While discussing U.S. foreign policy in Latin America on the campaign trail in October 1960, Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy declared that “whatever we do in Cuba itself … we must create a Latin America where freedom can flourish—where long enduring people know … that they are moving toward a better life for themselves and their children—where tyranny, isolated and despised, eventually withers on the vine.”1 Kennedy’s rhetoric illustrated a deep understanding of the issues facing the United States in the Western Hemisphere. No challenge was greater than that of the Cuban Revolution. Historian Thomas Wright notes that the revolution “embodied the aspirations and captured the imagination of Latin America’s masses as no other political movement had ever done.”2 Fidel Castro well understood his appeal, stating during the Second Declaration of Havana, “It is the duty of every revolutionary to make the revolution.”3 A 1962 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate posited, “From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has sought to gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for others and of himself as the leader of revolutionary forces throughout Latin America.”4 In stark contrast with many of his contemporary Latin American counterparts on the political left, Castro and his band of revolutionaries believed in the power of a vanguard movement fused with a reliance on Ernesto Ché Guevara’s foco theory.5 If Castro was not going to wait, Kennedy could not afford to either. While scholars of U.S.-Latin American relations are correct to note the use of more conventional instruments of diplomacy, including economic and military aid, too often neglected are other aspects of Kennedy administration foreign policy toward the region.6 In an attempt to co-opt the energies of the Cuban Revolution and impede Fidel Castro’s influence in Latin America, Washington waged an extensive public diplomacy campaign through the United States Information Agency (USIA) against the revolutionary fervor emanating from Havana. Based on research in U.S. repositories, as well as archives in Colombia and Cuba, this article argues that public diplomacy was an essential component of Kennedy’s approach to Latin America. Such actions encompassed different dimensions of U.S. government relations with local populations, including student exchanges, publications sponsored by the United States, films, and cultural events at U.S. binational centers. By focusing on the idealistic early days of the Kennedy administration’s attempts to sell the $20 billion economic development initiative known as the Alliance for Progress and counter Fidel Castro’s influence in the region, historians are better able to understand the lofty ambitions held by U.S. policymakers, modernization theorists, and Latin American leaders at the dawn of the 1960s.7 While sustained economic progress proved elusive on a large scale, soft diplomacy employed by Kennedy allowed Washington to sustain its hegemonic role in the Western Hemisphere while also supporting reformist allies in the region. Although the opening of USIA records at the U.S. National Archives during the 1990s led to an increase of historical monographs on public diplomacy, the 1960s and beyond still offer many avenues of study.8 Thus far, scholars have produced works dedicated to educational exchanges, the role of Edward R. Murrow, the civil rights movement, and the 1970s.9 Moreover, for far too long scholarship on U.S.-Latin American relations has overlooked public diplomacy.10 Beginning with a discussion of the origins of Kennedy administration public diplomacy, this article highlights attempts by the USIA to reach Latin Americans through both region-wide programs and specific country plans. Colombia and Venezuela receive particular attention, as both became contested battlegrounds between the United States and Castro’s Cuba. Because Colombia and Venezuela had recently transitioned to democratic government, and due to their potential for strong middle-class growth, U.S. leaders deemed them prime examples of what the Alliance for Progress could accomplish. In Colombia, the United States viewed the Alberto Lleras Camargo administration as a benchmark for all of Latin America. A former ambassador to the United States, Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), and top political representative of the liberal wing, Kennedy adviser Adolf Berle referred to Lleras Camargo as a member of the “democratic progressive ‘New Deal’ movement.”11 In Venezuela, President Kennedy respected Rómulo Betancourt so much he consistently sought out the Venezuelan’s thoughts on important inter-American issues and even installed a direct line from the White House to the Venezuelan leader’s office at the Miraflores palace in Caracas. Kennedy publicly lauded Betancourt as “all that we admire in a political leader.”12 It quickly became vital for Washington to have workable relationships with partners such as Colombia’s Lleras Camargo and Venezuela’s Betancourt to maximize the possibilities for diplomatic successes. A main theme illustrated by the case studies of Colombia and Venezuela includes how public diplomacy functions best when aligned with reform-minded local leadership. The Kennedy administration believed that by supporting the Lleras Camargo and Betancourt governments through public diplomacy, Colombia and Venezuela could become examples to all Latin Americans of a reformist vision of progress, one that would stand in complete contradiction to the revolutionary path promoted by Fidel Castro’s Cuba. A difficult aspect of studying Kennedy-era policy towards Latin America is bridging the gap between the soaring pro-democratic rhetoric often used by the administration and the actual policies implemented, which sometimes included the support of dictatorships. By examining case studies in U.S.-Latin American relations, and taking note of how Washington’s attempted policy prescriptions intersected with local realities, scholars can achieve a more complete understanding of Kennedy’s approach in the Western Hemisphere. A close examination of U.S. public diplomacy in Colombia and Venezuela highlights the nuance and flexibility that existed in the formulation of Kennedy policy towards Latin America. While the administration pursued more heavy-handed tactics in other Latin American nations, particularly Bolivia, Guatemala, and Paraguay, the examples of Colombia and Venezuela demonstrate Kennedy’s utilization of both public and personal diplomacy, along with his commitment to constructive engagement in the region.13 In particular, the Kennedy administration increased its public diplomacy in the wake of the Bay of Pigs disaster. Viewing the attempted overthrow of Fidel Castro as a momentous mistake, USIA Director Edward Murrow appealed to the White House to intensify its cultural and information outreach to Latin Americans. Murrow’s appeals for an enhanced USIA role reverberated from Washington meeting rooms to the villages of Colombia and to the streets of Venezuela. His call to action increased efforts through a robust comic book program, cultural visits, information operations, and film screenings. USIA outreach focused on specific target groups, which included intellectuals, teachers, students, campesinos (peasants), and labor union members. Ultimately, the Kennedy administration came to view public diplomacy as a vital tool to confront the rising revolutionary tide facing governments in Bogotá and Caracas. New Frontier Public Diplomacy in Latin America Once settled in the Oval Office, President Kennedy’s early briefings on Latin America consistently included mentions of “an ancient heritage of poverty, widespread illiteracy, and grave social injustice.”14 In February 1961, head of USIA programs for Latin America John McKnight outlined the public diplomacy challenges ahead. He noted that “the emergence of Fidel Castro, a bearded Cuban Robin Hood of a perilous charisma, [has given] fire and focus to the long-suppressed aspirations of countless millions of under-privileged in the area … [and could] set the entire hemisphere aflame.”15 Three top goals for the United States included exposing “Castro for the demagogue he is, destroy the myth he embodies, and uproot or nullify the Castro-Communist apparatus in the hemisphere.” Additional objectives included convincing governments in power to sponsor immediate reforms, and creating a “counter-mystique” around development programs to “offset” Castro’s influence. McKnight argued, “We must find the words to move men’s hearts. Still, only through our deeds can we convince the Latin Americans that our side is the right side for them.”16 McKnight’s memorandum concluded with a recommendation to include public diplomacy practitioners in policymaking discussions. This last point was critical, as one of Kennedy’s selling points to win over incoming USIA Director Edward Murrow was access to policy debates.17 Though the president promised Murrow an important advisory role, Kennedy’s words did not match his early actions, for a U.S. covert attempt to oust Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 lacked any input from the USIA. Aside from embarrassing the administration and elevating Fidel Castro’s status among many Latin Americans in the region, the fiasco demonstrated a wide gap between Kennedy’s stated commitment to public diplomacy and his actual use of the USIA. Murrow only learned of the operation a week or so before the invasion, and was furious about such important administration policy being decided with little or no concern for the consequences to the U.S. image. He commented that public diplomacy officials needed to be in “on the take-offs, not just the crash landings.”18 Following the Bay of Pigs, Murrow and the USIA immediately sought to increase U.S. public diplomacy operations in Latin America. A month after the failed action, Murrow wrote to USIA budget director David Bell and White House special adviser Theodore Sorensen that Castro’s success against the exile-landing group “heightened his stature, thus augmenting his ability to promote subversion and insurrection in other countries.” He prodded Kennedy: “decisions by the president call for an energetic campaign of persuasion… to unify Latin America against Castro.” The lengthy memorandum also posited new