Abstract This article examines the relationship between post-conflict peace-building and state-building. In so doing, the article illustrates the process of the expansion and transformation of “world international society”. By comparing the process of the formation of sovereign states in modern Europe and state-building activities in post-conflict societies in the contemporary world, the article seeks to identify dilemmas of peace-building through state-building. First, it describes the dilemma at the level of overall international order concerning world international society and regional discrepancies of peace-building through state-building. Second, it also highlights the dilemma at the level of state-building policies concerning the concentration of power and the limitation of concentrated power. Third, it illustrates the dilemma concerning liberal peace-building and local ownership. Then, the article argues that post-conflict state-building needs to be understood in the context of the long-term state-building process. 1 Introduction This article is intended to examine the relationship between post-conflict peace-building and state-building in the context of the process of the expansion and transformation of ‘world international society’.1 In turn, the article compares the process of the formation of sovereign states in modern Europe and state-building activities in post-conflict societies in the contemporary world. The article sets out to answer the question, what are the fundamental dilemmas of peace-building through state-building, as seen from the perspective of world international society? The question deserved to be answered, as there are numerous theoretical and policy-oriented issues concerning such dilemmas. Then, the article presents three dilemmas relevant to this question.2 First, there is the dilemma at the level of overall international order concerning world international society and regional discrepancies of peace-building through state-building. Second, there is the dilemma at the level of state-building policies concerning the concentration of power and the limitation of concentrated power. Third, there is the dilemma concerning liberal peace-building and local ownership. The article argues that post-conflict state-building needs to be understood in the context of the long-term state-building process. There are usually many fragile elements, including armed conflicts, in such a process. In the process, we will be able to see a long-term process of state-building, which covers conflict-prone states in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Developing countries, de-colonized in the process of the formation of ‘world international society’, constitute the conflict zone of the contemporary world, stretching from Africa to South East Asia. The fragility of these states can be explained in terms of the rapid universalization within international society of sovereign nation states in the 20th century after the geographical expansion of European international society in the 19th century. Armed conflicts, seen from a historical perspective, are not occasional appearances of ‘holes’ in a once-complete international society, but rather the constant appearances of hidden structural tasks in our ‘world international society’. There are similarities and differences between state formation in modern times and state-building in the contemporary world. Nation states, including modern European states and latecomers, such as the United States and Japan, overcame the social structure of internal armed conflicts by joining international society, where they exposed themselves to competition with other states. Until the 19th century, competition among nation states was not just a sad reality; it was part of nation-state-building itself. In contrast, state-building activities in post-conflict societies in the contemporary world are promoted by international assistance. No competition among nation states is assumed in our universalized international society, where there is no more geographical room for external expansion of state power. While we need strong states to sustain peace, we do not need stronger states to threaten peace. State-building is an attempt to create a strong state, which must also be sufficiently constrained by international norms. The way in which we identify the problem of state-building in post-conflict societies is a reflection of the problem of international order in our contemporary world. The article also touches upon the debate concerning liberal peace-building and local ownership. It has been widely discussed that the orthodox doctrine of peace-building activities is more or less based upon liberal values. This could imply that peace-building is a set of Western-centric intervention activities to a great extent. This observation indicates that this Western-centric nature of peace-building may clash with another key principle of peace-building, namely, respect for local ownership. In turn, this poses a fundamental dilemma regarding the attitudes of peace-building. The article provides an overall description of state-building as an issue of contemporary peace-building activities in the first section. Then, the second section illustrates the dilemma of state-building in the context of world international society. The third section discusses the dilemma concerning the concentration of state power for peace-building. The fourth section highlights the dilemma between liberal peace-building theory and the principle of local ownership. 2 State-building in contemporary international society It is commonly understood that state-building constitutes a pillar of peace-building activities focused on resolving armed conflicts throughout the world. The expansion of international peace-building activities since the end of the Cold War has promoted the role played by the United Nations (UN), regional organizations and other international organizations in rebuilding state functions. The widely shared analysis is that, in many cases, the root causes of conflicts involve the fragility of governance, which has necessitated state-building activities, even led by international actors. Accordingly, the principles that guide state-building are regarded as key in contemporary peace-building activities, such as the rule of law (Shinoda, 2003). Since the large missions in East Timor and Kosovo, as established in 1999, UN peacekeeping operations have involved state-building activities on an extensive scale. The United States advanced the trend by unilaterally introducing