Regime Type and Diaspora Politics: A Dyadic Approach

Regime Type and Diaspora Politics: A Dyadic Approach Why do some diaspora groups, but not others, play a prominent role in the formalization of cooperative political ties between their country of origin and their country of residence? This article adopts a novel dyadic approach to the study of diaspora politics by arguing that diaspora politics are simultaneously structured by regime type in the country of origin and in the country of residence. Diaspora groups can play a prominent role in the formalization of cooperative foreign policy ties between their country of origin and their country of residence in democracy–democracy dyads (i.e., when the country of origin and the country of residence are both democratic). In all other dyads (including authoritarian–authoritarian), diaspora groups’ political impact on the formalization of cooperative foreign policy ties tends to be limited. The democracy–democracy dyad approximates a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition; nationalism and international economic strategies adopted by the country of origin help shape diaspora politics. This article examines all four regime type dyads by focusing on diaspora politics in authoritarian Malaysia and democratic United States, which have notable populations of Chinese and of Indian origin. Introduction Why do some diaspora groups play an important role in the formalization of cooperative political ties between their country of origin and their country of residence, while other diaspora groups lack such influence? Answering this question requires us to simultaneously study diaspora politics in the country of origin and in the country of residence. Regime type in the country of origin and in the country of residence structures and constrains foreign policy influence by diaspora groups. We should think of this structure in terms of dyads defined by regime type (i.e., a democracy/authoritarianism dichotomy). In the democracy/democracy dyad (i.e., when the country of origin and the country of residence are both democratic), the diaspora can play a prominent role in the formalization of foreign policy cooperation. In the three other dyads, including the authoritarian/authoritarian one, diaspora groups are more likely to be limited to having an economic rather than a political impact. I argue that a democracy–democracy dyad approximates a necessary cause allowing diaspora groups to contribute to the formalization of foreign policy cooperation. A democracy–democracy dyad is not, however, a sufficient cause of such cooperation. Variation in nationalism and international economic strategies adopted by the country of origin helps explain diaspora engagement policymaking. In addition to diaspora politics, this analysis helps us address larger theoretical questions about the role of democracy in international relations and about domestic political sources of international cooperation. Studying diaspora engagement challenges and expands our understanding of the dichotomy between voice and exit (Hirschman 1970). Emigrants have left their country of origin, but some of them continue to impact that country’s politics. Researching diaspora engagement also has increasing policy relevance. Economic links between diasporas and their country of origin (e.g., remittances) have grown (Riddle 2008). Diaspora engagement is an increasingly important policy issue for the United States. President Barack Obama’s administration has emphasized public-to-private and people-to-people mechanisms of global outreach. Those mechanisms involve diaspora outreach. The Global Partnership Initiative at the State Department is an example of this approach becoming formalized (author’s personal communication with State Department and USAID officials, November and December 2010). In spite of their importance, key aspects of diaspora politics, including diaspora advocacy, are understudied (Newland 2010). The literature has neglected to study diaspora politics in countries of origin and countries of residence simultaneously (Tsuda 2012). I argue that a dyadic approach is essential to the study of diaspora politics and provide a novel empirical approach that examines the determinants of diaspora politics in countries of origin and countries of residence simultaneously. I test my claims by comparing and contrasting the extent of foreign policy influence by four diaspora groups: people of Chinese and of Indian origin in Malaysia and in the United States. This research design examines all four regime type dyads (China and Malaysia are authoritarian countries; India and the United States are democracies). The next section describes the theory proposed in this article in more detail. The third section addresses alternative arguments and situates the argument in the literature. The fourth section describes the research design and the analysis. The fifth section concludes. How Regime Type Dyads Structure Diaspora Politics Diasporas, Institutions, and Cooperation The definition of the term diaspora is contested, and whether or not an individual belongs to a diaspora is to some extent self-defined (Butler 2001). Shain and Barth (2003, 542) define a diaspora as “a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland—whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control.” Faist (2010, 12–13) argues that most of the definitions of the term diaspora incorporate three characteristics: migration or dispersal, cross-border experiences with the homeland, and “some sort of cultural distinctiveness of the diaspora vis-à-vis other groups.” In this article, the focus is on communities of Chinese and of Indian origin who reside in the United States and in Malaysia.1 The dependent variable is the extent of a diaspora group’s impact on and involvement in the formalization of cooperative political ties between the country of origin and the country of residence. Formalized cooperation can take the form of building institutions, conceptualized following North (1990) as the rules of the game (“humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions”), or of building political organizations. An example of cooperative institutionalization is the advent of the US–India nuclear agreement, discussed in more detail below. Organization building refers to the advent of organizations based in the country of residence that seek to promote cooperation (e.g., closer security ties), between the country of origin and the country of residence via political mechanisms (e.g., lobbying, generating and disseminating information on the benefits of cooperation, etc.). Diasporas can have an impact on institutionalized cooperation by helping mobilize domestic political support (e.g., for approval of international agreements in the legislature). Diaspora engagement could also be built into institutions focused on the bilateral relations between the countries of residence and of origin.2 By contrast, diaspora participation in bilateral political ties between the country of origin and the country of residence may be discouraged and is more likely to face obstacles: I argue that this outcome is more likely in settings other than democracy/democracy dyads. Diasporas may also be unwilling to support an authoritarian regime in the country of origin (Mirilovic 2015). Some diasporas with an authoritarian country of origin based in democracies (e.g., Cuban Americans) may be well positioned to push for tough policies (e.g., sanctions) toward their country of origin. The institutionalization of cooperative ties may be partly conditional on the country of origin also being interested in forming links with its diaspora. That may not be the case: countries of origin sometimes ignore the diaspora, and sometimes even condemn and persecute coethnics abroad and their relatives at home. Partly for this reason, understanding diaspora politics requires analyzing it simultaneously in the country of origin and the country of residence. Impact of Regime Type Dyads I argue that democracy–democracy dyads play a key role in allowing diaspora groups to promote cooperative policymaking between their country of origin and their country of residence. This is the case because diaspora groups can appeal to shared democratic norms and benefit from positive branding effects and because democracy leads to increased transparency, which can lessen concerns over diaspora influence. Norms such as alteration in power (i.e., the ruling party peacefully steps down from power upon losing an election), and increased transparency due to free speech protections and the presence of independent media, are key characteristics of democratic states (Maoz and Russett 1993; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010, 3) define democracies as “regimes in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections.” Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy emphasizes two dimensions: contestation and participation. Elections should be contested in a meaningful manner: Multiple parties and candidates should be involved, those parties should have an opportunity to campaign (e.g., a lack of restrictions on free speech and assembly, the opposition should have access to the media), and upon losing an election, the ruling party should peacefully step down from power. Participation refers to the relative size of the electorate. Restrictions on the franchise, such as those based on gender, ethnicity, or property ownership, reduce the extent to which a polity is democratic. Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013) (based on Dahl’s [1971] definition of democracy) and Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) (using the alternation criterion) construct and operationalize dichotomous regime type indicators, classifying different countries as either democratic or authoritarian.3 We should expect politics in democracies to be more transparent than politics in authoritarian states in part because meaningful contestation implies free speech and assembly. Free speech, assembly, and a lack of restrictions on the media increase the availability of reliable political information, relative to countries where political debates are tightly controlled and constrained and the media lacks independence. We should also expect democracies to share important norms, such as peaceful alternation. Democracy in the country of origin facilitates political efforts of its diaspora residing in another democracy when those efforts intend to strengthen the political ties between the two countries. In other words, if both the country of origin and the country of residence are democracies, this will facilitate the efforts of the diaspora to strengthen and formalize political ties between the two countries. That is the case for two reasons. First, there is a positive branding effect of democracy, particularly in political settings. Policymakers and business people who operate in such settings, such as the legislature, electoral campaigns, or associations that seek to exercise political influence, prefer being associated with a democracy (which shares political norms with the democratic country of residence) to being associated with an authoritarian state. All else equal, they will seek to cooperate with organizations and groups that promote ties with another democracy, rather than with those that promote ties to an authoritarian state. Members of a diaspora with a democratic country of origin benefit from being able to make appeals to those shared norms. Shain (1994) argues that US-based diasporas seek to justify their political actions in terms of American democratic values. Second, having an authoritarian country of origin may exacerbate the political vulnerabilities diasporans face when attempting to influence foreign policymaking in their country of residence. Those may include concerns about the perceived trade-off between the national interest and interest group influence, about alleged dual loyalties, and about infiltration and espionage (Baron 2009). Authoritarian regime type in the country of origin can exacerbate these concerns due to the relative lack of transparency in authoritarian states. By contrast, a corresponding affinity between authoritarian states is weaker or nonexistent. In other words, diasporans whose country of origin is authoritarian will not benefit politically from that fact even if their country of residence is also authoritarian. That is the case in part because authoritarian states tend to extend fewer rights to their immigrant populations than democracies. Migrant populations in authoritarian states have difficulty influencing policymaking in their country of residence regardless of the political system of their country of origin (Kapiszewski 2001; Mirilovic 2010). Authoritarian countries may seek to restrict transnational political ties of their diaspora or minority populations whom they view as a potential political threat. Moreover, authoritarian solidarity in the contemporary world is limited. Many contemporary authoritarian states claim to be democratic in their rhetoric and/or hold sham elections (Schedler 2009). Such behavior appears to be inconsistent with the idea of taking pride in the authoritarian nature of one’s political system and with emphasizing, for branding or normative reasons, political associations with other such systems. Diaspora politics in the three other dyads (democratic country of residence-authoritarian country of origin, authoritarian country of residence-democratic country of origin, and authoritarian country of residence-authoritarian country of origin) are structured in a way that makes it difficult for diaspora groups to successfully push for and participate in formalized international cooperation. Diaspora groups based in those settings can have a large economic impact. They may be economically successful in the country of residence and contribute to the economy of the country of origin via remittances or via investment. However, their impact on cooperative bilateral ties between the country of origin and the country of residence is more likely to be economic, rather than political. The facilitating effect applies to diaspora groups that seek to strengthen ties between their countries of origin and residence. By contrast, diasporans from authoritarian states who reside in a democracy may be well positioned to advocate for tough policies toward the regime in the country of origin. In other words, diaspora groups may be effective in encouraging a democratic country of residence to use “sticks” against an authoritarian country of residence, as well as in encouraging the provision of “carrots” when the country of origin is democratic. For example, groups representing Cuban Americans have been influential proponents of the US embargo on Cuba (Rubenzer 2011). While the focus in this article is on the building of the cooperative international ties, the claim that diaspora groups can effectively lobby against their authoritarian states of origin is consistent with the main claims of the article. Regime type affinity, including within democracy–democracy dyads, is not a sufficient cause of cooperation, as illustrated by the history of US–India relations. Both countries have been democratic during most of the post-World War II period. However, the relationship between the United States and India was characterized by notable tensions during the cold war, when India built ties with the Soviet Union while the US cooperated with India’s rival Pakistan. US–India relations were notably tense following India’s intervention in what was then East Pakistan in 1971 (Widmaier 2005). The relations between the United States and India have improved in recent decades; I argue that diaspora politics contributed to this change. Table 1 lists the four dyads defined by regime type, provides an example of a diaspora group within each dyad, and states the type of impact a diaspora group located in a given dyad may have on strengthening bilateral ties between its country of origin and country of residence. Table 1. Regime type dyads and diaspora politics   Country of origin   Democracy  Authoritarian  Destination country  Democracy  Political and economic (e.g., Indian Americans)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in the Philippines)  Authoritarian  Economic (e.g., Indians in the United Arab Emirates)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in Malaysia)    Country of origin   Democracy  Authoritarian  Destination country  Democracy  Political and economic (e.g., Indian Americans)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in the Philippines)  Authoritarian  Economic (e.g., Indians in the United Arab Emirates)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in Malaysia)  Table 1. Regime type dyads and diaspora politics   Country of origin   Democracy  Authoritarian  Destination country  Democracy  Political and economic (e.g., Indian