policy for the USIA. The agency now needed to “go directly to the people. This necessity is sharpened with the events of April 17 [Bay of Pigs].”19 The USIA’s John McKnight added to Murrow’s sense of urgency with a critically important July 5 directive to Kennedy administration adviser Adolf Berle titled “An Expanded Propaganda Program in Latin America.” The number one priority and the reasoning behind an increase included “the need to (1) counteract the effort of the Castro-Communist apparatus and (2) make known the positive … United States contributions to the general welfare of the people of the area.”20 This expanded U.S. program aimed to further infiltrate Latin American press, radio, and television outlets. Regarding the press, though McKnight conceded that the United States had success in planting anti-Castro stories in prominent publications, he argued now for an expansion of USIA articles to reach both urban and rural populations. Concerning radio, he contended that the Voice of America (VOA) could reach millions more in the region if programming became “tailored” to the individual “provincial stations.”21 McKnight also favored educational exchanges, which illustrated the comprehensive outlook the Kennedy administration took towards public diplomacy. This approach also demonstrated an inter-agency coordination, as McKnight pushed for increases in both USIA activities and State Department programs. In the end, the administration greatly increased educational exchanges and Kennedy personally supported efforts by the newly created office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs.22 McKnight’s argument in favor of expanding information programs took on even more importance when U.S. and Latin American delegates held an inter-American conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay to sign the charter for the Alliance for Progress in August 1961. Cuba’s representative, Ché Guevara, declared to the assembled representatives that the island “cannot stop exporting our example.”23 Cuban intelligence reports from the conference indicated that Havana paid close attention to how Latin American countries reacted to Guevara’s speech.24 A central challenge for the United States regarding the Alliance for Progress was making sure Latin Americans became aware of the program. USIA officials reported that while government leaders, business professionals, landowners, educators, and university students were aware of the economic program, “Relatively few people in the rural areas of Latin America know about the Alliance for Progress.”25 To help remedy the situation the agency relied on comic books. This choice reflected an understanding on the part of U.S. policymakers of social realities in several Latin American countries. Due to the high rates of illiteracy, those with little reading ability had a better chance of understanding the messages in a comic book. While one of the first known uses of comics by the United States in Latin America occurred in 1950s Chile, a comprehensive comic book program originated in Kennedy’s first year in office and included two types of publications; pro-Alliance for Progress and anti-Castro.26 Ernest Keller, a former journalist and U.S. attaché stationed in the Philippines ran the comic book program. The USIA published both full comics and strips focused on selling the Alliance for Progress and disparaging the Cuban Revolution. Comics published in support of the U.S. economic program included Alianza para el Progresso (Alliance for Progress), La Hora Decisiva (The Decisive Hour), and Hacia Una Vida Mejor (Toward a Better Life). Alianza attempted to draw a connection between the United States and Latin America’s revolutionary pasts, casting the Alliance for Progress as a continuation of reform in U.S.-Latin American relations. La Hora Decisiva appealed more to young people.27 It told the story of Roberto and Maria, young students who end up as vocal proponents of economic reforms. Hacia Una Vida Mejor attempted to reach one of the groups most sought out by the Kennedy administration: Latin American campesinos. This comic told the story of Manuel, a down and out farmer. Agency reports from 1963 noted, “Indicating the great need for direct, graphic and easily understood appeals to the Latin American campesino (or farmer), Toward a Better Life has broken all record for first run orders from the posts.”28 The agency printed over 1.5 million copies. The first illustration is Manuel standing over his wife’s grave following her death from lack of adequate medical care. He laments the absence of schools and opportunity, but now must care for his daughter Juanita who has a serious fever. When a local Alliance for Progress agricultural agent named Juan visits Manuel’s farm, he quickly deduces that water contamination is responsible for the illnesses and promises to help. Juan then explains the Alliance for Progress to the entire village and pledges to provide schools, hospitals, and better farming techniques. The locals agree to come together to achieve progress and several pages then depict how hard they work. At the end of the story, Manuel and his now-recovered daughter greet Juan, who states to himself, “The story of these people is repeated in thousands of other towns and cities … free men gather, discuss problems, decide how to resolve them and work together … decisions are based on the basic principles of the Alliance for Progress.”29 Figure 1: View largeDownload slide “Toward a Better Life,” August 1963 (Courtesy of the Ernest Keller Papers, Georgetown University Library Special Collections Research Center, Washington, DC). Figure 1: View largeDownload slide “Toward a Better Life,” August 1963 (Courtesy of the Ernest Keller Papers, Georgetown University Library Special Collections Research Center, Washington, DC). Included in the anti-Castro series were La Puñalada (Stab in the Back), El Despertar (The Awakening), Los Secuestradores (The Kidnappers), and La Traición (The Betrayal). These stories portrayed the ideals of the Cuban Revolution as undemocratic, communist-inspired, and a betrayal of basic human rights. La Traición focused exclusively on Castro’s supposed treachery against labor unions, and illustrated the Kennedy administration’s focus on reaching workers throughout Latin America.30 By 1967 the USIA comic book program in Latin America printed over sixty-six million copies of anti-Castro and pro-Alliance for Progress comics.31 The agency was careful to reach as broad an audience as possible, and included comic strips as part of the program. At particular markets shoppers received free copies when checkers placed them into customer bags. Catholic churches helped the effort by handing out strips to parishioners following mass.32 Latin American newspapers published certain strips and included them as supplements. In Colombia, the weekly newspaper El Campesino regularly printed the comics. Labor unions also made use of the materials, and one USIA post noted that a communist speaker was furious when union members continued reading their comic books when he attempted to speak.33 While the comic book program became a centerpiece of Kennedy-era public diplomacy in Latin America, the administration also focused its information operations efforts on particular Latin American countries, specifically Colombia and Venezuela. Making peaceful reforms possible became the central goal of U.S. foreign policy in both nations during the early 1960s. Gaining Influence in Venezuela By the late 1950s, the military dictatorship of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez stood on the brink of collapse. Widespread unrest spread throughout Venezuela and in 1958 Rómulo Betancourt, who had led a brief democratic awakening in the country almost a decade prior, returned to the presidency. He immediately sought to court favor with all segments of society by appointing men to his cabinet from different political parties, business leaders, and members of the military.34 Likely an attempt to assuage powerful economic forces in Venezuela, he quickly dismissed any discussions about the potential nationalization of the oil industry.35 Betancourt also became deeply engaged in hemispheric relations. In January 1959, he welcomed Cuba’s new leader, Fidel Castro, to Caracas. Though Betancourt labeled the Cuban a “continental figure” and initially held discussion on potential economic and political ties, Castro’s public denunciations of Latin American institutions such as the armed forces seemed belligerent to Betancourt.36 Later, when Ché Guevara publicly scolded Betancourt and told Cuban students that Venezuela did not have a true democracy, Betancourt became further incensed.37 By 1961, his patience with Cuba’s verbal assaults and support for revolutionary guerilla movements ran out as Venezuela broke relations with the Cuban government.38 For the Kennedy administration, Venezuela occupied a position of importance unsurpassed by any other Latin American nation. USIA officials, along with intelligence agencies, viewed Venezuela as “the key Latin American nation in the struggle between democracy and communism.”39 Perhaps most critical to Washington was Betancourt’s stated commitment to democratic government and economic reform. His agenda included a massive increase in education spending and a willingness to focus on rural areas of Venezuela, where Cuba’s revolutionary message could find welcoming ears if ignored.40 Betancourt was exactly the kind of leader that Kennedy hoped to support through the Alliance for Progress. Information agency programs based in Caracas attempted to reach “Venezuelans, especially intellectuals and leaders in the fields of education and labor.”41 U.S. officials used the term “intellectuals” interchangeably with “opinion molders,” as both referred to individuals who had influence in the country. Additionally, the administration focused intently on selling the Alliance for Progress. When introducing the Alliance in March 1961, the president described “a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools.”42 For Kennedy, the program offered an opportunity for real change in the hemisphere. The USIA printed 30,000 pamphlets exclusively designed to sell the initiative. One million people watched President Kennedy deliver an Alliance for Progress-themed speech via television. Another 500,000 