large state-building activities in Afghanistan and Iraq in the context of the War on Terror after 2001. This was ironic, given that George W. Bush had criticized the Clinton administration’s engagement with ‘nation building’ in the 1990s over Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. But the fact is that US policies in the age of the War on Terror have paradoxically strengthened the myth of ‘democratic peace’ theory as a conceptual tool to justify wars by democracies against non-democracies in order to facilitate regime changes, leading to a domino effect of democratization (Fukuyama, 2006). Technical terms for peace-related operations, such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and the protection of civilians, were coined around the turn of the 21st century to reinforce efforts for state-building. Civilian experts on state-building emerged to take active roles in the fields of peace operations, development aid, human rights, etc. They assisted, advised, and often almost supervised host governments. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), together with Department of Field Support (DFS), in the 2008 handbook of principles and guidelines known as the ‘Capstone Doctrine’, argued that the UN respects the principle of impartiality, instead of neutrality, by complying with international law and peace agreements (UN DPKO and DFS, 2008, pp. 33–34). Recent trends have seen a growing collaboration between the UN, and regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as other international actors, in the field of peace operations. In the era of ‘partnership peacekeeping’, the European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and many others are among the major implementers of peace operations involving complex means of sequential and functional cooperation. The understanding is that, in order to confront global issues such as terrorist attacks, stakeholders in the international community are increasing the scale of multilayered involvement by multiple institutions, as well as the range of multidimensional policy options (United Nations, 2015). Roland Paris discussed ‘liberal peace-building’ theory by promoting academic discussion on how to understand it. According to Paris, many international peace operations in the 1990s led by the UN as the promotor of liberal values failed due to hasty approaches to democratization and introducing market economies. Donors sought to find successful project examples and create formal institutions, while being mindful of the gap between the needs of the respective local society and the needs of international society (Paris, 2002). The dilemma here is that liberal peace-building theory tends to be misplaced state-building efforts by local societies (Paris and Sisk, 2009). A critic of liberal peace-building theory, Oliver Richmond, shares the view that peace-building practices by international organizations and donor states are more or less based upon the value system of liberal democracy. Furthermore, he criticizes such an attitude towards peace-building by saying that local stakeholders are forced to become dependent upon foreign interventions (Richmond, 2011). Other critics, such as David Roberts, express the view that liberal peace-building is peace-building by external actors, which destroys traditional local conflict resolution mechanisms. Worse still is that liberal peace-building led by external actors often strengthens the mechanism of resource distribution, which is maneuvered by power holders exploiting fragile governmental systems. This inevitably deteriorates the existing unjust social structure (Roberts, 2011). In this manner, the current form of state-building in post-conflict or other types of fragile states is mainly being implemented by the Western donor community, which is concerned about the prospect of their own agendas, including security issues in the age of the War on Terror.3 The mainstream international community is also strengthening the normative power of the international legal regime, such as international humanitarian and human rights laws. It should also be noted that the more the mainstream international community strengthens its universalistic attitude, the more the gap between the mainstream and the periphery widens. 3 The purpose of state-building in conflict-prone areas: dilemma of world international society In the last 25 years or so since the end of the Cold War, there have been some crucial changes in trends regarding armed conflicts in the world. There was a sharp rise in the number of armed conflicts at a global level at the beginning of the 1990s. The number gradually decreased, although a significant reversal began several years ago, such that the number of armed conflicts has now surpassed its historic record after the end of the Cold War.4 Armed conflicts tend to take place in geographically specific areas where fragile states are accumulated. First of all, most of them occur as internal conflicts in states that became independent in the latter half of the 20th century on the tide of decolonization. Namely, the conflicts have been mainly happening in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Their social foundations to sustain sound governmental functions have been rather weak and in fact have been fragile since their independence. There are some more specific trends. Southern Africa and South East Asia were significantly volatile during and shortly after the Cold War. But these areas are now comparatively stable. On the other hand, the center of the world’s conflict zone is now the Middle East, especially since the Arab Spring. Africa, especially North Africa and the Sahel, remains volatile, even though African states are performing comparatively better now than previously. It goes without saying that these conflict-prone areas are found in the world’s least developed areas. They are more or less fragile, corrupt in governance,5 low in terms of the human development index,6 complex in the composition of identity groups,7 dependent upon natural resources (UNCTAD, 2012), and high in population growth with the clear indication of a ‘youth bulge’ (Beehner, 2007). Thus, it seems natural that the international community should mobilize not only security and political measures, but also social and economic assistance to these fragile areas, where the need for comprehensive strategies of state-building is hardly surprising. In the post-Cold War era, there has been a widely shared understanding of the background of armed conflicts. Fragility arises out of