42: Which of these NGOs and initiatives do you trust? eSimple column summation of respondent selections of all four types of NGO support. View Large Volunteering (“Willingness” by NGO category). Survey question Q.46 provided the same list of 27 specific areas and encouraged respondents to pick any in which they “would be willing to work on a volunteer basis.” This provided a wide field of possible concrete response options, each one as a separate nominal dependent binary variable for “willingness to volunteer.” As with each of the other “NGO Category” questions, this question also allowed respondents to consciously choose a “None” response. This allowed the authors a second rough approximation of an HSER group’s tendency to reject all forms of joining. Giving (“Willingness” by NGO category). Q.47 reproduces the same list of possible NGOs from Q.46, but asks if the respondent is “willing to help financially, to donate” to these same NGOs. As with Q.46, it provides a second set of dependent binary variables for “willingness to give” and an overall approximation of a group’s rejection of the idea of giving to NGOs based upon the “None” choice offered at the end of the pick-list. Another two questions asked about actual overall charitable giving, and while the answers to these questions also lagged far behind “Willingness to give,” they help to provide a check on the correlations found between “Willingness” and “Actual” (self-reported) giving. General support for and “trust in” religious and secular NGOs. In addition to the use of the “None” selections as part of Q.48 and Q.49, the authors constructed a scale based on answers to Q.29 which put this question in a positive format: “In developed countries the majority of citizens participate in the work of social, religious, charitable, and other NGOs to jointly solve problems and help others, as well as to influence government activities. In your opinion, is it necessary or unnecessary for the situation in Russia to become the same as in other developed countries?” This question allowed for selection from its own ordinal scale of answers from “1. Definitely necessary” through “4. Definitely unnecessary” and “5. Hard to say.” This scale, despite its obvious normative loading, was analyzed for correlation with NGO category choice and was also converted to a Binary “support/nonsupport” dummy variable by selecting all who selected either of the first two responses (1. Definitely necessary and 2. Probably necessary) as NGO Supporters. As with the measures of religiosity discussed above, one might expect a social desirability impact for self-reported participation, giving, and volunteering in the RF. NGO participation is not necessarily widely supported in the RF, especially after the “foreign-agent law” debates from 2012 on (Popkova 2016; Ryzhkov 2015). Education shows a slight positive correlation with NGO participation in Model 5.0 below. Self-reported giving and volunteering might well be even more subject to such a bias. This bias might be more significant for older citizens who grew up under the Communist Party’s (CPSU) public propaganda campaigns that favored such activities. This may also explain some of the very slight covariances for these control variables (especially age and education) in the models below and underscores the importance of controlling for them in logistic regression analysis. A final check on support for NGOs came from the analysis of answers to Q.42: “Which of these NGOs do you trust?” These answers were analyzed using the same approaches that were applied to the data from Q.44, Q.46, and Q.47. Control variables. While there are interactions between some of the measured demographic variables and several of the scales created on the basis of the HSE/PSI.14 survey, many of the most likely connections seem to be slight or simply not discoverable using this particular survey tool. For instance, Gamma (Kruskal’s Gamma as modeled in SPSS) analysis of association of our ordinal HSER Scale against the full range of HSE’s demographic variables showed few significant direct correlations at all. These included: rural/urban respondent address, internet use, life satisfaction, personal economic expectations, and pride in Russian citizenship. When the subjects of analysis were narrowed to the specific NGO categories of interest in this article, only sex, age, education, and income showed significant interactions with the HSER Scale. Each of these demographic variables were included as regression controls. HYPOTHESES Many scholars have argued that State efforts to penetrate, channel, and control all voluntary associations (often by requiring formal Communist Party oversight) resulted in an “atomization” of the populations of the Soviet Union and an atrophying of all voluntary social groups. Some argue that this resulted in both a decreased level of civic engagement and an increased suspicion of civil society that carried over to the functioning of post-Soviet civil society.3 Other scholars have argued that since 1991 religious organizations have provided new and supportive narratives for commitment to community and civil society.4 To test respondents’ openness to, and involvement in, civil society, the HSE/PSI.14 survey asked several questions about charitable giving (Q.22–Q.24), willingness “to join with others” to solve social problems (Q.29–Q.30), and asked about specific social problems and organizations that attracted the interest, favor, and active involvement of survey respondents (Q.28, Q.42–Q.44, Q.46, Q.47, Q.57). Assuming that religion is either correlated with or will have a conditioning impact on attitudes toward voluntary association, we expect that: H1: Measures of increased religiosity in the HSE/PSI.14 survey (as coded by the HSER Scale) will correlate positively with Believers’ general willingness to support NGOs as demonstrated by their responses to Q.29. We further expected that, given the body of research that suggests a link between traditional religions and authoritarianism and nationalism: (H1a) increased religiosity will correlate specifically with increased support for nationalist and authoritarian NGOs. H2: Measures of increased religiosity on the HSE/PSI.14 survey will correlate positively with specific measures of civic engagement as demonstrated by increases in measured “Willingness to Give to NGOs.” It is expected that HSE religiosity will correlate positively with willingness to give to (H2a) religious NGOs and to (H2b) nonreligious NGOs. These same dynamics might also correlate with attitudes governing the willingness to join with others to work together to solve social problems. Thus we expect that: H3: Measures of increased religiosity will correlate positively with increases in Nominal Believers’ and Attenders’ willingness to volunteer their time with other citizens “to solve social problems” in both (H3a) religious and (H3b) secular NGOs. Finally, despite the fact that far fewer respondents reported their “participation or membership” in NGOs in Russia, we expect that: H4: Measures of increased religiosity will correlate positively with increases in Believers and Attenders self-reported actual “participation” in religious and secular NGOs. ANALYTIC STRATEGY The authors conducted binary logistic regression analysis on the levels of NGO participation, and of willingness to volunteer for, and to give to, the various surveyed NGO categories. In each model, the binary responses for willingness to “trust,” “give/not give,” or “volunteer/not volunteer” were also analyzed using Helmert contrasting to show probability differentials at higher levels of religiosity. Helmert Contrast modeling allows noncontinuous ordinal data structures to be compared by assigning step-wise odds of selection comparisons. A coding system was employed based upon the “Helmert I” approach that grouped respondents into a “Reference vs. All succeeding levels” of religiosity as a binomial pairing. For successive steps of increased religiosity, contrasting models were constructed that reflected the intervals between the five levels of the HSER scale. Each successive Helmert Contrast in the analysis models gives a step-wise odd comparison based upon increases of religiosity as defined by the HSER Scale. The Ht1 Helmert contrast gives the odds ratio of selection of specific NGO interest between Atheists and All Believers (Category 1 vs. Categories 2–5). Ht2 shows the odds of selection contrast between (non-attending) Nominal Believers and All Attenders (Category 2 vs. Categories 3–5). The Ht3 contrast shows the odds of selection contrast between Occasional Attenders and Regular Attenders (Category 3 vs. Categories 4–5). The Ht4 level shows the odds of selection contrast between Regular Attenders and Attender/Members (Category 4 vs. Category 5). Of course, since each contrast level groups the remaining successive groups into a single binary for comparison purposes, the pool of available respondents shrinks with each movement up the list of Helmert contrasts to the point where the Ht4 comparison suffers a statistical significance impact from the small pool of data (Attender/Member N = 21 out of 1,500 respondents). As a result, odds differentials at the Ht2 and Ht3 measurements show the most likely impact of increased attendance on NGO attitudes. And where the data support such analysis, the Ht4 contrast gives a general sense of the importance of the highest level of religious commitment and identification measured by the survey. RESULTS Generalized Support for NGOs (Hypothesis 1) The correlations between levels of religiosity (as measured by the HSER Scale) and generalized support for NGOs are presented in table 2. This model controlled for four possible demographic variables. Of these, only Education Level showed a significant impact on the “necessity” of Russian citizens to emulate “developed nations” in their participation in NGOs. The model suggests that approximately 22% of the overall variance can be accounted for by this variable. More educated respondents are more likely to select “definitely necessary” than less educated respondents. This may reflect an overall “western-leaning” bias among more educated Russians. The model also showed that the self-identified religious (Ht1 shows the Helmert contrast between atheists and all believers) were 1.53 times more likely to select “definitely necessary” than were atheists, independent of educational level. Although there was a similar increase in odds at the next level of religiosity (35.5% more likely), the data only supported a marginal significance for this finding (p = 0.054). The data did not support conclusions of increased support for this correlation for Regular Attenders or for Attender/Members. Each of the other response patterns analyzed below (giving, volunteering, and participating) showed similar correlations, though in each case, the data required the use of the “none” choice to gauge general support. Table 2 Odds Ratios for Generalized Support for NGOs by Religiosity with Helmert Contrastsa Indep. Variables Coefficient Sig. Odds Sex .013 1.013 Age .002 1.002 Education .196 *** 1.216 Income −.007 .993 Ht1 .425 *** 1.530 Ht2 .304 * 1.355 Ht3 .306 1.359 Ht4 .151 1.163 Indep. Variables Coefficient Sig. Odds Sex .013 1.013 Age .002 1.002 Education .196 *** 1.216 Income −.007 .993 Ht1 .425 *** 1.530 Ht2 .304 * 1.355 Ht3 .306 1.359 Ht4 .151 1.163 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.29, Q.98, Q.99. a. Logit regression for “NGO support” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001% View Large Table 2 Odds Ratios for Generalized Support for NGOs by Religiosity with Helmert Contrastsa Indep. Variables Coefficient Sig. Odds Sex .013 1.013 Age .002 1.002 Education .196 *** 1.216 Income −.007 .993 Ht1 .425 *** 1.530 Ht2 .304 * 1.355 Ht3 .306 1.359 Ht4 .151 1.163 Indep. Variables Coefficient Sig. Odds Sex .013 1.013 Age .002 1.002 Education .196 *** 1.216 Income −.007 .993 Ht1 .425 *** 1.530 Ht2 .304 * 1.355 Ht3 .306 1.359 Ht4 .151 1.163 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.29, Q.98, Q.99. a. Logit regression for “NGO support” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001% View Large These data provide qualified support for hypothesis 1. Increased religious identification plays a significant role in increases of support for NGOs in Russia. Increases in attendance suggest a slight increase in generalized support for NGOs. Increased Support for Authoritarian NGOs (Hypothesis 1a) The authors found no significant statistical correlations between religiosity and respondents’ support for authoritarian or nationalist NGOs. Although the raw number of supporters for these groups was low (i.e., Nationalist-Patriotic Movements, N = 10), no statistical analysis showed any correlation between the HSER and “Trust” (Q.42-20, Q.42-21, Q.42-26) in these groups. To test this hypothesis further, the authors ran Helmert contrasts on the HSER and “Trust in Civil Rights NGOs” (Q.42-12). Q.42-12 included the following description of these NGOs: “legal aid for victims of arbitrary state action, for military recruits, Soldiers’ Mothers’ Committees, etc.” As shown in Model 2.1, table 3 increases in ritual attendance were significantly and positively correlated with “trust” in these groups. As a result, hypothesis 1a was rejected. There was no measured increase in support for nationalist or authoritarian groups in the HSE/PSI.14 dataset and clear support for anti-authoritarian civil rights NGOs as religious attendance increases. Table 3 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Trust NGO Categories by Religiosity with Helmert Contrastsa Indep. Variables Model 2.0 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Relig. NGOs CivRights NGOs National/patriotic NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.024 0.976 −0.144 0.866 −0.996 0.369 0.397* 1.49 Age 0.010* 1.01 −0.008 0.992 0.007 1.00 −0.004 0.996 Education 0.122* 1.13 0.342*** 1.41 0.375 1.45 0.158* 1.17 Income −0.060** 0.941 −0.014 0.986 −0.036 0.96 0.003 1.00 Ht1 1.00*** 2.73 1.767 0.990 −7.14 0.001 0.165 1.18 Ht2 0.856*** 2.36 1.468* 1.60 −6.90 0.001 0.331* 1.39 Ht3 0.488** 1.63 1.357** 1.93 −10.8 0.000 0.360 1.43 Ht4 0.353 1.42 0.509 0.86 −0.028 1.03 0.057 1.06 Indep. Variables Model 2.0 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Relig. NGOs CivRights NGOs National/patriotic NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.024 0.976 −0.144 0.866 −0.996 0.369 0.397* 1.49 Age 0.010* 1.01 −0.008 0.992 0.007 1.00 −0.004 0.996 Education 0.122* 1.13 0.342*** 1.41 0.375 1.45 0.158* 1.17 Income −0.060** 0.941 −0.014 0.986 −0.036 0.96 0.003 1.00 Ht1 1.00*** 2.73 1.767 0.990 −7.14 0.001 0.165 1.18 Ht2 0.856*** 2.36 1.468* 1.60 −6.90 0.001 0.331* 1.39 Ht3 0.488** 1.63 1.357** 1.93 −10.8 0.000 0.360 1.43 Ht4 0.353 1.42 0.509 0.86 −0.028 1.03 0.057 1.06 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.42, Q.98, Q.99. aLogit regression models for “NGOs you trust” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%.*** View Large Table 3 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Trust NGO Categories by Religiosity with Helmert Contrastsa Indep. Variables Model 2.0 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Relig. NGOs CivRights NGOs National/patriotic NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.024 0.976 −0.144 0.866 −0.996 0.369 0.397* 1.49 Age 0.010* 1.01 −0.008 0.992 0.007 1.00 −0.004 0.996 Education 0.122* 1.13 0.342*** 1.41 0.375 1.45 0.158* 1.17 Income −0.060** 0.941 −0.014 0.986 −0.036 0.96 0.003 1.00 Ht1 1.00*** 2.73 1.767 0.990 −7.14 0.001 0.165 1.18 Ht2 0.856*** 2.36 1.468* 1.60 −6.90 0.001 0.331* 1.39 Ht3 0.488** 1.63 1.357** 1.93 −10.8 0.000 0.360 1.43 Ht4 0.353 1.42 0.509 0.86 −0.028 1.03 0.057 1.06 Indep. Variables Model 2.0 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Relig. NGOs CivRights NGOs National/patriotic NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.024 0.976 −0.144 0.866 −0.996 0.369 0.397* 1.49 Age 0.010* 1.01 −0.008 0.992 0.007 1.00 −0.004 0.996 Education 0.122* 1.13 0.342*** 1.41 0.375 1.45 0.158* 1.17 Income −0.060** 0.941 −0.014 0.986 −0.036 0.96 0.003 1.00 Ht1 1.00*** 2.73 1.767 0.990 −7.14 0.001 0.165 1.18 Ht2 0.856*** 2.36 1.468* 1.60 −6.90 0.001 0.331* 1.39 Ht3 0.488** 1.63 1.357** 1.93 −10.8 0.000 0.360 1.43 Ht4 0.353 1.42 0.509 0.86 −0.028 1.03 0.057 1.06 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.42, Q.98, Q.99. aLogit regression models for “NGOs you trust” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%.