Venezuelans saw the president through mobile film units. Broadcasts in motion picture houses and during local television shows reached thousands more.43 As early as the summer of 1961, the USIA reported that it continued “devoting a substantial portion of its efforts on a continuing basis, in Latin America to publicizing the Alliance for Progress.”44 One of the most effective methods of connecting with opinion molders in Venezuela, as well as the public, included cultural exchanges with prominent U.S. individuals. In 1961 noted author William Faulkner accepted an invitation from the State Department-supported North American Association of Venezuela (NAAV) for a two-week visit to the country. During his stay, Faulkner delivered a speech at the Ministry of Education, met with the Venezuelan president, received an award, attended a Venezuelan music production, and visited the Venezuelan-American center in Maracaibo on the coast.45 While the State Department believed it vitally important for such a popular author to accept a role in cultural diplomacy, Faulkner did not.46 He wrote to friend and fellow novelist Joan Williams in January 1961, “The State Dept. is sending me to Venezuela, unless by that time the new administration will have created an actual foreign policy, so that they won’t need to make these frantic desperate cries for help to amateurs like me.”47 USIA reports after the visit told a different story: “Mr. Faulkner materially extended the cultural relations of the United States with Venezuela. He charmed the people with his courtliness, integrity and courage. He captured headlines for weeks … USIS [A] mobilized to achieve the greatest possible propaganda mileage from the visit.”48 Hugh Jencks, a State Department official and Faulkner’s translator during the visit, also noted the trip’s impact: “The cultural leaders of Venezuela … tend to agree with the Communist tenet that the United States is grossly materialistic, with no cultural achievements. To bring a literary figure of the stature of Faulkner to Venezuela was an effective refutation of this view.”49 More popular visitors soon eclipsed Faulkner’s trip when Air Force One touched down at Caracas’s Maiquetía International Airport in December 1961. Unlike Caracas in 1958, when Vice-President Richard Nixon faced clenched fists, outstretched open arms greeted President Kennedy and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy.50 Thousands lined up on the streets to welcome the U.S. leader’s motorcade. President Betancourt decided to roll down his window and shake hands with members of the crowd. Before long, he saw President Kennedy do the same.51 Following a brief helicopter ride, the delegation arrived at the village of La Morita where a large billboard featuring both presidents greeted the delegation. Kennedy officiated an agrarian reform ceremony where he handed out land titles to campesinos. In public remarks he lauded Betancourt as an example of good democratic leadership, and made specific mention of the United States’ new approach in Latin America: “this program is at the heart of the Alianza para el Progreso, for no real progress is possible unless the benefits of increased prosperity are shared by the people themselves.”52 The highlight of the event, for many, occurred when the president introduced the first lady to deliver some brief remarks.53 In fluent Spanish Jackie declared that no father or mother could achieve true happiness until knowing their children have a bright future. “This must be for all, not for just a fortunate few,” she said as the crowd erupted in applause.54 The imagery of a young U.S. president, accompanied by his eloquent wife, handing out land titles and speaking the local language was broadcast throughout Venezuela. In just a few brief moments, the Kennedy administration aligned the glamour of Camelot with the message of the Alliance for Progress. Figure 2: View largeDownload slide President Kennedy, First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy, and Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt (seated) appear at an Alliance for Progress land reform rally in La Morita, Venezuela in December 1961 (Courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library). Figure 2: View largeDownload slide President Kennedy, First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy, and Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt (seated) appear at an Alliance for Progress land reform rally in La Morita, Venezuela in December 1961 (Courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library). The December 1961 visit also provided Kennedy an opportunity to hear and see firsthand about Betancourt’s reformist vision, particularly his commitment of vast resources to the education system. Whereas the military dictatorship allocated four percent of the national budget to education in its last year in power, Betancourt spent ten percent.55 The increase allowed for more school construction, which in turn permitted more elementary-aged children to receive basic schooling. By 1963, over 1.3 million students received primary education.56 Due to Betancourt’s pledge to continue reforms, the USIA matched the Venezuelan government’s efforts in the field of education. Influencing both teachers and students became key priorities. Perhaps the most effective method of reaching educators was through the USIA’s monthly educational publication Carta Pedagógica (Education Letter). Labeled a soft sell by agency members, the magazine discussed “fundamental democratic attitudes about national education.” Teachers received thousands of copies, with the expectation they would impart the knowledge gained onto students in the classroom. The publication also provided teaching techniques for classes that ranged from kindergarten to high school, while at the same time promoting U.S. democratic values.57 The circulation of Carta Pedagógica rose steadily, reaching over 30,000 by late 1961.58 Giving the newsletter a “Venezuelan” feel aided in the periodical’s popularity. A local editor, Carmen Rivas, became director of the publication. Furthermore, the Venezuelan Ministry of Education helped in dispersing copies, as did the Institute for Professional Development of Educators (IPDE). The ministry had access to all national schools while the IPDE helped supervise over 15,000 teachers in training. Agency reports indicated subscribers felt the publication was “written by Venezuelans for Venezuelans.”59 While the Kennedy administration focused on teachers, the USIA also began aggressively working to shape the opinions of young people through student exchange programs. Within U.S. policymaking circles, students had a reputation for being particularly susceptible to Castro’s influence. In fact, USIA officials in Caracas concluded during Kennedy’s first year in office that “students took the lead … and agitated endlessly for Venezuelan alignment with Castro’s Cuba.”60 The USIA centered most of its attention on Caracas’s two major universities, Universidad Central de Venezuela (Central University of Venezuela) and Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (Andrés Bello Catholic University). Agency officials believed both the director of the school of economics and journalism at Central held communist sympathies. Thus, students studying economics and journalism earned first priority to participate in exchange programs. Seven seniors from Central’s journalism school traveled to the United States while fourteen economic students, along with two professors, participated in a seminar held at the University of Michigan. The seminar quickly grew in reputation as students began competing during their freshman year in hopes of earning selection when they reached upper class status.61 Labor groups also became USIA targets as the agency believed “Fidelismo cast a definite shadow over the Venezuelan labor scene” by 1962.62 The close connection between unions and political parties made reaching labor of paramount importance in Venezuela. The USIA focused its efforts on the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (Political Electoral Independent Organization Committee), and Union Democratica Republicana (Democratic Republican Union).63 The primary issue confronting unions in Venezuela was inexperience. One high-level union member stated, “We were born on January 23, 1958 [the day the dictatorship fell].”64 The USIA noted, “The same technical and material void that plagues the teaching profession, obstructs legitimate union leaders.” Early plans centered on classes for labor union members and exchange programs to bring some of them to the United States. While top leaders in unions often received grants, the U.S. Embassy in Caracas quickly shifted its focus and in 1961 selected nine younger leaders to attend classes at the Washington-supported University of Puerto Rico Labor Institute.65 Overall, the U.S. Embassy in Caracas reported that “the foreign policy objectives of the United States have been well-served by the program during FY 1961 … these relations, although they are not always necessarily significant individually, are collectively forming an earnest of long-needed improvement in the political, economic, and cultural relations of Venezuela with the United States.”66 Such praise for exchange programs was common from Ambassador Allen Stewart and his diplomatic staff in Caracas. In 1964 they contended that the programs served as an “effective and essential tool in the realization of the country objectives.”67 Expanding the reading material for Venezuelan laborers also became a top priority. Two important publications were Boletin Laboral (Labor Bulletin) and Carta Obrera (Worker’s Newsletter). Boletin Laboral, published weekly, had an overtly anti-Castro tinge and circulated on a mass basis. The USIA argued that “among the rank and file it attempts to disseminate program material over as wide a cross section as is physically and financially possible.”68 It consistently contained stories “on the true nature of Castroism” and certain articles found their way into local newspapers. Radio productions, sponsored by AD, also used USIA articles as a main source for information so much so a broadcaster complained one week when his copy did not reach him in time and he lacked material for his program.69 Carta Obrera, published twice a month, offered more