the bad governance of decolonized states without sound social and economic infrastructure (United Nations, 1998, pp. 3–5). The international community needs to identify this symptom as a serious structural problem, as a majority of states may apparently or potentially be fragile. If the spread of fragility is not prevented, the entire international community would have to experience a collapse in the existing international order. It is natural for the mainstream international community to respond to crises in fragile states, as it needs to establish international order by introducing comprehensive strategies of state-building in order to sustain social order in sovereign states (OECD, 2001). Those who are responsible for governance in each state are the key stakeholders in the context of international order. Once they become corrupt, or exploit their positions through state mechanisms, the fragility of such a state is inevitable and international order is at stake. Analysts such as Paul Collier and Frances Stewart have discussed the social and economic aspects of the causal factors behind armed conflicts, which create opportunities or greater inequalities for the greedy to exploit among the unprivileged (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Collier, 2007; Stewart, 2008). But, in the end, such structural changes can only happen when political initiatives are introduced with competent government functions: namely, they all require state-building types of peace-building, even provided by international actors. State-building is conducted in the form of international assistance by major donor countries or international organizations in recipient fragile states. It responds to national peace-building agendas, as well as the maintenance of international order at the same time. It is somewhat paradoxical that, for the sake of independence, some independent states ask for external intervention for the purpose of state-building/peace-building. This represents a dilemma between the maintenance of universal order in international society based upon the independence of each sovereign state and the reality of fragility among a great number of developing countries, which eventually require external assistance. Peace-building through state-building comprises activities that are intended to solve the problems arising out of such a dilemma faced by world international society. 4 State-building in the process of the formation of modern nation states: the dilemma of the concentration of power The perspective of the historical development of international society clearly illustrates the relationship between conflict-prone areas and intervening actors involved in state-building activities. Intervening actors often exploit the growing normative power of international legal regimes, such as the UN Charter and international humanitarian law, to justify their engagement in state-building activities. Regardless of the concrete wording of UN Security Council Resolutions, both the UN and other organizations, such as NATO or the AU, in addition to ad hoc coalitions of the willing, are taking bolder and broader approaches when conducting state-building activities, as if they represent the entire international community. The belief that there are universal values, rules, and institutions is the existential foundation of international society itself (Bull, 1977). It is significantly linked to the worldview that those responsible for international order are responsible for defending international societies against its challengers. World international society is not just geographically worldwide: since it is a community of values, rules, and institutions, it is also intended to be universal in ideas. The enhancement of the validity of international values, rules, and institutions is the effort to strengthen the foundation of universal international order (Shinoda, 2015). Hedley Bull asserts that international society is a society of states, which has its origin in Europe. In the early period, international society was a ‘Christian international society’ of those European states sharing Christian values. Secularization of political societies took place in Europe around the 17th century, when ‘European international society’ emerged as a society of states in Europe, which shared the same regional institutions, such as the balance of power. Meanwhile, the 19th century saw the worldwide spread of European states’ imperial ambitions to the extent that the entire planet was dominated by a single international society of sovereign states. The heavy blows suffered in the course of the two World Wars in the first half of the 20th century led to the disruption of European imperial powers, with numerous new independent states created in the process. As ‘European international society’ came to an end, a new international society called ‘world international society’ was introduced with the universal application of the principle of self-determination. The zone of decolonized newly independent states is where most contemporary armed conflicts are taking place. It is the zone in which people are struggling to establish their own sovereign state by overcoming conflicts, poverty, bad governance and other serious problems through state-building efforts. Many of them were supported by the superpowers during the Cold War. Now, they receive international assistance in order to sustain their national existence. When we think of the relationship between armed conflicts and state-building, we often assume that once-perfect international society is now revealing its flaws as it is confronted by some ad hoc problems. The fact is, however, that international society has never been perfect or complete. Fragility did not result from a series of dysfunctional events, but rather evolved out of the fundamental structural nature of ‘world international society’. It is more appropriate to say that ‘world international society’ managed to come into existence despite continuous fundamental structural fragility. ‘World international society’ was as fundamentally fragile in the beginning as it is now. State-building efforts in our contemporary world represent a series of activities seeking to establish ‘world international society’ in substance after its formal existence was widely acknowledged. Without such state-building efforts to strengthen the constitutive components of ‘world international society’, it could disastrously collapse, thereby destroying international order. The number of constitutive units in ‘European international