Measure for Measure on Trial—A Shakespearean Mock Trial

Measure for Measure on Trial—A Shakespearean Mock Trial ABSTRACT Mock trials have been a privileged way to teach law for many years. They allow to convey to the students many subtleties in the workings of the law in a way that lecturing probably never can. Among many other things, it helps pinpoint the values in tension in the real life of the law, the drama of a court room, the imaginaries at play, the social pressure and other forces bearing down on the law’s different actors. Shakespeare’s work epitomises this passion, these waves that curl the flat, cool covers of the law books. 1. INTRODUCTION Mock trials have been a privileged way to teach law for many years. They allow to convey to the students many subtleties in the workings of the law in a way that lecturing probably never can. Among many other things, it helps pinpoint the values in tension in the real life of the law, the drama of a court room, the imaginaries at play, the social pressure and other forces bearing down on the law’s different actors. Shakespeare’s work epitomizes this passion, these waves that curl the flat, cool covers of the law books. Dispute settlement is a particular moment, when the life bites into society. Shakespeare provided us with some of the most revealing, and the most enjoyable, accounts of these moments. The idea to stage a Mock Trial based on Shakespeare follows almost naturally. And so it came that, on 23 March 2015, I organized a Shakespeare Mock Trial based on Measure for Measure. The Mock Trial took place at Inner Temple Hall, itself one of the historical Shakespearean venues, where the Twelfth Knight was first performed. Measure for Measure is concerned with law, power and corrupted adjudication: Vienna has collapsed into lawlessness. Sexual promiscuity, which is prohibited, abounds. The laws themselves are draconian but for years the Duke has not enforced them. His remedy is to appoint Angelo in his place, as his Deputy with all his powers. Angelo, believed by the Duke to be a man of high integrity, and himself already engaged to Mariana, can be trusted to see that the laws will be applied with their full rigour. Law and order and sexual propriety will be restored. For the time being Duke declares that he will be leaving Vienna, but in fact he stays, in disguise as a friar, to observe what unfolds. Claudio has had sexual intercourse with Juliet, his betrothed. This fact emerges after Angelo has assumed power. In law this crime carries the death penalty. In the Duke’s day no public interest would have been served by a prosecution. The couple would be married in all but name. Claudio’s sister Isabella, who is about to take vows of chastity as a nun, pleads with Angelo, not that Claudio is innocent but for mercy, for her brother’s life. She is offered a stark choice. The price for dispensing with the law is Claudio’s life in exchange for her virginity. She is appalled. Yet when she tells her brother, he begs her to comply with Angelo’s demand. The Duke, still in disguise, solves the problem. Angelo is tricked into believing that Isabella will share his bed, but in the darkness she is replaced by Mariana. Thus Isabella is spared and Angelo has committed the same crime as Claudio, having intercourse with his fiancée. Still believing that he has slept with Isabella, Angelo nevertheless orders the execution of Claudio to proceed. A second substitution is made. The head of a pirate, Ragozine, who died on that night, is substituted for that of Claudio. At last the Duke steps in. Despite his insistence that he should be punished for this own crime, Angelo must marry Mariana, Claudio will marry Juliet, and the Duke proposes, more accurately assumes, that Isabella and he will marry. The idea of the Mock Trial was to bring Vienna’s rulers to court to test their legal responsibility: the Duke Vincentio and his second in command, Angelo, took the stand to defend their record in government and to discharge their responsibility for the downfall of the city. The Mock Trial is not a simple Moot Competition, where advocates present an argument in front of a panel. The Mock Trial attempts to recreate a real trial scene with a jury box, a witness stand, three sitting judges and advocates for the prosecution and for the defence. Students filled all those positions with enthusiasm and engaged in a fabulous trial, presided over by Lord Judge, Judge David Caron and Lady Justice Arden. What follows is the written script prepared in advance, together with the edited transcript of the exchange between the prosecution, the defence and the court. The first part of the Mock Trial deals with the case against Angelo. The second part of the Mock Trial deals with the case against the Duke. 2. THE TRIAL OF ANGELO Lord Judge calls upon the Prosecution to open the trial Prosecution: We seek that the law should be strictly applied to Angelo and find him guilty of blackmail and corruption and therefore warrant a reversal of the Duke’s pardon of Angelo’s unlawful actions. The case against Angelo will be divided into two charges: blackmail and corruption. For the purposes of the prosecution, we submit that blackmail is, ‘Any payment or other benefit extorted by threats or pressure, especially by threatening to reveal a damaging or incriminating secret.’1 Similarly, we define Angelo’s corruption as the misuse of the entrusted power that the Duke bestowed upon him. The defence’s case rests on the argument that Angelo was not liable for his actions due to the power bestowed upon him by the Duke. The prosecution refutes this and draws the court’s attention to Act One, Scene One, where the Duke directed Angelo ‘to enforce or qualify the laws’2 meaning that Angelo had the power to use the law and apply it with moral discretion but did not allow Angelo free reigns to act outside the law. I will now seek to convince the court that Angelo is guilty of blackmail. The 1601 Act for the more peaceable Government,3 which criminalized blackmail and extortion, stipulated that criminals were to be charged with felony. Officers of the court were included, meaning Angelo is criminally liable for any conduct of blackmail under Elizabethan law. In Act Two, Scene Two, the defendant first engaged in blackmail when he approached Isabella with the possibility of ‘lay[ing] down the treasures of your body/to this supposed [II.iv.93–4]’. Here, ‘this supposed’ is the defendant in question, as he openly suggests that it would be beneficial for Isabella to engage in sexual conduct with himself to ‘fetch [her] brother from the manacles of the all-building law [II.iv.88–91]’. The defendant goes on to explicitly say that Claudio will face the full penalty of the law, if Isabella does not agree to the terms of his sexually fuelled blackmail. As Isabella stated: ‘My brother did love Juliet/and you tell me that he should die for it’ and Angelo responded: ‘He shall not Isabel, if you give me love [II.iv.139–41].’ This conversation clearly shows that Angelo intended to misuse his authority as the sole controller of Claudio’s fate for private sexual pleasures. Furthermore, Angelo manipulates the familial love that Isabella holds for her dear brother. Not only does Angelo blackmail Isabella for the clear exchange of sex for life, the defendant then emphasizes the deployment of blackmail by emotionally manipulating Isabella. Angelo states ‘But thy unkindness shall his death draw out/to lingering sufferance [II.iv.163–4].’ Here, Angelo reverses the ‘unkindness’ he has dealt Isabella with and imposes it onto her, arguing that she would be demonstrating ‘unkindness’ towards her brother if she does not submit to Angelo’s blackmail. The defendant has clearly taken advantage of his power and is fully aware of this and the superiority that he has in this situation. Evidenced by the fact that he declares that his lies surpass her honesty, ‘my false, o’erweighs your true [II.iv.167]’. To end the accusation of blackmail, the prosecution will admit the defence’s proposition that Angelo never actually carried through sexual intercourse with Isabella. However, the prosecution argues that the defendant Angelo still carried through the exchange of sex for the exoneration of Claudio, only unknowingly with Mariana. On corruption, we submit to the court that the defendant’s private gain is both the reputation as an effective law enforcer and the sexual contact derived from Isabella. Our accusation is twofold. First, Angelo wrongly used the law to condemn Claudio to death, which he was able to do solely because of his position of power. Secondly, he attempted to corrupt Isabella’s maidenhood through blackmail. Dealing with his treatment of Claudio, the prosecution argues that there was no legal basis for Angelo’s imprisonment and conviction of Claudio. Indeed, Elizabethan law stated that: the ‘Binding nature of Claudio and Julietta’s “true contract”, makes them man and wife.’4 Furthermore, a ‘conditional or de futuro spousal agreement followed by sexual intercourse resulted in an immediate, enforceable and valid marriage’.5 This examination of Elizabethan law illustrates how Angelo acted unlawfully in his imprisonment of Claudio, since it was the law of the time to make couples marry if they have fornicated before their wedding. ‘Betrothed couples’, which was the case of Claudio and Julietta, ‘who conceived a child before their wedding … were regularly summoned to the ecclesiastical courts and ordered to solemnize their unions in church as soon as possible: if they were assigned a penance, it was usually a private one involving confession to a small group of fellow parishioners.’6 Taking this into regard, nowhere in Elizabethan law does it state that sex was punishable by death. The prosecution submits that the defendant, Angelo, has used his newly found position of power to impose himself as a strict and seemingly law-abiding leader. Secondly, Angelo has displayed his corruption as the appointed leader of Vienna by attempting to take Isabella’s maidenhead. Isabella confirms Angelo’s attempt, when relaying his offer to Claudio, ‘If I would yield him my virginity they mightst be freed [III.i.97–98].’ The defendant has shown corruption in the two instances that have been discussed and the prosecution submits that he should face the legal ramifications for this conduct. In conclusion, the prosecution vehemently disagrees with the forthcoming submission from the defence that Angelo acted within his legal rights. The defendant has no right whatsoever to make the law as he sees fits and we have shown that he has acted outside the relevant law of the time. Therefore, we urge the court to reverse the Duke’s pardon of Angelo and find Angelo guilty of blackmail and corruption and restore the scales of justice. Thank you. Lord Judge calls for questions Lady Justice Arden: I’d like to ask a question please of the Prosecution in relation to the blackmail charge. Now, Claudio admits his guilt, that’s right isn’t it? Prosecution: That he slept with Julietta, yes. Lady Justice Arden: And Isabella must have known, as a long-time resident of Vienna, that there was a strict rule that the law did not permit fornication. Prosecution: Well, we have argued that according to the hand-fasting laws of the time any penalty that was to be incurred for pre-marital sexual relations was immediate marriage. Lady Justice Arden: But blackmail was morally wrong. Surely what we know from Angelo was that he was the only person who stood up for consistent application of the law. He said ‘we must not make a scarecrow of the law.’ He was the only person who knew what principle was. Prosecution: I would submit respectfully that if anybody was making a scarecrow of the law it was Angelo himself because of his abandonment of his own betrothed, Marianna. Lord Judge calls upon the defence to present their case Defence: Thank you very much my lord. My learned friends have clearly demonstrated that they find my client to be merciless, hypocritical and cruel. What they have not made clear is how these personal attacks on his character breach the laws. The defence will show that Angelo acted as a rightful regent and thus was above such accusations as he was at the time acting under the Duke’s Divine Right to rule. That being so, his actions are answerable only to the sovereign and the lord our God. My client’s sovereign has pardoned him of all wrongdoing. Having been so judged, I do not see how the prosecution intends to mount an effective case without first questioning the Duke’s Divine right to rule, which I remind them, is an act of treason. To begin, I offer examples of the authority of regents. I ask the jury to recall, from Genesis, the story of Joseph. When in Egypt, Pharaoh appointed him Zaphnath-Paaneah and said ‘Only Pharaoh in the throne shall be higher.’7 It has been the role of regents since the ancient days to act as full agents of divinely appointed authority. Even in our own recent history we have lived under the rule of various regents while sovereigns have been either absent or not of age—Katherine of Aragon in 1513 and the Duke of Somerset and Lord Protector to name but two from the 16th century. Let it be indisputable that the authority of regent’s is as if the King or, in our own Viennese context, Duke himself speaks. Indeed, the Duke explicitly gave Angelo ‘his deputation all the organs of our own power [I.i.21].’ You will all no doubt be aware that according to Frederick V’s conformation of Privilegium Maius in 1453, Austria is the official archduchy of the Holy Roman Empire, and as such my client acted as regent to the emperor. I am sure I need not remind this court of the eminence of the Emperor, nor of the considerable threats that such men have been capable of towards this country, not least the power Charles V was able to exert over the Bishop of Rome in 1527.8 There can be no doubt that my client was acting lawfully through the divine power channels of the sovereign. Previous statements from his grace the Duke to this effect include the following: ‘Hold therefore, Angelo: –/In our remove be thou at full our self;/Mortality and mercy in Vienna/Live in thy tongue and heart…[I.i.42–44].’ ‘A due sincerity governed [V.i.450]’ my client’s deeds. His Majesty King James has written at some length, commenting that we must all: ‘Observe the Statutes of your Heavenly King;/and from his law, make all your Laws to spring:/Since his Lieutenant here ye should remain.’9 According to Basilikon Doron, such a power belongs to a ruler who is ‘ordained for his people, having received from the God a burden of government.’10 I must remind the ladies and gentlemen of the jury of Romans 13, wherein Paul states: ‘Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.’11 I am sure that no man or woman here seeks damnation, and where does the authority of this court stem from but the King? This chamber may do nothing but what Parliament makes law, and Parliament may not function without the involvements and efforts of its majesty the King. No subject may question the royal prerogative, of which the ability to grant pardon is an inherent part. It would be much better that my learned friends adhere to the commands of her late majesty Queen Elizabeth’s comments to Parliament. The House, and we may assume its subsequent authorities, should ‘only to confer upon speedy and effectual remedies against these great and fierce dangers, and not to spend the time in devising of new laws and statutes; whereof there is already so great store’.12 If you are to question the actions of my client you must question the authority upon which he acted, and no court in Christendom has the power to cast aspersions or try the actions of an anointed sovereign. It is within the royal prerogative to administer the law and thus Angelo, as regent was perfectly entitled to sentence Claudio for the crime of fornication, which both he and my learned friends have admitted. It matters little that there is little evidence that this law has ever been enforced rigorously, as it is and remains the law of Vienna. It is left to the agent of the monarchy, in this case Angelo, to administer the application of the law. Otherwise what is to become of us? Are we to ‘sit upon the ground and tell sad stories of the death of Kings’?13 Claudio sits before us in this court, his sister Isabella has not been robbed of her maidenhead and Mariana is now married to Angelo. So I ask, what damage does the prosecution seek to redress? Thank you my lords and lady. Lord Judge: Are you submitting to us that, acting as the Duke’s deputy, Angelo is entitled to blackmail Isabella into sleeping with him? Does royal power go that far? Defence: I would argue that at the time of this blackmail, blackmail is a very sketchily understood concept. I believe it was first brought up as a precise term in a Scottish court in 1530, and involved a specific understanding of property14, rather than actions. Lord Judge calls Angelo Angelo: Thank you my lords and lady. I was told by the Duke to ‘In our remove be thou at full ourself [I.i.43]’ and I would not waver from that which is commanded to me by the Duke, being, ‘always obedient to [his] grace’s will [I.i.25].’ I felt I should follow the law to the letter, as without having a stringent control upon the people under my jurisdiction, the entire society could’ve broken down. I did not act in excess of the law in charging Claudio. As I made clear to Isabella on our first meeting, his ‘fine stands in record [II.ii.41]’, and that I wished to follow out to no greater nor lesser degree. Isabella admitted that it was ‘true’ that her brother appeared to be ‘Accountant to the law upon that pain [II.iv.84].’ In conversation with Escalus, being the virtuous man that I am, I conceded I would happily be accountable to the same punishment that Claudio was subjected to by my hands, if I was found guilty of the same charge: ‘When I, that censure him, do so offend,/Let mine own judgement pattern out my death,/And nothing come in partial [II.i.29–31].’ It is true that I had some amorous feelings towards Isabella—those were moments of weakness, brought on by the devil, of which all people are subject to. As shown when the Duke returned to his position, I did not sleep with Isabella and so the charge of blackmail against me is flawed. I cannot believe I am still being tried under the charges levelled against me. Despite the fact I was cleared by the Duke, who reigns over all the land, you still wish to pursue the claims of Isabella, than trust that ‘my unsoiled name, th’austereness of my life,/… and my place i’ th’ state [II.iv.152–53].’ I find it treasonous, especially after the lies that that woman fed to the Duke to tarnish my name she called me an ‘adulterous thief [V.i.42],’ a strange claim considering my lack of sexual conquest against her, and makes her accusation against me of being ‘a virgin-violator [V.i.45]’ a maddening one. Lord Judge calls Isabella Isabella: I twice met with Angelo to discuss the fate of my brother Claudio. During the first meeting I was accompanied by Lucio, who was privy to this conversation, yet unseen by Angelo, and during the second I was completely alone. It is during this second meeting that he proposed I yield my body to him, thus compromising my position as an aspiring nun in order to free my brother. I had been urged by Lucio to ‘assay the power [II.i.77]’ I have in attempt to make him retract his decision. It soon became apparent as I spent more time in his presence that Angelo was in fact governed by corporeal, carnal desires. I was very much aware of the implications of my brother’s transgression in both worldly and heavenly realms. Nevertheless, as his sister, I felt inclined to attempt to soften Angelo’s resolve, using the notion of mercy. Upon arriving at the first meeting, I introduced my difficult position as both distraught sister and strict adherer to divine rule by saying, ‘There is a vice that most I do abhor/And most desire should meet the blow of justice/For which I would not plead, but that I must;/For which I must not plead, but that I am/At war ‘twixt will and will not [II.ii.30–34].’ I did not err in my plight to become a nun, constantly referring back to God and the importance of religious hierarchy during our conversation, saying: ‘'Better it were a brother die at once,/Than that a sister, by redeeming him/Should die forever. [II.iv.103–5],’ and yet Angelo would not relent. I proclaimed that with ‘outstretched throat [II.iv.155],’ I would tell people of his blackmailing, to which he used his rank to say that no one would believe my accusation. That I did plead with the Duke that he pardon my brother from death when all was revealed is not by any means indicative of me diminishing the torment that he caused me; however, again, my faith permits me to have mercy, I do strongly feel that he needs to be held accountable for his proposition and subsequent blackmail. Lord Judge calls Mariana Mariana: ‘They say, best men are moulded out of faults; and, for the most, become much more the better for being a little bad: so may my husband [V.i.431–33].’ I defended my husband once with these words and they also stand today. It is true that I myself have called my husband, Angelo, a ‘cruel’ [V.i.204] man. But as I told the Duke previously ‘I crave no other, nor no better man [V.i.420].’ I had always believed Angelo to be my husband in my heart, if not in legal binding, and I do not blame him for not pursuing the marriage fully following the loss of my dowry. But now ‘as there comes light from heaven and words from breath, As there is sense in truth and truth in virtue, I am affianced this man’s wife as strongly as words could make up vows [V.i.223–26].’ Leave Angelo to fulfil his duties as my husband; do not punish him for a crime that was not committed. He did not engage in premarital sex, for as the Duke said himself, he was my ‘husband on a pre-contract [IV.i.70].’ There is no crime here. I was a willing participant in the Friar’s plan to reunite Angelo and myself. There is no crime here. I forgave him long ago for the problems surrounding our engagement so they are of no concern to the jury now that we are officially married. There is no crime here. The Duke’s authority in the matter of our marriage and in Angelo’s pardoning must not be ignored. The Duke himself, disguised as a friar who brought me much comfort in my times of trouble at Saint Luke’s, looked to bring us together and allowed Angelo to become my husband. The Duke himself trusted Angelo with the moral authority of Vienna upon his leave. The Duke himself pardoned Angelo, and it is he that holds the authority to do so. Angelo has committed no crime. He is a determinedly moral man, instead of punishing him I call upon the jury to let him use this strong willed nature to aid Vienna. Thank you. Lord Judge calls Escalus Escalus: As chief counsellor to the Duke, and in his absence, Lord Angelo, I feel that I have been a keen spectator of the grievous misbehaviours of the latter, both in his treatment of Claudio and his dereliction of duty to Vienna. I thought from the start that ‘If any in Vienna be of worth [I.i.22]’ to take up the administration it was Lord Angelo. I was mistaken. It was abundantly clear at the time that Lord Angelo could be capable of severity but not yet of injustice. I, in my good nature, had instructed him to be merciful but he insisted that, ‘We must not make a scarecrow of the law,/Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,/And let it keep one shape, till custom make it/Their perch and not their terror [II.i.1–4].’ I did beseech my lord further to have mercy on Claudio whose ‘noble father’ [II.i.7] is known and that he too must have, ‘at sometime in [his] life,/Erred [II.i.14–15]’ but he assured me that ‘Tis one thing to be tempted, Escalus, Another thing to fall. [II.i.17–18].’ I would like it to be noted that I implored the heavens to ‘…forgive him, and forgive us all!/Some rise by sin, and some by virtue fall [II.i.37–38].’ I do believe him to have been juvenile in his attempt to root out corruption. It grieved me that despite my pleas there seemed no remedy for poor Claudio. However, the hypocrisy of my Lord regarding his conduct towards Isabella came as a shock, I must confess I was ‘more amazed at his dishonour/Than at the strangeness of it [V.i.383–84].’ It certainly pained me that ‘one so learned and so wise,/… Should slip so grossly, both in the heat of blood. And lack of tempered judgment afterward [V.i.466–69].’ I don’t think any ruler is above the law, especially when they overplay their hand and misuse justice for selfish ends. Lord Judge calls Claudio Claudio: Thank you my lord. In the Duke’s absence, Angelo imprisoned me and sentenced to death by execution as punishment for fornication. Whilst I understand I acted against the law, I am betrothed to Julietta, ‘she is fast my wife [I.ii.124]’ and we are due to wed. Thus, in accordance with our bond of hand fasting, this promise of marriage permits us conjugal privileges. However, Angelo, in his exchange for my life, bargained to bed my virginal sister. How, my Lord, can this act be admonished in accordance with the law yet the fornication I perpetrated in loving devotion with my betrothed be more reprehensible? When man is granted too much liberty our natures do pursue ‘like rats that raven down their proper bane [I.ii.118].’ I have suffered f–or my transgression. Lustfulness is a ‘thirsty evil, and when we drink we die [I.ii.119].’ I, according to this belief, have already suffered death as a punishment for my fornication. I am remorseful and live with the burden of my action. I was brought to a place of abject misery and for the loss of my sister’s affection towards me; I sought the capital punishment to which I was sentenced. However, I was not and am not deserving of the punishment. He on the other hand, is criminally liable for his actions. I desire justice for my sister and the unnecessary suffering brought upon the both of us. I ask you my Lord, how is Angelo, who ‘bite[s] the law by th’ nose/When he would force it [III.i 108–9],’ a hypocrite, who abused the power granted to him by the Duke, not culpable for his actions? Angelo, in desiring to bed my sister also sanctioned another crime as ‘is’t not a kind of incest to take life/From thine own sister’s shame? [III.i 139–40]’ Angelo’s flagrant disregard for the law and his actions resulting in legal and social discord must be the result in him being held accountable. I therefore agree with the prosecution that Angelo be made criminally liable for his actions. Judge Caron: My question goes to our erstwhile prosecutors. Claudio demands that this court damn, and so we come full circle. ‘“An Angelo for a Claudio, death for death.” Haste still pays haste, and leisure answers leisure;/Like doth quit like, and still measure for measure’ [V.i.403–6]. But, in damning Angelo would this court not possibly remove the chance of absolution? Isn’t the real punishment that by the Duke’s decision he will escape punishment? Prosecution: It is argued that Angelo’s personal preference of punishment, which is death rather than having to wed Marianna, is of absolutely no relevance. He should be subject to the relevant law, which was subject to the 1601 Act for the more peaceable Government, which directs that any criminals guilty of blackmail and extortion were to be charged with felony, without benefit of clergy, their names were to be proclaimed and they were to be imprisoned. Judge Caron: And is there no room for mercy? Prosecution: If Angelo were accused of stealing a loaf of bread because he was hungry then perhaps some mercy. But blackmail and corruption against a nun? No, I don’t think there is room for mercy here. Judge Caron: Thank you for your answer. Lady Justice Arden: I would like to ask a question of the defence, if I may. We’ve heard the evidence of Escalus, the servant of the Duke. And at the very start the Duke says ‘Our government, the properties to unfold/would seem in me t’affect speech and discourse’. So the Duke set about the social experiment, giving the power to somebody while he stayed around in disguise and we see what happened to Angelo. He fell straight into a trap, that was set by the Duke for him. Didn’t he display that the properties of government were corrupt and that absolute power, as Escalus said, corrupts absolutely? Defence: On the face of it the famous phrase ‘power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely’ appears to fit nicely to the situation we find Angelo in. A person who has had absolute power thrust upon him, and then used his position for his own personal gain. He was, however, already a morally questionable person before he came into office, so we can cast doubt on whether or not the attainment of real power changed anything significantly. In addition, when it comes to the governing of the commonwealth, of the common good of the people as he saw fit, as we was instructed by the Duke, he administered the laws faithfully and to the best of his ability. And so I do not think that my Lord was corrupted by power but more, as he said, tempted as all men are by the Devil. 