nuance and less overt propaganda. It became “overwhelmingly accepted by labor leaders as a working manual in union movement fundamentals.” Focused on collective bargaining, negotiating tactics, and democratic practices, labor union leaders became the primary target and its subscription list reached 20,000 by 1962.70 Fifteen-hundred copies went directly to the headquarters of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (Confederation of Workers of Venezuela, CTV). These copies contained the CTV emblem alongside the seal of the United States. The labor organization sent them throughout the country to members. Unions requested large quantities of the publication so workers would gain access to articles and put the information into practice. Reports indicated members utilized techniques outlined in Carta Obrera to take power through elections. One such instance occurred in the important industrial center of Valencia.71 Other measures implemented included the use of mobile film units to show labor union movies. By the end of 1961, units screened movies to over 175 labor groups and sent an additional 300 titles to various organizations.72 U.S. public diplomacy officials understood that in attempting to sway Venezuelan public opinion, the United States could not focus solely on government-to-government relations; policymakers had to seek out teachers, students, campesinos, and labor union members. USIA operations in Venezuela, though focused on different target groups, did serve the collective purpose of achieving three key objectives: supporting the government of Rómulo Betancourt, selling the Alliance for Progress, and sullying the reputation of Fidel Castro’s Cuban Revolution. Officials in charge of public diplomacy on the ground in Venezuela strongly believed their efforts were imperative. They wrote in 1962, “USIA Caracas feels strongly that the funds spent … to further the various U.S. government efforts … are the cheapest form of insurance against an unacceptable alternative.”73 Even with the attention, aid, and resources allocated to Venezuela by Washington, internal political realities threatened to halt economic and democratic progress. Anti-Betancourt guerilla groups, inspired by the Cuban model, intensified operations and formed a coalition known as the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (Armed Forces of National Liberation, FALN). Members hoped to engulf Venezuela in a guerilla war and topple the Betancourt government.74 In response to growing unrest, Betancourt launched a military counter-offensive and suspended constitutional guarantees for guerilla groups.75 As a 1963 national election approached, the FALN called for a general strike and announced they would shoot anyone who showed up to vote. Government fears that Venezuelans would sit out the election due to the threats of violence proved unfounded as ninety percent of voters participated. Moreover, the Betancourt-supported candidate, Raúl Leoni, won the election.76 Democracy triumphed while pro-Castro guerillas regrouped. The election of Leoni proved to be a pivotal setback for Havana. Soon after the Cuban Revolution, Castro’s vision had found many supporters within the Venezuelan political left. One member of the Central Committee of the nation’s communist party declared, “The Cuban Revolution … was like a continental detonator … it justified revolutionary impatience, and it ended the old discussion about geographic fatalism—the belief that no revolution in Latin America could ever succeed. In one fell swoop, the Cuban Revolution swept away that old ghost.”77 Yet documents from Cuba’s Foreign Ministry illustrate the extent to which the Castro regime misjudged the popularity of guerrilla groups like the FALN. Officials in Havana believed they would soon recover their support, following the 1963 election, among young people.78 In reality, the FALN’s popularity significantly diminished in the wake of their pre-election violence. The Betancourt government’s response certainly aided in curtailing the ability of FALN guerillas to conduct operations, and the group’s resort to outright violence created little sympathy, but what prevented most Venezuelans from joining the pro-Castro movement? Betancourt’s reforms, coupled with the U.S. public diplomacy onslaught, created an atmosphere where a Cuban-inspired guerilla insurrection could not take hold. More to the point, the U.S. information offensive, led by the USIA and aided by President Kennedy’s personal visit to the country, buttressed Betancourt’s actions. Though U.S. outreach could never convince the most committed anti-government elements, officials consistently maintained that their efforts made an impact and needed to increase. During a 1962 Latin American Policy Committee meeting, which included Ambassador Stewart, one recommendation argued for the “dramatic” expansion of the “cultural and information program in Venezuela.”79 Furthermore, a detailed State Department assessment echoed the need for an increase and for more efforts to alert “popular opinion in Venezuela” regarding the Cuban threat as being critical for denying Havana support among local groups.80 Moreover, while the embassy in Caracas consistently gave praise to Betancourt’s political acumen for securing the survival of constitutionalism in Venezuela, Ambassador Stewart also recognized the efforts of the country team, singling out U.S. public diplomacy by giving the example of “the USIA [helping] the chief of the military mission by sending pamphlets to the officers’ school or pamphlets to be distributed among the draftees on the problem of communism.”81 In his overall assessment as to why Betancourt’s government survived, the ambassador stated the following: “So the fact that we were operating as a team and were assisting the Venezuelans in every way possible—the minute they asked for something they got—we can take a certain amount of credit for the success of the Betancourt administration.”82 Critically important for the U.S. was implementing operations in support of President Betancourt’s vision and urging Venezuelans to have faith in their government. Teodoro Petkoff, a former Venezuelan guerilla fighter, recalled debating a worker and criticizing Betancourt’s supposed reform agenda, only to have the worker tell him “if Betancourt says its right, it must be right.”83 The Cuban-inspired alternative did not look as promising to labor union members, campesinos, and urban intellectuals who came to view the Betancourt-U.S. model of reform as more alluring. Lacking support from those key groups, a leftist guerilla insurgency, in either the countryside or cities, held little chance of succeeding. The Colombian Challenge The dramatic political unrest experienced in Colombia during the post-1945 period rivaled that of any other Latin American nation. Alberto Lleras Camargo came to the presidency in 1958 through a coalition government termed the National Front following a decade of bloody conflict known as La Violencia.84 As a former foreign minister, ambassador, and head of the OAS, Lleras Camargo held a keen understanding of how to achieve working relationships with regional leaders.85 Political Scientist Robert Dix wrote, “If the National Front was the construction of a modernizing elite, Alberto Lleras Camargo was a true son of such an elite; if it was a product of moderation, fair play, and an evolving tendency to give the opposition its due, Lleras epitomized that spirit.”86 The Lleras Camargo government quickly moved to restructure Colombia. It established the Comisión de Planeación (Planning Commission) and the Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Planeación (National Council of Economic Policy and Planning) to better coordinate national projects. Law 135 became central to these efforts. Approved in late 1961, it attempted to address reform in the countryside by distributing land on a more equitable basis.87 The Lleras Camargo government also devoted significant attention to foreign matters, as the increase of pro-Castro groups within Colombia concerned leaders in Bogotá.88 The Amigos de la Revolución Cubana (Friends of the Cuban Revolution) began promoting Castro’s agrarian reform while the Comité Colombiano Pro Defensa a la Revolución Cubana (Colombian Committee for the Defense of the Cuban Revolution) soon began to publish “informative bulletins” exhorting Colombians to support Castro’s movement and combat “yanqui aggression.”89 Other groups, such as the Comite Colombiano de Defensa de la Revolución Cubana (Colombian Committee in Defense of the Cuban Revolution), distributed anti-U.S. pamphlets in the wake of the Bay of Pigs.90 The Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de la Construccion de Cundinmarca (Union of Workers of the Construction Industry of Cundinmarca) vowed to fight for Fidel Castro.91 Concerned about Cuban influence, the Colombian government began tracking citizens who traveled to the island nation and produced detailed reports on each individual.92 As guerilla violence in the Colombian countryside increased, Lleras Camargo also implemented a Campana de Cedulación (Campaign of Identification). The administration admitted that while identification served as an important measure for providing civil services, it could also be a vital component of combating escalating violence through tracking Colombian citizens.93 While much more access to Cuban archives is necessary before any complete rendering of Fidel Castro’s foreign policy towards Latin America, documents now available from the Foreign Ministry Archive in Havana do indicate that the revolutionary government was aware of the support it had in the region among leftist groups.94 As Piero Gleijeses argues, Havana did have a significant impact on inspiring movements from the Andes to the Southern Cone.95 Furthermore, historians often differ over the extent to which Latin American governments implemented anti-Castro measures on their own or whether Washington pushed them to do so. Colombian documents illustrate that leaders in Bogotá took seriously the threat of guerilla violence and did not need prodding from Washington to enact measures aimed at rooting out subversive elements. Members of the Colombian government went as far to compare their internal situation to events taking place in Vietnam. In both instances, the Foreign Ministry argued that