society’ continuously decreased since its beginning in the 17th century. At the time of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, there were hundreds of political communities in Europe. Following a series of consecutive wars and territorial settlements over a number of centuries, only a handful of great powers in Europe remained. At the beginning of the 20th century, only about six states were fully recognized as sovereign states in Europe, while other smaller states were called ‘semi-sovereign’ or ‘half-sovereign’ states (Tilly, 1975). Why did the number of sovereign states continue to decrease prior to the collapse of the European empires after the two World Wars of the 20th century? Great powers survived the extreme level of competition between various political communities by advancing industrialization and militarization through a capitalist market economy. Those states that were unable to compete against the most advanced states were left behind and absorbed by stronger powers. The logic of state-building, based upon competition, was intrinsically enshrined in ‘European international society’, while the consequence was totally in opposition to the situation of ‘world international society’. Only then did the international society of sovereign states experience a dramatic decrease in the number of sovereign states, along with the worldwide expansion of international society itself. The nature of ‘European international society’ makes a critical contrast with ‘world international society’ where there is no longer any geographical expansion, while the dramatic increase in the number of sovereign states is a constant phenomenon. Political and industrial revolutions since the 17th century brought about structural changes in political communities and international society in Europe. The birth of nation states was, in particular, an epoch-making event. The revolutionary doctrine of the existence of a nation being identical with a state with a collective will was a product of the political culture introduced during the French Revolution. War was the most significant dimension of the emergence of modern nation states. Revolutions in England, North America, and France were all wars seen from the perspective of international society, that is, internal armed conflicts linked with international conflicts. The Glorious Revolution of England was only possible with the military intervention of the Netherlands. The American Revolution was the War of Independence with interventions from countries such as France. The French Revolution was defended during the continental Napoleonic Wars. Germany, Italy, Russia, China, and Japan are among those countries that created nation states through revolutionary wars. For instance, the Meiji Revolution was achieved through the Boshin War. The reforms for state-building introduced by the Meiji government led to the waves of internal armed conflicts especially for the first 10 years. The consequences of wars determined the structures of nation states. Wars stimulated state-building and created nation states, while war and preparation for war determined the concentration of administrative powers and financial resources. As Anthony Giddens observes, states transformed themselves in order to conduct war, or did so as a result of war (Giddens, 1985, p. 112). According to Hedley Bull, war was an institution of ‘European international society’ in the 18th and 19th centuries (Bull, 1977, ch. 8). When the configuration of power relations changed, war brought about a new form of the balance of power. When critical incidents took place, war brought about sanctions to challengers of international order. In the 19th century, only a handful of great powers were said to be truly sovereign states, while other smaller states were only given the status of ‘half-sovereign states’. ‘European international society’ was a society of oligarchical order (Shinoda, 2000). Unless states were great powers, which were capable of pursuing such enforcement measures as war in order to maintain international order, states were simply objectives within the context of the balance of power calculation, while their existence as independent states could be compromised at any time. In accordance with the institutionalization of a nation state mechanism, financial, and administrative capacities of central governments also developed. Michael Mann highlights the historic moment in the 19th century when non-military expenditures surpassed those of the military, in line with the evolution of government functions of nation state mechanisms. The more the population participated in political and military activities of their state, the more the administrative power of government advanced; the more internal administrative functions developed, the more external war capacities expanded. This was a rapid process in the formation of the nation state in Europe in the 19th century (Giddens, p. 113). European absolutist states accumulated resources to heighten their military capacities to wage wars. The process facilitated innovation in military technologies, which advanced the great powers’ dominance in the region and their imperial expansions outside the region. The intensive military capacity of the central governments of nation states ushered in nationwide administrative mechanisms. These governments’ capacity to collect tax was one significant condition of the expansion of governmental functions, including conscripted military. This higher capacity of central government to administer the population in detail was the condition for the birth of nation state, defined by Max Weber as a ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’. A large standing army is essentially linked to the establishment of a nation state. The belief in the identification of a nation and a state justifies the taxation and conscription of the population needed to create a large standing army. Actual wars against external threats strengthened the spiritual foundation of a nation state to justify further strengthening of state capacity to administer the entire nation. Social security for a large number of government officials, including conscripted soldiers, was a byproduct of the birth of nation states. The rise of communism in the 19th century was more or less accommodated by the accumulation of expanded administrative functions of nation states, especially after the two world ‘total wars’ in the first half of the 20th century (Mann, 1988, p. 158). Universal suffrage was introduced in accordance with the development of