Americans)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in the Philippines)  Authoritarian  Economic (e.g., Indians in the United Arab Emirates)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in Malaysia)    Country of origin   Democracy  Authoritarian  Destination country  Democracy  Political and economic (e.g., Indian Americans)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in the Philippines)  Authoritarian  Economic (e.g., Indians in the United Arab Emirates)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in Malaysia)  Democracy–democracy dyads can allow diasporans to effectively push for formalized political cooperation between the country of origin and the country of residence. The success of such efforts may be partly conditional on whether there is interest in such cooperation in the country of origin. Nationalism and international economic strategies help explain variations in such interest. Explaining Destination Country Policymakers’ Motivations: Nationalism and International Economic Strategies Nationalism is an ideology that seeks to establish or promote the unity, identity, and autonomy of a nation or potential nation (Shulman 2000). Nationalists may be interested in the affairs of their coethnics abroad because they emphasize national identity and unity. They are particularly likely to support diaspora engagement as a means of promoting links between coethnics separated by international borders. Nationalists may believe that the absence of such links contributes to a lack of national unity and potentially lead to a loss of conationals via the assimilation of the diaspora into the dominant culture of their country of residence (Shulman 2000). While nationalism generally leads to more diaspora engagement, this pattern is not entirely linear. Increases in nationalism can weaken links between the country of origin and its diaspora population. Instead of building links with the diaspora, nationalists may condemn diasporans as traitors, cut off contacts with them, and in some cases persecute them and/or their relatives who remained at home. Nationalists may perceive the decision to emigrate as an act of disloyalty to one’s homeland. Furthermore, they might regard diasporans with suspicion because they may have close contacts with foreigners and because they may have been assimilated into the dominant culture of their country of residence. Nationalist episodes involving extreme suspicions and persecution of diasporans are more likely to occur in authoritarian states where political transparency is relatively low (see the example of the Cultural Revolution below). The nonlinear relationship between nationalism and diaspora engagement has two largely counterintuitive implications for the study of the links between domestic politics and international relations. First, while increases in nationalism are often associated with a higher risk of international conflict, they may also lead to more international cooperation and improved bilateral ties between the country of origin and the country of residence of the diaspora. Second, increases in nationalist concerns about the diaspora do not necessarily lead to stronger ties between the diaspora and the country of origin; they can lead to the weakening of those ties. Meanwhile, international economic strategies can be divided into two broad categories. Some countries emphasize self-sufficiency and are skeptical of international economic links. They pursue autarky, seek to protect domestic industries, and adopt barriers (e.g., tariffs) to international economic flows. Other countries prioritize economic efficiency over self-sufficiency and embrace world markets by lowering barriers to trade and to foreign investment. Countries that pursue international economic openness are more likely to engage their diaspora than countries that embrace autarky. Diasporas can facilitate international economic integration. Their human and financial capital and their contacts at home and in the destination country can facilitate investment and trade links between the two countries. Diasporans may possess knowledge about the conditions and the practices at their country of origin which other foreign investors lack. Diaspora networks may facilitate foreign investment by reducing transaction and information costs (Leblang 2010). Countries that seek international economic integration have an incentive to pursue those economic links via diaspora engagement. Countries that seek autarky lack this incentive. In the context of China and India, nationalism and international economic strategies help explain why policymakers’ interest in diaspora engagement has shifted over time. The Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966, was a period of ideological and nationalist extremism in China (Oksenberg 1986). It ushered in persecution of groups regarded as suspect by the government. Among those targeted were the relatives of the overseas Chinese, the returned overseas Chinese, and the officials of government agencies conducting outreach to the overseas Chinese (Fitzgerald 1972, author’s personal communication with an International Relations Professor in Beijing, May 11, 2010). The government regarded these groups as suspect for two reasons. First, the government considered them a capitalist group because many overseas Chinese were successful businessmen. Second, the overseas Chinese and their relatives at home were suspected due to their foreign ties (Chang 1980). They were targeted, in part, due to nationalist concerns about loyalty and foreign influences. The perceived turning away from China by the overseas Chinese was resented in Beijing (Wang 2001). Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission officials were accused of not doing enough to mobilize the overseas Chinese in order to facilitate class struggle abroad. By 1968, organizations dealing with the overseas Chinese ceased to function (Fitzgerald 1972). China’s diaspora engagement policy changed with the end of the Cultural Revolution and the advent of economic liberalization in the late 1970s. The reforms included opening the Chinese economy to the world markets and China’s exports and FDI inflows increased rapidly. A large fraction of the foreign investment came from the overseas Chinese, who contributed up to 70 percent of FDI inflows into China in the 1990s (Zhu 2007). In 1978, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council was established. In 1984, the National Congress of Returned Overseas Chinese and their Relatives, held every five years, was launched. Between 1983 and 1985, special privileges were granted by legislation and by State Council provisions to overseas Chinese who wanted to invest in China (Barabantseva 2005). By the 1980s, China was reaching out to its diaspora notably in order to encourage international investment. In the period that followed independence (which India attained in 1947), the Indian government prioritized stable intergovernmental relations over links with overseas Indians when the two interests conflicted. The advent of economic liberalization in the early 1990s, and the coming to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1998 (the BJP has more of a Hindu nationalist orientation than the center-left Congress Party), brought about the key turning point in India’s diaspora engagement. Prior to the reforms, India pursued a strategy of economic self-sufficiency. The reforms opened India’s economy to the world markets. Investment by overseas Indians provided an important source of capital inflows into India (Rana 2009; Naujoks 2010). The key policy changes regarding diaspora engagement in India starting in the late 1990s include the following. In 1998, the government introduced the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) card. The PIO card facilitates the travel of overseas Indians to India, as well as their investment in India. In 2002, Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) was launched. The PDB is an annual gathering that brings together representatives of the diaspora and top Indian officials. In 2004, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) was established (Rana 2009). The creation of a separate ministry dedicated to diaspora issues illustrates the increasing importance of those issues to the Indian government. Situating the Argument in the Literature Scholars have explored links between regime type, or political institutions and governance structures more broadly, and diaspora politics. Freedman (2000) claims that institutional settings, and the incentive structures they generate, explain cross-national variation in Chinese communities’ political participation. Smith (2003) argues that regime change is an important variable driving diaspora engagement, while Ragazzi (2009) emphasizes global shifts in neoliberal values. A different claim linking democracy and diaspora politics is that diaspora activism or emigration cause democratization in the country of origin. Kapur (2010) argues that elite emigration has contributed to the advent and the maintenance of democracy in India. Other scholars posit that diasporas socialized with democratic values can contribute to democratization at the country of origin ( Shain 1999; Koinova 2009). The case of China appears to be problematic for the claims that diasporas or elite emigration cause democracy. China has had a long history of emigration, including of the elites and/or to Western countries such as the United States, but it has yet to democratize. Previous work linking democracy and diaspora politics lacks the dyadic approach that is central to this article. Studying the relationship between regime type and diaspora politics only in, for example, the country or residence, gives us an incomplete understanding of diaspora politics. For example, Koinova (2013) argues that, in the case of the Kosovar Albanian diaspora in the United States and the United Kingdom, violence levels in the homeland affect the extent of moderation or radicalism in diaspora politics. Alternative explanations of diaspora activism emphasize group-level cultural and/or economic attributes. For example, traditional theories of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995) posit that more educated and/or wealthier individuals are more likely to be politically active than less educated and/or less wealthy individuals. Other scholars have argued that group-level cultural traits may explain political participation, or a lack thereof. Freedman (2000) states that this perspective (which she treats as an alternative argument) has been prominent in the study of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. For example, Pye (1985) argues that Asian cultural values are linked with an authoritarian leadership style. If arguments emphasizing the political impact of cultural identities characteristic of ethnic groups are correct, we would expect members of a given ethnic group to be relatively politically active or inactive regardless of their country of residence. This article does not claim that diasporas are the only relevant actors in international relations or that traditional explanations of international relations, such as those focusing on great power politics, are irrelevant. The relations between the United States, China, and India have been shaped by geopolitical concerns and by balance of power considerations. The United States improved ties with China in the 1970s partly in order to contain the Soviet Union, while geopolitical developments such as the end of the cold war and the Bush administration’s response to the attacks of 9/11 affected US–India ties (Singh 2007; Kissinger 2011). However, even interstate relations usually regarded as dominated by high politics and geopolitical concerns, such as the US–China relationship during the cold war, are to some extent influenced by domestic politics. The Committee of One Million (led by Marvin Liebman and Walter Judd [R-MN]) was active between 1953 and 1971 and regarded as the “China lobby” in American politics. The principal issue for the committee was its opposition to granting the PRC a seat at the United Nations instead of the Republic of China government in Taiwan. The committee also lobbied for other tough American policies toward the PRC, for example against trade with the PRC. The committee conducted petition drives and sought to influence American presidential administrations and legislators; it claimed bipartisan support from a large number of members of Congress. The committee’s efforts may have contributed to the delay of several decades from the establishment of the PRC to its assuming of China’s seat at the United Nations (Bachrack 1976).4 The relevance of geopolitics, however, does point to a possible limiting condition of the argument: Diasporas are unlikely to completely reverse the foreign policies of their country of residence (Haney and Vanderbush 1999). Even though diasporas may matter primarily when at least some shared interest in improved bilateral ties is already in place, that effect is still important. Mancur Olson (1971) has demonstrated that shared interests often do not lead to cooperation: collective action problems have to be overcome first. Relatively small but motivated groups with access to resources, such as some diaspora groups, can help overcome collective action problems associated with building domestic political support needed for closer bilateral ties.5 Furthermore, perceived strategic convergence between foreign policy preferences of the country of residence government and the goals of diaspora advocacy may in some cases be a consequence of diaspora group influence rather than its precondition (Rubenzer 2008). The argument and the findings in this article may also contribute to addressing prominent international relations and comparative politics debates. The literature should do more to link international relations theory and the study of diaspora politics (Koinova 2012). I argue that domestic politics helps explain variation in international cooperation. That pattern challenges structural realist views of international relations, which posit that we should think of states as black boxes, within which internal developments are irrelevant (e.g., Waltz 1979).6 The claims and findings in this article may help fill gaps within democratic peace theory. Previous research claims a robust empirical relationship between democratic dyads and a lack of interstate war (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993). However, the question of what causal logic explains this pattern remains contested (Rosato 2003). The causal logics identified by proponents of democratic peace theory include those that emphasize shared values between democracies (Maoz and Russett’s [1993] normative model) and those that emphasize the impact of democracy on the availability of better information (Schultz 1998). The diaspora politics argument developed in this article may add to those theories by identifying actors who may promote international cooperation. Shared values present opportunities for cooperation, while lack of transparency in authoritarian states reduces such opportunities. However, for cooperation to occur, actors have to make arguments that emphasize such shared values. Diasporans may be one group of actors with the inclination and the ability to do so. Meanwhile, comparative analyses of the Indian and the Chinese diaspora engagement policies are rare (exceptions include the work of Das [2010] and of Zhu [2007]). More generally, to the best of my knowledge, previous research does not examine diaspora politics in all four regime type variation dyads simultaneously. Furthermore, immigration and diaspora politics in authoritarian settings are generally understudied. This is problematic because, in order to understand the impact of democracy on diaspora politics, we also need to study diaspora politics in the absence of democracy. Finally, debates over whether and how regime type variation affects policymaking are prominent within comparative politics. Some scholars argue that democracy leads to systematically different policy choices (e.g., Boix 2003). Others claim that democracies and authoritarian states adopt similar policies in a number of key areas (e.g., Mulligan, Gill, and Sala-i-Martin 2004). This article seeks to demonstrate the importance of regime type to diaspora politics. Research Design and Analysis Case Selection This article focuses on four groups: Chinese and Indian Americans, and Malaysians of Chinese and Indian origin. In terms of temporal scope, the article focuses primarily on contemporary politics, but it also considers evidence from earlier in the post-World War II period. There are three principal reasons for choosing this research design. First, the research design incorporates each regime type dyad quadrant—I examine a group with a democratic country of origin and residence (Indian Americans), with