*** View Large Willingness to Give (Hypothesis 2) The findings on the relationship between the HSER Scale and support for charitable giving are shown in table 4. Though analysis was conducted for all 27 possible NGO categories, only four response categories showed any statistical correlation with the HSE Religiosity Scale. Confirming the prediction of hypothesis 2, the results suggest that in Russia, increased levels of religiosity correlate with a greater willingness to give as represented by the inverse relationship between the “Non-givers” shown in the “None” model and the religiosity scale. (Note that “None” responses on this question signaled a rejection of the idea of giving to any NGO, so this selection provides a rough inverse relationship to “willingness to give.”) As per Model 3.0, both Ht1 and Ht2 contrasts showed significant inverse correlations as well. All Believers were approximately 30% less likely to select “None” for willingness to give than atheists. And, as per Ht2, believers who attend (either occasionally or frequently) were 25% less likely to make this selection than non-attending Nominals. All of these data (for each of these giving models) hold age, sex, education, and income as controls. Table 4 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Donate to NGO Categories by Religiosity with Helmert Contrastsa Indep. Variables Model 3.0 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231** 0.79 −0.208 0.81 0.394** 1.48 0.353** 1.42 Age 0.016*** 1.02 0.030** 1.03 −0.007 0.99 −0.015 0.99 Education −0.123*** 0.88 0.073 1.08 0.104** 1.11 0.107 1.11 Income 0.035** 1.04 −0.069 0.93 −0.015 0.98 −0.018 0.98 Ht1 −0.362*** 0.70 1.767*** 5.86 0.565*** 1.76 0.610** 1.84 Ht2 −0.287** 0.75 1.468*** 4.34 0.389** 1.48 0.087 1.09 Ht3 −0.056 0.95 1.357*** 3.89 0.285 1.33 −0.047 0.95 Ht4 0.098 1.10 0.509 1.66 0.083 1.09 −0.149 0.86 Indep. Variables Model 3.0 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231** 0.79 −0.208 0.81 0.394** 1.48 0.353** 1.42 Age 0.016*** 1.02 0.030** 1.03 −0.007 0.99 −0.015 0.99 Education −0.123*** 0.88 0.073 1.08 0.104** 1.11 0.107 1.11 Income 0.035** 1.04 −0.069 0.93 −0.015 0.98 −0.018 0.98 Ht1 −0.362*** 0.70 1.767*** 5.86 0.565*** 1.76 0.610** 1.84 Ht2 −0.287** 0.75 1.468*** 4.34 0.389** 1.48 0.087 1.09 Ht3 −0.056 0.95 1.357*** 3.89 0.285 1.33 −0.047 0.95 Ht4 0.098 1.10 0.509 1.66 0.083 1.09 −0.149 0.86 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.47, Q.98, Q.99. aLogit regression models for “willingness to donate” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%. View Large Table 4 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Donate to NGO Categories by Religiosity with Helmert Contrastsa Indep. Variables Model 3.0 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231** 0.79 −0.208 0.81 0.394** 1.48 0.353** 1.42 Age 0.016*** 1.02 0.030** 1.03 −0.007 0.99 −0.015 0.99 Education −0.123*** 0.88 0.073 1.08 0.104** 1.11 0.107 1.11 Income 0.035** 1.04 −0.069 0.93 −0.015 0.98 −0.018 0.98 Ht1 −0.362*** 0.70 1.767*** 5.86 0.565*** 1.76 0.610** 1.84 Ht2 −0.287** 0.75 1.468*** 4.34 0.389** 1.48 0.087 1.09 Ht3 −0.056 0.95 1.357*** 3.89 0.285 1.33 −0.047 0.95 Ht4 0.098 1.10 0.509 1.66 0.083 1.09 −0.149 0.86 Indep. Variables Model 3.0 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231** 0.79 −0.208 0.81 0.394** 1.48 0.353** 1.42 Age 0.016*** 1.02 0.030** 1.03 −0.007 0.99 −0.015 0.99 Education −0.123*** 0.88 0.073 1.08 0.104** 1.11 0.107 1.11 Income 0.035** 1.04 −0.069 0.93 −0.015 0.98 −0.018 0.98 Ht1 −0.362*** 0.70 1.767*** 5.86 0.565*** 1.76 0.610** 1.84 Ht2 −0.287** 0.75 1.468*** 4.34 0.389** 1.48 0.087 1.09 Ht3 −0.056 0.95 1.357*** 3.89 0.285 1.33 −0.047 0.95 Ht4 0.098 1.10 0.509 1.66 0.083 1.09 −0.149 0.86 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.47, Q.98, Q.99. aLogit regression models for “willingness to donate” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%. View Large Hypothesis 2a is also confirmed by the data from the Religious NGO odds comparisons shown in Model 3.1. In this case, each Helmert contrast (other than Ht4—“Attender/Member” contrast) shows strong and significant increases of odds of willingness to provide financial support. Believers (in the Ht1 contrast) were five times more likely to be willing to give to religious NGOs than atheists. Attenders were 4.3 times more likely to be willing to give than nominal non-Attenders. And Regular Attenders were 3.9 times more likely to select this option than Occasional Attenders. Hypothesis 2b is also partially confirmed by the data shown in Models 3.2 and 3.3. In these cases, increasing religiosity is correlated with increases in willingness to give for two specific NGO categories: “Poverty Support Collections” and “Victims Support Associations.” Incremental increases on the religiosity scale were correlated with higher odds of selection of willingness to give for both of these nonreligious NGO categories. For both “Victims” and “Poverty Collections,” the significant correlations were found at the lower end of the Helmert contrast scale. Believers were 1.84 times more likely to select “willing to give” to Victims NGOs than were Atheists (Mod. 3.3 Ht1). Believers were also 1.76 times more likely to be “willing to give” to Poverty Collections NGOs than Atheists (Mod. 3.2 Ht1). Attenders were 1.48 times more likely to express willingness to donate to Poverty Collection NGOs than were Nominals (Mod. 3.2 Ht2). This suggests, holding the basic demographic variables as controls, a significant, if limited, positive religiosity correlation with support for these specific secular NGOs. This may imply that the religious are willing to donate to secular NGOs provided they fit with their own view of their specific religious obligations to care for the poor and needy and that increased self-identification with and (in some cases) attendance at religious services has a correlation with increased willingness to donate both to religious and these specific secular (“mercy-oriented”) NGOs.5 Willingness to Volunteer—Hypothesis 3 The findings on the relationship between the HSER Scale and a willingness to volunteer for NGOs are shown in table 5. Confirming the prediction of hypothesis 3, the results suggest that in Russia, religiosity correlates positively with “willingness to volunteer” as well. Analysis of Model 4.0 shows that there is an inverse relationship between the “None” volunteers and the initial Helmert contrasts on the HSER Scale. (See above for analysis of this inverse relationship.) As per Model 4.0 Ht1, Believers are 33% less likely to be Non-Volunteers than are Atheists. And Attenders are 34% less likely to select None than are Nominals (Model 4.0 Ht2). Neither of the two remaining Helmert contrasts displayed significant decreases in likelihood of volunteering (Model 4.0 Ht3, Ht4). Table 5 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Volunteer by Religiosity with Helmert Contrasts Indep. Variables Model 4.0 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 None Relig. NGOs Poverty Collection NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231* 0.79 0.415 1.51 0.564** 1.76 0.233 1.26 Age 0.029*** 1.03 −0.005 1.00 −0.019*** 0.98 −0.022*** 0.98 Education −0.188*** 0.83 −0.042 0.96 0.165** 1.18 0.172** 1.19 Income 0.028 1.03 −0.065 0.94 0.000 1.00 0.011 1.01 Ht1 −0.403*** 0.67 1.343*** 3.83 0.539** 1.72 0.915*** 2.50 Ht2 −0.421*** 0.66 1.952*** 7.04 0.479** 1.61 −0.055 0.95 Ht3 −0.027 0.97 1.108*** 3.03 0.232 1.26 −0.139 0.87 Ht4 −0.150 0.86 0.670* 1.95 0.298 1.35 −0.395 0.67 Indep. Variables Model 4.0 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 None Relig. NGOs Poverty Collection NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231* 0.79 0.415 1.51 0.564** 1.76 0.233 1.26 Age 0.029*** 1.03 −0.005 1.00 −0.019*** 0.98 −0.022*** 0.98 Education −0.188*** 0.83 −0.042 0.96 0.165** 1.18 0.172** 1.19 Income 0.028 1.03 −0.065 0.94 0.000 1.00 0.011 1.01 Ht1 −0.403*** 0.67 1.343*** 3.83 0.539** 1.72 0.915*** 2.50 Ht2 −0.421*** 0.66 1.952*** 7.04 0.479** 1.61 −0.055 0.95 Ht3 −0.027 0.97 1.108*** 3.03 0.232 1.26 −0.139 0.87 Ht4 −0.150 0.86 0.670* 1.95 0.298 1.35 −0.395 0.67 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.46, Q.98, Q.99. aLogit regression models for “willingness to volunteer” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%. View Large Table 5 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Volunteer by Religiosity with Helmert Contrasts Indep. Variables Model 4.0 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 None Relig. NGOs Poverty Collection NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231* 0.79 0.415 1.51 0.564** 1.76 0.233 1.26 Age 0.029*** 1.03 −0.005 1.00 −0.019*** 0.98 −0.022*** 0.98 Education −0.188*** 0.83 −0.042 0.96 0.165** 1.18 0.172** 1.19 Income 0.028 1.03 −0.065 0.94 0.000 1.00 0.011 1.01 Ht1 −0.403*** 0.67 1.343*** 3.83 0.539** 1.72 0.915*** 2.50 Ht2 −0.421*** 0.66 1.952*** 7.04 0.479** 1.61 −0.055 0.95 Ht3 −0.027 0.97 1.108*** 3.03 0.232 1.26 −0.139 0.87 Ht4 −0.150 0.86 0.670* 1.95 0.298 1.35 −0.395 0.67 Indep. Variables Model 4.0 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 None Relig. NGOs Poverty Collection NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231* 0.79 0.415 1.51 0.564** 1.76 0.233 1.26 Age 0.029*** 1.03 −0.005 1.00 −0.019*** 0.98 −0.022*** 0.98 Education −0.188*** 0.83 −0.042 0.96 0.165** 1.18 0.172** 1.19 Income 0.028 1.03 −0.065 0.94 0.000 1.00 0.011 1.01 Ht1 −0.403*** 0.67 1.343*** 3.83 0.539** 1.72 0.915*** 2.50 Ht2 −0.421*** 0.66 1.952*** 7.04 0.479** 1.61 −0.055 0.95 Ht3 −0.027 0.97 1.108*** 3.03 0.232 1.26 −0.139 0.87 Ht4 −0.150 0.86 0.670* 1.95 0.298 1.35 −0.395 0.67 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.46, Q.98, Q.99. aLogit regression models for “willingness to volunteer” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%. View Large Hypothesis 3A is also strongly supported by the data in the Religious NGOs preference data (Model 4.1). Here again significance of relationship is strong (p < 0.01) and likelihood of selection of “willingness to volunteer” at 3.8×, 7.0×, and 3.0×, respectively for Ht1, Ht2, and Ht3 contrasts. There is even a marginal statistical significance for the final (Attending/Member) category in comparison with the previous group (Regular Attenders). Not surprisingly, the Religious are increasingly likely to volunteer for religious NGOs as their level of religiosity increases. Hypothesis 3B is also supported by Models 4.2 and 4.3. In fact, the data show the same pattern for both “Poverty Collections” NGOs and for “Victims Support” NGOs as was found for “willingness to give.” Both the Ht1 and Ht2 Helmert contrasts show significant increases in odds of selection of “willingness to volunteer” for Poverty Collections NGOs (1.7× and 1.6×, respectively). For Victims Support NGOs the single significant indication of increased willingness to volunteer comes at the contrast between Atheists and All Believers, with Believers being 2.50 times more likely to indicate their willingness to volunteer than Atheists (Mod. 4.3 Ht1). Connecting “Willingness” to Behavior (Hypothesis 4) The findings on the relationship between the HSER Scale and self-reported participation in NGOs are shown in table 6. Confirming the prediction of hypothesis 4, the results suggest that in Russia religiosity correlates positively with “participation/membership” in both religious and secular NGOs. The problem of low response rates on Q.44 affected analysis of actual participation rates and especially of the religiosity impact on participation. While “willingness” is a soft form of the impact of religiosity, the “willingness” responses (on Q.46 and Q.47) were high enough to allow for analysis of correlations between religiosity and specific NGO support. This problem becomes even more obvious when actual response rates are compared (table 1). Only 19% of all respondents admitted “participation, membership” in any of the 27 categories of NGOs. (Compare this with the 39% of respondents willing to volunteer and the 44% willing to give.) Table 6 Self-identified Participation/Membership by Religiosity with Helmert Contrasts Model 5.0 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex 0.079 1.082 0.216 1.241 0.750 2.117 Age 0.005 1.005 −0.002 0.998 0.006 1.006 Education −0.213*** 0.808 0.010 1.010 0.000 1.000 Income 0.029 1.030 −0.024 0.976 0.002 1.002 Ht1 −0.500*** 0.607 1.034* 2.812 0.917* 2.502 Ht2 −0.703*** 0.495 2.696*** 14.819 1.076*** 2.932 Ht3 −0.382* 0.683 1.226*** 3.407 1.276*** 3.583 Ht4 −0.529** 0.589 1.264*** 3.538 0.435 1.545 Model 5.0 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex 0.079 1.082 0.216 1.241 0.750 2.117 Age 0.005 1.005 −0.002 0.998 0.006 1.006 Education −0.213*** 0.808 0.010 1.010 0.000 1.000 Income 0.029 1.030 −0.024 0.976 0.002 1.002 Ht1 −0.500*** 0.607 1.034* 2.812 0.917* 2.502 Ht2 −0.703*** 0.495 2.696*** 14.819 1.076*** 2.932 Ht3 −0.382* 0.683 1.226*** 3.407 1.276*** 3.583 Ht4 −0.529** 0.589 1.264*** 3.538 0.435 1.545 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.44, Q.98, Q.99. a. Logit regression models for “willingness to volunteer” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%. View Large Table 6 Self-identified Participation/Membership by Religiosity with Helmert Contrasts Model 5.0 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex 0.079 1.082 0.216 1.241 0.750 2.117 Age 0.005 1.005 −0.002 0.998 0.006 1.006 Education −0.213*** 0.808 0.010 1.010 0.000 1.000 Income 0.029 1.030 −0.024 0.976 0.002 1.002 Ht1 −0.500*** 0.607 1.034* 2.812 0.917* 2.502 Ht2 −0.703*** 0.495 2.696*** 14.819 1.076*** 2.932 Ht3 −0.382* 0.683 1.226*** 3.407 1.276*** 3.583 Ht4 −0.529** 0.589 1.264*** 3.538 0.435 1.545 Model 5.0 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex 0.079 1.082 0.216 1.241 0.750 2.117 Age 0.005 1.005 −0.002 0.998 0.006 1.006 Education −0.213*** 0.808 0.010 1.010 0.000 1.000 Income 0.029 1.030 −0.024 0.976 0.002 1.002 Ht1 −0.500*** 0.607 1.034* 2.812 0.917* 2.502 Ht2 −0.703*** 0.495 2.696*** 14.819 1.076*** 2.932 Ht3 −0.382* 0.683 1.226*** 3.407 1.276*** 3.583 Ht4 −0.529** 0.589 1.264*** 3.538 0.435 1.545 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.44, Q.98, Q.99. a. Logit regression models for “willingness to volunteer” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%. View Large Analysis of Model 5.0 shows that there is an inverse relationship between the “None” volunteers and every one of the Helmert contrasts on the HSER Scale. (See above for explanation of this inverse relationship.) As per Model 5.0 Ht1, Believers are nearly 40% less likely (100%–60.7%) to be Non-Volunteers than are Atheists. And Attenders are half as likely (100%–49.5%) to select None as are Nominals (Model 5.0 Ht2). The two remaining Helmert contrasts of Model 5.0 displayed less significant but still measurable increases in likelihood of volunteering (Model 5.0 Ht3, Ht4). Regular Attenders were 32% more likely to be volunteers than Occasional Attenders (Ht3). Attender/Members were 41% more likely to self-designate as volunteers than Regular Attenders who did not identify as “members of their religious communities” even though they attended religious services regularly (Model 5.0 Ht4). Data on membership patterns for specific NGO categories are less clear than for the non-membership category of Model 5.0. Despite the paucity of data, participation rates for Religious NGOs and at least one of the “mercy-oriented” NGOs also reflect the sort of dynamics seen in the “None” memberships correlations of Model 5.0. As per table 1 above, only 10 respondents indicated “participation/membership” in Victims Support NGOs. These responses (not surprisingly) displayed no significant correlation with the HSER Scale for any of the Helmert contrast levels. However, despite the slim data for both Religious (N = 19) and Poverty Collections (N = 24) NGOs (table 1), these data, when examined against levels of religiosity using the Helmert contrast approach (as per Models 5.1 and 5.2) were arrayed in ways that displayed actual significant relationships with the HSER Scale. Note that where data provided the ability to discover significant relationships, there were strong increases in the odds of participation at each level of increased religious attendance. Membership in religious NGOs was powerfully influenced by increasing levels of religiosity. As per Model 5.1, All Religious were 2.8 times more likely to be members of religious NGOs than atheists. Attenders were almost 15 times more likely to be members than Nominals. Regular Attenders were 3.4 times more likely to join religious NGOs than Occasional Attenders. And Attender/Members were 3.5 times more likely than those Regular Attenders who do not identify as members of their religious communities. Increasing religiosity was correlated with increasing odds of membership in Poverty Collections NGOs as well (Model 5.2). Only at the contrast between Attender/Members versus Regular Attending Non-Members, was their no significant odds differential in likelihood of membership in these NGOs. At each of the other three contrast levels (Models 5.2 Ht1, Ht2, and Ht3) the increase in likely NGO membership ranged from 2.5 to 3.6 times. So, while Nominal self-identified faith alone seemed to play a large role in the “willingness” categories, attendance may have an even more pronounced impact when the topic shifts to self-reported NGO “participation.” DISCUSSION Each of the areas of analysis outlined above point to a persisting tendency within the HSE/PSI.14 survey data, namely that Russian religious believers (taken together and across their various religious traditions) occupy a significantly prosocial position in their world. Increase in religious attendance is correlated with prosocial civic attitudes and is not correlated with support for authoritarian NGOs. This is evident from the nature of religious Russians’ civic engagement and provides a window into the norms and values that drive that engagement. Despite the literature linking ethno-nationalism within the dominant church institutions of the RF, there was no significant correlation between religiosity and NGOs linked to such movements (Nationalist/Patriotic or Youth Political Groups) or even to political NGOs that have been linked to State institutions (see hypothesis 1a above). In fact the data showed the reverse: as attendance increased (at Ht2 and Ht3 attendance contrasts) the odds of support for anti-authoritarian civil rights NGOs also increased. While popular religiosity may be linked to such movements in other parts of the world, and even while some Russian religious hierarchs themselves may attempt such linkage, this study shows no significant connections for self-identified believers or for the more religious lay members of the local parishes themselves. This “non-authoritarianism” may also reflect the balance between “institutional” and “ideological/theological” impacts on members. Gryzmala-Busse’s work (2015) highlights the ways that Church and State institutions “trade moral authority” for political power and for the benefits of access to State resources. These elements are largely removed from the equation when, as in the HSE/PSI.14, analysis focuses on lay attitudes toward various elements of the NGO sector. It also fits with the analysis of the impact of increased Orthodox religiosity in works like Papkova’s survey of 792 students at nine Russian universities in 2006. She discovered the presence of possible institutional conservative impacts among students on the career track to become priests but found that increasing religiosity (primarily evinced by increases in ritual attendance) among students at secular universities was not correlated with more authoritarian political attitudes (Papkova 2011:181–8). While these findings suggest that ROC culture and teaching have limited impact on authoritarian attitudes outside of its institutional hierarchy, other studies suggest that “devout Orthodox Christians as a group are somewhat more favorably inclined toward democracy” (Marsh 2005b:450). In light of these findings it may not be surprising that the HSE/PSI.14 data, with their focus on lay religiosity and individual civic engagement, point toward a nonauthoritarian relationship between the two and the possibility that ROC social messaging at the parish level is not inherently authoritarian and does reflect prosocial and charitable norms and values. This is further supported by the actual patterns of NGO support discovered in the data above. They show an increased willingness to join and to give financially to religiously oriented NGOs and to two specific types of secular NGOs. These two categories of NGO’s have been dubbed “mercy-oriented” by the authors due to the fact that both categories target support for the most disadvantaged and victimized of Russian citizens. They are also not categories for which the Soviet and Russian governments have been most successful in providing. NGO categories like “Invalid Support NGOs” and “Veterans” groups are traditionally viewed as wards of vast government bureaucracies (state-supported medical and military systems) (Caldwell 2010). Other NGO categories (Political, Nationalist, Trade Unions, Cultural, and Hobbies) are also not usually viewed as “mercy-oriented” in Russia or the west. In several cases the two mercy-oriented NGO categories highlighted in this study show increased strength when Attendance data are included in the model. This fits with similar findings for religious believers’ willingness to support specific categories of religious and secular NGOs in the west (Wuthnow 2004:349–52). It seems likely that, given the choice of the specific NGOs supported by the more religious respondents in the HSE/PSI.14 survey, attendance and religious norms and values are intertwined. It suggests that the ROC draws individuals with these values or that it trains its flocks in these values. The available anthropological studies suggest that it is most likely a mixture of the two (see Caldwell 2010 for