nation states. Bismarck introduced such a measure to strengthen the logic of a nation state to build a strong military. The First World War necessitated countries such as Britain to introduce universal suffrage. Wars involving nation states led the way to mass political participation and welfare state systems (Giddens, 1985, p. 234). The modern nation state contributed to an incredible advancement in control over communication and information. This means that the modern state now enjoys considerable power in administering citizens’ lives through advanced police power (Giddens, 1985, pp. 172–192). The geographical expansion of colonial powers was the result of the development of logistical technologies. These technologies were rapidly advanced by the military conduct of modern nation states (Giddens, 1985, pp. 222–232). According to Giddens, the nation and its large military are twins of citizenship, which was dramatically advanced by the total wars in the 20th century (Giddens, 1985, pp. 233–235). According to Giddens, the system of sovereign nation states requires both domestic stability and external wars at the same time. This theoretical model of the nation state is valid, even in the case of contemporary peace-building activities in post-war societies. ‘DDR’ and ‘SSR’, for instance, are measures to create a nation state as the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’. Capacity development for good governance is intended to help establish an effective central government, given that a strong state mechanism is believed to be a way to overcome a social structure involving internal armed conflicts. Despite the assumption about the effectiveness of the concentration of power, the issue about the war-conducting capacity of the modern nation state is not typically emphasized in the context of state-building as peace-building. If the model were a typical modern European-style nation state, war-conducting capacity would be key to state-building. There is no historical sample of nation-state-building without preparation for war-conducting capacity (Cohen et al., 1981). The more state-building succeeds in building centralized administrative power, the more the state becomes capable of conducting effective military operations. Successful state-building with a concentration of strong military power greatly incentivizes political leaders to pursue external activism. Historically rare are the simultaneous achievements of both the creation of a strong centralized military to prevent internal wars and constraints over the external use of the military. War was the strongest factor that facilitated the process of state-building; without war, it could not have been possible to establish the modern nation state system. If so, however, what are the implications of ongoing wars in our contemporary world, which the mainstream international community is trying to mediate? If war is the mother of modern nation states, how should contemporary world international society look at war as the evil to be simply abolished? It is also true that even if some aspects of war might have been the mothers of modern nation states, not every single element of war can be a mother of a modern nation state. But given that the creation of contemporary world international society is a work in progress, the manner we cope with the dilemma between strengthening the state and limiting the state, namely, the dilemma between avoiding war and building upon the effects of war is one of the fundamental questions that policymakers for peace-building/state-building ought to take into consideration. 5 The validity of state-building as the means to overcome the structure of internal armed conflicts: the dilemma of liberal peace-building and local ownership These observations illustrate some of the relevant points concerning the manner in which internal wars ended throughout history. Put another way, there is no example in the history of modern European nation state formation whereby domestic social order was constructed through a peace agreement. Successful nation states, such as Britain, France, and Germany in addition to such non-European countries as the United States and Japan experienced severe internal wars at the time of state-formation. Their revolutionary wars ended with victory for one of the conflict parties over the other(s). Their manner of state-building was a form of peace-building by the victor. In the contemporary world, there is a natural assumption that third party mediation is the most desirable form of conflict resolution. Furthermore, ceasefire is seen as worth pursuing, while peace through an agreement is also a pregiven goal to achieve. But we do not know whether a peace agreement can really promise longer peace than a military victory (Licklider, 1995). The mainstream international community demands that contemporary armed conflicts should be mediated in a manner not experienced by their own home countries. If contemporary peace-building activities focus upon the limitation of governmental powers through negotiated peace, war might miss the chance to strengthen the state in accordance with the historical precedents of European nation states. The history of state-building betrays liberal peace-building practices. Should we consider the possibility of the moment to ‘give war a chance?’ (Luttwak, 1999). If so, when should we? A peace agreement through mediation is understood to be desirable from the perspective of humanitarian concerns in order to prevent further loss of human life. This does not mean, however, that mediated peace is always a form of consolidated peace. Sri Lanka terminated the prolonged war in 2009 following victory on the part of the government. It is questionable whether the pattern set by Sri Lanka jeopardizes peace-building through effective state-building, even when compared to cases such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, where an artificial peace agreement mediated by external powers was the foundation of state-building. The process of the creation of a modern state seeks to concentrate state power in the hands of the central government as a measure to overcome the structure of internal armed conflicts. Peace agreements are introduced to implant liberal values to constrain state powers. Both are compatible when Western-style constitutional states are our models. But is it really universally applicable? Should it be so? The tendency among the mainstream international community to rely on liberal peace-building theory is on account of the dilemma of state-building. The