3. THE TRIAL OF THE DUKE Lord Judge opens the trial of the Duke and calls upon the Prosecution to present their arguments Prosecution: the Prosecution humbly seeks judgement against the defendant on two grounds. The first is that we seek the Court find the Duke guilty of dereliction of duty and the second is that we seek the Court declare void the Duke’s trial at the end of Measure for Measure. May it please the court; we will begin by presenting our arguments as to why the Duke is guilty of dereliction of duty. My Lords and Lady; you see before you a man who, through his maladministration and dereliction of duty, has almost brought the fair city of Vienna to its knees. The defendant is the Duke of Vienna and therefore he is duty bound to protect the city and its peoples, and enforce its laws. We submit that principles of sovereign immunity and royal prerogative are not applicable to the Duke because he is not a monarch but an aristocratic governor. Our illustrious monarch King James I is a supporter of this view, as he clearly states in his 1598 treatise The True Law of Free Monarchies: ‘I mean always of such free Monarchies as our king is, and not of elective kings, and much less of such sort of governors, as the dukes of Venice are, whose Aristocratic and limited government, is nothing like to free Monarchies’.15 Although the Duke has been called ‘royal’ and ‘Prince’, we would submit that such comments are mere formalities made by subjects who are accustomed to paying such tributes, and are not representative of the defendant’s legal standing. Therefore, we submit that the defendant can be prosecuted for his gross dereliction of duty. By his own admission, the defendant has neglected to effectively enforce the laws of Vienna for 14 years, resulting in social chaos. As the defendant confessed to Friar Thomas: We have strict statutes and most biting laws, The needful bits and curbs to headstrong jades, Which for this fourteen years we have let slip;            … so our decrees, Dead to infliction, to themselves are dead; And liberty plucks justice by the nose [I.iii.19–29]. The defendant did not attempt to take responsibility for his mismanagement and enforce the law, as he is duty bound to do. Instead, the defendant ‘elected him [Angelo] our absence to supply [I.i.18],’ that is, the defendant appointed Angelo as his agent and tasked Angelo with rectifying his maladministration. The defendant did so in order to avoid confronting the public outcry, and consequent reputation damage, that he knew the restoration of law and order would illicit from the people of Vienna. As the defendant stated in Act 1, Scene 3: Sith ‘twas my fault to give the people scope, ‘Twould be my tyranny to strike and gall them          … Therefore indeed, my father, I have on Angelo imposed the office, Who may, in th’ambush of my name strike home, And yet my nature never in the fight To do in slander [I.iii.35–43]. In appointing Angelo as his agent, the defendant chose a man he knew to have previously acted unlawfully. In Act 3 Scene 1, the defendant revealed his knowledge of Angelo’s repudiation of his marriage contract to Mariana and the fact that Angelo subsequently attempted to justify his unlawful breach by slandering the good lady. It is reasonable to ask why the defendant would, with as he states ‘prepared choice [I.i.52],’ place the city he was bound to protect in the hands of a man he knew to be of questionable character? The answer is that it was indeed, a prepared choice because the defendant intended from the outset for Angelo to fail. Only through Angelo’s disgrace, could the defendant ensure that he could return to office with his authority and reputation restored. The fact that the defendant knowingly and negligently entrusted the city of Vienna to an unsuitable agent is further evidenced by the fact that once the defendant was made aware of Angelo’s inappropriate behaviour towards Isabella—the defendant did not revoke the agency. Instead, not only did the defendant allow the agency to remain in place, but in order to secure the restoration of his reputation and his triumphant return to office, the defendant orchestrated his own agent’s downfall by organizing for Mariana to engage in extramarital fornication with Angelo. Thus, the defendant himself engaged in criminal behaviour as the incitement of prostitution was deemed unlawful in the Baude’s Case of 1603.16 That the defendant appointed a criminal as his agent and was prepared to act as an illegal bawd in order to ensure the downfall of that agent, just to secure his return to power, demonstrates the depths of his hypocrisy and his complete dereliction of duty. On both legal and moral grounds, such a man must be removed from office. We will now move to our second ground, that we seek the Court declare void the Duke’s trial at the end of Measure for Measure. Beginning on a policy point, it is well known that in these early years of the reign of our most magnanimous monarch King James I, heightened importance has been given to political and legal stability. It is submitted that the Duke’s actions threatened said stability, particularly during the trial, and thus violated the Rule of Law itself. The Duke has engaged in unlawful and illicit activities in order to gain ‘the upper hand’ in the trial, perverting the very principles of justice upon which our system is predicated. He does so most prominently by committing three different crimes. First, and as previously demonstrated, the Duke encourages Mariana to engage in extramarital and unlawful fornication. He does so with the clear objective of putting Angelo in a detrimental position during the trial scene. Secondly, he impersonates a religious officer, specifically a friar, contrary to the Simony Act 1588 c 6, sections 6 and 8.17 He uses his guise for the sole purpose of influencing the outcome of the trial. This is evidenced when he knowingly misinforms the participants of the trial about the death of Claudio, or when he finds Lucio criminally liable for slander, and when he acts as being completely alien to the facts of the trial. Thirdly, and most importantly, he is