a democratic country of origin and an authoritarian country of residence (Malaysians of Indian descent), with an authoritarian country of origin and a democratic country of residence (Chinese Americans), and with an authoritarian country of origin and residence (Malaysians of Chinese descent). This approach has the advantage of being particularly comprehensive and is novel if not unique in the literature. Second, focusing on this set of cases allows us to hold alternative explanations constant. For example, variation in political participation and outcomes across groups of Indian origin in the United States and Malaysia cannot be explained by their ethnic background, which in this analysis is held roughly constant. For example, while there is variation across individuals who identify as Indian (and reside in the United States or in Malaysia) in terms of region of origin and other factors, those individuals share an Indian ethnic identity. Comparing and contrasting foreign policy choices and outcomes involving China and India also allows us to hold potential alternative explanations constant: China and India share a location in Asia, great economic potential and population size, and a long history of civilizational achievement. Third, examining US relations with China and India, and the role the diaspora plays in their rise, addresses substantively important issues. The US–China relationship is arguably the most important contemporary bilateral relationship. Meanwhile, the diaspora plays an important economic role in China and in India, affecting economies consequential to millions of people and to the world economy. I proceed by analyzing the key cases in detail. Diaspora influence on the formalization of international cooperation is difficult to quantify. I rely on two measurement strategies. First, I compare and contrast expert rankings and evaluations of diaspora influence on foreign policymaking between their country of origin and their country of residence. Second, I compare and contrast the extent of institutionalization of cooperative ties through mechanisms that involve diaspora participation. United States Two key patterns emerge when comparing the role that Chinese and Indian Americans play in affecting US foreign policy toward their respective countries of origin. First, in expert rankings and evaluations, Indian Americans, unlike Chinese Americans, are often listed as an increasingly influential interest group (e.g., Lindsay 2002, discussed in greater detail below). That is the case even though Chinese and Indian Americans are roughly comparable in terms of numbers and of access to resources. Second, political bilateral links between the United States and India that involve active participation of Indian Americans are more formalized than the corresponding links with China. By contrast, in terms of more purely economic links, the United States is much more closely connected with China than with India. Table 2 displays the relevant demographic profile of Chinese7 and Indian Americans8: Table 2. Chinese and Indian Americans, 2000s   Chinese Americans  Indian Americans  US total or average  # born in China or India (millions)  1.5  1  281.4  Education: BA or higher, pop. 25 and older (%)  47.7  69.1  24.4  Income: $50,000 a year or higher, households (%)  49.6  66.9  41.9  Ethnically Chinese or Indian (millions)  3.54  2.77  281.4    Chinese Americans  Indian Americans  US total or average  # born in China or India (millions)  1.5  1  281.4  Education: BA or higher, pop. 25 and older (%)  47.7  69.1  24.4  Income: $50,000 a year or higher, households (%)  49.6  66.9  41.9  Ethnically Chinese or Indian (millions)  3.54  2.77  281.4  Source: US Census Bureau (2000, 2007). The education and income numbers are for 2000 for the Chinese- and the Indian-born, respectively. The numbers of people who are ethnically Chinese or Indian are 2007 estimates. Table 2. Chinese and Indian Americans, 2000s   Chinese Americans  Indian Americans  US total or average  # born in China or India (millions)  1.5  1  281.4  Education: BA or higher, pop. 25 and older (%)  47.7  69.1  24.4  Income: $50,000 a year or higher, households (%)  49.6  66.9  41.9  Ethnically Chinese or Indian (millions)  3.54  2.77  281.4    Chinese Americans  Indian Americans  US total or average  # born in China or India (millions)  1.5  1  281.4  Education: BA or higher, pop. 25 and older (%)  47.7  69.1  24.4  Income: $50,000 a year or higher, households (%)  49.6  66.9  41.9  Ethnically Chinese or Indian (millions)  3.54  2.77  281.4  Source: US Census Bureau (2000, 2007). The education and income numbers are for 2000 for the Chinese- and the Indian-born, respectively. The numbers of people who are ethnically Chinese or Indian are 2007 estimates. The demographic profile of the two groups is similar. They constitute a relatively small share of the US population and electorate. However, on average, they tend to be wealthier and more educated than the rest of the population. While their demographic profiles are relatively similar, there is a significant difference in their level of foreign policy influence as estimated by experts. Scholars often point out the increasing influence of Indian Americans. Mearsheimer and Walt (2007, 8) list groups representing Indian Americans as one of the ethnic lobbies that has successfully influenced US foreign policy. In her discussion of successful lobbying efforts by diaspora groups, Newland (2010) examines the impact of Indian Americans on the US–India nuclear deal. Lerner (2014) discusses the increasing influence of Indian Americans on American foreign policymaking and on American domestic politics in general. According to Lindsay (2002), Indian Americans are the group most likely to emerge as a “political powerhouse,” while Chinese Americans have historically been quiet on foreign policy. Chinese Americans are not usually mentioned by experts as a key group influencing US foreign policymaking. More generally, experts perceive overseas Chinese as tending to lack political influence in destination countries where they live. According to Shain (1994, 833), the overseas Chinese have traditionally not been influential in home and host politics. The increasing influence of Indian Americans has been an important contributing factor leading to the advent and rapid growth of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans. Congressional caucuses, unlike congressional committees, do not have a formal legislative role. However, they influence policymaking via agenda setting and by helping to inform their members and to coordinate their actions (Webb, Mullholan, and Stevens 1985). The India Caucus is the largest country-specific caucus in the US Congress; it has roughly twice as many members as the China-specific caucuses combined9 (see Table 3 for information about the caucuses; e.g., in the 112th Congress the India Caucus had at least 180 members). In the Senate, there is a comparable gap that differentiates the caucuses that focus on India and on China, respectively. The US Senate India Caucus was launched in 2004 and had an initial thirty-two members (BBC News 2004). By 2009, it had thirty-seven members, and by late 2011, the membership had grown to forty. The Senate India Caucus is the largest country-specific caucus in the Senate (The Hindu 2009; Embassy of India, Washington, DC 2011). By contrast, the US–China Senate Working Group is a by-invitation ad-hoc group that does not have a permanent membership list (author’s correspondence with Igor Khrestin [2012], Senator Mark Kirk’s [R-IL] Legislative Assistant). The India Caucus is much larger than the combined membership of the caucuses focused on China, even though US–China relations tend to attract much more popular attention within the United States than US–India relations. The discrepancy illustrates the advantage that advocates of stronger bilateral ties between democracies enjoy due to branding effects in political settings. Indian Americans have made an important contribution to the creation and the growth of the India Caucus. For example, Kapur (2010) cites one of the founders and a cochair of the caucus, Jim McDermott (D-WA): “Indian-Americans on our staff were largely responsible for the launch [of the Caucus].” Kapur (2010) also states that members of Congress are partly interested in joining as a means of accessing political support, including campaign contributions, from Indian Americans. We can observe a similar discrepancy when comparing the US-India Business Council with the US–China Business Council (see Table 4 for Business Council data). Business Councils bring together American companies that conduct business in the country concerned and assist them with political advocacy. For example, the US-India Business Council helped rally political support for the US–India nuclear deal in 2006 (Kamdar 2007). Furthermore, the US-India Business Council generated estimates of commercial opportunities for US companies from nuclear trade with India that were cited in a Committee on Foreign Relations hearing by Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) (US Congress Senate 2009, 48). The bilateral economic links between the United States and China are much more extensive than the bilateral economic links between the United States and India. The volume of trade between the United States and China is about eight times larger than the corresponding volume of trade with India, while China attracts much more total (from the United States and from other countries combined) FDI than India (see, e.g., Huang and Khanna 2003). However, the US-India Business Council is larger than the US–China Business Council, roughly by a three to two margin. This pattern is again consistent with a branding effect. All else equal, companies, like members of Congress, prefer to be associated with a democracy to being associated with an authoritarian state in a political realm. By contrast, investment and trade decisions are made primarily based on profit motives, and with less regard for the regime type of the trading or investment partner. Indian Americans have also played an important role in promoting international cooperation between the United States and India. Most notably, Indian Americans contributed to the passage of the US–India nuclear deal—a key diplomatic breakthrough in Indo–US relations. The nuclear deal was controversial in the United States10; its opponents argued that it undermined norms of nuclear nonproliferation. Organizations of Indian Americans played an important role in persuading members of Congress to support the nuclear deal (Kirk 2008; Newland 2010). Newland (2010) describes US India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) efforts to track the progress of the deal, to reach out to potential allies in the Congress (including members of the Congressional Black Caucus and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus), and to encourage USINPAC members to write to members of Congress in support of the deal. USINPAC also made campaign contributions to senators and members of the House who represent areas with significant Indian American populations (Newland 2010). According to Federal Election Commission (FEC) data, in 2005–2006, USINPAC spent about $150,000 on contributions to committees. In their lobbying efforts, USINPAC documents emphasize that India is a democracy (e.g., USINPAC 2008). Members of the Indian American community placed advertisements in major newspapers and lobbied prominent policymakers in support of the bill (Hanifa 2006). Statements from American elected officials also support the claim that organizations representing Indian Americans and the US-India Business Council played an important role in the passage of the bill. Congressmen Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and Joe Crowley (D-NY) emphasized the importance of work done by Indian Americans to the passage of the bill in the House (Dutt 2006). According to Joe Wilson (R-SC), Ron Somers, the president of the US-Indian Business Council, is one of the individuals who made an essential contribution to the passage of the bill. Wilson also stated that the bill has the support of the Indian–American community, and that the United States and India are both democracies (Congressional Record 2008, 33). In addition to the US–India nuclear deal, Indian Americans have sought to influence other US policies toward India. According to Talbott (2006, 36), “Indian Americans pushed an increasingly responsive Congress for more leniency toward new Delhi on virtually all issues.” For example, Talbott (2006, 127) claims that the influence of Indian Americans contributed to the passage of an Amendment to the Arms Control Act that encouraged the Clinton administration to waive sanctions it had imposed on New Delhi in response to its 1998 nuclear test. By contrast, international agreements of comparative relevance (e.g., to the US–India nuclear deal) between the United States and China, to which organizations of Chinese Americans prominently contributed, appear to be lacking. Malaysia In this section, I argue that neither the Chinese nor the Indian community in Malaysia has had a disproportionally large influence on Kuala Lumpur’s foreign policy toward China and India, respectively. Malaysian policymakers do to some extent consider the interests of their ethnic Chinese and Indian citizens; however, the Chinese and Indian communities in general have a limited influence on Malay-dominated Malaysian politics (Pepinsky 2009). The Chinese community in Malaysia tends to lack an influence on Malaysia’s foreign policymaking even though the Chinese community in Malaysia is numerically relatively large and disproportionally wealthy. This pattern contradicts the predictions of traditional theories of political participation. Moreover, the authoritarian–authoritarian dyad does not appear to facilitate a prominent role for Malaysians of Chinese origin in influencing Malaysia’s foreign policymaking toward China. Meanwhile, the Indian community in Malaysia also does not appear to benefit from its country of origin being democratic. These patterns are consistent with the prediction of the theory presented in this article about the importance of democracy–democracy dyads. Malaysia is commonly described by scholars as a soft authoritarian state (Pepinsky 2009). Elections are regularly held. However, opposition leaders are sometimes subjected to pressure and harassment. Malaysia is coded as an authoritarian state in cross-national regime type indicators, such as the one by Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013). The Chinese community accounts for about 23 percent of Malaysia’s population (The World Factbook 2014). Ethnic Chinese Malaysians are disproportionally economically successful. For example, in 1995, the income of an average Chinese household was about 1.8 times higher than the income of an average Malay household (Freedman 2000). The Indian community accounts for 7.3 percent of Malaysia’s population (Singh 2011). Members of the Indian community have income levels that are on average similar to those of ethnic Malays. Meanwhile, several notable social problems disproportionally affect the Indian community, who are overrepresented among juvenile delinquents and underrepresented among university graduates (Kaur 2006). Ethnic identities are salient in Malaysian politics and society (Holst 2012). Freedman (2001) argues that Malaysian political institutions maintain ethnic distinctions within Malaysia. Chinese and Indian identities are politically salient in Malaysia, and Malaysians of Indian and Chinese origin have not become fully assimilated to the point where they would be indistinguishable from ethnic Malays. For example, most ethnic Chinese Malaysians speak Mandarin, unlike most ethnic Malays (Tan 2004). Many ethnic Chinese Malays take pride in China as a source of their culture with a long historical tradition (Nonini 1997, 208). According to Chu, Kang, and Huang (2015, 414), opinion poll evidence indicates that ethnic Chinese Malaysians are much more likely than their ethnic Malay compatriots to view the rise of China positively. Meanwhile, many ethnic Indian Malaysians take pride in the rise of India (Nagarajan 2008, 388). It is important to point out, however, that ethnic Chinese and Indian communities in Malaysia are not monolithic. As with other diaspora communities, there is variation across individuals in the extent to which they emphasize the distinctiveness of their culture, maintain an interest in their country of origin, and in terms of how they view their position in the society of the country of residence (Tan 2004; Sathian and Ngeow 2014). Scholars generally agree that Chinese and Indian Malaysians exercise less political influence than their numbers would indicate. Two developments demonstrate this pattern. First, Malaysia has adopted policies that discriminate in favor