guerillas hoped to bring about political change through violence.96 By 1961 the United States viewed the pro-democracy government of Lleras Camargo, a staunch supporter of an inter-American system with a strong U.S. role, as a critical ally in the contest against Fidel Castro’s Cuba.97 The Kennedy administration hoped to reinvigorate USIA operations in Colombia and target university students, barrio (neighborhood) groups, intellectuals, and campesinos. Because Colombia had several large cities, public diplomacy programs often utilized binational centers in populated areas. The USIA also produced three short films, known as the “Colombian Trilogy,” to sell Washington’s vision of development. To demonstrate support for the Lleras Camargo administration and promote the Alliance for Progress, Kennedy visited Bogotá immediately following his trip to Caracas in December 1961. In the days before arrival, editorials, news articles, and welcome messages appeared all over the pages of Colombia’s El Tiempo.98 President Lleras Camargo met his U.S. counterpart at the airport and the leaders motorcaded past thousands of onlookers. As they viewed the throngs of waving Colombians, Lleras Camargo asked Kennedy “do you know why those workers and campesinos are cheering you … It’s because they believe you are on their side.”99 The two leaders arrived at Ciudad Techo, a barrio located several miles away. The Colombian government hoped to make the small neighborhood a symbol for the Alliance for Progress by building new houses for over 80,000 Colombians.100 The front page of the New York Times the next day read, “500,000 in Bogotá Greet President on Alliance Tour.”101 Press Secretary Pierre Salinger reported that the assembled crowds eclipsed the number of onlookers who later gathered for Kennedy in Ireland and Germany. Figure 3: View largeDownload slide President Kennedy, First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy, and Colombian President Alberto Lleras Camargo appear at an Alliance for Progress housing development project just outside Bogotá in December 1961 (Courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library). Figure 3: View largeDownload slide President Kennedy, First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy, and Colombian President Alberto Lleras Camargo appear at an Alliance for Progress housing development project just outside Bogotá in December 1961 (Courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library). Along with increasing knowledge of the Alliance for Progress, President Kennedy’s appearance helped boost a lagging public diplomacy operation. The 1960 Country Plan reported that USIA “is operating at an absolute minimum both in terms of personnel and funds. This country plan is being reduced considerably in the number of projects.”102 The assessment reflected a lack of willingness to fully support the USIA. In 1958 the U.S. Congress decreased the agency budget from $144 million to $96 million.103 Upon taking over the USIA, Edward Murrow requested a substantial increase, primarily for more operations in Latin America and Africa. Though he did not get the total amount requested, the $134 million approved by Congress was a substantial increase from the previous years.104 The additional money allowed for more specific operations in Colombia. Public Affairs Officer Keith Adamson noted that while a shortage of funds significantly hampered any USIA activities outside of the immediate Bogotá area in the past, the agency now planned for new programs in other major urban centers. These included cities such as Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla, and Cartagena. Given Colombia’s size and demographic makeup, U.S. information programs sought to distribute materials in a broad manner and reach as many targets as possible at once.105 The U.S. Embassy in Bogotá recognized that an increase in support by the United States for educational programs could aid Colombian government efforts: “Colombia, with formidable social and economic problems, has put emphasis on the development of education, knowing that better schooling at all levels will ultimately alleviate other problems.”106 Binational centers proved to be one of the most useful tools for reaching the population. These cultural institutes sponsored educational opportunities, including academic lectures, concerts, and art shows. Though U.S. personnel ran the centers, their overarching goal was to encourage close collaboration between U.S. citizens and local populations. A key objective in Colombia became making cultural exchanges available to larger segments of the population, not just the upper classes.107 The USIA maintained that “of all the activities that [the agency] conducts in Latin America, however, binational centers constitute one of the more effective techniques for influencing present or potential community leaders.”108 At least eight centers became active with the goal of improving U.S-Colombian relations. Large offices in Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Bucaramanga, Barranquilla, and Cartagena offered English classes, cultural events, and community action programs. In Cartagena, taxi drivers became particularly interested in English classes as they came into close contact with many U.S. tourists disembarking their cruise ships in the coastal city.109 The Medellín center gained inroads into labor unions through a music program as a choral group based out of a local factory made use of the facility for practice sessions.110 The only center receiving a poor evaluation was in Cali. USIA officials blamed the performance on a weak Board of Directors and inadequate offices. Even so, the agency argued that closing the center would indicate a lack of interest on the part of the United States. Abandoning a presence in the Valle de Cauca district, which Cali occupied, greatly concerned information officers. The region was Colombia’s entryway to the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, groups in Valle de Cauca, such as the Comite Unidad de Obrero-Campesino del Municipio de Pradera (United Committee of Workers-Peasants in the town of Pradera), became active supporters of the Cuban Revolution.111 While the Cali binational center did not measure up, progress did materialize. Kennedy administration outreach to labor unions produced tangible success in late 1962 when a major union, the Labores de Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores es Libres del Valle (Free Workers Union of the Valle), denounced Fidel Castro’s regime as undemocratic. The Union included workers from heavily populated Cali.112 Moreover, U.S. operations benefited when local citizens established the Asociación Popular Alianza Para El Progreso (People’s Association Alliance for Progress) in 1963.113 The group set out to assist government efforts in advancing the development program. Binational centers also utilized media such as television and film. In fact, a significant increase in production of USIA films and television broadcasts occurred during the Kennedy presidency, so much so that historian Nicholas Cull has called it the “Murrow Revolution.”114 Regarding films, the USIA often acquired productions from trade unions, museums, and other government sectors. At the same time, the agency also enlisted the help of professional filmmakers. Steven Larner and James Blue created three ten-minute films, A Letter from Colombia, Evil Wind Out, and The School at Rincon Santo, which formed what became known as the “Colombian Trilogy.”115 All three films depicted progress in rural areas of Colombia. Perhaps the most popular, The School at Rincon Santo, centered on the building of a school in a remote part of Colombia. For years the people of this tiny village lived isolated from the rest of the country. The locals did not own the land they worked and the majority could not read or write. The narrator softly states, these people “learned to live without asking, but they always wanted a school.” Scenes depict Colombian officials promising to provide the building materials, with local residents constructing the school themselves.116 The final minutes of the film show the children on their first day learning the alphabet as smiling parents watch from the windows. The narrator declares, “This is part of the spirit of the Alliance for Progress.”117 Creating a film focused on self-help was critical in the eyes of U.S. foreign policymakers. The initial charter of the Alliance for Progress repeatedly mentioned the concept of self-help.118 However, USIA public opinion polls conducted in Colombia often found that “the problem continues of exaggerated conceptions of the extent of U.S. contributions to the Alianza as versus self-help.”119 Though several polls indicated an awareness of the Alliance, particularly in Colombia and Venezuela, embassy officials in Bogotá and Caracas continually worried about the misconception that the program was wholly dependent upon U.S. actions.120 While a film such as the School at Rincon Santo could not completely alter local perceptions about the outsized role of Washington in the Alliance for Progress, it did provide powerful images of self-help and collective action operating in concert with U.S. aid. Public diplomacy officials in Colombia thought so much of the film that they sent copies to other posts in the region, including Venezuela.121 The USIA’s operations in Colombia illustrated an understanding among U.S. officials on the economic, social, and demographic realities in the country. Furthermore, the programs implemented also demonstrated some stark contrasts with agency actions in neighboring Venezuela. In Caracas, and throughout the countryside, the USIA focused its efforts on expanding its reach to impact teachers, students, campesinos, and labor union members. Pamphlet production of publications such as Boletin Laboral and Carta Obrera highlighted the political importance of workers. In contrast, public diplomacy in Colombia did not have such an emphasis on labor unions, as U.S. officials did not believe workers groups in Bogotá and other cities enjoyed the same political influence as their counterparts in Venezuela. Even with the stark differences in tactics and target groups focused on by the USIA in Colombia and Venezuela, U.S. public diplomacy in both nations did have some similarities. U.S. officials