a summary). This conclusion is further supported by the common complaint of the absence of “lay democracy” within ROC parishes. Some scholars have argued that while lay control might have provided opportunity for civic education in Russian Orthodox parishes in 1990s, this may have been significantly lessened by a re-established centralized control over parishes after the publication of the new Social Doctrine of the ROC in 2000. These observers note a continuing wave of complaints from supporters of a decentralized hierarchy (and for more lay control) within the church (Freeze 2017; Rousselet 2013). As popular blogger Deacon Andrei Kuraev put it: “What can one say to a catechist when he asks about his rights in the parish ... when ordinary parishioners are not even allowed to participate in regular parish meetings?” (Kuraev 2013.) This lack of lay control and involvement may significantly weaken churches as “schools” of civic practice and thereby further highlight the role of ROC communities as sources of theologically inflected moral education. The impact of “mere nominalism” in the models analyzed above also suggests that the church draws the “caring” to its banner, even if they do not attend at all (and therefore are not directly under the sway of either its moral or civic education through regular attendance). Perhaps more so than in North America, mere Nominal religious self-identification matters (for its pro-social civic impacts) in the RF. In almost every model included in this study, the Ht1 contrast (between Atheists and All Believers) showed significant increases in odds of willingness to give, volunteer, and join. And, in contrast to North American data, “Nominal willingness” might have both direct and indirect impacts on a larger scale. After all, 1,031 out of 1,500 respondents selected one of the Believing categories on Q.98. This level of self-identified religiosity is supported by the surveys referenced above. The fact that this immense group (irrespective of its attendance figures) was 33% less likely to reject volunteering (as per Model 4.0), 3.8 times more willing to volunteer for religious NGOs (Model 4.1) and (per Models 4.2 and 4.3) 1.7 and 2.5 times more likely to volunteer for Poverty Collection and Victims’ Support NGOs (respectively), suggests that Russia’s 98 million Nominal Believers play a pervasive, if modest, role in supporting the activities of Russia’s mercy-oriented NGOs. But attendance also matters. The fact that the “willingness” effects captured in the survey do tend to increase as attendance increases is an indicator of the power of community for moral education and support for civic engagement. Occasional Attenders were more likely than Nominals to give, to volunteer, and to join. In a few cases the effect extended to Regular Attenders who were more likely than Occasional Attenders to give and to volunteer. There were some possible marginally significant indications of this effect when Regular Attender/Members were compared with nonmember Attenders. While this study helps to fill out the picture of the evolution of post-Soviet civic culture, the HSE/PSI.14 survey also raises significant questions which beg to be answered. That work should include the construction of new survey implements and a careful selection of new survey targets and subsamples. These surveys, accompanied by careful interview campaigns, should be used to greatly sharpen the picture of the impact of religious commitment on civil society in the RF, as well as to help predict the impact of religious communities on their broader social and political environment. In the meantime, the HSE/PSI.14 survey highlights several important dynamics in the role of religiosity and civic engagement as a whole. First, it provides support for a nuanced understanding of the cross-cutting impacts of clergy and laity in civil society. Even in nations where national and religious identity are tightly fused, church laity may harbor norms and values at odds with the policy positions of the dominant tradition’s hierarchical leaders. Second, laity may read the moral and social traditions of their faith in ways that support prosocial civic engagement even when popular political movements, and large blocks of nominal believers, lean in the opposite direction. Both of these dynamics might well be important in both the east and west, and in societies where the religious discourse is not dominated by Christian or even Abrahamic majorities. FUNDING This work was supported by the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow and the Center for Religion and Civil Society at the Rivendell Institute at Yale. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank the staff of the Yale Center for Science and Social Science Information and its statistics consultants for their invaluable help in the creation of the Helmert1 data matrix and in coding that matrix into SPSS. Footnotes 1 See Brooks (2007); Caputo (2009); Dhingra and Becker (2001); Froese and Bader (2008); Herbert (2003); Jones-Correa and Leal (2001); Lam (2002); Lichterman (2008); Norris and Inglehart (2004); Smidt (2003); Wuthnow (1996). 2 For further discussion of questions of religious identity and self-reported attendance, see Brenner (2016) or Woodberry (1998). 3 See Arendt (1966), Bahry and Silver (1990), Colton and McFaul (2002), Sakwa (2005) and Stoeckl (2008). 4 See Carnes and Kliger (1995), Hill and den Dulk (2013), Ruiter and De Graaf (2006), Mersianova and Yakobson (2010) and Mersianova and Korneeva (2013). 5 The full response descriptors for these two categories included the following language: 24. Poverty Collection NGOs—“charitable initiatives to collect money and material goods for homeless people, orphanages, needy people, etc.” and 10. Victims NGOs—“charitable organizations (children’s shelters, rape victims, addicts, refugees, homeless, etc.).” REFERENCES Almond , Gabriel A. , and Sidney Verba . 1980 . The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study . Boston : Little Brown . Arendt , Hannah . 1966 . The Origins of Totalitarianism . New York : Harcourt, Brace & World . Bahry , Donna , and Brian D. Silver . 1990 . “ Soviet Citizen Participation on the Eve of Democratisation ”, The American Political Science Review 84 : 821 – 47 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Baker , Joseph O’Brian , and Buster Smith . 2009 . “ None Too Simple: Examining Issues of Religious Nonbelief and Nonbelonging in the United States .” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 48 : 719 – 33 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Brenner, Philip S. 2016. “Cross-National Trends in Religious Service Attendance”, Public Opinion Quarterly 80: 563–83 . Brooks , Albert . 2007 . Who Really Cares: The Surprising Truth about Compassionate Conservatism . New York, NY : Basic Books . Caldwell , Melissa . 2010 . “ The Russian Orthodox Church, the Provision of Social Welfare, and Changing Ethics of Benevolence .” In Eastern Christians in Anthropological Perspective , edited by Chris Hann and Herman Goltz . Berkeley : University of California Press, 329–50 . Caputo , Richard K . 2009 . “ Religious Capital and Intergenerational Transmission of Volunteering as Correlates of Civic Engagement, ” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 38 : 983 – 1002 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Carnes , Tony , and Samuel Kliger . 1995 . “ Religion and Moral Values in Russia: Surveys from 1990–1994 .” Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Religion , Los Angeles , August 4–6, 1994 . Casidy , Riza , and Yelena Tsarenko . 2014 . “ Perceived Benefits and Church Participation .” Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics 26 : 761 – 76 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Colton , Timothy J. , and Michael McFaul . 2002 . “ Are Russians Undemocratic ?” Post-Soviet Affairs 18 : 91 – 121 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Dahl , Robert A . 1971 . Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition . New Haven : Yale University Press . ———. 1998 . On Democracy . New Haven, CT : Yale University Press . Davis , Nancy J. , and Robert V. Robinson . 2012 . Claiming Society for God: Religious Movements and Social Welfare . Bloomington : Indiana University Press . Dhingra , Pawan H. , and Penny Edgell Becker . 2001 . “ Religious Involvement and Volunteering: Implications for Civil Society, ” Sociology of Religion 62 , 315 – 35 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Diamond , Larry . 1996 . “ Is the Third Wave Over ?” Journal of Democracy 7: 20–37 . Diamond , Larry , and Leonardo Morlino , eds. 2005 . Assessing the Quality of Democracy . Baltimore, MD : The Johns Hopkins University Press . Diamond , Larry , and Marc F. Platter , eds. 2001 . The Global Divergence of Democracies . Baltimore, MD : The Johns Hopkins University Press . Eye , Alexander Von , and Eun-Yung Mun . 2013 . Log-Linear Modeling: Concepts, Interpretation, and Application . Hoboken, NJ : Wiley Press . Finke, Roger, and Christopher D. Bader, eds. 2017. Faithful Measures: New Methods in the Measurement of Religion. New York: New York University Press . Freeze , Gregory L . 2017 . Russian Orthodoxy and Politics in the Putin Era . Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2-14-17_Gregory_Freeze_Russian_Orthodoxy.pdf. Accessed October 17, 2017. Froese , Paul , and Christopher Bader . 2008 . “ Unraveling Religious Worldviews: The Relationship between Images of God and Political Ideology in a Cross-Cultural Analysis .” The Sociological Quarterly 49 : 689 – 718 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Granovetter , Mark S . 1973 . “The Strength of Weak Ties.’’ American Journal of Sociology 78 : 1360 – 80 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS ———. 1983 . “ The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited .” Sociological Theory 1 : 201 – 33 . CrossRef Search ADS Gryzmala-Busse , Anna . 2015 . Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Hadaway , C. Kirk , and Penny Long Marler . 2005 . “ How Many Americans Attend Worship Each Week: An Alternative Approach to Measurement .” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 44 : 307 – 22 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Hadaway , C. Kirk , Penny Long Marler , and Mark Chaves . 1993 . “ What the Polls Don’t Show: A Closer Look at U.S. Church Attendance .” American Sociological Review 58 : 741 – 52 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Herbert , David . 2003 . Religion and Civil Society: Rethinking Public Religion in the Contemporary World . London : Ashgate . Hill , Jonathan P. , and K. R. den Dulk . 2013 . “ Religion, Volunteering, and Educational Setting: The Effect of Youth Schooling Type on Civic Engagement ” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 52 : 179 – 97 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Hill , Peter C. , and Ralph W. Hood , Jr ., eds. 1999 . Measures of Religiosity . Birmingham, AL : Religious Education Press . Hunsberger , Bruce . 1989 . A Short Version of the Christian Orthodoxy Scale . Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 28 : 360 – 5 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Jones-Correa , Michael A. , and David L. Leal . 2001 . “ Political Participation: Does Religion Matter ?” Political Research Quarterly 54 : 751 – 70 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Kuraev , Andrei . 2013 . “ Prikhod mezhdu monarkhiei i aristokratiei .” LiveJournal , August 6 . http://diak-Kuraev.livejournal.com/502361.html. Accessed October 17, 2017 . Lam , Pui-Yan . 2002 . “ As the Flocks Gather: How Religion Affects Voluntary Association Participation .” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 41 : 405 – 22 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Lichterman , Paul . 2008 . “ Religion and the Construction of Civic Identity .” American Sociological Review 73 : 83 – 104 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Lun , Vivian M. , and Michael Harris Bond . 2013 . “ Examining the Relation of Religion and Spirituality to Subjective Well-Being across National Cultures .” Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 5 : 304 – 15 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Marsh , Christopher . 2005a . “ Russian Orthodox Christians and Their Orientation toward Church and State .” Journal of Church and State 47 : 545 – 61 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS ———. 2005b . “ Orthodox Christianity, Civil Society, and Russian Democracy .” Demokratizatsiya 3 : 449 – 62 . Menken , F. Carson , and Brittany Fitz . 2013 . “ Image of God and Community Volunteering among Religious Adherents in the United States .” Review of Religious Research 55 : 491 – 508 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Mersianova , Irina V. , and Irina E. Korneeva . 2013 . Blagotvoritel’nost’ i Uchastie Rossiyan v Praktikakh Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva: Regional’noe Izmirenie . Monitoring Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva, 6th ed . Moscow : Nats. Issled. Universitet “Vysshaya Shkola Ekonomiki” . Mersianova , Irina V. , and Lev I. Yakobson . 2010 . “ Denezhnye Pozhertvovania—Naibolee Massovaya Filantropichesk Praktika .” In Potentsial i Puti Razvitiya Filantropii v Rossii , edited by Irina V. Mersianova & Lev I. Yakobson , 187 – 221 . M oscow : Izd. Dom Gos. Universiteta Vyshaya Shkola Ekonomiki . Monsma , Stephen V . 2007 . “ Religion and Philanthropic Giving and Volunteering: Building Blocks for Civic Responsibility .” Interdisciplinary Journal on Research on Religion 3 : 1 – 28 . http://religjournal.com/articles/article_view.php?id= 19. Norris , Pippa , and Ronald Inglehart . 2004 . Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Park , Jerry Z. , and Christian Smith . 2000 . “ ‘To Whom Much Has Been Given...’: Religious Capital and Community Voluntarism among Churchgoing Protestants .” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 39 : 272 – 86 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Papkova , Irina . 2011 . The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics . New York : Oxford University Press . Popkova , Anna . 2016 . “ Global Partners or International Spies? A Comparative Analysis of the Russian Media’s Coverage of the Law on ‘Foreign Agents .” International Journal of Communication . 10 : 3062 – 84 . Putnam , Robert D . 1993 . Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy . Princeton : Princeton University Press . ———. 2000 . Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community . New York : Simon and Schuster . Putnam , Robert D. , and David E. Campbell . 2010 . American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us . New York : Simon & Shuster . Roof , Wade Clark , and Dean R. Hoge . 1980 . “ Church Involvement in America: Social Factors Affecting Membership and Participation .” Review of Religious Research 21 : 405 – 26 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Rousselet , Kathy . 2013 . “ Religious Authority in a Post-Soviet Context .” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 162 : 15 – 36 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Ruiter , Stijn , and Nan D. De Graaf . 2006 . “ National Context, Religiosity, and Volunteering: Results from 53 Countries .” American Sociological Review 71 : 191 – 210 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Ryzhkov , Vladimir . 2015 . “ Russia’s Foreign Agents Law is Recipe for Disaster .” The Current Digest of the Russian Press 23 : 12 . Sakwa , Richard . 2005 . “ Politics in Russia .” In Developments in Russian Politics 6 , edited by Stephen White , Zvi Gitelman , and Richard Sakwa , 1 – 17 . Durham, NC : Duke University Press . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Shek , Daniel T . 1999 . “Parenting Characteristics and Adolescent Psychological Well-being: A Longitudinal Study in a Chinese Context . Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs 125 : 27 – 44 . Google Scholar PubMed Solodovnik , Svetlana 2014 . “ Russia: The Official Church Chooses the State .” RussianPolitics & Law 52 : 38 – 66 . Smidt , Corwin , ed. 2003 . Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good . Waco, TX : Baylor University Press . Stark , Rodney , and Charles Y. Glock . 1968 . American Piety: The Nature of Religious Commitment . Berkeley, CA : University of California Press . Stark , Rodney , and Roger Finke . 2000 . Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion . Berkeley, CA : University of California Press . Steensland , Brian , Jerry Z. Park , Mark Regnerus , Lynn D. Robinson , W. Bradford Wilcox , and Robert D. Woodberry . 2000 . “ The Measure of American Religion: Toward Improving the State of the Art .” Social Forces 79 : 291 – 318 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Stoeckl , Kristina . 2008 . Community after Totalitarianism: The Russian Orthodox Intellectual Tradition and the Philosophical Discourse of Political Modernity . Frankfurt am Main : Peter Lang . ———. 2014 . The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights . London/New York : Routledge . Tamney , Joseph B . 2002 . The Resilience of Conservative Religion: The Case of Popular, Conservative Protestant Congregations . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press . Titarenko , Larissa . 2008 . “ On the Shifting Nature of Religion during the Ongoing Post-Communist Transformation in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine .” Social Compass 55 : 237 – 54 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Wills , Thomas. A. , A. M. Yaeger , and J. M. Sandy . 2003 . “ Buffering Effect of Religiosity for Adolescent Substance Use .” Psychology of Addictive Behaviors 17 : 24 – 31 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS PubMed Wilson , John , and Marc Musick . 1997 . “ Who Cares?: Toward an Integrated Theory of Volunteer Work .” American Sociological Review 62 : 694 – 713 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Winandy , Julien . 2015 . “ ‘Religious Citizens’ in Post-Secular Democracies: A Critical Assessment of the Debate on the Use of Religious Argument in Public Discourse .” Philosophy & Social Criticism 41 : 837 – 52 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Woodberry , Robert D . 1998 . “ When Surveys Lie and People Tell the Truth: How Surveys Oversample Church Attenders .” American Sociological Review 63 : 119 – 22 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Wuthnow , Robert . 1996 . Christianity and Civil Society: The Contemporary Debate . Valley Forge, PA : Trinity Press International . ———. 2004 . “ Mobilizing Civic Engagement: The Changing Impact of Religious Involvement .” In Civic Engagement in American Democracy , edited by Theda Skocpol and M. P. Fiorina , 331 – 63 . Hanover, PA : Brookings Institution Press . Zorkaia , Natalia . 2014 . “ Orthodox Christianity in Post-Soviet Society .” Russian Politics & Law 52 : 7 – 37 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Association for the Sociology of Religion. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/about_us/legal/notices) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Sociology of Religion Oxford University Press