of the majority ethnic Malays at the expense of other groups. Most notably, the goal of the New Economic Policy, adopted in 1970, was to increase the share of the economy controlled by ethnic Malays. Ethnic Malays were given privileged status in awarding university admissions, employment decisions, and government contracts. Those privileges occur at the expense of the other communities in Malaysia (notably the Chinese). Other examples of policies that favor ethnic Malays include the 1967 National Language Bill, which made Malay the only official language in Malaysia (Heng 1999). Second, political parties that have represented ethnic Chinese and Indians (the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), respectively) have been part of governing coalitions in Malaysia. However, those coalitions were dominated by a party primarily representing ethnic Malays, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Both the MCA and the MIC have received criticism from members of the Chinese and Indian communities in Malaysia for their subordinate role and perceived failure to adequately advance the interests of those communities (Heng 1999; Kaur 2006; Ramasamy 2008). Have Chinese and Indian communities been able to influence Malaysia’s foreign policy toward China and India? The effect of the presence of the Chinese community on Malaysia on the relations between Beijing and Kuala Lumpur should probably be described as either negative or neutral. According to Acharya (1999, 134), “the fear of China continues (albeit in a low key manner) to serve as a device of shoring up Malay unity and hence as a basis for regime legitimization in Malaysia.” Baginda (2015, 18) argues that Malay politicians have used criticism of China to seek popular support among ethnic Malays and to question the loyalty of the Malaysian Chinese. Suspicions that ethnic Chinese have faced in Malaysia indicate that authoritarian–authoritarian dyads may not reduce concerns about diasporans’ loyalty like democracy–democracy dyads do. Baginda (2015) also claims that Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Tun Razak’s decision to visit Beijing and normalize relations with China in 1974 was partly motivated by Tun Razak seeking to improve how he was perceived by ethnic Chinese Malaysians. However, as the theoretical framework in this article predicts, Malaysia insisted on minimizing the political role of Chinese Malaysians in the Beijing–Kuala Lumpur relationship. A key Malaysian precondition for normalization was for China to encourage ethnic Chinese in Malaysia to be loyal to their country of residence and minimize their political ties with China (Baginda 2015).11Liow (2000) downplays the impact of communalism as a determinant of foreign policymaking in post-cold war Malaysia.12Kuik (2013, 35) argues that the impact of the ethnic Chinese community on Kuala Lumpur’s foreign policy toward China should not be overestimated. According to Kuik (2013, 35), Malaysia’ foreign policy decision making is centralized and elitist, with the policy makers, in a Malay-dominated political system, not necessarily concerned with the outlook of minority groups. People of Indian origin in Malaysia also do not exercise a disproportional influence on Malaysia’s foreign policy toward India. Rather, their status in Malaysia is a potential source of tension in the relations between the two countries. Singh (2011) describes the state of India–Malaysia relations as a missed opportunity. He argues that the Indian community is marginalized in Malaysia in both political and economic terms. In response to a 2003 incident in which 300 Indian citizens in Malaysia were “ill-treated” and “interrogated” by Malaysian authorities, the Indian government “reacted sharply and warned that any repetition of such incidents would affect bilateral ties” (Singh 2011, 95). In general, Singh (2011) states that mistreatment of persons of Indian origin in Malaysia has been a source of concern for the Indian authorities. He also claims that “[t]he Indian government has not been able to develop a strong economic constituency in Malaysia which could strengthen and expand the bilateral political and economic ties between the two countries (Singh 2011, 102).” By contrast, authoritarian–authoritarian dyads do allow for the building of strong economic ties between the country of origin and the country of residence. China is Malaysia’s second largest trading partner (Department of Statistics, Malaysia 2013). Given the disproportionate representation of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia’s economy, it is likely that ethnic Chinese businesspeople play a prominent role in this trade. Meanwhile, a high fraction of FDI into China comes from overseas Chinese investors (Katzenstein 2005). Assessing the Evidence Across the Cases A comparison between Chinese Malaysians and Indian Americans demonstrates the relevance of the causal logic emphasized by this article. Both groups are disproportionally wealthy; both come from a country that shares a regime type with their country of residence. Ethnic Chinese account for a larger share of the Malaysia population than Indian Americans do in the United States. However, Indian Americans have a notable impact on strengthening Washington, DC.–New Delhi ties, while Malaysians of Chinese descent tend to lack such an influence on the Beijing–Kuala Lumpur relationship. Engagement of the Indian American community is built into institutions such as the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, while Malaysia has sought to discourage the political involvement of ethnic Chinese Malaysians with China and with China–Malaysia relations. Ethnic Chinese in Malaysia have faced suspicions about the nature of their loyalties. This pattern is consistent with the claim that a democracy–democracy dyad greatly facilitates diaspora efforts to strengthen ties between the country of origin and the country of residence. By contrast, an authoritarian–authoritarian dyad does not facilitate such ties. A comparison between Indian Americans and people of Indian origin in Malaysia reveals a pattern that is not consistent with essentialist accounts of ethnicity. The former group is more politically influential than the latter group. Since both groups share an Indian identity, that identity cannot explain this divergence in outcomes. Consistent with the predictions of this article, the most notable political contribution of a diaspora group to formalization of cooperative foreign policy ties occurred in a democracy–democracy dyad (i.e., diaspora politics involving Indian Americans). Nationalism and international economic integration help explain the timing of the advent of the larger role for the diaspora. While the research design adopted in this article allows us to control for several alternative explanations, there may be other relevant differences between Indian and Chinese communities. For example, Uslaner (1998) claims that assimilation into American society and politics is considered to increase interest group effectiveness. However, Kapur (2010, 194) claims, citing data from Vigdor (2008), that Indian and Chinese Americans may be similar in terms of how assimilated they are into the “American mainstream.” Furthermore, Rubenzer and Redd (2010) argue that the extent to which a diasporic group is mobilized matters more than cultural similarity or the numerical size of the group in terms of effectively influencing policymakers. In addition to the extent of perceived assimilation into American or into Malaysian society, there may be other relevant differences between and among diaspora groups of Chinese and of Indian origin—in terms of region of origin, political ideology, and others. Questions such as the impact of the geopolitical relations between the United States and China, or of the impact of the difference in tactics that different diaspora groups adopt, should be studied further.13 Conclusions This article emphasizes a structural determinant of diaspora politics: regime type in the country of origin and the country of residence. The article advances a novel dyadic analysis, which posits that diaspora groups can play a key role in strengthening and formalizing bilateral ties between their country of origin and country of residence primarily in democracy–democracy dyads (when the country of origin and the country of residence of the diaspora group are both democratic). Democracy–democracy dyads approximate a permissive cause of such cooperation. Variation in country of origin developments and policy choices, such as nationalism and international economic strategy choices, helps explain when such cooperation will occur. This analysis modifies alternative arguments that posit that group-level attributes explain variations in political participation and influence. Differences in relative income, or in the size of a diaspora group, do not appear to be the only drivers of interest group influence. Essentialist claims about culture also do not appear to be supported by the evidence. The empirical analysis in this article follows a novel dyadic setup that extends the analysis to four different settings. However, future research should expand the testing still more broadly. We should test across a large number of diaspora groups based in a large number of different countries. The theory advanced in this paper could, for example, be applied to diaspora politics in the context of authoritarian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. GCC countries have some of the world’s highest per capita migrant stocks. However, migrants in GCC countries have a limited influence on the domestic or the international policy choices of those countries, regardless of whether those migrants come from democratic or authoritarian countries (Kapiszewski 2001). The findings in this article illustrate the relevance of studying domestic and international politics together. For example, while affinity between democracies may matter in international relations, realizing the potential for cooperation may depend on actors, including diasporans14, who make arguments emphasizing those norms within the domestic politics of those countries. Furthermore, the importance of diaspora politics may continue to increase. If global trends such as international economic integration and democratization continue they will facilitate further increases in the importance of diaspora engagement cross-nationally. Table 3. Congressional China and India caucuses     112th Congress    2006–2009*  2011–2012  Caucus on India and Indian Americans  152  180+  Congressional China caucus  34  40  US–China-Congressional Working Group  40  57      112th Congress    2006–2009*  2011–2012  Caucus on India and Indian Americans  152  180+  Congressional China caucus  34  40  US–China-Congressional Working Group  40  57  * Data on the India Caucus are from 2009; data for the China caucuses are from 2006. Sources: BBC News (2004), The Hindu (2009), Kapur (2010), Sutter (2007), http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress1/housecaucus/members.htm, http://joewilson.house.gov/Caucus/Congressional CaucusonIndiaandIndianAmericans.htm, http://forbes.house.gov/ChinaCaucus/Members/; author’s correspondence with Craddock (2012), Legislative Assistant for Representative Rick Larsen. Table 3. Congressional China and India caucuses     112th Congress    2006–2009*  2011–2012  Caucus on India and Indian Americans  152  180+  Congressional China caucus  34  40  US–China-Congressional Working Group  40  57      112th Congress    2006–2009*  2011–2012  Caucus on India and Indian Americans  152  180+  Congressional China caucus  34  40  US–China-Congressional Working Group  40  57  * Data on the India Caucus are from 2009; data for the China caucuses are from 2006. Sources: BBC News (2004), The Hindu (2009), Kapur (2010), Sutter (2007), http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress1/housecaucus/members.htm, http://joewilson.house.gov/Caucus/Congressional CaucusonIndiaandIndianAmericans.htm, http://forbes.house.gov/ChinaCaucus/Members/; author’s correspondence with Craddock (2012), Legislative Assistant for Representative Rick Larsen. Table 4. US-based business councils, trade, and FDI   China  India  US trade, $billion (2008)  409.2  50  Total FDI, $billion (2004)  61  5.5  Business Councils, member companies (2009)  213  318  Business Councils, member companies (2012)  239  362    China  India  US trade, $billion (2008)  409.2  50  Total FDI, $billion (2004)  61  5.5  Business Councils, member companies (2009)  213  318  Business Councils, member companies (2012)  239  362  Sources: US–India Business Council and US–China Business Council websites; Zhu (2007). Table 4. US-based business councils, trade, and FDI   China  India  US trade, $billion (2008)  409.2  50  Total FDI, $billion (2004)  61  5.5  Business Councils, member companies (2009)  213  318  Business Councils, member companies (2012)  239  362    China  India  US trade, $billion (2008)  409.2  50  Total FDI, $billion (2004)  61  5.5  Business Councils, member companies (2009)  213  318  Business Councils, member companies (2012)  239  362  Sources: US–India Business Council and US–China Business Council websites; Zhu (2007). Dr. Nikola Mirilovic is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department at the University of Central Florida. His work has been published or is forthcoming in Comparative Politics, International Political Science Review, Politics and Religion, and Political Studies. Dr. Mirilovic’s research examines links between domestic and international politics. In particular, his research interests include migration and diaspora politics, and the role of ideology and religion in international relations. Author’s note: The author would like to thank Nathan Ilderton, Binod Khadria, Barbara Kinsey, Shawn McHale, Deepa Ollapally, Rajesh Rajagopalan, JC Sharma, Shyam Sriram, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. Juliana Velasco provided excellent research assistance. 1I do not assume that all individuals of Chinese or of Indian origin identify with or maintain an interest in China or India (respectively). 2For example, Caucus on India and Indian Americans in the US Congress. 3Vreeland, Gandhi, and Cheibub (2010, 11) argue for considering regime type as a dichotomous variable in part because the distributions of ordinal regime type measures are bimodal with peaks at the extremes (i.e., relatively pure democracies and authoritarian states). Future research, potentially employing large n methods, however, could include ordinal measures of democracy in the analysis and explore differences between different types of nondemocracies. 4The committee was concerned with avoiding the appearance of being a “front” for foreign influences, and it avoided seeking contribution from Chinese sources and from Chinese Americans (Bachrack 1976, 191). This pattern illustrates the constraints that diasporans from authoritarian states may face when seeking to influence foreign policies of their country of residence toward their country of origin. 5For example, diasporas can help build political support for getting international treaties approved by the legislature. 6Waltz (1979, 122) concedes that understanding foreign policy choices requires considering states’ internal structures. 7The Chinese-born include persons born in Taiwan. 8People of Indian origin are defined by the census as Asian Indian alone or in any combination. 9Some representatives are members of both China-specific caucuses, so the gap is in fact even larger. 10The nuclear deal was also controversial in India. A government led by the Congress Party agreed to the deal, in spite of criticism from the Bharatiya Janata Party, which was then in the opposition (Tharoor 2012). 11The Joint Communique issued during Tun Razak’s visit included a statement that the PRC considers individuals who acquire Malaysian citizenship to be forfeiting China’s citizenship. Furthermore, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai made statements about how the ethnic Chinese Malaysians owe loyalty to Malaysia and had no further links with China (Baginda 2015, 163–67). 12Liow (2000) downplays the extent to which the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, and especially the younger generation, have a sense of political attachment to China. As described above, however, the ethnic Chinese identity in Malaysia remains salient. 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Regime Type and Diaspora Politics: A Dyadic Approach

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Abstract