guilty on several instances of committing perjury. The precedents of Core vMorton (1601)18 and Brittridge’s case (1602)19 show us that the Duke is guilty of perjury because his words during the trial scene ‘import an act done’. A few examples are: when the Duke as Friar said: ‘Where is the Duke? ‘Tis he should hear me speak’; [V.i.298] and when the Duke as Friar said: Be not so hot. The Duke dare No more stretch this finger of mine than he Dare rack his own. His subject I am not, Nor here provincial. My business in this state Made me a looker-on here in Vienna’. [V.1.318–321] My Lords and Lady, we are, as such, faced by a man who, exhibiting extreme cunning and malice, committed several crimes in order to influence the outcome of a trial. In doing so, he has perverted the principles of Justice that lay at the core of our legal system. It follows, then, that the trial should, and must, be voided. Before concluding our submissions, it is imperative to draw attention to the defence’s arguments. Their’s rests on the assumption that the Duke possesses the same legal standing as a monarch. They will seek to claim that a sovereign cannot be held criminally liable, on the basis of them being above legal reproach and that to hold a monarch accountable would lead to perverting the principle that the King maintains the peace. As stated previously, we do not consider the Duke to enjoy the same legal position as a King. However, were the Court to find this interpretation unsatisfactory, it is worth noting that the defence’s submissions ignores what, in the words of our King, is the duty by which a true monarch is bound to his people. I quote from the True Law of Free Monarchies: By the Law of Nature the King becomes a natural Father to all his Lieges at his Coronation: And as the Father of his fatherly duty is bound to care for the nourishing, education, and virtuous government of his children; even so is the king bound to care for all his subjects.20 It has been shown that the Duke violated his duty to care for his peoples when he first appointed a criminal as a substitute ruler, effectively derelicting his duty; and secondly, when he engaged in criminal enterprise during and prior to the events at the aforementioned trial. In conclusion, the Duke has acted unlawfully, harming his subjects and perverting the Rule of Law himself. To allow him to escape liability would lead the general loss of faith in our legal system and the ability of our most Gracious King to protect the peoples living herein. Such a morally bankrupt head of state cannot be allowed to remain in power. Judge Caron: You ask that we judge that which is sovereign. I must admit that I am thankful for the appointment that he granted me but I am open to your argument. But by what law can we try the Duke as sovereign? And if we dared to do so, is he not entitled to a jury of his peers? Prosecution: My lord, putting a head of state on trial and even removing a head of state is not a novel concept. In 1327, leading barons and members of the clergy demanded and received the abdication of Edward II on the basis of his weak and incompetent leadership. In 1553, Parliament rescinded Lady Jane Grey’s proclamation as queen. She was subsequently tried, convicted and executed for high treason. In 1586, Mary Queen of Scots, an anointed queen, was similarly placed on trial, convicted and later executed for high treason. These trials, convictions and even executions of prior heads of state were lawfully effected by special commissions of Parliament and did not require a jury of the defendant’s peers. Judge Caron: And is this a special commission created by Parliament? Prosecution: Arguably it is, your Honour. Lord Judge: Arguably that is very well done, thank you. Lord Judge asks the defence to present their arguments Defence: My Lords, it is respectfully put to this court that none of the grounds advocated by my learned friends counsel for the prosecution can defy the immunity that the Duke enjoys by virtue of his sovereign position or invalidate his exercise of the royal prerogative. There is a long constitutional and jurisprudential tradition supporting this. With due respect, it is submitted that my learned friends, the counsel for the prosecution, appear to have overlooked that in the play the Duke is clearly equated to a sovereign monarch, who enjoys similar powers and liberties as the King of England. We would like to draw you honours’ attention to Act 5, Scene 1, where Isabella states ‘Justice, O royal Duke’, [V.i.22] referring to Duke Vincentio. If it pleases the court, we would like to move to our second submission, which pertains to the charge of dereliction of duty: that no criminal liability can be imposed on the Duke, as his actions are non-justifiable and immune from any kind of prosecution. Indeed, the general rule at common and civil law is that no proceedings, civil or criminal, are maintainable against the monarch in person, for the courts, being the monarch’s own, can have no jurisdiction over him. Therefore, there can be no prosecution of Duke Vincentio for his actions in Measure for Measure, however immoral, undesirable and dissolute they might be. The origins of the Crown’s immunity are rooted in feudalism and, in particular, in the monarch’s role as dispenser of justice and in the inability to sue a lord in his own courts. The immunity is derived from the medieval maxim Rex non potest peccare (King can do no wrong). If whatever the monarch does is right, there can be no question of the monarch committing criminal acts, or being subject to criminal proceedings. Indeed, the imposition of criminal liability upon the Crown would offend the fundamental idea that the criminal law protects the King’s peace, that the Crown cannot be both prosecutor and defendant, that fines cannot be paid to the Crown to itself; and, that if imprisonment were a possibility, the Crown could not be imprisoned. Such things are impossible given that the Crown is indivisible and not subject to the coercive jurisdiction of the courts. Judge Caron: Are you recommending that we first remove the accused from office? Defence: No my lord, with due respect we submit that this court cannot prosecute the Duke because he is immune. The inconvenience that might result from some particular mischief of the sovereign is well recompensed by the peace of the public and security of government, in the person of the sovereign, the Duke, being set out of the reach of distracting legal proceedings, such as these. The statesmen and legal scholars of Elizabeth’s reign have distinctly held that the king in parliament is absolutely supreme, above the law. Courts of justice have also affirmed the immunity of the sovereign. Popham CJKB in The Case of Swans (1592)21 explained that the king’s absolute prerogatives: ‘are not examinable or determinable by any course of justice and only by the King’. Lord Judge: Which absolute prerogative are you relying on? Defence: My lord, the prerogative, as we have heard in the previous trial, is the sovereign’s power to act, as he likes, without