consistently concentrated on helping generate support for the Alliance for Progress and against Fidel Castro’s vision of revolution. Moreover, information programs and cultural exchanges had a specific focus on discrediting the romanticization and appeal of supporting, perhaps joining, Cuban-style guerilla movements. Another commonality included the utilization of the Kennedy administration’s popular comic book program, which produced millions of copies for audiences in Colombia and Venezuela.122 Figure 4: View largeDownload slide Depicting how Fidel Castro “betrayed” the Cuban people, U.S. public diplomacy officials hoped La Traición (November 1961) would make Latin Americans question the path propagated by the revolutionary government in Havana (Courtesy of the Ernest Keller Papers, Georgetown University Library Special Collections Research Center, Washington, DC). Figure 4: View largeDownload slide Depicting how Fidel Castro “betrayed” the Cuban people, U.S. public diplomacy officials hoped La Traición (November 1961) would make Latin Americans question the path propagated by the revolutionary government in Havana (Courtesy of the Ernest Keller Papers, Georgetown University Library Special Collections Research Center, Washington, DC). A final characteristic shared by Colombia and Venezuela was the outbreak of organized guerilla violence. Economic difficulties brought on by declining coffee prices, coupled with increased unrest in the countryside threatened stability.123 By 1964 anti-government guerillas began operating under the banner of one name, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).124 Several U.S. military survey teams conducted assessments and recommended Colombia implement a program of counter-insurgency. The Castro government hoped such reliance by Bogotá on Washington for military aid could help stoke anti-U.S. sentiment.125 While the FARC certainly drew inspiration from Cuba, it is critical to understand that the group’s beginnings dated back to the political battles of the 1940s and 1950s.126 Their membership never grew beyond several thousand soldiers, as a majority of Colombians followed the democratic path. In the end, while periodic political violence remained in Colombia, elections became a mainstay. Conclusion The rise of revolutionary Cuba proved to be a watershed moment in U.S.-Latin American relations. U.S. policymakers faced an uphill battle in the region at the dawn of the 1960s as growing mistrust of the “colossus to the north,” coupled with a youthful population desperate for change, set the stage for possible region-wide revolution. In confronting the changing dynamics, and to counter revolutionary Cuba’s appeal, the Kennedy administration implemented a comprehensive and coordinated public diplomacy campaign in Latin America. Through a robust comic book series and information operations specifically designed to sell the Alliance for Progress, the United States launched a “psychological offensive” in Latin America.127 Primary target groups included intellectuals, teachers, students, labor unions, and campesinos. Together with region-wide operations, the USIA also developed programs for individual countries, and public diplomacy officials demonstrated a keen understanding of local customs by taking into account the political, economic, and cultural differences that defined each nation. When discussing U.S. public diplomacy towards Latin America in 1962, USIA Director Edward Murrow noted, “We are in pursuit of men’s minds and opinions. It is an elusive goal. You do not win them quickly or easily. Once won, they give you no commitment that they will stay won. They are people like you and me. They will change their minds as capriciously or as often as we do.” The former newsman continued, “They will judge us more by what we do than by what we say. A Cuban invasion can defame the name of this country in Latin America, just as an Alliance for Progress can do much to honor it.”128 Murrow’s quotation is important, for it touches upon a central component of implementing effective public diplomacy: matching words with deeds. Together with Venezuela’s Rómulo Betancourt and Colombia’s Alberto Lleras Camargo, the United States put forward powerful and sustained public diplomacy operations regarding the benefits of U.S.-led development. For their part, these Latin American leaders made significant political and economic gains.129 Betancourt implemented a constitutional system and reformed important sectors of the economy, all the while combatting Fidel Castro’s revolutionary ambitions. Colombia followed a similar path. The Lleras Camargo administration achieved many successes in improving education, housing, and healthcare. Colombians who had never once set foot in a doctor’s office or schoolhouse gained the hope of a better future. When first announcing the Alliance for Progress in March 1961, President Kennedy spoke confidently of an opportunity to transform the political and economic realities in Latin America.130 Infused with a determined sense of mission, U.S. modernization planners and their Latin American counterparts set out to fundamentally alter inter-American relations. By the end of the 1960s economic development in the region stagnated, and in the words of one report, Kennedy’s program was “the Alliance that lost its way.”131 While Colombia and Venezuela did not achieve all of the stated objectives of the Alliance for Progress, there is more to the story. Historian David Sheinin gives the example of a Colombian man who became a “child of the Alliance for Progress.” Though born into poverty, Antonio López’s (a pseudonym) father improved his family’s socioeconomic status through Alliance for Progress programs, so much so that the family moved to a better neighborhood and young Antonio received an education at a school funded by the Alliance for Progress. That education allowed him to secure a well-paying job and middle-class life in Cartagena.132 Though anecdotal, Antonio’s story mirrors the path taken by many in Colombia and Venezuela. It is simplistic to examine the Alliance for Progress only through a statistical lens. At its core, the program sought to advance the lives of Latin Americans and instill a sense of hope in each person. The USIA, through diplomatic visits, outreach to the public, binational centers and mobile film units, made sure Colombians and Venezuelans knew about the U.S. commitment to ushering in fundamental changes during the Kennedy administration. As demonstrated by this article, to sell a U.S. vision of development the United States implemented wide-ranging public diplomacy campaigns in Latin America during the Kennedy administration. While studies of U.S. public diplomacy must be careful in not overstating the significance of propaganda efforts in achieving diplomatic successes, scholars must recognize the centrality public diplomacy occupied in the formulation of foreign policy during the Kennedy-era. Donald Wilson, a top USIA official and member of the NSC, noted that “I think President Kennedy was a man who perhaps better than any other President in our history, understood how foreign opinion worked, what molded it, what shaped it and how to shape it.”133 Ultimately, those actions played a role in helping many in the region accept Washington’s vision of reform, rather than Havana’s dream of revolution. Footnotes * The author wishes to thank two anonymous reviewers for their very constructive comments and the staff at Diplomatic History for all of their hard work in helping bring this article to publication. Very special thanks also to Chester Pach, Kenneth Osgood, Kevin Mattson, Patrick Barr-Melej, Brad Jokisch, and Matthew Shannon, all who read an earlier version of this article. 1 “Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, Cincinnati, Ohio, Democratic Dinner,” October 6, 1960, American Presidency Project, accessed March 20, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25660. 2 Thomas Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution (London, 2001), 1. 3 Jorge Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA, 1989), 116. 4 Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 85-4-62, “Castro’s Subversive Capabilities in Latin America,” November 9, 1962, National Security Files, National Intelligence Estimate, box 9, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library (hereafter LBJL). 5 The foco argued that a small number of committed individuals could mobilize in rural areas and launch a successful overthrow of a sitting regime: Ché Guevara, Guerilla Warfare (Lincoln, NE, 1998). 6 Stephen Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York, 2011); Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999); Rabe, The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919–1976 (Austin, TX, 1982). 7 Michael Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and ‘Nation Building’ in the Kennedy-era (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000); Christopher Darnton, “Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in U.S.-Latin American Relations: Rethinking the Origins of the Alliance for Progress,” Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 4 (2012): 55–92. 8 Two articles that focus exclusively on the 1960s include Mark Haefele, “John F. Kennedy, USIA, and World Public Opinion,” Diplomatic History 25, no.1 (2001): 63–84 and Matthew Shannon, “‘One of our greatest psychological assets’: The New Frontier, Cold War Public Diplomacy, and Robert Kennedy’s 1962 Goodwill Tour,” International History Review 36, no. 4 (2014): 767–790. 