Why do some diaspora groups, but not others, play a prominent role in the formalization of cooperative political ties between their country of origin and their country of residence? This article adopts a novel dyadic approach to the study of diaspora politics by arguing that diaspora politics are simultaneously structured by regime type in the country of origin and in the country of residence. Diaspora groups can play a prominent role in the formalization of cooperative foreign policy ties between their country of origin and their country of residence in democracy–democracy dyads (i.e., when the country of origin and the country of residence are both democratic). In all other dyads (including authoritarian–authoritarian), diaspora groups’ political impact on the formalization of cooperative foreign policy ties tends to be limited. The democracy–democracy dyad approximates a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition; nationalism and international economic strategies adopted by the country of origin help shape diaspora politics. This article examines all four regime type dyads by focusing on diaspora politics in authoritarian Malaysia and democratic United States, which have notable populations of Chinese and of Indian origin. Introduction Why do some diaspora groups play an important role in the formalization of cooperative political ties between their country of origin and their country of residence, while other diaspora groups lack such influence? Answering this question requires us to simultaneously study diaspora politics in the country of origin and in the country of residence. Regime type in the country of origin and in the country of residence structures and constrains foreign policy influence by diaspora groups. We should think of this structure in terms of dyads defined by regime type (i.e., a democracy/authoritarianism dichotomy). In the democracy/democracy dyad (i.e., when the country of origin and the country of residence are both democratic), the diaspora can play a prominent role in the formalization of foreign policy cooperation. In the three other dyads, including the authoritarian/authoritarian one, diaspora groups are more likely to be limited to having an economic rather than a political impact. I argue that a democracy–democracy dyad approximates a necessary cause allowing diaspora groups to contribute to the formalization of foreign policy cooperation. A democracy–democracy dyad is not, however, a sufficient cause of such cooperation. Variation in nationalism and international economic strategies adopted by the country of origin helps explain diaspora engagement policymaking. In addition to diaspora politics, this analysis helps us address larger theoretical questions about the role of democracy in international relations and about domestic political sources of international cooperation. Studying diaspora engagement challenges and expands our understanding of the dichotomy between voice and exit (Hirschman 1970). Emigrants have left their country of origin, but some of them continue to impact that country’s politics. Researching diaspora engagement also has increasing policy relevance. Economic links between diasporas and their country of origin (e.g., remittances) have grown (Riddle 2008). Diaspora engagement is an increasingly important policy issue for the United States. President Barack Obama’s administration has emphasized public-to-private and people-to-people mechanisms of global outreach. Those mechanisms involve diaspora outreach. The Global Partnership Initiative at the State Department is an example of this approach becoming formalized (author’s personal communication with State Department and USAID officials, November and December 2010). In spite of their importance, key aspects of diaspora politics, including diaspora advocacy, are understudied (Newland 2010). The literature has neglected to study diaspora politics in countries of origin and countries of residence simultaneously (Tsuda 2012). I argue that a dyadic approach is essential to the study of diaspora politics and provide a novel empirical approach that examines the determinants of diaspora politics in countries of origin and countries of residence simultaneously. I test my claims by comparing and contrasting the extent of foreign policy influence by four diaspora groups: people of Chinese and of Indian origin in Malaysia and in the United States. This research design examines all four regime type dyads (China and Malaysia are authoritarian countries; India and the United States are democracies). The next section describes the theory proposed in this article in more detail. The third section addresses alternative arguments and situates the argument in the literature. The fourth section describes the research design and the analysis. The fifth section concludes. How Regime Type Dyads Structure Diaspora Politics Diasporas, Institutions, and Cooperation The definition of the term diaspora is contested, and whether or not an individual belongs to a diaspora is to some extent self-defined (Butler 2001). Shain and Barth (2003, 542) define a diaspora as “a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland—whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control.” Faist (2010, 12–13) argues that most of the definitions of the term diaspora incorporate three characteristics: migration or dispersal, cross-border experiences with the homeland, and “some sort of cultural distinctiveness of the diaspora vis-à-vis other groups.” In this article, the focus is on communities of Chinese and of Indian origin who reside in the United States and in Malaysia.1 The dependent variable is the extent of a diaspora group’s impact on and involvement in the formalization of cooperative political ties between the country of origin and the country of residence. Formalized cooperation can take the form of building institutions, conceptualized following North (1990) as the rules of the game (“humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions”), or of building political organizations. An example of cooperative institutionalization is the advent of the US–India nuclear agreement, discussed in more detail below. Organization building refers to the advent of organizations based in the country of residence that seek to promote cooperation (e.g., closer security ties), between the country of origin and the country of residence via political mechanisms (e.g., lobbying, generating and disseminating information on the benefits of cooperation, etc.). Diasporas can have an impact on institutionalized cooperation by helping mobilize domestic political support (e.g., for approval of international agreements in the legislature). Diaspora engagement could also be built into institutions focused on the bilateral relations between the countries of residence and of origin.2 By contrast, diaspora participation in bilateral political ties between the country of origin and the country of residence may be discouraged and is more likely to face obstacles: I argue that this outcome is more likely in settings other than democracy/democracy dyads. Diasporas may also be unwilling to support an authoritarian regime in the country of origin (Mirilovic 2015). Some diasporas with an authoritarian country of origin based in democracies (e.g., Cuban Americans) may be well positioned to push for tough policies (e.g., sanctions) toward their country of origin. The institutionalization of cooperative ties may be partly conditional on the country of origin also being interested in forming links with its diaspora. That may not be the case: countries of origin sometimes ignore the diaspora, and sometimes even condemn and persecute coethnics abroad and their relatives at home. Partly for this reason, understanding diaspora politics requires analyzing it simultaneously in the country of origin and the country of residence. Impact of Regime Type Dyads I argue that democracy–democracy dyads play a key role in allowing diaspora groups to promote cooperative policymaking between their country of origin and their country of residence. This is the case because diaspora groups can appeal to shared democratic norms and benefit from positive branding effects and because democracy leads to increased transparency, which can lessen concerns over diaspora influence. Norms such as alteration in power (i.e., the ruling party peacefully steps down from power upon losing an election), and increased transparency due to free speech protections and the presence of independent media, are key characteristics of democratic states (Maoz and Russett 1993; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010, 3) define democracies as “regimes in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections.” Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy emphasizes two dimensions: contestation and participation. Elections should be contested in a meaningful manner: Multiple parties and candidates should be involved, those parties should have an opportunity to campaign (e.g., a lack of restrictions on free speech and assembly, the opposition should have access to the media), and upon losing an election, the ruling party should peacefully step down from power. Participation refers to the relative size of the electorate. Restrictions on the franchise, such as those based on gender, ethnicity, or property ownership, reduce the extent to which a polity is democratic. Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013) (based on Dahl’s [1971] definition of democracy) and Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) (using the alternation criterion) construct and operationalize dichotomous regime type indicators, classifying different countries as either democratic or authoritarian.3 We should expect politics in democracies to be more transparent than politics in authoritarian states in part because meaningful contestation implies free speech and assembly. Free speech, assembly, and a lack of restrictions on the media increase the availability of reliable political information, relative to countries where political debates are tightly controlled and constrained and the media lacks independence. We should also expect democracies to share important norms, such as peaceful alternation. Democracy in the country of origin facilitates political efforts of its diaspora residing in another democracy when those efforts intend to strengthen the political ties between the two countries. In other words, if both the country of origin and the country of residence are democracies, this will facilitate the efforts of the diaspora to strengthen and formalize political ties between the two countries. That is the case for two reasons. First, there is a positive branding effect of democracy, particularly in political settings. Policymakers and business people who operate in such settings, such as the legislature, electoral campaigns, or associations that seek to exercise political influence, prefer being associated with a democracy (which shares political norms with the democratic country of residence) to being associated with an authoritarian state. All else equal, they will seek to cooperate with organizations and groups that promote ties with another democracy, rather than with those that promote ties to an authoritarian state. Members of a diaspora with a democratic country of origin benefit from being able to make appeals to those shared norms. Shain (1994) argues that US-based diasporas seek to justify their political actions in terms of American democratic values. Second, having an authoritarian country of origin may exacerbate the political vulnerabilities diasporans face when attempting to influence foreign policymaking in their country of residence. Those may include concerns about the perceived trade-off between the national interest and interest group influence, about alleged dual loyalties, and about infiltration and espionage (Baron 2009). Authoritarian regime type in the country of origin can exacerbate these concerns due to the relative lack of transparency in authoritarian states. By contrast, a corresponding affinity between authoritarian states is weaker or nonexistent. In other words, diasporans whose country of origin is authoritarian will not benefit politically from that fact even if their country of residence is also authoritarian. That is the case in part because authoritarian states tend to extend fewer rights to their immigrant populations than democracies. Migrant populations in authoritarian states have difficulty influencing policymaking in their country of residence regardless of the political system of their country of origin (Kapiszewski 2001; Mirilovic 2010). Authoritarian countries may seek to restrict transnational political ties of their diaspora or minority populations whom they view as a potential political threat. Moreover, authoritarian solidarity in the contemporary world is limited. Many contemporary authoritarian states claim to be democratic in their rhetoric and/or hold sham elections (Schedler 2009). Such behavior appears to be inconsistent with the idea of taking pride in the authoritarian nature of one’s political system and with emphasizing, for branding or normative reasons, political associations with other such systems. Diaspora politics in the three other dyads (democratic country of residence-authoritarian country of origin, authoritarian country of residence-democratic country of origin, and authoritarian country of residence-authoritarian country of origin) are structured in a way that makes it difficult for diaspora groups to successfully push for and participate in formalized international cooperation. Diaspora groups based in those settings can have a large economic impact. They may be economically successful in the country of residence and contribute to the economy of the country of origin via remittances or via investment. However, their impact on cooperative bilateral ties between the country of origin and the country of residence is more likely to be economic, rather than political. The facilitating effect applies to diaspora groups that seek to strengthen ties between their countries of origin and residence. By contrast, diasporans from authoritarian states who reside in a democracy may be well positioned to advocate for tough policies toward the regime in the country of origin. In other words, diaspora groups may be effective in encouraging a democratic country of residence to use “sticks” against an authoritarian country of residence, as well as in encouraging the provision of “carrots” when the country of origin is democratic. For example, groups representing Cuban Americans have been influential proponents of the US embargo on Cuba (Rubenzer 2011). While the focus in this article is on the building of the cooperative international ties, the claim that diaspora groups can effectively lobby against their authoritarian states of origin is consistent with the main claims of the article. Regime type affinity, including within democracy–democracy dyads, is not a sufficient cause of cooperation, as illustrated by the history of US–India relations. Both countries have been democratic during most of the post-World War II period. However, the relationship between the United States and India was characterized by notable tensions during the cold war, when India built ties with the Soviet Union while the US cooperated with India’s rival Pakistan. US–India relations were notably tense following India’s intervention in what was then East Pakistan in 1971 (Widmaier 2005). The relations between the United States and India have improved in recent decades; I argue that diaspora politics contributed to this change. Table 1 lists the four dyads defined by regime type, provides an example of a diaspora group within each dyad, and states the type of impact a diaspora group located in a given dyad may have on strengthening bilateral ties between its country of origin and country of residence. Table 1. Regime type dyads and diaspora politics   Country of origin   Democracy  Authoritarian  Destination country  Democracy  Political and economic (e.g., Indian Americans)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in the Philippines)  Authoritarian  Economic (e.g., Indians in the United Arab Emirates)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in Malaysia)    Country of origin   Democracy  Authoritarian  Destination country  Democracy  Political and economic (e.g., Indian Americans)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in the Philippines)  Authoritarian  Economic (e.g., Indians in the United Arab Emirates)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in Malaysia)  Table 1. Regime type dyads and diaspora politics   Country of origin   Democracy  Authoritarian  Destination country  Democracy  Political and economic (e.g., Indian Americans)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in the Philippines)  Authoritarian  Economic (e.g., Indians in the United Arab Emirates)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in Malaysia)    Country of origin   Democracy  Authoritarian  Destination country  Democracy  Political and economic (e.g., Indian Americans)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in the Philippines)  