Russian Faith Matters: Religiosity and Civil Society in the Russian Federation

Loading next page...
 
/lp/ou_press/russian-faith-matters-religiosity-and-civil-society-in-the-russian-yp4zaW8ufh
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Association for the Sociology of Religion. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
ISSN
1069-4404
eISSN
1759-8818
D.O.I.
10.1093/socrel/sry014
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract Inspired by recent studies of the relationship between religiosity and norms of civic participation in the West, the authors examined four areas of possible correlation between similar norms and values in contemporary Russian society: authoritarianism, charitable giving, volunteering, and support for NGOs. The authors obtained survey responses from 1,500 randomly selected Russian citizens from 105 urban and rural locations in 43 regions across the Russian Federation. Results emphasize that in Russia, as in much of the developed world, active religious attendance matters and that the impact of such behavior in Russia is generally prosocial, not authoritarian, and possibly driven by the moral discourses found in religious communities. Results also suggest that the impact of religiosity in Russia is diminished by the relatively small segment of the population that claims regular religious attendance. Together these results highlight the importance of further studies of pious Russians’ behavior and beliefs. INTRODUCTION Over the past several decades, sociological surveys have highlighted the role of religion in the development and function of voluntary associations. The study of this relationship began in earnest with Tocqueville’s Democracy in America in 1835 and gained new impetus after the resurgence of civil society theory in the wake of political and governance reforms that have been dubbed the “Third Wave of Democracy” (Diamond 1996). A common approach has been to analyze the civic and social impacts of religiosity and religious institutions. According to the theory, religiously affiliated citizens participate in religious services for a wide range of personal reasons (Casidy and Tsarenko 2014; Roof and Hoge 1980). Many religious attendees are then drawn into committees and small groups that support the activities of their communities (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Stark and Finke 2000; Tamney 2002). Believers emerge from this experience with the practical tools and motivations to join with others to solve communal problems in the secular civil sphere as well. These “engaged citizens” often recruit others in their religious networks to partner with them in these secular engagements. This encourages a continuation of this process through networks that maintain recruiting relationships between secular and religious voluntary associations. Scholars of this process have demonstrated that this cycle can be very complex and that belief, behaviors, and identity can have overlapping impacts (Park and Smith 2000). Studies have shown that in many ways, nominal believers (nonpracticing, though self-identifying with a faith community) often vary little from the activities and values of some of their nonidentifying (“nones”) neighbors (Baker and Smith 2009). Other studies have demonstrated that the values, norms, and practices of civic engagement, in turn, are often correlated with the frequency of religious rituals and habits of surveyed populations.1 To date, very little work has been done to study the impact of these same dynamics on the growth of civic engagement across the territory of the Russian Federation (RF). As a first step in filling this gap, we included a series of research questions in our analysis of data from the 2014 Russian national survey “Potentsial Sotsial’nykh Innovatsii” (HSE/PSI.14) which was carried out in 2014 by the Centre for the Study of Civil Society and the Non-commercial Sector (CSCSNS) of the Higher School of Economics University (HSE) in Moscow, Russia. We begin with an overview of the factors involved in the study of religiosity and civic engagement. We provide an overview of the survey and analytical work on these factors in the RF as well as a short description of the main religious options available to Russian citizens and how the interplay between national and religious legitimacy might result in increases in authoritarian values among “religious attenders.” We then explain the variables measured, describe our use of a primary religiosity scale (the HSER), and the use of binomial logistic analysis of its correlation with authoritarianism, volunteering, and giving data in the survey. We use the Helmert Contrast approach to compare the impact of a step-wise increase in levels of religiosity on each of these dependent variables. Finally, we discuss the possible civil society impacts of these attitudes in Russia and how our analysis may have applications for similar work in Russia and in other nations where religious and national identity overlap. THEORY AND LITERATURE Theories about the nature and types of motivation driving civic engagement have sparked much debate about the positive and negative impacts of civil society activism. Although religiosity itself has been defined and measured in various ways, many recent studies include discussion of its impact on civil society, the realm of voluntary and self-organized groups of citizens for purposes of mutual benefit (e.g., Caputo 2009 or Davis and Robinson 2012). These mutual benefits often include increased support for humanitarian social reforms, cultural development, leisure activities, and communal or infrastructure improvements. They can also result in increased support for narrow, ethnic, nationalist, or class groupings with, intended or accidental, negative impacts on other social groups or on the broader fabric of social solidarity. For this reason, civic engagement should not be considered as a universally prosocial category of analysis or social action. However, social and religious norms that support self-organization, that encourage joint behaviors for the common good, that discourage free-riding and encourage toleration and communal behavior across racial, ethnic, economic, and religious lines can be understood as prosocial civic values that may have direct effects on the spread of the bridging networks of socially constructive civil society (Granovetter 1973, 1983; Putnam 2000; Smidt 2003). Measuring Religiosity Social science research has long focused on several specific elements of religiosity to better measure its significance for social interaction (Hill and Hood 1999; Steensland et al. 2000). Commonly surveyed elements have included denominational identification, ideology (or belief systems), ritual activities (and their frequency), and broader behavioral consequences (charitable giving, volunteering, etc.) (Hunsberger 1989; Stark and Glock 1968). One common difficulty with survey research based on subjective personal reporting of ritual attendance (especially in the United States) has been the tendency in many countries for respondents to over-report socially approved religious behavior and under-report stigmatized behavior (like criminality or sexual deviance) (Hadaway and Marler 2005; Hadaway et al. 1993; Woodberry 1998). However, a number of studies have used combined scales of religious self-identification and frequency of religious attendance as part of their scales of a subject population’s religiosity. Versions of this scale have been shown to have significant correlation with various dependent variables including subjective well-being, life-satisfaction, social conflict, rates of substance abuse, and decreased parental dysfunction (Lun and Bond 2013; Shek 1999; Wills et al. 2003). So, while additional nuance is added to such studies by the deployment of additional objective or unobtrusive scales, the core measures of religious self-identification and frequency of religious ritual provide a baseline for scales of religiosity as an independent variable. Several studies have shown these correlations specifically as they relate to volunteerism (Monsma 2007; Wilson and Musick 1997). Measuring Civic Engagement After 1945, social scientists blended theory with ever more careful social science methods and narrowed their focus on those elements of study that might better explain why some polities seemed more successful at balancing political stability with popular control and access (Almond and Verba 1980; Dahl 1971, 1998; Davis and Robinson 2012; Diamond and Platter 2001; Putnam 1993). Onto this foundation was added a new wave of work that became available as western researchers studied the writings and movements of activists and scholars in Eastern Europe involved in the wave of democratization that followed the 1974 revolution in Portugal, the post-Franco reforms in Spain, and the wave of change after 1985 in the countries of the Warsaw Pact (Diamond and Morlino 2005). Research has shown that higher levels of religiosity (measured by commitment to traditional beliefs, salience, or attendance) correlate with higher levels of volunteering for both religious and nonreligious organizations. Two types of motivations are often connected with these higher levels of volunteering. The first of these stems from the theological context: members of many religious traditions believe that their God requires service to the needy and love for the neighbor. Survey respondents often cite specific religious texts or sermons as support for this view. Others argue that specific understandings of the nature of God as loving, generous, or merciful spark imitative behavior on the part of believers (Menken and Fitz 2013). A second type of motivation relates to the inherent civic training impact of social networks (apart from any specific religious messaging that they might impart) on members’ levels of volunteerism. Members of social networks are both trained and encouraged by their involvement, quite apart from the religious or nonreligious nature of their network commitments. Many studies have shown effects for both of these types of motivations in North America, Europe, and Asia. Some suggest that religious attenders are primarily motivated by the norms and values of their faith. Others suggest that religious attenders are schooled in the habits and techniques of civic engagement by their involvement. Still others argue that religious groups naturally include the sorts of people who sacrifice time to meet the needs of their neighbors. Do “churched” Russian believers attend because of their values or are their values shaped by their attendance? Some possible conclusions regarding this question will be offered at the conclusion of this article. Surveys of Religion and Civic Engagement in Eastern Europe Participation in NGOs is a common measure of relative civic engagement in the scholarly literature (Dhingra and Becker 2001; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Finke and Bader 2017; Putnam 1993). Russia’s Higher School of Economics has published multiple reports on this measure for the populations of the RF (Mersianova and Korneeva 2013; Mersianova and Yakobson 2010). The 2014 HSE/PSI.14 survey project was also devised with an eye toward the political culture survey work already carried on in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The World Value Survey (WVS) is a primary example of this work (1981–2010). Over the years, succeeding versions of the WVS questionnaire expanded to include a wide array of worldview questions including attitudes toward the overall meaning of life, death, and suffering. WVS surveys now include a range of questions on the role of churches in social and political debates. The WVS’ European affiliate, the EVS, has sponsored four separate waves of surveys which focus on particular social and religious values. The most recent of these, the EVS 2008: Russian Federation survey, was actually completed in 2010. This study included a number of valuable questions about self-identity, behavior, and doctrine. Unfortunately, the 2008 Russian EVS survey only included the most basic questions about the actual social and political activism of respondents. While it may provide a baseline for general religious attitudes, it provides little solid data to allow correlation directly between religiosity and civic engagement. Russian History, Religiosity, Authoritarianism, and Civic Engagement The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has formed a bedrock element of Russian national identity for most of the last millennium. It is a direct descendant of the Church of Kievan Rus’ which traces its origins to the missionary work of Saints Cyril and Methodius who brought the Byzantine faith to the Slavs in the ninth century C.E. In 988, the Kievan Prince Vladimir officially baptized his kingdom and made Christianity the approved national religion. From that point on, Orthodox Christianity has remained the dominant faith of the lands of Kievan Rus’, of Muscovy and, later, the Russian Empire. Today, large portions of the Russian populace view the ROC as a founding element in national identity. While opinions about the Church’s engagement with the Russian state today vary, for much of the population, national and religious identities are closely linked. In the HSE/PSI.14 survey, 68.7% of all respondents (1,031 of 1,500) identified themselves as Russian Orthodox even though less than 13% of the population (N = 134) identified themselves as regular attenders (more than just a few times per year). While Titarenko found 9.2% claimed to attend more than once per month (Titarenko 2008), various surveys report that nearly 70% of the population believes that “to be Russian is to be Orthodox” (Papkova 2011:183). Political scientists and political sociologists have long suspected a link between traditional religions and authoritarian systems. This work is well summarized by scholars like Anna Gryzmala-Busse (2015) in her Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy. Papkova (2011) examined similar social and political dynamics in The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics. Recent scholarship supports the view that nations with a “fused” national and religious identity (as demonstrated by popular surveys) are often subject to a significant intertwining of religious and State policy preferences. Often these policies tend toward authoritarianism and nationalism (Gryzmala-Busse 2015; Papkova 2011; Solodovnik 2014; Stoeckl 2014; Winandy 2015; Zorkaia 2014) A related element of the puzzle of religiosity and authoritarianism has to do with the impact of clerical political priorities on the values and norms of the laity. Papkova’s survey work (2011) highlighted the importance of such analysis by demonstrating a real divergence between the political values of these groups. The possible impact of these dynamics on the HSE/PSI.14 data will be discussed below. Non-Orthodox Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and Animists have lived in the lands comprising the RF for most of the last millennium. However, the actual number of respondents from each of these separate religious groups to the HSE/PSI.14 survey is so low as to be statistically insignificant. DATA AND METHODS Survey Description The HSE/PSI.14 survey was carried out in 2014 by formal personal interview according to a prepared script which included 100 questions. A full quality control system was implemented that included random checks on accuracy, completeness, and procedural regularity. The scope of research included both urban and rural adults (aged 18 and greater) of the RF. The research sample included 105 urban and rural locations in 43 regions of the RF for a total sample size of 1,500 persons. The survey sample was constructed using a multi-step stratified in-person territorial random sampling method where interviewers knocked at the doors of more than 2,500 residences. An average of approximately 60% of those who answered the interviewer’s knock were willing to complete the entire survey. The HSE/PSI.14 survey asked respondents to select among 27 different types of NGOs and to indicate their willingness to volunteer or give to each. These 27 types of NGO’s can be split into a number of separate categories based on the targets of their activities: (1) Ethnic/Nationalist NGOs, (2) Religious NGOs, (3) Professional Support NGOs, (4) Property and Consumers Support NGOs, (5) Cultural/Arts/Education NGOs, (6) General Social NGOs, (7) Benevolent or Mercy Associations (Victims’ Support Groups, Poverty Relief Collections NGOs), (8) Political and Civil Rights Associations, and (9) Other NGOs. Among these nine categories, significant positive correlations only appeared (using Kruskal’s gamma analysis) between the HSE Religiosity scale (HSER) and the Religious (#2 above), Benevolence/Mercy (#7), and Civil Rights (#8) categories. For this reason, additional analysis was focused on the NGO types of these categories. Since the HSE/PSI.14 survey provided no empirically continuous scale of religiosity, the odds differentials provided by in-depth binary logistic regression is reported below. An additional level of relative comparison was added to the analysis with the use of the Helmert contrast technique (see below for a description of this approach). Independent Variables The HSE/PSI.14 survey questions focused primarily on measuring civic engagement, attitudes toward and knowledge about NGOs, and standard demographic categories. The study included two primary questions on the religious self-identification of participants. In particular, Question 98 (Q.98) asked respondents to sort themselves into one of seven categories: Russian Orthodox, Non-Orthodox Christian, Muslim, Jew, Buddhist, Other, and Atheist. Q.99 (skipped for Atheists) then asked believers to rate themselves on frequency of attendance at their place of worship or ritual. For the purpose of this report, Q.98 was used only to single out self-described “Atheists” and to designate them as the first position in the HSER scale as the least religious group of respondents. This provided the authors with a reference or dummy variable against which to compare the other categories. Taking these two questions together, the authors created a five-step ordinal scale of respondent religiosity where self-identifying atheists were designated as group 1, nominal “never-attending” believers (of any faith) fit into group 2, occasional attenders were designated as group 3, regular attending believers were designated as group 4, and regular attenders who also viewed themselves as active “members or their faith community” were labeled as group 5. This HSE Religiosity (HSER) Scale was defined as the primary independent variable. In addition to this HSER Scale of respondent religiosity, gender, age, income, and education levels were also included in the binomial logistic regression models as independent variables to test for any covariance effects. The HSE survey does not provide an objective or unobtrusive measure of actual attendance. Our analysis makes no effort to add to the debate over actual ritual attendance in the RF nor on the gap between reported and actual attendance figures.2 Instead, we study the impacts of self-reported religious identity and attendance on giving, volunteering, and trust in NGOs in Russia. Finally, since the HSER scale is constructed from two questions (Atheism vs. Belief) and a self-reported four-point continuum of attendance frequency, simple scale reliability for these purposes is assured. Dependent Variables Participation/membership. The HSE/PSI.14 survey included a number of questions that probed respondents’ willingness to join together with other Russian citizens to “influence the situation in various spheres of social life.” Of these questions, Q.44 listed the 27 specific NGO categories described above. Respondents were asked to choose as many of these categories as necessary to indicate in which categories of NGOs and “civil or social initiatives [they] participate, membership of which” they maintain. Of course, since this question conjoined these two levels of participation (informal and formal membership), it is very likely that some participants who do not maintain formal membership might well have not selected any of the possible categories. Perhaps as a result, the actual “participation/membership” responses are significantly lower than either “volunteer,” “donate to,” or “trust in” for any of the selected categories other than the “None” category (which is consistent with the inverse relationship implied by this category itself). See table 1 for a comparison of raw response data for the relevant categories analyzed below. Table 1 Levels of Support among HSE/PSI.14 Respondents by NGO Categories and by Type of Support NGO categories HSER scale correlations No HSER scale correlations (selected sample) None Relig Victims support Pov. relief collections Civ. rights Consumer protection Trade unions Culture, arts Ecology Women’s Political parties Youth political National patriotic Valid 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 Donatea 845 30 145 243 14 11 180 20 26 8 3 4 2 Volunteerb 921 27 103 100 6 27 25 46 38 25 8 7 5 Participatec 1212 18 10 24 2 6 86 12 4 1 9 1 1 Trustd 382 118 174 183 93 253 180 135 94 53 31 18 10 Raw totalse 3360 193 432 550 115 297 471 213 162 87 51 30 18 NGO categories HSER scale correlations No HSER scale correlations (selected sample) None Relig Victims support Pov. relief collections Civ. rights Consumer protection Trade unions Culture, arts Ecology Women’s Political parties Youth political National patriotic Valid 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 Donatea 845 30 145 243 14 11 180 20 26 8 3 4 2 Volunteerb 921 27 103 100 6 27 25 46 38 25 8 7 5 Participatec 1212 18 10 24 2 6 86 12 4 1 9 1 1 Trustd 382 118 174 183 93 253 180 135 94 53 31 18 10 Raw totalse 3360 193 432 550 115 297 471 213 162 87 51 30 18 aTotal of answers to Q.47: Which of these NGOs and civil initiatives would you like to support with financial donations? bTotal of answers to Q.46: For which of these NGOs and civil initiatives would you willing to volunteer? cTotal of answers to Q.44: For which of these NGOs and civil initiatives do you participate, membership of which you maintain? dTotal of answers to Q.42: Which of these NGOs and initiatives do you trust? eSimple column summation of respondent selections of all four types of NGO support. View Large Table 1 Levels of Support among HSE/PSI.14 Respondents by NGO Categories and by Type of Support NGO categories HSER scale correlations No HSER scale correlations (selected sample) None Relig Victims support Pov. relief collections Civ. rights Consumer protection Trade unions Culture, arts Ecology Women’s Political parties Youth political National patriotic Valid 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 Donatea 845 30 145 243 14 11 180 20 26 8 3 4 2 Volunteerb 921 27 103 100 6 27 25 46 38 25 8 7 5 Participatec 1212 18 10 24 2 6 86 12 4 1 9 1 1 Trustd 382 118 174 183 93 253 180 135 94 53 31 18 10 Raw totalse 3360 193 432 550 115 297 471 213 162 87 51 30 18 NGO categories HSER scale correlations No HSER scale correlations (selected sample) None Relig Victims support Pov. relief collections Civ. rights Consumer protection Trade unions Culture, arts Ecology Women’s Political parties Youth political National patriotic Valid 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 Donatea 845 30 145 243 14 11 180 20 26 8 3 4 2 Volunteerb 921 27 103 100 6 27 25 46 38 25 8 7 5 Participatec 1212 18 10 24 2 6 86 12 4 1 9 1 1 Trustd 382 118 174 183 93 253 180 135 94 53 31 18 10 Raw totalse 3360 193 432 550 115 297 471 213 162 87 51 30 18 aTotal of answers to Q.47: Which of these NGOs and civil initiatives would you like to support with financial donations? bTotal of answers to Q.46: For which of these NGOs and civil initiatives would you willing to volunteer? cTotal of answers to Q.44: For which of these NGOs and civil initiatives do you participate, membership of which you maintain? dTotal of answers to Q.42: Which of these NGOs and initiatives do you trust? eSimple column summation of respondent selections of all four types of NGO support. View Large Volunteering (“Willingness” by NGO category). Survey question Q.46 provided the same list of 27 specific areas and encouraged respondents to pick any in which they “would be willing to work on a volunteer basis.” This provided a wide field of possible concrete response options, each one as a separate nominal dependent binary variable for “willingness to volunteer.” As with each of the other “NGO Category” questions, this question also allowed respondents to consciously choose a “None” response. This allowed the authors a second rough approximation of an HSER group’s tendency to reject all forms of joining. Giving (“Willingness” by NGO category). Q.47 reproduces the same list of possible NGOs from Q.46, but asks if the respondent is “willing to help financially, to donate” to these same NGOs. As with Q.46, it provides a second set of dependent binary variables for “willingness to give” and an overall approximation of a group’s rejection of the idea of giving to NGOs based upon the “None” choice offered at the end of the pick-list. Another two questions asked about actual overall charitable giving, and while the answers to these questions also lagged far behind “Willingness to give,” they help to provide a check on the correlations found between “Willingness” and “Actual” (self-reported) giving. General support for and “trust in” religious and secular NGOs. In addition to the use of the “None” selections as part of Q.48 and Q.49, the authors constructed a scale based on answers to Q.29 which put this question in a positive format: “In developed countries the majority of citizens participate in the work of social, religious, charitable, and other NGOs to jointly solve problems and help others, as well as to influence government activities. In your opinion, is it necessary or unnecessary for the situation in Russia to become the same as in other developed countries?” This question allowed for selection from its own ordinal scale of answers from “1. Definitely necessary” through “4. Definitely unnecessary” and “5. Hard to say.” This scale, despite its obvious normative loading, was analyzed for correlation with NGO category choice and was also converted to a Binary “support/nonsupport” dummy variable by selecting all who selected either of the first two responses (1. Definitely necessary and 2. Probably necessary) as NGO Supporters. As with the measures of religiosity discussed above, one might expect a social desirability impact for self-reported participation, giving, and volunteering in the RF. NGO participation is not necessarily widely supported in the RF, especially after the “foreign-agent law” debates from 2012 on (Popkova 2016; Ryzhkov 2015). Education shows a slight positive correlation with NGO participation in Model 5.0 below. Self-reported giving and volunteering might well be even more subject to such a bias. This bias might be more significant for older citizens who grew up under the Communist Party’s (CPSU) public propaganda campaigns that favored such activities. This may also explain some of the very slight covariances for these control variables (especially age and education) in the models below and underscores the importance of controlling for them in logistic regression analysis. A final check on support for NGOs came from the analysis of answers to Q.42: “Which of these NGOs do you trust?” These answers were analyzed using the same approaches that were applied to the data from Q.44, Q.46, and Q.47. Control variables. While there are interactions between some of the measured demographic variables and several of the scales created on the basis of the HSE/PSI.14 survey, many of the most likely connections seem to be slight or simply not discoverable using this particular survey tool. For instance, Gamma (Kruskal’s Gamma as modeled in SPSS) analysis of association of our ordinal HSER Scale against the full range of HSE’s demographic variables showed few significant direct correlations at all. These included: rural/urban respondent address, internet use, life satisfaction, personal economic expectations, and pride in Russian citizenship. When the subjects of analysis were narrowed to the specific NGO categories of interest in this article, only sex, age, education, and income showed significant interactions with the HSER Scale. Each of these demographic variables were included as regression controls. HYPOTHESES Many scholars have argued that State efforts to penetrate, channel, and control all voluntary associations (often by requiring formal Communist Party oversight) resulted in an “atomization” of the populations of the Soviet Union and an atrophying of all voluntary social groups. Some argue that this resulted in both a decreased level of civic engagement and an increased suspicion of civil society that carried over to the functioning of post-Soviet civil society.3 Other scholars have argued that since 1991 religious organizations have provided new and supportive narratives for commitment to community and civil society.4 To test respondents’ openness to, and involvement in, civil society, the HSE/PSI.14 survey asked several questions about charitable giving (Q.22–Q.24), willingness “to join with others” to solve social problems (Q.29–Q.30), and asked about specific social problems and organizations that attracted the interest, favor, and active involvement of survey respondents (Q.28, Q.42–Q.44, Q.46, Q.47, Q.57). Assuming that religion is either correlated with or will have a conditioning impact on attitudes toward voluntary association, we expect that: H1: Measures of increased religiosity in the HSE/PSI.14 survey (as coded by the HSER Scale) will correlate positively with Believers’ general willingness to support NGOs as demonstrated by their responses to Q.29. We further expected that, given the body of research that suggests a link between traditional religions and authoritarianism and nationalism: (H1a) increased religiosity will correlate specifically with increased support for nationalist and authoritarian NGOs. H2: Measures of increased religiosity on the HSE/PSI.14 survey will correlate positively with specific measures of civic engagement as demonstrated by increases in measured “Willingness to Give to NGOs.” It is expected that HSE religiosity will correlate positively with willingness to give to (H2a) religious NGOs and to (H2b) nonreligious NGOs. These same dynamics might also correlate with attitudes governing the willingness to join with others to work together to solve social problems. Thus we expect that: H3: Measures of increased religiosity will correlate positively with increases in Nominal Believers’ and Attenders’ willingness to volunteer their time with other citizens “to solve social problems” in both (H3a) religious and (H3b) secular NGOs. Finally, despite the fact that far fewer respondents reported their “participation or membership” in NGOs in Russia, we expect that: H4: Measures of increased religiosity will correlate positively with increases in Believers and Attenders self-reported actual “participation” in religious and secular NGOs. ANALYTIC STRATEGY The authors conducted binary logistic regression analysis on the levels of NGO participation, and of willingness to volunteer for, and to give to, the various surveyed NGO categories. In each model, the binary responses for willingness to “trust,” “give/not give,” or “volunteer/not volunteer” were also analyzed using Helmert contrasting to show probability differentials at higher levels of religiosity. Helmert Contrast modeling allows noncontinuous ordinal data structures to be compared by assigning step-wise odds of selection comparisons. A coding system was employed based upon the “Helmert I” approach that grouped respondents into a “Reference vs. All succeeding levels” of religiosity as a binomial pairing. For successive steps of increased religiosity, contrasting models were constructed that reflected the intervals between the five levels of the HSER scale. Each successive Helmert Contrast in the analysis models gives a step-wise odd comparison based upon increases of religiosity as defined by the HSER Scale. The Ht1 Helmert contrast gives the odds ratio of selection of specific NGO interest between Atheists and All Believers (Category 1 vs. Categories 2–5). Ht2 shows the odds of selection contrast between (non-attending) Nominal Believers and All Attenders (Category 2 vs. Categories 3–5). The Ht3 contrast shows the odds of selection contrast between Occasional Attenders and Regular Attenders (Category 3 vs. Categories 4–5). The Ht4 level shows the odds of selection contrast between Regular Attenders and Attender/Members (Category 4 vs. Category 5). Of course, since each contrast level groups the remaining successive groups into a single binary for comparison purposes, the pool of available respondents shrinks with each movement