being subject to any judicial review. I would like to draw the court’s attention to James I’s The True Law of Free Monarchies, in which he claimed that the ‘Monarchy is the true paternal of Divinity’.22 James furthermore used the example of King David to demonstrate that a monarch is God’s minister, leading to his point of immunity, and that only God has the right to judge the King. In summary, it is submitted that the law has thus no coercive power against the Duke. If any person has, in point of property, a just demand upon the sovereign, he can only petition him in his Court of Chancery. With the court’s permission, we would now like to turn to our third submission; that the Duke’s trial at the end of Measure for Measure cannot be declared void nor can his pardons be annulled. Indeed, it falls to the sovereign, by virtue of his royal prerogative, to create new courts and grant pardons as it pleases him.23 The monarch’s power to erect new courts was exercised in the Middle Ages. Nothing was commoner that for the king by his charter to grant to some town or some lord of manor the right to hold a court. As a matter of fact, the prerogative power of erecting new courts has not been used in England for quite some time. Consequently, it may be argued that this has now fallen into disuse, yet this prerogative was never superseded, either implicitly or explicitly, by an Act of Parliament. Therefore, we cannot say that the prerogative is gone; at any moment if might become important, as it has in the present case. It has never been expressly taken away, and I therefore submit that the Duke’s court in Measure for Measure is legitimate. If it pleases the court, we turn to the Duke’s decision at the end of the trial. We submit that the prosecution of all public offences and breaches of the peace are brought in the sovereign’s name, as he is the person injured in the eyes of the law. And so arises another branch of the Royal prerogative, that of pardoning offences, for it is reasonable that he only who is injured should have the power of forgiving. This power was declared in Parliament, by the Jurisdiction in Liberties Act 1535, that no other person has power to pardon or remit any treason or felonies whatsoever; but that the king has the whole and sole power thereof. There is therefore a magistrate, the sovereign, who has it in his power to extend mercy, wherever he thinks it is deserved: borrowing Blackstone’s language, the Duke holds ‘a court of equity in his own breast, to soften the rigour of the general law, in such criminal cases as merit an exemption from punishment’.24 It is, thus, put to the court that this prerogative power and the validity of the Duke’s pardons, and indeed the whole trial, cannot be questioned, regardless of their effects and implications. Lady Justice Arden: This is a very modest court and it knows that it is said in the Gospels that with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to your gain, which I think has been taken for the title of some bawdy play that has been played out in the Inner Temple. But why shouldn’t the same apply to the king? After Magna Carta, one of our most outstanding Chief Justices and legal scholars, Bracton, said that the King was subject to God and the law, so why shouldn’t the Duke be subject to God and the law? Defence: It is submitted that King John was a tyrant and the Duke is not. Lord Judge: That is a very interesting submission. Lord Judge asks the first witness, Lucio, to give evidence Lucio: The Duke is not divine and yet he had the audacity to disguise himself as a divine figure, to play God, to usurp a holy position on his unrelenting quest for power. He meddled in the lives of his own people in his sacrilegious façade, fraudulently hearing confessions from his subjects and doing nothing as Angelo rampantly handed out sentences to honest men whilst acting dishonestly himself. The Duke abused his position to learn the secrets of the people of Vienna, whilst dishonourably abandoning his duties to the very same people. I, myself, bore witness to the act, and spoke to the deceptive fellow one day while he was snooping around in the prison cells. It was I that unmasked the ‘Friar’, who was ‘honest in nothing but his clothes’, and made him a Duke once again. Not only did the Duke act malevolently and manipulatively whilst impersonating a Friar, but in the time that he was parading around in costume, he appointed a tyrant in his place. Angelo treated a ‘familiar sin’ as worthy of death, and sentenced Claudio as if playing a ‘game of tick-tack’. I stand to my word that Angelo’s ‘blood is snow-broth’ and his natural edge is blunt; he placed a heavy sentence upon my dear friend in order to make an example. The Duke knew of Angelo’s actions but made no effort to amend his mistake of appointing a hypocritical despot, instead manipulating the situation in his own favour and betraying the citizens of Vienna. It is for these reasons and for the benefit of Vienna itself that the Duke must be punished. Lord Judge asks the second witness, Mistress Overdone, to give evidence Mistress Overdone: The Duke is guilty because he has violated the contract of duty he had towards me and the economic prosperity of the city. I had stated in Act 1, Scene 2 that: Thus, what with the war, what with the sweat, what with the gallows, and what with poverty, I am custom-shrunk. [I.ii.74–76] As you can hear, I was already losing all my costumers over the war, the plague, and above all capital punishment. The brothel was my income and helped regulate the trade of the city. Yet, as the Duke had gone away and left Angelo in charge, Angelo had started imposing laws that would affect my business. My brothels in particular, play an important role in society as ‘betrothed couples who conceived a child before their wedding, were regularly summoned to the ecclesiastical courts and ordered to solemnize their unions in church as soon as possible’.25 Therefore, my brothels not only had significance in the economy but also social relations, as it created a union between people. As the Duke had gone away, he broke down both the economic and social unifying pillar of this city. An Early Modern Broadside Ballad about Mistress Flora’s marriage to Pandarus called: The Marriage of Pandarus and Flora was sung as: Let every street, of Trading meet, The Wedding to adore-a, Both he and she of Brothelry26 This shows that Mistress Flora, like myself, was part of a brothel in the city, relying on ‘trade’ to create her income. Yet, like myself, she also had a place in society and was able to marry and lead a normal life. As transgressive as I seem I, like Mistress Flora of the ballad, am trying to lead a normal life and provide for Lucio’s daughter who was begotten by Mistress Kate Keepdown. In Act 3, Scene 1, I declared: Mistress Kate Keepdown was with child by him in the Duke’s time; he promised her marriage. His child is a year and a quarter old, come Philip and Jacob. I have kept it myself, and see how he goes about to abuse me! [III.i.433–436] Needless to say, despite