Authoritarian  Economic (e.g., Indians in the United Arab Emirates)  Economic (e.g., Chinese in Malaysia)  Democracy–democracy dyads can allow diasporans to effectively push for formalized political cooperation between the country of origin and the country of residence. The success of such efforts may be partly conditional on whether there is interest in such cooperation in the country of origin. Nationalism and international economic strategies help explain variations in such interest. Explaining Destination Country Policymakers’ Motivations: Nationalism and International Economic Strategies Nationalism is an ideology that seeks to establish or promote the unity, identity, and autonomy of a nation or potential nation (Shulman 2000). Nationalists may be interested in the affairs of their coethnics abroad because they emphasize national identity and unity. They are particularly likely to support diaspora engagement as a means of promoting links between coethnics separated by international borders. Nationalists may believe that the absence of such links contributes to a lack of national unity and potentially lead to a loss of conationals via the assimilation of the diaspora into the dominant culture of their country of residence (Shulman 2000). While nationalism generally leads to more diaspora engagement, this pattern is not entirely linear. Increases in nationalism can weaken links between the country of origin and its diaspora population. Instead of building links with the diaspora, nationalists may condemn diasporans as traitors, cut off contacts with them, and in some cases persecute them and/or their relatives who remained at home. Nationalists may perceive the decision to emigrate as an act of disloyalty to one’s homeland. Furthermore, they might regard diasporans with suspicion because they may have close contacts with foreigners and because they may have been assimilated into the dominant culture of their country of residence. Nationalist episodes involving extreme suspicions and persecution of diasporans are more likely to occur in authoritarian states where political transparency is relatively low (see the example of the Cultural Revolution below). The nonlinear relationship between nationalism and diaspora engagement has two largely counterintuitive implications for the study of the links between domestic politics and international relations. First, while increases in nationalism are often associated with a higher risk of international conflict, they may also lead to more international cooperation and improved bilateral ties between the country of origin and the country of residence of the diaspora. Second, increases in nationalist concerns about the diaspora do not necessarily lead to stronger ties between the diaspora and the country of origin; they can lead to the weakening of those ties. Meanwhile, international economic strategies can be divided into two broad categories. Some countries emphasize self-sufficiency and are skeptical of international economic links. They pursue autarky, seek to protect domestic industries, and adopt barriers (e.g., tariffs) to international economic flows. Other countries prioritize economic efficiency over self-sufficiency and embrace world markets by lowering barriers to trade and to foreign investment. Countries that pursue international economic openness are more likely to engage their diaspora than countries that embrace autarky. Diasporas can facilitate international economic integration. Their human and financial capital and their contacts at home and in the destination country can facilitate investment and trade links between the two countries. Diasporans may possess knowledge about the conditions and the practices at their country of origin which other foreign investors lack. Diaspora networks may facilitate foreign investment by reducing transaction and information costs (Leblang 2010). Countries that seek international economic integration have an incentive to pursue those economic links via diaspora engagement. Countries that seek autarky lack this incentive. In the context of China and India, nationalism and international economic strategies help explain why policymakers’ interest in diaspora engagement has shifted over time. The Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966, was a period of ideological and nationalist extremism in China (Oksenberg 1986). It ushered in persecution of groups regarded as suspect by the government. Among those targeted were the relatives of the overseas Chinese, the returned overseas Chinese, and the officials of government agencies conducting outreach to the overseas Chinese (Fitzgerald 1972, author’s personal communication with an International Relations Professor in Beijing, May 11, 2010). The government regarded these groups as suspect for two reasons. First, the government considered them a capitalist group because many overseas Chinese were successful businessmen. Second, the overseas Chinese and their relatives at home were suspected due to their foreign ties (Chang 1980). They were targeted, in part, due to nationalist concerns about loyalty and foreign influences. The perceived turning away from China by the overseas Chinese was resented in Beijing (Wang 2001). Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission officials were accused of not doing enough to mobilize the overseas Chinese in order to facilitate class struggle abroad. By 1968, organizations dealing with the overseas Chinese ceased to function (Fitzgerald 1972). China’s diaspora engagement policy changed with the end of the Cultural Revolution and the advent of economic liberalization in the late 1970s. The reforms included opening the Chinese economy to the world markets and China’s exports and FDI inflows increased rapidly. A large fraction of the foreign investment came from the overseas Chinese, who contributed up to 70 percent of FDI inflows into China in the 1990s (Zhu 2007). In 1978, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council was established. In 1984, the National Congress of Returned Overseas Chinese and their Relatives, held every five years, was launched. Between 1983 and 1985, special privileges were granted by legislation and by State Council provisions to overseas Chinese who wanted to invest in China (Barabantseva 2005). By the 1980s, China was reaching out to its diaspora notably in order to encourage international investment. In the period that followed independence (which India attained in 1947), the Indian government prioritized stable intergovernmental relations over links with overseas Indians when the two interests conflicted. The advent of economic liberalization in the early 1990s, and the coming to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1998 (the BJP has more of a Hindu nationalist orientation than the center-left Congress Party), brought about the key turning point in India’s diaspora engagement. Prior to the reforms, India pursued a strategy of economic self-sufficiency. The reforms opened India’s economy to the world markets. Investment by overseas Indians provided an important source of capital inflows into India (Rana 2009; Naujoks 2010). The key policy changes regarding diaspora engagement in India starting in the late 1990s include the following. In 1998, the government introduced the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) card. The PIO card facilitates the travel of overseas Indians to India, as well as their investment in India. In 2002, Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) was launched. The PDB is an annual gathering that brings together representatives of the diaspora and top Indian officials. In 2004, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) was established (Rana 2009). The creation of a separate ministry dedicated to diaspora issues illustrates the increasing importance of those issues to the Indian government. Situating the Argument in the Literature Scholars have explored links between regime type, or political institutions and governance structures more broadly, and diaspora politics. Freedman (2000) claims that institutional settings, and the incentive structures they generate, explain cross-national variation in Chinese communities’ political participation. Smith (2003) argues that regime change is an important variable driving diaspora engagement, while Ragazzi (2009) emphasizes global shifts in neoliberal values. A different claim linking democracy and diaspora politics is that diaspora activism or emigration cause democratization in the country of origin. Kapur (2010) argues that elite emigration has contributed to the advent and the maintenance of democracy in India. Other scholars posit that diasporas socialized with democratic values can contribute to democratization at the country of origin ( Shain 1999; Koinova 2009). The case of China appears to be problematic for the claims that diasporas or elite emigration cause democracy. China has had a long history of emigration, including of the elites and/or to Western countries such as the United States, but it has yet to democratize. Previous work linking democracy and diaspora politics lacks the dyadic approach that is central to this article. Studying the relationship between regime type and diaspora politics only in, for example, the country or residence, gives us an incomplete understanding of diaspora politics. For example, Koinova (2013) argues that, in the case of the Kosovar Albanian diaspora in the United States and the United Kingdom, violence levels in the homeland affect the extent of moderation or radicalism in diaspora politics. Alternative explanations of diaspora activism emphasize group-level cultural and/or economic attributes. For example, traditional theories of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995) posit that more educated and/or wealthier individuals are more likely to be politically active than less educated and/or less wealthy individuals. Other scholars have argued that group-level cultural traits may explain political participation, or a lack thereof. Freedman (2000) states that this perspective (which she treats as an alternative argument) has been prominent in the study of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. For example, Pye (1985) argues that Asian cultural values are linked with an authoritarian leadership style. If arguments emphasizing the political impact of cultural identities characteristic of ethnic groups are correct, we would expect members of a given ethnic group to be relatively politically active or inactive regardless of their country of residence. This article does not claim that diasporas are the only relevant actors in international relations or that traditional explanations of international relations, such as those focusing on great power politics, are irrelevant. The relations between the United States, China, and India have been shaped by geopolitical concerns and by balance of power considerations. The United States improved ties with China in the 1970s partly in order to contain the Soviet Union, while geopolitical developments such as the end of the cold war and the Bush administration’s response to the attacks of 9/11 affected US–India ties (Singh 2007; Kissinger 2011). However, even interstate relations usually regarded as dominated by high politics and geopolitical concerns, such as the US–China relationship during the cold war, are to some extent influenced by domestic politics. The Committee of One Million (led by Marvin Liebman and Walter Judd [R-MN]) was active between 1953 and 1971 and regarded as the “China lobby” in American politics. The principal issue for the committee was its opposition to granting the PRC a seat at the United Nations instead of the Republic of China government in Taiwan. The committee also lobbied for other tough American policies toward the PRC, for example against trade with the PRC. The committee conducted petition drives and sought to influence American presidential administrations and legislators; it claimed bipartisan support from a large number of members of Congress. The committee’s efforts may have contributed to the delay of several decades from the establishment of the PRC to its assuming of China’s seat at the United Nations (Bachrack 1976).4 The relevance of geopolitics, however, does point to a possible limiting condition of the argument: Diasporas are unlikely to completely reverse the foreign policies of their country of residence (Haney and Vanderbush 1999). Even though diasporas may matter primarily when at least some shared interest in improved bilateral ties is already in place, that effect is still important. Mancur Olson (1971) has demonstrated that shared interests often do not lead to cooperation: collective action problems have to be overcome first. Relatively small but motivated groups with access to resources, such as some diaspora groups, can help overcome collective action problems associated with building domestic political support needed for closer bilateral ties.5 Furthermore, perceived strategic convergence between foreign policy preferences of the country of residence government and the goals of diaspora advocacy may in some cases be a consequence of diaspora group influence rather than its precondition (Rubenzer 2008). The argument and the findings in this article may also contribute to addressing prominent international relations and comparative politics debates. The literature should do more to link international relations theory and the study of diaspora politics (Koinova 2012). I argue that domestic politics helps explain variation in international cooperation. That pattern challenges structural realist views of international relations, which posit that we should think of states as black boxes, within which internal developments are irrelevant (e.g., Waltz 1979).6 The claims and findings in this article may help fill gaps within democratic peace theory. Previous research claims a robust empirical relationship between democratic dyads and a lack of interstate war (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993). However, the question of what causal logic explains this pattern remains contested (Rosato 2003). The causal logics identified by proponents of democratic peace theory include those that emphasize shared values between democracies (Maoz and Russett’s [1993] normative model) and those that emphasize the impact of democracy on the availability of better information (Schultz 1998). The diaspora politics argument developed in this article may add to those theories by identifying actors who may promote international cooperation. Shared values present opportunities for cooperation, while lack of transparency in authoritarian states reduces such opportunities. However, for cooperation to occur, actors have to make arguments that emphasize such shared values. Diasporans may be one group of actors with the inclination and the ability to do so. Meanwhile, comparative analyses of the Indian and the Chinese diaspora engagement policies are rare (exceptions include the work of Das [2010] and of Zhu [2007]). More generally, to the best of my knowledge, previous research does not examine diaspora politics in all four regime type variation dyads simultaneously. Furthermore, immigration and diaspora politics in authoritarian settings are generally understudied. This is problematic because, in order to understand the impact of democracy on diaspora politics, we also need to study diaspora politics in the absence of democracy. Finally, debates over whether and how regime type variation affects policymaking are prominent within comparative politics. Some scholars argue that democracy leads to systematically different policy choices (e.g., Boix 2003). Others claim that democracies and authoritarian states adopt similar policies in a number of key areas (e.g., Mulligan, Gill, and Sala-i-Martin 2004). This article seeks to demonstrate the importance of regime type to diaspora politics. Research Design and Analysis Case Selection This article focuses on four groups: Chinese and Indian Americans, and Malaysians of Chinese and Indian origin. In terms of temporal scope, the article focuses primarily on contemporary politics, but it also considers evidence from earlier in the post-World War II period. There are three principal reasons for choosing this research design. First, the research design incorporates each regime type dyad quadrant—I examine a group with a democratic country of origin and residence (Indian Americans), with a democratic country of origin and an authoritarian country of residence (Malaysians of Indian descent), with an authoritarian country of origin and a democratic country of residence (Chinese Americans), and with an authoritarian country of origin and residence (Malaysians of Chinese descent). This approach has the advantage of being particularly comprehensive and is novel if not unique in the literature. Second, focusing on this set of