up the list of Helmert contrasts to the point where the Ht4 comparison suffers a statistical significance impact from the small pool of data (Attender/Member N = 21 out of 1,500 respondents). As a result, odds differentials at the Ht2 and Ht3 measurements show the most likely impact of increased attendance on NGO attitudes. And where the data support such analysis, the Ht4 contrast gives a general sense of the importance of the highest level of religious commitment and identification measured by the survey. RESULTS Generalized Support for NGOs (Hypothesis 1) The correlations between levels of religiosity (as measured by the HSER Scale) and generalized support for NGOs are presented in table 2. This model controlled for four possible demographic variables. Of these, only Education Level showed a significant impact on the “necessity” of Russian citizens to emulate “developed nations” in their participation in NGOs. The model suggests that approximately 22% of the overall variance can be accounted for by this variable. More educated respondents are more likely to select “definitely necessary” than less educated respondents. This may reflect an overall “western-leaning” bias among more educated Russians. The model also showed that the self-identified religious (Ht1 shows the Helmert contrast between atheists and all believers) were 1.53 times more likely to select “definitely necessary” than were atheists, independent of educational level. Although there was a similar increase in odds at the next level of religiosity (35.5% more likely), the data only supported a marginal significance for this finding (p = 0.054). The data did not support conclusions of increased support for this correlation for Regular Attenders or for Attender/Members. Each of the other response patterns analyzed below (giving, volunteering, and participating) showed similar correlations, though in each case, the data required the use of the “none” choice to gauge general support. Table 2 Odds Ratios for Generalized Support for NGOs by Religiosity with Helmert Contrastsa Indep. Variables Coefficient Sig. Odds Sex .013 1.013 Age .002 1.002 Education .196 *** 1.216 Income −.007 .993 Ht1 .425 *** 1.530 Ht2 .304 * 1.355 Ht3 .306 1.359 Ht4 .151 1.163 Indep. Variables Coefficient Sig. Odds Sex .013 1.013 Age .002 1.002 Education .196 *** 1.216 Income −.007 .993 Ht1 .425 *** 1.530 Ht2 .304 * 1.355 Ht3 .306 1.359 Ht4 .151 1.163 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.29, Q.98, Q.99. a. Logit regression for “NGO support” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001% View Large Table 2 Odds Ratios for Generalized Support for NGOs by Religiosity with Helmert Contrastsa Indep. Variables Coefficient Sig. Odds Sex .013 1.013 Age .002 1.002 Education .196 *** 1.216 Income −.007 .993 Ht1 .425 *** 1.530 Ht2 .304 * 1.355 Ht3 .306 1.359 Ht4 .151 1.163 Indep. Variables Coefficient Sig. Odds Sex .013 1.013 Age .002 1.002 Education .196 *** 1.216 Income −.007 .993 Ht1 .425 *** 1.530 Ht2 .304 * 1.355 Ht3 .306 1.359 Ht4 .151 1.163 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.29, Q.98, Q.99. a. Logit regression for “NGO support” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001% View Large These data provide qualified support for hypothesis 1. Increased religious identification plays a significant role in increases of support for NGOs in Russia. Increases in attendance suggest a slight increase in generalized support for NGOs. Increased Support for Authoritarian NGOs (Hypothesis 1a) The authors found no significant statistical correlations between religiosity and respondents’ support for authoritarian or nationalist NGOs. Although the raw number of supporters for these groups was low (i.e., Nationalist-Patriotic Movements, N = 10), no statistical analysis showed any correlation between the HSER and “Trust” (Q.42-20, Q.42-21, Q.42-26) in these groups. To test this hypothesis further, the authors ran Helmert contrasts on the HSER and “Trust in Civil Rights NGOs” (Q.42-12). Q.42-12 included the following description of these NGOs: “legal aid for victims of arbitrary state action, for military recruits, Soldiers’ Mothers’ Committees, etc.” As shown in Model 2.1, table 3 increases in ritual attendance were significantly and positively correlated with “trust” in these groups. As a result, hypothesis 1a was rejected. There was no measured increase in support for nationalist or authoritarian groups in the HSE/PSI.14 dataset and clear support for anti-authoritarian civil rights NGOs as religious attendance increases. Table 3 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Trust NGO Categories by Religiosity with Helmert Contrastsa Indep. Variables Model 2.0 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Relig. NGOs CivRights NGOs National/patriotic NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.024 0.976 −0.144 0.866 −0.996 0.369 0.397* 1.49 Age 0.010* 1.01 −0.008 0.992 0.007 1.00 −0.004 0.996 Education 0.122* 1.13 0.342*** 1.41 0.375 1.45 0.158* 1.17 Income −0.060** 0.941 −0.014 0.986 −0.036 0.96 0.003 1.00 Ht1 1.00*** 2.73 1.767 0.990 −7.14 0.001 0.165 1.18 Ht2 0.856*** 2.36 1.468* 1.60 −6.90 0.001 0.331* 1.39 Ht3 0.488** 1.63 1.357** 1.93 −10.8 0.000 0.360 1.43 Ht4 0.353 1.42 0.509 0.86 −0.028 1.03 0.057 1.06 Indep. Variables Model 2.0 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Relig. NGOs CivRights NGOs National/patriotic NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.024 0.976 −0.144 0.866 −0.996 0.369 0.397* 1.49 Age 0.010* 1.01 −0.008 0.992 0.007 1.00 −0.004 0.996 Education 0.122* 1.13 0.342*** 1.41 0.375 1.45 0.158* 1.17 Income −0.060** 0.941 −0.014 0.986 −0.036 0.96 0.003 1.00 Ht1 1.00*** 2.73 1.767 0.990 −7.14 0.001 0.165 1.18 Ht2 0.856*** 2.36 1.468* 1.60 −6.90 0.001 0.331* 1.39 Ht3 0.488** 1.63 1.357** 1.93 −10.8 0.000 0.360 1.43 Ht4 0.353 1.42 0.509 0.86 −0.028 1.03 0.057 1.06 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.42, Q.98, Q.99. aLogit regression models for “NGOs you trust” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%.*** View Large Table 3 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Trust NGO Categories by Religiosity with Helmert Contrastsa Indep. Variables Model 2.0 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Relig. NGOs CivRights NGOs National/patriotic NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.024 0.976 −0.144 0.866 −0.996 0.369 0.397* 1.49 Age 0.010* 1.01 −0.008 0.992 0.007 1.00 −0.004 0.996 Education 0.122* 1.13 0.342*** 1.41 0.375 1.45 0.158* 1.17 Income −0.060** 0.941 −0.014 0.986 −0.036 0.96 0.003 1.00 Ht1 1.00*** 2.73 1.767 0.990 −7.14 0.001 0.165 1.18 Ht2 0.856*** 2.36 1.468* 1.60 −6.90 0.001 0.331* 1.39 Ht3 0.488** 1.63 1.357** 1.93 −10.8 0.000 0.360 1.43 Ht4 0.353 1.42 0.509 0.86 −0.028 1.03 0.057 1.06 Indep. Variables Model 2.0 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Relig. NGOs CivRights NGOs National/patriotic NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.024 0.976 −0.144 0.866 −0.996 0.369 0.397* 1.49 Age 0.010* 1.01 −0.008 0.992 0.007 1.00 −0.004 0.996 Education 0.122* 1.13 0.342*** 1.41 0.375 1.45 0.158* 1.17 Income −0.060** 0.941 −0.014 0.986 −0.036 0.96 0.003 1.00 Ht1 1.00*** 2.73 1.767 0.990 −7.14 0.001 0.165 1.18 Ht2 0.856*** 2.36 1.468* 1.60 −6.90 0.001 0.331* 1.39 Ht3 0.488** 1.63 1.357** 1.93 −10.8 0.000 0.360 1.43 Ht4 0.353 1.42 0.509 0.86 −0.028 1.03 0.057 1.06 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.42, Q.98, Q.99. aLogit regression models for “NGOs you trust” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%.*** View Large Willingness to Give (Hypothesis 2) The findings on the relationship between the HSER Scale and support for charitable giving are shown in table 4. Though analysis was conducted for all 27 possible NGO categories, only four response categories showed any statistical correlation with the HSE Religiosity Scale. Confirming the prediction of hypothesis 2, the results suggest that in Russia, increased levels of religiosity correlate with a greater willingness to give as represented by the inverse relationship between the “Non-givers” shown in the “None” model and the religiosity scale. (Note that “None” responses on this question signaled a rejection of the idea of giving to any NGO, so this selection provides a rough inverse relationship to “willingness to give.”) As per Model 3.0, both Ht1 and Ht2 contrasts showed significant inverse correlations as well. All Believers were approximately 30% less likely to select “None” for willingness to give than atheists. And, as per Ht2, believers who attend (either occasionally or frequently) were 25% less likely to make this selection than non-attending Nominals. All of these data (for each of these giving models) hold age, sex, education, and income as controls. Table 4 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Donate to NGO Categories by Religiosity with Helmert Contrastsa Indep. Variables Model 3.0 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231** 0.79 −0.208 0.81 0.394** 1.48 0.353** 1.42 Age 0.016*** 1.02 0.030** 1.03 −0.007 0.99 −0.015 0.99 Education −0.123*** 0.88 0.073 1.08 0.104** 1.11 0.107 1.11 Income 0.035** 1.04 −0.069 0.93 −0.015 0.98 −0.018 0.98 Ht1 −0.362*** 0.70 1.767*** 5.86 0.565*** 1.76 0.610** 1.84 Ht2 −0.287** 0.75 1.468*** 4.34 0.389** 1.48 0.087 1.09 Ht3 −0.056 0.95 1.357*** 3.89 0.285 1.33 −0.047 0.95 Ht4 0.098 1.10 0.509 1.66 0.083 1.09 −0.149 0.86 Indep. Variables Model 3.0 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231** 0.79 −0.208 0.81 0.394** 1.48 0.353** 1.42 Age 0.016*** 1.02 0.030** 1.03 −0.007 0.99 −0.015 0.99 Education −0.123*** 0.88 0.073 1.08 0.104** 1.11 0.107 1.11 Income 0.035** 1.04 −0.069 0.93 −0.015 0.98 −0.018 0.98 Ht1 −0.362*** 0.70 1.767*** 5.86 0.565*** 1.76 0.610** 1.84 Ht2 −0.287** 0.75 1.468*** 4.34 0.389** 1.48 0.087 1.09 Ht3 −0.056 0.95 1.357*** 3.89 0.285 1.33 −0.047 0.95 Ht4 0.098 1.10 0.509 1.66 0.083 1.09 −0.149 0.86 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.47, Q.98, Q.99. aLogit regression models for “willingness to donate” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%. View Large Table 4 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Donate to NGO Categories by Religiosity with Helmert Contrastsa Indep. Variables Model 3.0 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231** 0.79 −0.208 0.81 0.394** 1.48 0.353** 1.42 Age 0.016*** 1.02 0.030** 1.03 −0.007 0.99 −0.015 0.99 Education −0.123*** 0.88 0.073 1.08 0.104** 1.11 0.107 1.11 Income 0.035** 1.04 −0.069 0.93 −0.015 0.98 −0.018 0.98 Ht1 −0.362*** 0.70 1.767*** 5.86 0.565*** 1.76 0.610** 1.84 Ht2 −0.287** 0.75 1.468*** 4.34 0.389** 1.48 0.087 1.09 Ht3 −0.056 0.95 1.357*** 3.89 0.285 1.33 −0.047 0.95 Ht4 0.098 1.10 0.509 1.66 0.083 1.09 −0.149 0.86 Indep. Variables Model 3.0 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231** 0.79 −0.208 0.81 0.394** 1.48 0.353** 1.42 Age 0.016*** 1.02 0.030** 1.03 −0.007 0.99 −0.015 0.99 Education −0.123*** 0.88 0.073 1.08 0.104** 1.11 0.107 1.11 Income 0.035** 1.04 −0.069 0.93 −0.015 0.98 −0.018 0.98 Ht1 −0.362*** 0.70 1.767*** 5.86 0.565*** 1.76 0.610** 1.84 Ht2 −0.287** 0.75 1.468*** 4.34 0.389** 1.48 0.087 1.09 Ht3 −0.056 0.95 1.357*** 3.89 0.285 1.33 −0.047 0.95 Ht4 0.098 1.10 0.509 1.66 0.083 1.09 −0.149 0.86 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.47, Q.98, Q.99. aLogit regression models for “willingness to donate” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%. View Large Hypothesis 2a is also confirmed by the data from the Religious NGO odds comparisons shown in Model 3.1. In this case, each Helmert contrast (other than Ht4—“Attender/Member” contrast) shows strong and significant increases of odds of willingness to provide financial support. Believers (in the Ht1 contrast) were five times more likely to be willing to give to religious NGOs than atheists. Attenders were 4.3 times more likely to be willing to give than nominal non-Attenders. And Regular Attenders were 3.9 times more likely to select this option than Occasional Attenders. Hypothesis 2b is also partially confirmed by the data shown in Models 3.2 and 3.3. In these cases, increasing religiosity is correlated with increases in willingness to give for two specific NGO categories: “Poverty Support Collections” and “Victims Support Associations.” Incremental increases on the religiosity scale were correlated with higher odds of selection of willingness to give for both of these nonreligious NGO categories. For both “Victims” and “Poverty Collections,” the significant correlations were found at the lower end of the Helmert contrast scale. Believers were 1.84 times more likely to select “willing to give” to Victims NGOs than were Atheists (Mod. 3.3 Ht1). Believers were also 1.76 times more likely to be “willing to give” to Poverty Collections NGOs than Atheists (Mod. 3.2 Ht1). Attenders were 1.48 times more likely to express willingness to donate to Poverty Collection NGOs than were Nominals (Mod. 3.2 Ht2). This suggests, holding the basic demographic variables as controls, a significant, if limited, positive religiosity correlation with support for these specific secular NGOs. This may imply that the religious are willing to donate to secular NGOs provided they fit with their own view of their specific religious obligations to care for the poor and needy and that increased self-identification with and (in some cases) attendance at religious services has a correlation with increased willingness to donate both to religious and these specific secular (“mercy-oriented”) NGOs.5 Willingness to Volunteer—Hypothesis 3 The findings on the relationship between the HSER Scale and a willingness to volunteer for NGOs are shown in table 5. Confirming the prediction of hypothesis 3, the results suggest that in Russia, religiosity correlates positively with “willingness to volunteer” as well. Analysis of Model 4.0 shows that there is an inverse relationship between the “None” volunteers and the initial Helmert contrasts on the HSER Scale. (See above for analysis of this inverse relationship.) As per Model 4.0 Ht1, Believers are 33% less likely to be Non-Volunteers than are Atheists. And Attenders are 34% less likely to select None than are Nominals (Model 4.0 Ht2). Neither of the two remaining Helmert contrasts displayed significant decreases in likelihood of volunteering (Model 4.0 Ht3, Ht4). Table 5 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Volunteer by Religiosity with Helmert Contrasts Indep. Variables Model 4.0 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 None Relig. NGOs Poverty Collection NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231* 0.79 0.415 1.51 0.564** 1.76 0.233 1.26 Age 0.029*** 1.03 −0.005 1.00 −0.019*** 0.98 −0.022*** 0.98 Education −0.188*** 0.83 −0.042 0.96 0.165** 1.18 0.172** 1.19 Income 0.028 1.03 −0.065 0.94 0.000 1.00 0.011 1.01 Ht1 −0.403*** 0.67 1.343*** 3.83 0.539** 1.72 0.915*** 2.50 Ht2 −0.421*** 0.66 1.952*** 7.04 0.479** 1.61 −0.055 0.95 Ht3 −0.027 0.97 1.108*** 3.03 0.232 1.26 −0.139 0.87 Ht4 −0.150 0.86 0.670* 1.95 0.298 1.35 −0.395 0.67 Indep. Variables Model 4.0 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 None Relig. NGOs Poverty Collection NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231* 0.79 0.415 1.51 0.564** 1.76 0.233 1.26 Age 0.029*** 1.03 −0.005 1.00 −0.019*** 0.98 −0.022*** 0.98 Education −0.188*** 0.83 −0.042 0.96 0.165** 1.18 0.172** 1.19 Income 0.028 1.03 −0.065 0.94 0.000 1.00 0.011 1.01 Ht1 −0.403*** 0.67 1.343*** 3.83 0.539** 1.72 0.915*** 2.50 Ht2 −0.421*** 0.66 1.952*** 7.04 0.479** 1.61 −0.055 0.95 Ht3 −0.027 0.97 1.108*** 3.03 0.232 1.26 −0.139 0.87 Ht4 −0.150 0.86 0.670* 1.95 0.298 1.35 −0.395 0.67 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.46, Q.98, Q.99. aLogit regression models for “willingness to volunteer” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%. View Large Table 5 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Volunteer by Religiosity with Helmert Contrasts Indep. Variables Model 4.0 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 None Relig. NGOs Poverty Collection NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231* 0.79 0.415 1.51 0.564** 1.76 0.233 1.26 Age 0.029*** 1.03 −0.005 1.00 −0.019*** 0.98 −0.022*** 0.98 Education −0.188*** 0.83 −0.042 0.96 0.165** 1.18 0.172** 1.19 Income 0.028 1.03 −0.065 0.94 0.000 1.00 0.011 1.01 Ht1 −0.403*** 0.67 1.343*** 3.83 0.539** 1.72 0.915*** 2.50 Ht2 −0.421*** 0.66 1.952*** 7.04 0.479** 1.61 −0.055 0.95 Ht3 −0.027 0.97 1.108*** 3.03 0.232 1.26 −0.139 0.87 Ht4 −0.150 