9 Scholarship on pre-1960 U.S. public diplomacy include Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, 2013); Sarah Graham, Culture and Propaganda: The Progressive Origins of American Public Diplomacy, 1936–53 (New York, 2016); Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, KS, 2006); Laura Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia, 2008). Works dedicated to post-1960 and beyond include Giles Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire: The US State Department’s Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France and Britain, 1950–1970 (New York, 2008); Kenneth Osgood and Brian Etheridge, eds., The New International History meets the New Cultural History: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Relations (Boston, 2010); Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ, 2011); Michael Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters for the Human Spirit: American Art and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2005); Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989 (New York, 2009); Nicholas Cull, The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy, 1989–2001 (New York, 2012); Hallvard Notaker, Giles Scott-Smith, David Synder, eds., Reasserting America in the 1970s: U.S. Public Diplomacy and the Rebuilding of America’s Image (Manchester, UK, 2016). Two accounts from former practitioners include Wilson Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency (Boulder, CO, 2004); Richard Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twenty-First Century (Silver Springs, MD, 2007). 10 For a concise review of recent scholarship on inter-American relations refer to Andrew Kirkendall, “Cold War Latin America: The State of the Field,” H-Diplo Essay No. 119, November 2014; Two notable works that do give attention to inter-American public diplomacy include Matt Loayza, “‘A Curative and Creative Force’: The Exchange of Persons Program and Eisenhower’s Inter-American Policies, 1953–1961,” Diplomatic History 37, no. 5 (2013): 946–970 and Jason Parker, Hearts, Minds, Voices: US Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World (New York, 2016), chapter 5. 11 Richard Gott, Guerilla Movements in Latin America (New York, 1971), 133–34. 12 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 99–101. 13 Thomas Field, From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy-era (Ithaca, NY, 2015); Kirk Tyvela, “‘A Slight but Salutary Case of the Jitters’: The Kennedy Administration and the Alliance for Progress in Paraguay,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 22, no. 2 (2011): 300–320; Stephen Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala (Athens, OH, 2000); Robert Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (New York, 2012). 14 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 22. 15 “Memorandum for Adolf Berle, Consultant to the Secretary of State,” February 22, 1961, Record Group 306, General Records of the United States Information Agency (hereafter RG 306), UD-WW 142, box 6, National Archives and Records Service, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA). 16 Ibid. 17 Nicholas Cull, “The Man who Invented Truth: The Tenure of Edward R. Murrow as Director of the United States Information Agency during the Kennedy Years,” Cold War History 4, no. 1 (October 2003): 26. 18 Christopher Paul, Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates (Santa Barbara, CA, 2011), 54. 19 James Warren, “The Struggle to Propagate the Truth,” U.S. News and World Report, December 30, 2015, accessed March 25, 2017, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2015-12-30/the-us-propaganda-problems-predates-the-islamic-state-group-and-the-web. 20 “An Expanded Propaganda Program in Latin America,” July 5, 1961, Record Group 59, General Records of the United States Department of State (hereafter RG 59), Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, box 1, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 21 Ibid. 22 “Message to a Meeting on the Foreign Student in the United States,” October 30, 1961, accessed March 26, 2017, American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8415. 23 Ernesto Ché Guevara, Our America and Theirs: Kennedy and the Alliance for Progress, The Debate at Punta Del Este (New York, 2005), 66; “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President Kennedy,” August 22, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962, ed. Louis J. Smith (Washington, DC, 1997), doc. 257. 24 “Informe sobe la conferencia del consejo Interamericano Economico y Social de la OEA celebrada en Punta del Este, a la que asistio el Cdte. Ernesto Ché Guevara,” 8 de Septiembre 1961, expediente 661, legajo 36, fondo, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Archivo Nacional de Cuba. 25 “Awareness of the ‘Alliance for Progress’ in Latin America,” April 4, 1962, RG 306, Office of Research and Reference, 1956–1962, Entry A1 1032, NARA. 26 Blair Woodard, “Intimate Enemies: Visual Culture and U.S.-Cuban Relations, 1945–2000” (PhD diss., University of New Mexico, 2010), 213. 27 These comic books are located in the Papers of Ernest Keller, Georgetown University Library Special Collections, box 4 (hereafter GULSC). Their publication dates are as follows: Alianza para el Progresso, April 1961; El Despertar, April 1961; La Traiciόn, November 1961; La Punalada, May 1962; Los Secuestradores, June 1962; La Hora Decisiva, January 1963; Hacia Una Mejor, August 1963. 28 “The Cartoon Book Program in Latin America,” May 22, 1963, box 4, GULSC. 29 Hacia Una Vida Mejor, August 1963, box 4, GULSC. 30 La Puñalada, May 1962, El Despertar, April 1961, Los Secuestradores, June 1962, La Traición, November 1961, box 4, GULSC. 31 “Cartoon Books and Photo-novellas Distribution by Country, 1967,” box 4, GULSC; Woodard, “Intimate Enemies,” 214. 32 “The Cartoon Book Program in Latin America,” May 22, 1963, box 4, GULSC. 33 Ibid. 34 Judith Ewell, Venezuela and the United States: From Monroe’s Hemisphere to Petroleum’s Empire (Athens, GA, 1996), 166. 35 Aragorn Storm Miller, Precarious Paths to Freedom: The United States, Venezuela, and the Latin American Cold War (Albuquerque, NM, 2016). 36 Robert Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela (New Brunswick, NJ, 1982), 541–42. 37 “Memorandum, Embajada de Venezuela en Havana a Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” 8 de Agosto 1960, America Latina, Venezuela, 1959–1969, Archivo de Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (hereafter MINREX); “Memorandum, Embajada de Venezuela en Havana a Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” 31 de Octubre 1960, America Latina, Venezuela, 1959–1969, MINREX. 38 Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela, 544. 39 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA; National Intelligence Estimate Number 89–61, “The Situation in Venezuela,” November 21, 1961, National Security Files, National Intelligence Estimates, box 9, LBJL. 40 John Duncan Powell, Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant (London, 1971), 109; John Crow, The Epic of Latin America, 4th ed. (Berkeley, CA, 1992), 794. 41 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 42 “Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics,” March 13, 1961, accessed March 26, 2017, American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8531. 43 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 44 “Public Information Program on ‘Alliance for Progress,’” RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961–1963, Entry A1 3149, box 1, NARA. 45 Deborah Cohn, The Latin American Literary Boom and U.S. Nationalism during the Cold War (Nashville, TN, 2012), 123. 46 For more on Faulkner and diplomacy refer to Deborah Cohn, “‘In between propaganda and escapism’: William Faulkner as Cold War Cultural Ambassador,” Diplomatic History 40, no. 3 (2016): 392–420. 47 Lisa Hickman, William Faulkner and Joan Williams: The Romance of Two Writers (Jefferson, NC, 2006), 188–89. 48 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 49 Helen Oakley, “William Faulkner and the Cold War: The Politics of Cultural Marketing,” in Look Away! The U.S. South in New World Studies, eds., Jon Smith and Deborah Cohn (Durham, NC, 2004), 413. 50 Alan McPherson, Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations (Cambridge, UK, 2003), chap. 1. 51 Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela, 555. 52 “Remarks at the La Morita Resettlement Project Near Caracas,” December 16, 1961, accessed March 26, 2017, American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8488. 53 “Kennedy en La Morita: Eliminar las Tiranías es el Objectivo del Interamericanismo,” El Nacional, 17 de Diciembre 1961, 26; Forging the Alliance-President Kennedy visits Venezuela and Colombia, December 1961, United States Government Agencies, Accession Number 1A, John F. Kennedy Library (hereafter JFKL). 54 “Jackie Delights Caracas,” The Miami News, December 17, 1961, 1; “It’s Jackie Si! As Caracas Salutes JFK,” The Miami News, December 17, 1961, 11. 55 Mark Hanson, Educational Reform and Administrative Development: The Cases of Colombia and Venezuela (Stanford, CA, 1986), 158; “Country Plan Submission,” June 21, 1962, RG 306, Country Plans, Entry UD-WW 389, box 110, NARA. 56 Judith Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change (Stanford, CA, 1984), 142. 57 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 58 “Venezuela Country Plan FY-1962,” July 13, 1961, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 59 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 63 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 64 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 65 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program,” July 27, 1961, CU, box 20, University of Arkansas Library’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection (hereafter UAR). 66 Ibid. 67 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program,” October 1, 1964, CU, box 20, UAR. 68 Ibid. 69 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA; “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 70 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 71 Ibid. 72 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 73 “Country Plan Submission,” June 21, 1962, RG 306, Country Plans, Entry UD-WW 389, box 110, NARA. 74 Michael Tarver, Venezuelan Insurgency, 1960–1968: A Successful Failure (Bloomington, IN, 2001), 67–68. 75 Benjamin Keen and Keith Haynes, A History of Latin America: Independence to the Present, vol. 2, 9th ed. (Boston, MA, 2013), 500; “Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Venezuela a Bogotá,” 24 de Enero 1961, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 820, Orden Numero 154, Archivo Nacional de Colombia (hereafter AGNCOL). 76 Peter Calvert, “Venezuela: The FALN-FLN,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, eds. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC, 2007), 496. 77 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002), 22. 78 “El Proceso Electoral Venezolano de 1 de Diciembre de 1963,” 13 de Marzo 1964, America Latina, Venezuela, 1959–1969, MINREX. 