cases allows us to hold alternative explanations constant. For example, variation in political participation and outcomes across groups of Indian origin in the United States and Malaysia cannot be explained by their ethnic background, which in this analysis is held roughly constant. For example, while there is variation across individuals who identify as Indian (and reside in the United States or in Malaysia) in terms of region of origin and other factors, those individuals share an Indian ethnic identity. Comparing and contrasting foreign policy choices and outcomes involving China and India also allows us to hold potential alternative explanations constant: China and India share a location in Asia, great economic potential and population size, and a long history of civilizational achievement. Third, examining US relations with China and India, and the role the diaspora plays in their rise, addresses substantively important issues. The US–China relationship is arguably the most important contemporary bilateral relationship. Meanwhile, the diaspora plays an important economic role in China and in India, affecting economies consequential to millions of people and to the world economy. I proceed by analyzing the key cases in detail. Diaspora influence on the formalization of international cooperation is difficult to quantify. I rely on two measurement strategies. First, I compare and contrast expert rankings and evaluations of diaspora influence on foreign policymaking between their country of origin and their country of residence. Second, I compare and contrast the extent of institutionalization of cooperative ties through mechanisms that involve diaspora participation. United States Two key patterns emerge when comparing the role that Chinese and Indian Americans play in affecting US foreign policy toward their respective countries of origin. First, in expert rankings and evaluations, Indian Americans, unlike Chinese Americans, are often listed as an increasingly influential interest group (e.g., Lindsay 2002, discussed in greater detail below). That is the case even though Chinese and Indian Americans are roughly comparable in terms of numbers and of access to resources. Second, political bilateral links between the United States and India that involve active participation of Indian Americans are more formalized than the corresponding links with China. By contrast, in terms of more purely economic links, the United States is much more closely connected with China than with India. Table 2 displays the relevant demographic profile of Chinese7 and Indian Americans8: Table 2. Chinese and Indian Americans, 2000s   Chinese Americans  Indian Americans  US total or average  # born in China or India (millions)  1.5  1  281.4  Education: BA or higher, pop. 25 and older (%)  47.7  69.1  24.4  Income: $50,000 a year or higher, households (%)  49.6  66.9  41.9  Ethnically Chinese or Indian (millions)  3.54  2.77  281.4    Chinese Americans  Indian Americans  US total or average  # born in China or India (millions)  1.5  1  281.4  Education: BA or higher, pop. 25 and older (%)  47.7  69.1  24.4  Income: $50,000 a year or higher, households (%)  49.6  66.9  41.9  Ethnically Chinese or Indian (millions)  3.54  2.77  281.4  Source: US Census Bureau (2000, 2007). The education and income numbers are for 2000 for the Chinese- and the Indian-born, respectively. The numbers of people who are ethnically Chinese or Indian are 2007 estimates. Table 2. Chinese and Indian Americans, 2000s   Chinese Americans  Indian Americans  US total or average  # born in China or India (millions)  1.5  1  281.4  Education: BA or higher, pop. 25 and older (%)  47.7  69.1  24.4  Income: $50,000 a year or higher, households (%)  49.6  66.9  41.9  Ethnically Chinese or Indian (millions)  3.54  2.77  281.4    Chinese Americans  Indian Americans  US total or average  # born in China or India (millions)  1.5  1  281.4  Education: BA or higher, pop. 25 and older (%)  47.7  69.1  24.4  Income: $50,000 a year or higher, households (%)  49.6  66.9  41.9  Ethnically Chinese or Indian (millions)  3.54  2.77  281.4  Source: US Census Bureau (2000, 2007). The education and income numbers are for 2000 for the Chinese- and the Indian-born, respectively. The numbers of people who are ethnically Chinese or Indian are 2007 estimates. The demographic profile of the two groups is similar. They constitute a relatively small share of the US population and electorate. However, on average, they tend to be wealthier and more educated than the rest of the population. While their demographic profiles are relatively similar, there is a significant difference in their level of foreign policy influence as estimated by experts. Scholars often point out the increasing influence of Indian Americans. Mearsheimer and Walt (2007, 8) list groups representing Indian Americans as one of the ethnic lobbies that has successfully influenced US foreign policy. In her discussion of successful lobbying efforts by diaspora groups, Newland (2010) examines the impact of Indian Americans on the US–India nuclear deal. Lerner (2014) discusses the increasing influence of Indian Americans on American foreign policymaking and on American domestic politics in general. According to Lindsay (2002), Indian Americans are the group most likely to emerge as a “political powerhouse,” while Chinese Americans have historically been quiet on foreign policy. Chinese Americans are not usually mentioned by experts as a key group influencing US foreign policymaking. More generally, experts perceive overseas Chinese as tending to lack political influence in destination countries where they live. According to Shain (1994, 833), the overseas Chinese have traditionally not been influential in home and host politics. The increasing influence of Indian Americans has been an important contributing factor leading to the advent and rapid growth of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans. Congressional caucuses, unlike congressional committees, do not have a formal legislative role. However, they influence policymaking via agenda setting and by helping to inform their members and to coordinate their actions (Webb, Mullholan, and Stevens 1985). The India Caucus is the largest country-specific caucus in the US Congress; it has roughly twice as many members as the China-specific caucuses combined9 (see Table 3 for information about the caucuses; e.g., in the 112th Congress the India Caucus had at least 180 members). In the Senate, there is a comparable gap that differentiates the caucuses that focus on India and on China, respectively. The US Senate India Caucus was launched in 2004 and had an initial thirty-two members (BBC News 2004). By 2009, it had thirty-seven members, and by late 2011, the membership had grown to forty. The Senate India Caucus is the largest country-specific caucus in the Senate (The Hindu 2009; Embassy of India, Washington, DC 2011). By contrast, the US–China Senate Working Group is a by-invitation ad-hoc group that does not have a permanent membership list (author’s correspondence with Igor Khrestin [2012], Senator Mark Kirk’s [R-IL] Legislative Assistant). The India Caucus is much larger than the combined membership of the caucuses focused on China, even though US–China relations tend to attract much more popular attention within the United States than US–India relations. The discrepancy illustrates the advantage that advocates of stronger bilateral ties between democracies enjoy due to branding effects in political settings. Indian Americans have made an important contribution to the creation and the growth of the India Caucus. For example, Kapur (2010) cites one of the founders and a cochair of the caucus, Jim McDermott (D-WA): “Indian-Americans on our staff were largely responsible for the launch [of the Caucus].” Kapur (2010) also states that members of Congress are partly interested in joining as a means of accessing political support, including campaign contributions, from Indian Americans. We can observe a similar discrepancy when comparing the US-India Business Council with the US–China Business Council (see Table 4 for Business Council data). Business Councils bring together American companies that conduct business in the country concerned and assist them with political advocacy. For example, the US-India Business Council helped rally political support for the US–India nuclear deal in 2006 (Kamdar 2007). Furthermore, the US-India Business Council generated estimates of commercial opportunities for US companies from nuclear trade with India that were cited in a Committee on Foreign Relations hearing by Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) (US Congress Senate 2009, 48). The bilateral economic links between the United States and China are much more extensive than the bilateral economic links between the United States and India. The volume of trade between the United States and China is about eight times larger than the corresponding volume of trade with India, while China attracts much more total (from the United States and from other countries combined) FDI than India (see, e.g., Huang and Khanna 2003). However, the US-India Business Council is larger than the US–China Business Council, roughly by a three to two margin. This pattern is again consistent with a branding effect. All else equal, companies, like members of Congress, prefer to be associated with a democracy to being associated with an authoritarian state in a political realm. By contrast, investment and trade decisions are made primarily based on profit motives, and with less regard for the regime type of the trading or investment partner. Indian Americans have also played an important role in promoting international cooperation between the United States and India. Most notably, Indian Americans contributed to the passage of the US–India nuclear deal—a key diplomatic breakthrough in Indo–US relations. The nuclear deal was controversial in the United States10; its opponents argued that it undermined norms of nuclear nonproliferation. Organizations of Indian Americans played an important role in persuading members of Congress to support the nuclear deal (Kirk 2008; Newland 2010). Newland (2010) describes US India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) efforts to track the progress of the deal, to reach out to potential allies in the Congress (including members of the Congressional Black Caucus and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus), and to encourage USINPAC members to write to members of Congress in support of the deal. USINPAC also made campaign contributions to senators and members of the House who represent areas with significant Indian American populations (Newland 2010). According to Federal Election Commission (FEC) data, in 2005–2006, USINPAC spent about $150,000 on contributions to committees. In their lobbying efforts, USINPAC documents emphasize that India is a democracy (e.g., USINPAC 2008). Members of the Indian American community placed advertisements in major newspapers and lobbied prominent policymakers in support of the bill (Hanifa 2006). Statements from American elected officials also support the claim that organizations representing Indian Americans and the US-India Business Council played an important role in the passage of the bill. Congressmen Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and Joe Crowley (D-NY) emphasized the importance of work done by Indian Americans to the passage of the bill in the House (Dutt 2006). According to Joe Wilson (R-SC), Ron Somers, the president of the US-Indian Business Council, is one of the individuals who made an essential contribution to the passage of the bill. Wilson also stated that the bill has the support of the Indian–American community, and that the United States and India are both democracies (Congressional Record 2008, 33). In addition to the US–India nuclear deal, Indian Americans have sought to influence other US policies toward India. According to Talbott (2006, 36), “Indian Americans pushed an increasingly responsive Congress for more leniency toward new Delhi on virtually all issues.” For example, Talbott (2006, 127) claims that the influence of Indian Americans contributed to the passage of an Amendment to the Arms Control Act that encouraged the Clinton administration to waive sanctions it had imposed on New Delhi in response to its 1998 nuclear test. By contrast, international agreements of comparative relevance (e.g., to the US–India nuclear deal) between the United States and China, to which organizations of Chinese Americans prominently contributed, appear to be lacking. Malaysia In this section, I argue that neither the Chinese nor the Indian community in Malaysia has had a disproportionally large influence on Kuala Lumpur’s foreign policy toward China and India, respectively. Malaysian policymakers do to some extent consider the interests of their ethnic Chinese and Indian citizens; however, the Chinese and Indian communities in general have a limited influence on Malay-dominated Malaysian politics (Pepinsky 2009). The Chinese community in Malaysia tends to lack an influence on Malaysia’s foreign policymaking even though the Chinese community in Malaysia is numerically relatively large and disproportionally wealthy. This pattern contradicts the predictions of traditional theories of political participation. Moreover, the authoritarian–authoritarian dyad does not appear to facilitate a prominent role for Malaysians of Chinese origin in influencing Malaysia’s foreign policymaking toward China. Meanwhile, the Indian community in Malaysia also does not appear to benefit from its country of origin being democratic. These patterns are consistent with the prediction of the theory presented in this article about the importance of democracy–democracy dyads. Malaysia is commonly described by scholars as a soft authoritarian state (Pepinsky 2009). Elections are regularly held. However, opposition leaders are sometimes subjected to pressure and harassment. Malaysia is coded as an authoritarian state in cross-national regime type indicators, such as the one by Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013). The Chinese community accounts for about 23 percent of Malaysia’s population (The World Factbook 2014). Ethnic Chinese Malaysians are disproportionally economically successful. For example, in 1995, the income of an average Chinese household was about 1.8 times higher than the income of an average Malay household (Freedman 2000). The Indian community accounts for 7.3 percent of Malaysia’s population (Singh 2011). Members of the Indian community have income levels that are on average similar to those of ethnic Malays. Meanwhile, several notable social problems disproportionally affect the Indian community, who are overrepresented among juvenile delinquents and underrepresented among university graduates (Kaur 2006). Ethnic identities are salient in Malaysian politics and society (Holst 2012). Freedman (2001) argues that Malaysian political institutions maintain ethnic distinctions within Malaysia. Chinese and Indian identities are politically salient in Malaysia, and Malaysians of Indian and Chinese origin have not become fully assimilated to the point where they would be indistinguishable from ethnic Malays. For example, most ethnic Chinese Malaysians speak Mandarin, unlike most ethnic Malays (Tan 2004). Many ethnic Chinese Malays take pride in China as a source of their culture with a long historical tradition (Nonini 1997, 208). According to Chu, Kang, and Huang (2015, 414), opinion poll evidence indicates that ethnic Chinese Malaysians are much more likely than their ethnic Malay compatriots to view the rise of China positively. Meanwhile, many ethnic Indian Malaysians take pride in the rise of India (Nagarajan 2008, 388). It is important to point out, however, that ethnic Chinese and Indian communities in Malaysia are not monolithic. As with other diaspora communities, there is variation across individuals in the extent to which they emphasize the distinctiveness of their culture, maintain an interest in their country of origin, and in terms of how they view their position in the society of the country of residence (Tan 2004; Sathian and Ngeow 2014). Scholars generally agree that Chinese and Indian Malaysians exercise less political influence than their numbers would indicate. Two developments demonstrate this pattern. First, Malaysia has adopted policies that discriminate in favor of the majority ethnic Malays at the expense of other groups. Most notably, the goal of the New Economic Policy, adopted in 1970, was to increase the share of the economy controlled by ethnic Malays. Ethnic Malays were given privileged status in awarding university admissions, employment decisions, and government contracts. Those privileges occur at the expense of the other communities in Malaysia (notably the Chinese). Other examples of