policies of peace-building, such as DDR and SSR, only make sense if strong military capacity is constrained by the liberal regime of the rule of law. It is rational that international organizations, such as the UN and EU, never abandon liberal values as the framework for peace-building, given that state-building ceases to be a form of peace-building without such a framework. State-building is only peace-building when the government is strengthened, but constrained by the social belief in the rule of law. Despite the criticism against Western-centric approaches to peace-building, the mainstream international community will never be able to leave behind liberal peace-building theory. Here is another dilemma: peace-building practitioners respect local ownership and the homegrown internal development of state-building (Shinoda, 2015). But, in the process of trying to ensure the effectiveness of peace-building, both internally and externally, they find it impossible to implant a culture that embodies the liberal rule of law without mobilizing the necessary financial, material, and human resources for liberal peace-building from outside. Implantations from outside and homegrown development from inside are always difficult to simultaneously achieve. But this represents the fundamental dilemma regarding peace-building and the fundamental challenge in establishing world international society. State-building through contemporary peace-building activities is different from the historical examples of nation-state-building in modern ‘European international society’. External intervention is abhorred, but never abandoned, while liberal peace-building theory is never an official doctrine to be promulgated outright, nor ignored in peace-building practices. In the age of world international society, there is no physically external sphere where new nation states can find room for expansion. They strengthen their state capacity without having any opportunity to exert their strengthened state capacity. They advocate local ownership based on homegrown social values, even when receiving overwhelming foreign assistance to implement Western-style liberal values. This paradoxical situation represents the fundamental challenge to be considered by policymakers of contemporary world international society. 6 Conclusion This article has tried to compare contemporary forms of state-building, as peace-building activities in post conflict or fragile states, with historical examples of nation-state-building in modern European international society. In turn, the article has argued that the emergence of world international society has created a dilemma between the universality of sovereign states and regional discrepancies in reality. It has also discussed whether the sovereign state as the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’ creates dilemmas regarding the possibility of using force against external actors. Liberal institutionalism should impose the necessary constraints upon central governments. But liberal peace-building theory is not a desirable guideline, as it goes against the principle of respecting the local ownership. Still, world international society cannot afford to abandon liberal values in order to control sovereign states. Contemporary world international society is not in a position to abandon the sovereign state as the most fundamental constitutive unit of international order. State-building is a panacea with which to overcome the structure of internal armed conflicts, even though it creates dilemmas in respect of universal international order, the concentration of state power and liberal peace-building theory. There is no easy exit from these dilemmas. In contemporary world international society, we conduct state-building by constraining state capacity, and implement liberal peace-building, while abhorring such a form of peace-building practice. What is required is a well-balanced understanding and implementation of such critical dilemmas. Footnotes 1 This article distinguishes between peace-building and state-building. The former points to activities needed to create the social foundations for a durable peace, while the latter is concerned with activities to create functional state institutions. See OECD, 2008. State-building is usually distinguished from nation-building, as the latter concerns the creation of group identity of the people as one single community. See Anderson, 1991. But state-building could go hand in hand with nation-building. State-building and nation-building are not mutually exclusive. So this essay could use the term ‘nation-state-building’. As for the definition of international society, with reference to the difference between ‘European international society’ and ‘world international society’ see Bull, 1977. A group of states constitutes international society when they share certain common values, rules and institutions. When the common set of values, rules and institutions is particularly Europe-specific, we may identify ‘European international society.’ ‘World international society’ appeared in the latter half of the 20th century, when the set of values, rules, and institutions became universally extensive. 2 A number of literature on conflict resolution and peace operations share the view that durable peace can be founded upon well-governed states. While many concrete issues arise as a result, more theoretical discussions on the view ought to be addressed to refine the fundamental framework. 3 While European and North-American countries traditionally led peacebuilding-related assistances, which are influential within the United Nations too, it is also true that non-Western countries have also made significant contributions in peacebuilding-related affairs. Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, and China are among those non-Western countries active in assistances in post-conflict areas. But Japan and RoK tend to resonate with the manner Western countries conduct assistances. The members of OECD DAC (Development Assistance Committee) where aid policies are coordinated consists of 30 members mainly from Europe, North America, and Oceania. Japan and RoK are the only exceptional, but harmonious, members from Asia. 4 As for the data set for armed conflicts, see UCDP website: http://www.pcr.uu.se/data/(26 September 2017, date last accessed). 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International Relations of the Asia-Pacific – Oxford University Press
Published: Jan 1, 2018
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