79 Latin American Policy Committee Meeting, “Venezuela,” July 19, 1962, Papers of Arthur Schlesinger Jr., White House Files, box 23, JFKL. 80 Memorandum, “Influence of the Castro Government on Venezuela from July 1961 to July 1962,” RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs/Office of East Coast Affairs, Entry P 224, box 8, NARA. 81 Ambassador Allen Stewart, Oral History, October 23, 1967, 24, JFKL. 82 Ibid. 83 Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela, 496. 84 Herbert Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán: Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia (Madison, WI, 1985); Mary Roldán, Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946–1953 (Durham, NC, 2002); James Henderson, When Colombia Bled: A History of the Violencia in Tolima (Tuscaloosa, AL, 1985). 85 “Memorando,” 13 de Marzo 1961, Presidencia de la Republica, Secretaria General, Caja 23, Carpeta 1, AGNCOL. 86 Robert Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven, CT, 1967), 159. 87 Robert Karl, Forgotten Peace: Reform, Violence, and the Making of Contemporary Colombia (Oakland, CA, 2017), 126. 88 “Informe sobre Colombia, Actividades contra Cuba, Politicas,” 11 de Noviembre 1960, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901–1967, MINREX; “Memorando, Servicio de Intelligencia Colombiana a Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,” 26 de Abril 1960, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Diplomatica y Consular, Transferencia 8, Problema Cubano en Latinoamerica, Caja 184, AGNCOL; “Platforma Revolucionaria Llevan los 525 Delegados de Colombia,” El Siglo, 26 de Julio 1960. 89 “Primer Congreso Continental Anti-Imperialista de Los Amigos de la Revolución Cubana, Comite Preparatorio,” 17 de Agosto 1960, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901–1967, MINREX. “Boletin Informativo,” Comité Colombiano Pro Defensa a la Revolución, 5 de Noviembre 1960, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901–1967, MINREX. 90 Proyecto de Plan de Trabajo para Seis Meses del Comite de Defensa de la Revolución Cubana 16 de Octubre 1961, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901–1967, MINREX; “Memorandum para Embajada de Cuba en Colombia a la Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores en Havana,” 29 de Abril 1961, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901–1967, MINREX. 91 “Memorandum por Embajada de Cuba en Colombia, Declaración de Solidaridad Juvenil,” 12 de Abril 1961, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901–1967, MINREX. 92 “Personalidad de los Colombianos que Intentaban Viajar a Cuba,” 1962, Ministerio de Gobierno, Despacho Ministro, Caja 34, Carpeta 292, AGNCOL. 93 “Boletin, Que la Cedula de Ciudadania es un Instrumento para Combatir la Violencia Afirman los Altos Nandos Militares,” 11 de Octubre 1962, Ministerio de Educacion, Secretaria General, Caja 332, Carpeta 4, AGNCOL. 94 For a recent study on Cuban foreign policy in Latin America refer to Jonathan Brown, Cuba's Revolutionary Worlds (Cambridge, MA, 2017). 95 Piero Gleijeses, The Cuban Drumbeat (Chicago, IL, 2009); Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 22. 96 Informe Político de Abril, El Problema de Viet-Nam, 21 de Mayo 21 1962, Presidencial la Republica, Caja 332, Carpeta 2, AGNCOL; For more on Colombian response to the Fidel Castro’s government refer to Robert Karl, “Reading the Cuban Revolution from Bogotá, 1957–62,” Cold War History 16, no. 4 (2016): 337–58. 97 “Colombian Urges Rise in Latin Aid,” New York Times, April 7, 1960, 1; “Kennedy y Castro,” 8 de Febrero 1961, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 368, AGNCOL. 98 “Bogotá se volcará mañana para recibir a los Kennedy,” El Tiempo, 16 de Diciembre 1961, 1; “El Pensamiento Político de John Kennedy,” El Tiempo, 16 de Diciembre 1961, 8; “Belleza en la Casa Blanca, Jacqueline Kennedy,” El Tiempo, 17 de Diciembre 1961, 10. 99 Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York, 1993), 267. 100 “Programa de Vivienda en Techo,” Programa de la Visita del Presidente de Estado Unidos, John F. Kennedy a Colombia, Diciembre de 1961, Carpeta 38, Papers of Alberto Lleras Camargo, Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango, Bogotá, Colombia. 101 “500,000 in Bogotá Greet President on Alliance Tour,” New York Times, December 18, 1961, 1; Colombian papers estimated a little higher: “600.000 Aclamaron a los Kennedy,” El Tiempo, 18 de Diciembre 1961, 1. 102 “Colombia Country Plan FY-1960,” August 6, 1959, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 103 Robert Dallek, Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908–1960 (New York, 1991), 516; “Senate Hacks USIA Budget Bill for 1958,” May 16, 1957, St. Petersburg Times, 1A. 104 “Group Cuts Fund Asked For USIA: Spending Questioned Department Fund Cut,” Washington Post, May 30, 1961, A6; McPherson, Yankee No!, 126. 105 “Bogotá Country Plan,” October 31, 1961, RG 306, Country Plans, Entry UD-WW 389, box 110, NARA. 106 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program,” March 22, 1963, CU, box 13, UAR. 107 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program,” November 15, 1961, CU, box 13, UAR. 108 “An Expanded Propaganda Program in Latin America,” July 5, 1961, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961–1963, box 1, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 109 “Evaluation of Binational Centers (Cartagena),” March 27, 1963, RG 306, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954–1965, Entry 1047, box 5, NARA. 110 Ibid. 111 “Memorandum para Embajada de Cuba en Colombia a la Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores en Havana,” 27 de Enero 1961, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901–1967, MINREX. 112 “Informes General de Labores de la Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores es Libres del Valle,” 20 de Diciembre 1962, Ministerio de Educacion, Secretaria General, Caja 332, Carpeta 4, AGNCOL. 113 Acta de Fundacion, Asociacion Popular Alianza Para El Progreso, 6 de Enero 1963, Ministerio de Gobierno, Despacho Ministro, Caja 37, Carpeta 317, AGNCOL. 114 Nicholas Cull, “Film as Public Diplomacy: The USIA’s Cold War at Twenty-Four Frames Per Second,” in The New International History meets the New Cultural History, eds. Kenneth Osgood and Brian Etheridge (Boston, MA, 2010), 266. 115 Tony Shaw, Hollywood’s Cold War (Amherst, MA, 2007), 179. 116 “The School At Rincon Santo, English Script,” September 28, 1962, RG 306, Office of Research, Country Project File, 1951–1964, box 111, Entry 1015, ARC ID 1065787, NARA. 117 Ibid. 118 The Charter of Punta del Este, Establishing an Alliance for Progress Within the Framework of Operation Pan America; August 17, 1961, Yale Law School’s Avalon Project, accessed February 18, 2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam16.asp. 119 “The Impact of President Kennedy’s Visit Upon Attitudes Toward the Alianza in Bogotá,” January 1962, RG 306, Office of Research and Media Reaction, Special Reports, 1953–1997, RG 306, Entry P 160, box 18, NARA. 120 Memorandum, “Opinions in Latin America,” August 2, 1961, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of the Special Assistant on Communism, Subject Files, Dominican Republic to Peru, Entry A1 3148, box 9, NARA; “Progress Report on AID-USIA Study of Attitudes Toward the Alliance for Progress in Seven Latin American Countries,” April 1, 1962, RG 306, Office of Research, Multi Country Project Files, Latin America, 1962, Entry A1 1023, box 6, NARA. 121 “Research of Alliance Film-School at Rincon Santo,” February 2, 1964, RG 306, Office of Research, Country Project File, 1951–1964, Entry 1015, box 111, NARA. 122 “Cartoon Books and Photo-novellas Distribution by Country, 1967,” box 4, GUSLC. 123 “Memorando, Revisión Plan de Inversiones Públicas 1963–1966 y Elaboración Proyecto Presupuesto 1964,” Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Depsacho Ministro (undated), Transferencia 8, Caja 21, AGNCOL; “Los Problemas de la Planeación Colombiana en la Actualidad, 1962,” Presidencia de la Republica, Secretaria General (undated), Caja 330, Carpeta 2, AGNCOL; Jeffrey Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York, 2007), 160. 124 Jorge Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (New Brunswick, NJ, 1989), 98–99; Nazih Richani, “Caudillos and the Crisis of the Colombian State: Fragmented Sovereignty, the War System and the Privatisation of Counterinsurgency in Colombia,” in The Long War—Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Collapsing States, eds. Mark Berger and Douglas Borer (New York, 2013), 218; Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica, CA, 2001), 23–25. 125 “Entrevista con Carlos Romero, Secretario de Organizacion de la Juventud Comunista de Colombia,” 19 de Agosto 1964, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901–1967, MINREX. 126 Marc Chernick, “Negotiating Peace amid Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to the Armed Conflicts in Colombia,” in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. Cynthia Arnson (Washington, DC, 1999), 197; Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior (New York, 2010), 94–95. 127 Frank Mora and Jerry Cooney, Paraguay and the United States: Distant Allies (Athens, GA, 2007), 162. 128 “The United States Information Agency: A Commemoration,” 30, accessed February 18, 2017, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/abtusia/commins.pdf. 129 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 108. 130 “Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics,” March 13, 1961, accessed March 26, 2017, American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8531. 131 Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, The Alliance that Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress (New York, 1970). 132 David Sheinin, H-Diplo Roundtable Review of Jeffrey Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, volume XI, No. 20 (2010), 14–15. 133 Donald Wilson, Oral History, September 2, 1964, 32, JFKL. © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: email@example.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/about_us/legal/notices)
Diplomatic History – Oxford University Press
Published: Nov 1, 2018
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