policies that favor ethnic Malays include the 1967 National Language Bill, which made Malay the only official language in Malaysia (Heng 1999). Second, political parties that have represented ethnic Chinese and Indians (the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), respectively) have been part of governing coalitions in Malaysia. However, those coalitions were dominated by a party primarily representing ethnic Malays, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Both the MCA and the MIC have received criticism from members of the Chinese and Indian communities in Malaysia for their subordinate role and perceived failure to adequately advance the interests of those communities (Heng 1999; Kaur 2006; Ramasamy 2008). Have Chinese and Indian communities been able to influence Malaysia’s foreign policy toward China and India? The effect of the presence of the Chinese community on Malaysia on the relations between Beijing and Kuala Lumpur should probably be described as either negative or neutral. According to Acharya (1999, 134), “the fear of China continues (albeit in a low key manner) to serve as a device of shoring up Malay unity and hence as a basis for regime legitimization in Malaysia.” Baginda (2015, 18) argues that Malay politicians have used criticism of China to seek popular support among ethnic Malays and to question the loyalty of the Malaysian Chinese. Suspicions that ethnic Chinese have faced in Malaysia indicate that authoritarian–authoritarian dyads may not reduce concerns about diasporans’ loyalty like democracy–democracy dyads do. Baginda (2015) also claims that Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Tun Razak’s decision to visit Beijing and normalize relations with China in 1974 was partly motivated by Tun Razak seeking to improve how he was perceived by ethnic Chinese Malaysians. However, as the theoretical framework in this article predicts, Malaysia insisted on minimizing the political role of Chinese Malaysians in the Beijing–Kuala Lumpur relationship. A key Malaysian precondition for normalization was for China to encourage ethnic Chinese in Malaysia to be loyal to their country of residence and minimize their political ties with China (Baginda 2015).11Liow (2000) downplays the impact of communalism as a determinant of foreign policymaking in post-cold war Malaysia.12Kuik (2013, 35) argues that the impact of the ethnic Chinese community on Kuala Lumpur’s foreign policy toward China should not be overestimated. According to Kuik (2013, 35), Malaysia’ foreign policy decision making is centralized and elitist, with the policy makers, in a Malay-dominated political system, not necessarily concerned with the outlook of minority groups. People of Indian origin in Malaysia also do not exercise a disproportional influence on Malaysia’s foreign policy toward India. Rather, their status in Malaysia is a potential source of tension in the relations between the two countries. Singh (2011) describes the state of India–Malaysia relations as a missed opportunity. He argues that the Indian community is marginalized in Malaysia in both political and economic terms. In response to a 2003 incident in which 300 Indian citizens in Malaysia were “ill-treated” and “interrogated” by Malaysian authorities, the Indian government “reacted sharply and warned that any repetition of such incidents would affect bilateral ties” (Singh 2011, 95). In general, Singh (2011) states that mistreatment of persons of Indian origin in Malaysia has been a source of concern for the Indian authorities. He also claims that “[t]he Indian government has not been able to develop a strong economic constituency in Malaysia which could strengthen and expand the bilateral political and economic ties between the two countries (Singh 2011, 102).” By contrast, authoritarian–authoritarian dyads do allow for the building of strong economic ties between the country of origin and the country of residence. China is Malaysia’s second largest trading partner (Department of Statistics, Malaysia 2013). Given the disproportionate representation of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia’s economy, it is likely that ethnic Chinese businesspeople play a prominent role in this trade. Meanwhile, a high fraction of FDI into China comes from overseas Chinese investors (Katzenstein 2005). Assessing the Evidence Across the Cases A comparison between Chinese Malaysians and Indian Americans demonstrates the relevance of the causal logic emphasized by this article. Both groups are disproportionally wealthy; both come from a country that shares a regime type with their country of residence. Ethnic Chinese account for a larger share of the Malaysia population than Indian Americans do in the United States. However, Indian Americans have a notable impact on strengthening Washington, DC.–New Delhi ties, while Malaysians of Chinese descent tend to lack such an influence on the Beijing–Kuala Lumpur relationship. Engagement of the Indian American community is built into institutions such as the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, while Malaysia has sought to discourage the political involvement of ethnic Chinese Malaysians with China and with China–Malaysia relations. Ethnic Chinese in Malaysia have faced suspicions about the nature of their loyalties. This pattern is consistent with the claim that a democracy–democracy dyad greatly facilitates diaspora efforts to strengthen ties between the country of origin and the country of residence. By contrast, an authoritarian–authoritarian dyad does not facilitate such ties. A comparison between Indian Americans and people of Indian origin in Malaysia reveals a pattern that is not consistent with essentialist accounts of ethnicity. The former group is more politically influential than the latter group. Since both groups share an Indian identity, that identity cannot explain this divergence in outcomes. Consistent with the predictions of this article, the most notable political contribution of a diaspora group to formalization of cooperative foreign policy ties occurred in a democracy–democracy dyad (i.e., diaspora politics involving Indian Americans). Nationalism and international economic integration help explain the timing of the advent of the larger role for the diaspora. While the research design adopted in this article allows us to control for several alternative explanations, there may be other relevant differences between Indian and Chinese communities. For example, Uslaner (1998) claims that assimilation into American society and politics is considered to increase interest group effectiveness. However, Kapur (2010, 194) claims, citing data from Vigdor (2008), that Indian and Chinese Americans may be similar in terms of how assimilated they are into the “American mainstream.” Furthermore, Rubenzer and Redd (2010) argue that the extent to which a diasporic group is mobilized matters more than cultural similarity or the numerical size of the group in terms of effectively influencing policymakers. In addition to the extent of perceived assimilation into American or into Malaysian society, there may be other relevant differences between and among diaspora groups of Chinese and of Indian origin—in terms of region of origin, political ideology, and others. Questions such as the impact of the geopolitical relations between the United States and China, or of the impact of the difference in tactics that different diaspora groups adopt, should be studied further.13 Conclusions This article emphasizes a structural determinant of diaspora politics: regime type in the country of origin and the country of residence. The article advances a novel dyadic analysis, which posits that diaspora groups can play a key role in strengthening and formalizing bilateral ties between their country of origin and country of residence primarily in democracy–democracy dyads (when the country of origin and the country of residence of the diaspora group are both democratic). Democracy–democracy dyads approximate a permissive cause of such cooperation. Variation in country of origin developments and policy choices, such as nationalism and international economic strategy choices, helps explain when such cooperation will occur. This analysis modifies alternative arguments that posit that group-level attributes explain variations in political participation and influence. Differences in relative income, or in the size of a diaspora group, do not appear to be the only drivers of interest group influence. Essentialist claims about culture also do not appear to be supported by the evidence. The empirical analysis in this article follows a novel dyadic setup that extends the analysis to four different settings. However, future research should expand the testing still more broadly. We should test across a large number of diaspora groups based in a large number of different countries. The theory advanced in this paper could, for example, be applied to diaspora politics in the context of authoritarian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. GCC countries have some of the world’s highest per capita migrant stocks. However, migrants in GCC countries have a limited influence on the domestic or the international policy choices of those countries, regardless of whether those migrants come from democratic or authoritarian countries (Kapiszewski 2001). The findings in this article illustrate the relevance of studying domestic and international politics together. For example, while affinity between democracies may matter in international relations, realizing the potential for cooperation may depend on actors, including diasporans14, who make arguments emphasizing those norms within the domestic politics of those countries. Furthermore, the importance of diaspora politics may continue to increase. If global trends such as international economic integration and democratization continue they will facilitate further increases in the importance of diaspora engagement cross-nationally. Table 3. Congressional China and India caucuses     112th Congress    2006–2009*  2011–2012  Caucus on India and Indian Americans  152  180+  Congressional China caucus  34  40  US–China-Congressional Working Group  40  57      112th Congress    2006–2009*  2011–2012  Caucus on India and Indian Americans  152  180+  Congressional China caucus  34  40  US–China-Congressional Working Group  40  57  * Data on the India Caucus are from 2009; data for the China caucuses are from 2006. Sources: BBC News (2004), The Hindu (2009), Kapur (2010), Sutter (2007), http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress1/housecaucus/members.htm, http://joewilson.house.gov/Caucus/Congressional CaucusonIndiaandIndianAmericans.htm, http://forbes.house.gov/ChinaCaucus/Members/; author’s correspondence with Craddock (2012), Legislative Assistant for Representative Rick Larsen. Table 3. Congressional China and India caucuses     112th Congress    2006–2009*  2011–2012  Caucus on India and Indian Americans  152  180+  Congressional China caucus  34  40  US–China-Congressional Working Group  40  57      112th Congress    2006–2009*  2011–2012  Caucus on India and Indian Americans  152  180+  Congressional China caucus  34  40  US–China-Congressional Working Group  40  57  * Data on the India Caucus are from 2009; data for the China caucuses are from 2006. Sources: BBC News (2004), The Hindu (2009), Kapur (2010), Sutter (2007), http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress1/housecaucus/members.htm, http://joewilson.house.gov/Caucus/Congressional CaucusonIndiaandIndianAmericans.htm, http://forbes.house.gov/ChinaCaucus/Members/; author’s correspondence with Craddock (2012), Legislative Assistant for Representative Rick Larsen. Table 4. US-based business councils, trade, and FDI   China  India  US trade, $billion (2008)  409.2  50  Total FDI, $billion (2004)  61  5.5  Business Councils, member companies (2009)  213  318  Business Councils, member companies (2012)  239  362    China  India  US trade, $billion (2008)  409.2  50  Total FDI, $billion (2004)  61  5.5  Business Councils, member companies (2009)  213  318  Business Councils, member companies (2012)  239  362  Sources: US–India Business Council and US–China Business Council websites; Zhu (2007). Table 4. US-based business councils, trade, and FDI   China  India  US trade, $billion (2008)  409.2  50  Total FDI, $billion (2004)  61  5.5  Business Councils, member companies (2009)  213  318  Business Councils, member companies (2012)  239  362    China  India  US trade, $billion (2008)  409.2  50  Total FDI, $billion (2004)  61  5.5  Business Councils, member companies (2009)  213  318  Business Councils, member companies (2012)  239  362  Sources: US–India Business Council and US–China Business Council websites; Zhu (2007). Dr. Nikola Mirilovic is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department at the University of Central Florida. His work has been published or is forthcoming in Comparative Politics, International Political Science Review, Politics and Religion, and Political Studies. Dr. Mirilovic’s research examines links between domestic and international politics. In particular, his research interests include migration and diaspora politics, and the role of ideology and religion in international relations. Author’s note: The author would like to thank Nathan Ilderton, Binod Khadria, Barbara Kinsey, Shawn McHale, Deepa Ollapally, Rajesh Rajagopalan, JC Sharma, Shyam Sriram, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. Juliana Velasco provided excellent research assistance. 1I do not assume that all individuals of Chinese or of Indian origin identify with or maintain an interest in China or India (respectively). 2For example, Caucus on India and Indian Americans in the US Congress. 3Vreeland, Gandhi, and Cheibub (2010, 11) argue for considering regime type as a dichotomous variable in part because the distributions of ordinal regime type measures are bimodal with peaks at the extremes (i.e., relatively pure democracies and authoritarian states). Future research, potentially employing large n methods, however, could include ordinal measures of democracy in the analysis and explore differences between different types of nondemocracies. 4The committee was concerned with avoiding the appearance of being a “front” for foreign influences, and it avoided seeking contribution from Chinese sources and from Chinese Americans (Bachrack 1976, 191). This pattern illustrates the constraints that diasporans from authoritarian states may face when seeking to influence foreign policies of their country of residence toward their country of origin. 5For example, diasporas can help build political support for getting international treaties approved by the legislature. 6Waltz (1979, 122) concedes that understanding foreign policy choices requires considering states’ internal structures. 7The Chinese-born include persons born in Taiwan. 8People of Indian origin are defined by the census as Asian Indian alone or in any combination. 9Some representatives are members of both China-specific caucuses, so the gap is in fact even larger. 10The nuclear deal was also controversial in India. A government led by the Congress Party agreed to the deal, in spite of criticism from the Bharatiya Janata Party, which was then in the opposition (Tharoor 2012). 11The Joint Communique issued during Tun Razak’s visit included a statement that the PRC considers individuals who acquire Malaysian citizenship to be forfeiting China’s citizenship. Furthermore, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai made statements about how the ethnic Chinese Malaysians owe loyalty to Malaysia and had no further links with China (Baginda 2015, 163–67). 12Liow (2000) downplays the extent to which the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, and especially the younger generation, have a sense of political attachment to China. As described above, however, the ethnic Chinese identity in Malaysia remains salient. The ethnic Chinese Malaysians are more likely than ethnic Malays to have a favorable view of the rise of China. 13I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these points. 14Actors other than diasporans could fulfill this role as well, or relations may be pursued at the state-to-state level not involving the diaspora. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point. References Acharya Amitav. 1999. “Containment, Engagement or Counter-Dominance: Malaysia’s Response to the Rise of China.” In Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power , edited by Johnston Alastair Iain Ross Robert, 132– 55. London: Routledge. Bachrack Stanley D. 1976. The Committee of One Million. China Lobby Politics 1953–1971 . New York: Columbia University Press. Baginda Abdul Razak Abdullah. 2015. China-Malaysia Relations and Foreign Policy . London: Routledge. 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