0.86 0.670* 1.95 0.298 1.35 −0.395 0.67 Indep. Variables Model 4.0 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 None Relig. NGOs Poverty Collection NGOs Victims NGOs Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex −0.231* 0.79 0.415 1.51 0.564** 1.76 0.233 1.26 Age 0.029*** 1.03 −0.005 1.00 −0.019*** 0.98 −0.022*** 0.98 Education −0.188*** 0.83 −0.042 0.96 0.165** 1.18 0.172** 1.19 Income 0.028 1.03 −0.065 0.94 0.000 1.00 0.011 1.01 Ht1 −0.403*** 0.67 1.343*** 3.83 0.539** 1.72 0.915*** 2.50 Ht2 −0.421*** 0.66 1.952*** 7.04 0.479** 1.61 −0.055 0.95 Ht3 −0.027 0.97 1.108*** 3.03 0.232 1.26 −0.139 0.87 Ht4 −0.150 0.86 0.670* 1.95 0.298 1.35 −0.395 0.67 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.46, Q.98, Q.99. aLogit regression models for “willingness to volunteer” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%. View Large Hypothesis 3A is also strongly supported by the data in the Religious NGOs preference data (Model 4.1). Here again significance of relationship is strong (p < 0.01) and likelihood of selection of “willingness to volunteer” at 3.8×, 7.0×, and 3.0×, respectively for Ht1, Ht2, and Ht3 contrasts. There is even a marginal statistical significance for the final (Attending/Member) category in comparison with the previous group (Regular Attenders). Not surprisingly, the Religious are increasingly likely to volunteer for religious NGOs as their level of religiosity increases. Hypothesis 3B is also supported by Models 4.2 and 4.3. In fact, the data show the same pattern for both “Poverty Collections” NGOs and for “Victims Support” NGOs as was found for “willingness to give.” Both the Ht1 and Ht2 Helmert contrasts show significant increases in odds of selection of “willingness to volunteer” for Poverty Collections NGOs (1.7× and 1.6×, respectively). For Victims Support NGOs the single significant indication of increased willingness to volunteer comes at the contrast between Atheists and All Believers, with Believers being 2.50 times more likely to indicate their willingness to volunteer than Atheists (Mod. 4.3 Ht1). Connecting “Willingness” to Behavior (Hypothesis 4) The findings on the relationship between the HSER Scale and self-reported participation in NGOs are shown in table 6. Confirming the prediction of hypothesis 4, the results suggest that in Russia religiosity correlates positively with “participation/membership” in both religious and secular NGOs. The problem of low response rates on Q.44 affected analysis of actual participation rates and especially of the religiosity impact on participation. While “willingness” is a soft form of the impact of religiosity, the “willingness” responses (on Q.46 and Q.47) were high enough to allow for analysis of correlations between religiosity and specific NGO support. This problem becomes even more obvious when actual response rates are compared (table 1). Only 19% of all respondents admitted “participation, membership” in any of the 27 categories of NGOs. (Compare this with the 39% of respondents willing to volunteer and the 44% willing to give.) Table 6 Self-identified Participation/Membership by Religiosity with Helmert Contrasts Model 5.0 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex 0.079 1.082 0.216 1.241 0.750 2.117 Age 0.005 1.005 −0.002 0.998 0.006 1.006 Education −0.213*** 0.808 0.010 1.010 0.000 1.000 Income 0.029 1.030 −0.024 0.976 0.002 1.002 Ht1 −0.500*** 0.607 1.034* 2.812 0.917* 2.502 Ht2 −0.703*** 0.495 2.696*** 14.819 1.076*** 2.932 Ht3 −0.382* 0.683 1.226*** 3.407 1.276*** 3.583 Ht4 −0.529** 0.589 1.264*** 3.538 0.435 1.545 Model 5.0 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex 0.079 1.082 0.216 1.241 0.750 2.117 Age 0.005 1.005 −0.002 0.998 0.006 1.006 Education −0.213*** 0.808 0.010 1.010 0.000 1.000 Income 0.029 1.030 −0.024 0.976 0.002 1.002 Ht1 −0.500*** 0.607 1.034* 2.812 0.917* 2.502 Ht2 −0.703*** 0.495 2.696*** 14.819 1.076*** 2.932 Ht3 −0.382* 0.683 1.226*** 3.407 1.276*** 3.583 Ht4 −0.529** 0.589 1.264*** 3.538 0.435 1.545 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.44, Q.98, Q.99. a. Logit regression models for “willingness to volunteer” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%. View Large Table 6 Self-identified Participation/Membership by Religiosity with Helmert Contrasts Model 5.0 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex 0.079 1.082 0.216 1.241 0.750 2.117 Age 0.005 1.005 −0.002 0.998 0.006 1.006 Education −0.213*** 0.808 0.010 1.010 0.000 1.000 Income 0.029 1.030 −0.024 0.976 0.002 1.002 Ht1 −0.500*** 0.607 1.034* 2.812 0.917* 2.502 Ht2 −0.703*** 0.495 2.696*** 14.819 1.076*** 2.932 Ht3 −0.382* 0.683 1.226*** 3.407 1.276*** 3.583 Ht4 −0.529** 0.589 1.264*** 3.538 0.435 1.545 Model 5.0 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 None Relig. NGOs Pov. collections Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Sex 0.079 1.082 0.216 1.241 0.750 2.117 Age 0.005 1.005 −0.002 0.998 0.006 1.006 Education −0.213*** 0.808 0.010 1.010 0.000 1.000 Income 0.029 1.030 −0.024 0.976 0.002 1.002 Ht1 −0.500*** 0.607 1.034* 2.812 0.917* 2.502 Ht2 −0.703*** 0.495 2.696*** 14.819 1.076*** 2.932 Ht3 −0.382* 0.683 1.226*** 3.407 1.276*** 3.583 Ht4 −0.529** 0.589 1.264*** 3.538 0.435 1.545 Source: HSE/PSI.14 survey data. Q.44, Q.98, Q.99. a. Logit regression models for “willingness to volunteer” by HSE Religiosity Scale, controlling for sex, age, education, and income. *p < .10%; **p < .05%; ***p < .001%. View Large Analysis of Model 5.0 shows that there is an inverse relationship between the “None” volunteers and every one of the Helmert contrasts on the HSER Scale. (See above for explanation of this inverse relationship.) As per Model 5.0 Ht1, Believers are nearly 40% less likely (100%–60.7%) to be Non-Volunteers than are Atheists. And Attenders are half as likely (100%–49.5%) to select None as are Nominals (Model 5.0 Ht2). The two remaining Helmert contrasts of Model 5.0 displayed less significant but still measurable increases in likelihood of volunteering (Model 5.0 Ht3, Ht4). Regular Attenders were 32% more likely to be volunteers than Occasional Attenders (Ht3). Attender/Members were 41% more likely to self-designate as volunteers than Regular Attenders who did not identify as “members of their religious communities” even though they attended religious services regularly (Model 5.0 Ht4). Data on membership patterns for specific NGO categories are less clear than for the non-membership category of Model 5.0. Despite the paucity of data, participation rates for Religious NGOs and at least one of the “mercy-oriented” NGOs also reflect the sort of dynamics seen in the “None” memberships correlations of Model 5.0. As per table 1 above, only 10 respondents indicated “participation/membership” in Victims Support NGOs. These responses (not surprisingly) displayed no significant correlation with the HSER Scale for any of the Helmert contrast levels. However, despite the slim data for both Religious (N = 19) and Poverty Collections (N = 24) NGOs (table 1), these data, when examined against levels of religiosity using the Helmert contrast approach (as per Models 5.1 and 5.2) were arrayed in ways that displayed actual significant relationships with the HSER Scale. Note that where data provided the ability to discover significant relationships, there were strong increases in the odds of participation at each level of increased religious attendance. Membership in religious NGOs was powerfully influenced by increasing levels of religiosity. As per Model 5.1, All Religious were 2.8 times more likely to be members of religious NGOs than atheists. Attenders were almost 15 times more likely to be members than Nominals. Regular Attenders were 3.4 times more likely to join religious NGOs than Occasional Attenders. And Attender/Members were 3.5 times more likely than those Regular Attenders who do not identify as members of their religious communities. Increasing religiosity was correlated with increasing odds of membership in Poverty Collections NGOs as well (Model 5.2). Only at the contrast between Attender/Members versus Regular Attending Non-Members, was their no significant odds differential in likelihood of membership in these NGOs. At each of the other three contrast levels (Models 5.2 Ht1, Ht2, and Ht3) the increase in likely NGO membership ranged from 2.5 to 3.6 times. So, while Nominal self-identified faith alone seemed to play a large role in the “willingness” categories, attendance may have an even more pronounced impact when the topic shifts to self-reported NGO “participation.” DISCUSSION Each of the areas of analysis outlined above point to a persisting tendency within the HSE/PSI.14 survey data, namely that Russian religious believers (taken together and across their various religious traditions) occupy a significantly prosocial position in their world. Increase in religious attendance is correlated with prosocial civic attitudes and is not correlated with support for authoritarian NGOs. This is evident from the nature of religious Russians’ civic engagement and provides a window into the norms and values that drive that engagement. Despite the literature linking ethno-nationalism within the dominant church institutions of the RF, there was no significant correlation between religiosity and NGOs linked to such movements (Nationalist/Patriotic or Youth Political Groups) or even to political NGOs that have been linked to State institutions (see hypothesis 1a above). In fact the data showed the reverse: as attendance increased (at Ht2 and Ht3 attendance contrasts) the odds of support for anti-authoritarian civil rights NGOs also increased. While popular religiosity may be linked to such movements in other parts of the world, and even while some Russian religious hierarchs themselves may attempt such linkage, this study shows no significant connections for self-identified believers or for the more religious lay members of the local parishes themselves. This “non-authoritarianism” may also reflect the balance between “institutional” and “ideological/theological” impacts on members. Gryzmala-Busse’s work (2015) highlights the ways that Church and State institutions “trade moral authority” for political power and for the benefits of access to State resources. These elements are largely removed from the equation when, as in the HSE/PSI.14, analysis focuses on lay attitudes toward various elements of the NGO sector. It also fits with the analysis of the impact of increased Orthodox religiosity in works like Papkova’s survey of 792 students at nine Russian universities in 2006. She discovered the presence of possible institutional conservative impacts among students on the career track to become priests but found that increasing religiosity (primarily evinced by increases in ritual attendance) among students at secular universities was not correlated with more authoritarian political attitudes (Papkova 2011:181–8). While these findings suggest that ROC culture and teaching have limited impact on authoritarian attitudes outside of its institutional hierarchy, other studies suggest that “devout Orthodox Christians as a group are somewhat more favorably inclined toward democracy” (Marsh 2005b:450). In light of these findings it may not be surprising that the HSE/PSI.14 data, with their focus on lay religiosity and individual civic engagement, point toward a nonauthoritarian relationship between the two and the possibility that ROC social messaging at the parish level is not inherently authoritarian and does reflect prosocial and charitable norms and values. This is further supported by the actual patterns of NGO support discovered in the data above. They show an increased willingness to join and to give financially to religiously oriented NGOs and to two specific types of secular NGOs. These two categories of NGO’s have been dubbed “mercy-oriented” by the authors due to the fact that both categories target support for the most disadvantaged and victimized of Russian citizens. They are also not categories for which the Soviet and Russian governments have been most successful in providing. NGO categories like “Invalid Support NGOs” and “Veterans” groups are traditionally viewed as wards of vast government bureaucracies (state-supported medical and military systems) (Caldwell 2010). Other NGO categories (Political, Nationalist, Trade Unions, Cultural, and Hobbies) are also not usually viewed as “mercy-oriented” in Russia or the west. In several cases the two mercy-oriented NGO categories highlighted in this study show increased strength when Attendance data are included in the model. This fits with similar findings for religious believers’ willingness to support specific categories of religious and secular NGOs in the west (Wuthnow 2004:349–52). It seems likely that, given the choice of the specific NGOs supported by the more religious respondents in the HSE/PSI.14 survey, attendance and religious norms and values are intertwined. It suggests that the ROC draws individuals with these values or that it trains its flocks in these values. The available anthropological studies suggest that it is most likely a mixture of the two (see Caldwell 2010 for a summary). This conclusion is further supported by the common complaint of the absence of “lay democracy” within ROC parishes. Some scholars have argued that while lay control might have provided opportunity for civic education in Russian Orthodox parishes in 1990s, this may have been significantly lessened by a re-established centralized control over parishes after the publication of the new Social Doctrine of the ROC in 2000. These observers note a continuing wave of complaints from supporters of a decentralized hierarchy (and for more lay control) within the church (Freeze 2017; Rousselet 2013). As popular blogger Deacon Andrei Kuraev put it: “What can one say to a catechist when he asks about his rights in the parish ... when ordinary parishioners are not even allowed to participate in regular parish meetings?” (Kuraev 2013.) This lack of lay control and involvement may significantly weaken churches as “schools” of civic practice and thereby further highlight the role of ROC communities as sources of theologically inflected moral education. The impact of “mere nominalism” in the models analyzed above also suggests that the church draws the “caring” to its banner, even if they do not attend at all (and therefore are not directly under the sway of either its moral or civic education through regular attendance). Perhaps more so than in North America, mere Nominal religious self-identification matters (for its pro-social civic impacts) in the RF. In almost every model included in this study, the Ht1 contrast (between Atheists and All Believers) showed significant increases in odds of willingness to give, volunteer, and join. And, in contrast to North American data, “Nominal willingness” might have both direct and indirect impacts on a larger scale. After all, 1,031 out of 1,500 respondents selected one of the Believing categories on Q.98. This level of self-identified religiosity is supported by the surveys referenced above. The fact that this immense group (irrespective of its attendance figures) was 33% less likely to reject volunteering (as per Model 4.0), 3.8 times more willing to volunteer for religious NGOs (Model 4.1) and (per Models 4.2 and 4.3) 1.7 and 2.5 times more likely to volunteer for Poverty Collection and Victims’ Support NGOs (respectively), suggests that Russia’s 98 million Nominal Believers play a pervasive, if modest, role in supporting the activities of Russia’s mercy-oriented NGOs. But attendance also matters. The fact that the “willingness” effects captured in the survey do tend to increase as attendance increases is an indicator of the power of community for moral education and support for civic engagement. Occasional Attenders were more likely than Nominals to give, to volunteer, and to join. In a few cases the effect extended to Regular Attenders who were more likely than Occasional Attenders to give and to volunteer. There were some possible marginally significant indications of this effect when Regular Attender/Members were compared with nonmember Attenders. While this study helps to fill out the picture of the evolution of post-Soviet civic culture, the HSE/PSI.14 survey also raises significant questions which beg to be answered. That work should include the construction of new survey implements and a careful selection of new survey targets and subsamples. These surveys, accompanied by careful interview campaigns, should be used to greatly sharpen the picture of the impact of religious commitment on civil society in the RF, as well as to help predict the impact of religious communities on their broader social and political environment. In the meantime, the HSE/PSI.14 survey highlights several important dynamics in the role of religiosity and civic engagement as a whole. First, it provides support for a nuanced understanding of the cross-cutting impacts of clergy and laity in civil society. Even in nations where national and religious identity are tightly fused, church laity may harbor norms and values at odds with the policy positions of the dominant tradition’s hierarchical leaders. Second, laity may read the moral and social traditions of their faith in ways that support prosocial civic engagement even when popular political movements, and large blocks of nominal believers, lean in the opposite direction. Both of these dynamics might well be important in both the east and west, and in societies where the religious discourse is not dominated by Christian or even Abrahamic majorities. FUNDING This work was supported by the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow and the Center for Religion and Civil Society at the Rivendell Institute at Yale. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank the staff of the Yale Center for Science and Social Science Information and its statistics consultants for their invaluable help in the creation of the Helmert1 data matrix and in coding that matrix into SPSS. Footnotes 1 See Brooks (2007); Caputo (2009); Dhingra and Becker (2001); Froese and Bader (2008); Herbert (2003); Jones-Correa and Leal (2001); Lam (2002); Lichterman (2008); Norris and Inglehart (2004); Smidt (2003); Wuthnow (1996). 2 For further discussion of questions of religious identity and self-reported attendance, see Brenner (2016) or Woodberry (1998). 3 See Arendt (1966), Bahry and Silver (1990), Colton and McFaul (2002), Sakwa (2005) and Stoeckl (2008). 4 See Carnes and Kliger (1995), Hill and den Dulk (2013), Ruiter and De Graaf (2006), Mersianova and Yakobson (2010) and Mersianova and Korneeva (2013). 5 The full response descriptors for these two categories included the following language: 24. Poverty Collection NGOs—“charitable initiatives to collect money and material goods for homeless people, orphanages, needy people, etc.” and 10. Victims NGOs—“charitable organizations (children’s shelters, rape victims, addicts, refugees, homeless, etc.).” REFERENCES Almond , Gabriel A. , and Sidney Verba . 1980 . The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study . Boston : Little Brown . Arendt , Hannah . 1966 . The Origins of Totalitarianism . New York : Harcourt, Brace & World . Bahry , Donna , and Brian D. Silver . 1990 . “ Soviet Citizen Participation on the Eve of Democratisation ”, The American Political Science Review 84 : 821 – 47 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Baker , Joseph O’Brian , and Buster Smith . 2009 . “ None Too Simple: Examining Issues of Religious Nonbelief and Nonbelonging in the United States .” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 48 : 719 – 33 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Brenner, Philip S. 2016. “Cross-National Trends in Religious Service Attendance”, Public Opinion Quarterly 80: 563–83 . Brooks , Albert . 2007 . Who Really Cares: The Surprising Truth about Compassionate Conservatism . New York, NY : Basic Books . Caldwell , Melissa . 2010 . “ The Russian Orthodox Church, the Provision of Social Welfare, and Changing Ethics of Benevolence .” In Eastern Christians in Anthropological Perspective , edited by Chris Hann and Herman Goltz . Berkeley : University of California Press, 329–50 . Caputo , Richard K . 2009 . “ Religious Capital and Intergenerational Transmission of Volunteering as Correlates of Civic Engagement, ” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 38 : 983 – 1002 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Carnes , Tony , and Samuel Kliger . 1995 . “ Religion and Moral Values in Russia: Surveys from 1990–1994 .” Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Religion , Los Angeles , August 4–6, 1994 . Casidy , Riza , and Yelena Tsarenko . 2014 . “ Perceived Benefits and Church Participation .” Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics 26 : 761 – 76 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Colton , Timothy J. , and Michael McFaul . 2002 . “ Are Russians Undemocratic ?” Post-Soviet Affairs 18 : 91 – 121 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Dahl , Robert A . 1971 . Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition . New Haven : Yale University Press . ———. 1998 . On Democracy . New Haven, CT : Yale University Press . Davis , Nancy J. , and Robert V. Robinson . 2012 . Claiming Society for God: Religious Movements and Social Welfare . Bloomington : Indiana University Press . Dhingra , Pawan H. , and Penny Edgell Becker . 2001 . “ Religious Involvement and Volunteering: Implications for Civil Society, ” Sociology of Religion 62 , 315 – 35 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Diamond , Larry . 1996 . “ Is the Third Wave Over ?” Journal of Democracy 7: 20–37 . Diamond , Larry , and Leonardo Morlino , eds. 2005 . Assessing the Quality of Democracy . Baltimore, MD : The Johns Hopkins University Press . Diamond , Larry , and Marc F. Platter , eds. 2001 . The Global Divergence of Democracies . Baltimore, MD : The Johns Hopkins University Press . Eye , Alexander Von , and Eun-Yung Mun . 2013 . Log-Linear Modeling: Concepts, Interpretation, and Application . Hoboken, NJ : Wiley Press . Finke, Roger, and Christopher D. Bader, eds. 2017. Faithful Measures: New Methods in the Measurement of Religion. New York: New York University Press . Freeze , Gregory L . 2017 . Russian Orthodoxy and Politics in the Putin Era . Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2-14-17_Gregory_Freeze_Russian_Orthodoxy.pdf. Accessed October 17, 2017. Froese , Paul , and Christopher Bader . 2008 . “ Unraveling Religious Worldviews: The Relationship between Images of God and Political Ideology in a Cross-Cultural Analysis .” The Sociological Quarterly 49 : 689 – 718 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Granovetter , Mark S . 1973 . “The Strength of Weak Ties.’’ American Journal of Sociology 78 : 1360 – 80 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS ———. 1983 . “ The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited .” Sociological Theory 1 : 201 – 33 . CrossRef Search ADS Gryzmala-Busse , Anna . 2015 . Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Hadaway , C. Kirk , and Penny Long Marler . 2005 . “ How Many Americans Attend Worship Each Week: An Alternative Approach to Measurement .” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 44 : 307 – 22 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Hadaway , C. Kirk , Penny Long Marler , and Mark Chaves . 1993 . “ What the Polls Don’t Show: A Closer Look at U.S. Church Attendance .” American Sociological Review 58 : 741 – 52 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Herbert , David . 2003 . Religion and Civil Society: Rethinking Public Religion in the Contemporary World . London : Ashgate . Hill , Jonathan P. , and K. R. den Dulk . 2013 . “ Religion, Volunteering, and Educational Setting: The Effect of Youth Schooling Type on Civic Engagement ” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 52 : 179 – 97 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Hill , Peter C. , and Ralph W. Hood , Jr ., eds. 1999 . Measures of Religiosity . Birmingham, AL : Religious Education Press . Hunsberger , Bruce . 1989 . A Short Version of the Christian Orthodoxy Scale . Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 28 : 360 – 5 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Jones-Correa , Michael A. , and David L. Leal . 2001 . “ Political Participation: Does Religion Matter ?” Political Research Quarterly 54 : 751 – 70 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Kuraev , Andrei . 2013 . “ Prikhod mezhdu monarkhiei i aristokratiei .” LiveJournal , August 6 . http://diak-Kuraev.livejournal.com/502361.html. Accessed October 17, 2017 . Lam , Pui-Yan . 2002 . “ As the Flocks Gather: How Religion Affects Voluntary Association Participation .” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 41 : 405 – 22 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Lichterman , Paul . 2008 . “ Religion and the Construction of Civic Identity .” American Sociological Review 73 : 83 – 104 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Lun , Vivian M. , and Michael Harris Bond . 2013 . “ Examining the Relation of Religion and Spirituality to Subjective Well-Being across National Cultures .” Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 5 : 304 – 15 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Marsh , Christopher . 2005a . “ Russian Orthodox Christians and Their Orientation toward Church and State .” Journal of Church and State 47 : 545 – 61 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS ———. 2005b . “ Orthodox Christianity, Civil Society, and Russian Democracy .” Demokratizatsiya 3 : 449 – 62 . Menken , F. Carson , and Brittany Fitz . 2013 . “ Image of God and Community Volunteering among Religious Adherents in the United States .” Review of Religious Research 55 : 491 – 508 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Mersianova , Irina V. , and Irina E. Korneeva . 2013 . Blagotvoritel’nost’ i Uchastie Rossiyan v Praktikakh Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva: Regional’noe Izmirenie . Monitoring Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva, 6th ed . Moscow : Nats. Issled. Universitet “Vysshaya Shkola Ekonomiki” . Mersianova , Irina V. , and Lev I. Yakobson . 2010 . “ Denezhnye Pozhertvovania—Naibolee Massovaya Filantropichesk Praktika .” In Potentsial i Puti Razvitiya Filantropii v Rossii , edited by Irina V. Mersianova & Lev I. Yakobson , 187 – 221 . M oscow : Izd. Dom Gos. Universiteta Vyshaya Shkola Ekonomiki . Monsma , Stephen V . 2007 . “ Religion and Philanthropic Giving and Volunteering: Building Blocks for Civic Responsibility .” Interdisciplinary Journal on Research on Religion 3 : 1 – 28 . http://religjournal.com/articles/article_view.php?id= 19. Norris , Pippa , and Ronald Inglehart . 2004 . Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Park , Jerry Z. , and Christian Smith . 2000 . “ ‘To Whom Much Has Been Given...’: Religious Capital and Community Voluntarism among Churchgoing Protestants .” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 39 : 272 – 86 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Papkova , Irina . 2011 . The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics . New York : Oxford University Press . Popkova , Anna . 2016 . “ Global Partners or International Spies? A Comparative Analysis of the Russian Media’s Coverage of the Law on ‘Foreign Agents .” International Journal of Communication . 10 : 3062 – 84 . Putnam , Robert D . 1993 . Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy . Princeton : Princeton University Press . ———. 2000 . Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community . New York : Simon and Schuster . Putnam , Robert D. , and David E. Campbell . 2010 . American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us . New York : Simon & Shuster . Roof , Wade Clark , and Dean R. Hoge . 1980 . “ Church Involvement in America: Social Factors Affecting Membership and Participation .” Review of Religious Research 21 : 405 – 26 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Rousselet , Kathy . 2013 . “ Religious Authority in a Post-Soviet Context .” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 162 : 15 – 36 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Ruiter , Stijn , and Nan D. De Graaf . 2006 . “ National Context, Religiosity, and Volunteering: Results from 53 Countries .” American Sociological Review 71 : 191 – 210 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Ryzhkov , Vladimir . 2015 . “ Russia’s Foreign Agents Law is Recipe for Disaster .” The Current Digest of the Russian Press 23 : 12 . Sakwa , Richard . 2005 . “ Politics in Russia .” In Developments in Russian Politics 6 , edited by Stephen White , Zvi Gitelman , and Richard Sakwa , 1 – 17 . Durham, NC : Duke University Press . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Shek , Daniel T . 1999 . “Parenting Characteristics and Adolescent Psychological Well-being: A Longitudinal Study in a Chinese Context . Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs 125 : 27 – 44 . Google Scholar PubMed Solodovnik , Svetlana 2014 . “ Russia: The Official Church Chooses the State .” RussianPolitics & Law 52 : 38 – 66 . Smidt , Corwin , ed. 2003 . Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good . Waco, TX : Baylor University Press . Stark , Rodney , and Charles Y. Glock . 1968 . American Piety: The Nature of Religious Commitment . Berkeley, CA : University of California Press . Stark , Rodney , and Roger Finke . 2000 . Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion . Berkeley, CA : University of California Press . Steensland , Brian , Jerry Z. Park , Mark Regnerus , Lynn D. Robinson , W. Bradford Wilcox , and Robert D. Woodberry . 2000 . “ The Measure of American Religion: Toward Improving the State of the Art .” Social Forces 79 : 291 – 318 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Stoeckl , Kristina . 2008 . Community after Totalitarianism: The Russian Orthodox Intellectual Tradition and the Philosophical Discourse of Political Modernity . Frankfurt am Main : Peter Lang . ———. 2014 . The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights . London/New York : Routledge . Tamney , Joseph B . 2002 . The Resilience of Conservative Religion: The Case of Popular, Conservative Protestant Congregations . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press . Titarenko , Larissa . 2008 . “ On the Shifting Nature of Religion during the Ongoing Post-Communist Transformation in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine .” Social Compass 55 : 237 – 54 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Wills , Thomas. A. , A. M. Yaeger , and J. M. Sandy . 2003 . “ Buffering Effect of Religiosity for Adolescent Substance Use .” Psychology of Addictive Behaviors 17 : 24 – 31 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS PubMed Wilson , John , and Marc Musick . 1997 . “ Who Cares?: Toward an Integrated Theory of Volunteer Work .” American Sociological Review 62 : 694 – 713 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Winandy , Julien . 2015 . “ ‘Religious Citizens’ in Post-Secular Democracies: A Critical Assessment of the Debate on the Use of Religious Argument in Public Discourse .” Philosophy & Social Criticism 41 : 837 – 52 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Woodberry , Robert D . 1998 . “ When Surveys Lie and People Tell the Truth: How Surveys Oversample Church Attenders .” American Sociological Review 63 : 119 – 22 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Wuthnow , Robert . 1996 . Christianity and Civil Society: The Contemporary Debate . Valley Forge, PA : Trinity Press International . ———. 2004 . “ Mobilizing Civic Engagement: The Changing Impact of Religious Involvement .” In Civic Engagement in American Democracy , edited by Theda Skocpol and M. P. Fiorina , 331 – 63 . Hanover, PA : Brookings Institution Press . Zorkaia , Natalia . 2014 . “ Orthodox Christianity in Post-Soviet Society .” Russian Politics & Law 52 : 7 – 37 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Association for the Sociology of Religion. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/about_us/legal/notices)

Journal

Sociology of ReligionOxford University Press

Published: Jun 1, 2018

There are no references for this article.

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.


DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

Search

Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly

Organize

Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.

Access

Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

DeepDyve

Freelancer

DeepDyve

Pro

Price

FREE

$49/month
$360/year

Save searches from
Google Scholar,
PubMed

Create lists to
organize your research

Export lists, citations

Read DeepDyve articles

Abstract access only

Unlimited access to over
18 million full-text articles

Print

20 pages / month

PDF Discount

20% off