these broken promises like the Duke’s broken promise to uphold my financial stability, I have been left to take care of Lucio and Kate’s illegitimate child. I heard that Francis Bacon once claimed, if the Common Laws of England ‘are rightly administered, they are the best, the equallest, by which the king has justest Prerogative, and the People the best Liberty’.27 Therefore, the Duke should have kept my brothels open without retreating because in doing so, he has wrongly ‘administered’ the law and has not given ‘liberty’ to the people. Lucio’s child and I are suffering due to the financial strain we are under. The Duke has abandoned his duty to me, as well Lucio’s child, but also the regular citizens of the city who now do not have the ‘liberty’ to go to the brothel. Lord Judge asks the third witness, Elbow, to give evidence Elbow: I am the Duke’s constable and for seven and half years, not seven but seven and a half—I have served this great Duke in Vienna and I have defectively guaranteed the administration of justice. I trust the Duke and his questionable judgments should be maintained. There should be a doubt about that. He is the appointed ruler that God has chosen and this should be upheld if we are ever to keep Vienna under control. Anybody who questions the authority of the Duke, questions the authority of God. It is not an easy task putting a lock on men and their codpieces. I mean, just last week my wife was beget with child yet again—this speaks to the nature of sexual liberties within the city. At this moment, Vienna is under great risk of infection. We are on the brink of a plague. But this is an ungodly plague. Within this city there is much fornication, it is scourged with bawds and licentiousness ekes out of every street corner. Many men are at risk of blindness because their trousers seek to lead them, rather than their mind. Men, good Christian men, I implore you to consider the fact that the only man we can trust to maintain Vienna is the Duke. The Duke has been a good governor and this was shown when he agreed with my decision, as the best and only constable in this land, to send Pompey to jail. He admonished Pompey and believed sending him to jail would help cure him of this aforementioned plague. The Duke is a malevolent leader and I am sure you can all agree that he did was not to punish Pompey, but correct him like a good father would do his own child. Despite Angelo taking over the Duke, my role and my moral compass have not been changed. There has been constancy in enforcing the law within the streets of Vienna and this is a testament to the Duke’s good nature and direction as a leader and of course my appointment as a constable. This very trial threatens to shake the foundations in which the government of Vienna stands—that men should be upright and just of which the Duke is and seeks others to emulate. In all, the Duke is a reliable leader, and therefore he is liable for this crime. Lord Judge addresses the counsel for the defence Lord Judge: Do you wish to call the Duke to give evidence in his own defence, or are you standing on principle and declining to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court? Defence: My lord, the Duke wishes to make his own statement. Lord Judge: By doing so, you acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court. Would you like to advise your client? Defence: My lord, the Duke still wants to give evidence. Lord Judge: Very well. Lord Judge asks the defendant, the Duke, to give evidence The Duke: I was heavily surprised having received the subpoena. So I asked some of my fellow Dukes, starting with Duke Solinus in The Comedy of Errors, the Duke of Milan in The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Duke Theseus in A Midsummer Night’s Dream and concluding with my most beloved fellow in The Merchant of Venice for their advice. This is what they said. In The Comedy of Errors, the Duke decides to exercise executive clemency and exempt Egeon entirely from the force of the law – he neither has to pay the one thousand marks nor be put to death. Antipholus of Ephesus says, ‘These ducats pawn I for my father here’, but the Duke makes it clear that Egeon is fully pardoned, saying, ‘It shall not need. Thy father hath his life’ [V.i.391–2]. By taking this step, the Duke effectively thwarted an application of the law that was never intended by its drafters. In The Two Gentlemen of Verona, the Duke of Milan lifts the sentence of banishment that he had pronounced: ‘Know then, I here forget all former griefs,/Cancel all grudge, repeal thee home again’ [V.4.139–140]. Valentine pleads for clemency for the rest of the outlaws, and the Duke, underscoring his newfound respect for Valentine, replies, ‘Thou hast prevailed; I pardon them and thee./Dispose of them as thou know’st their deserts’ [V.4.155–156]. It is worth noting that, however deserving Valentine might have been of clemency, there is no reason to think that the rest of the outlaws were equally so. Nevertheless, no one questions the Duke’s power to take this action, nor his prerogative to allow Valentine to ‘dispose of them’ as he saw fit. In A Midsummer Night’s Dream, it again is political hierarchy that matters: Egeus’ ‘natural’ right as a father to dictate his daughter’s marriage can be overborne by Theseus’s political right as Duke. His right to do so is not questioned and rightly so. In The Merchant of Venice, Shylock seems very unlucky in the end. But matters could have been worse: my fellow Duke might have decided that his life was forfeit; or he might have simply sent Shylock home empty-handed based on a finding that the contract was unenforceable; or permitted him to settle for late payment of the 3000 ducats by Bassanio. Not least, one should bear in mind that it was Portia who escalated matters by moving from contract to punishment for attempted murder. Lord Judge: Forgive me your Grace, but you are quoting to us from the jottings of some poor fellow from Warwickshire. What is the legal authority? The Duke: I am the legal authority. Lord Judge: Thank you, your Grace. In that case, we do not need to hear any further as we have understood your point. Any further questions? David Caron: No further questions. Lady Justice Arden: No further questions. Lord Judge: The jury has a very difficult question to answer in this case. We will ask you to retire and then return to pronounce your verdict. 4. VERDICT AND SENTENCING Lord Judge asks Angelo to stand and face the jury Lord Judge: Foreman, do you find the first defendant, Angelo, guilty or not guilty? Foreman: My lords and lady, on the counts of blackmail and corruption, the jury finds Angelo guilty. Lord Judge: Is that the verdict of you all or a verdict of the majority? Foreman: It is the verdict of us all. Lord Judge: Angelo, the jury has found you guilty on overwhelming evidence. We thought your counsel did very well in the face of overwhelming odds. The sentence of the court is that you will help Mistress Overdone by cleaning out her brothels every single day for a year. There is a condition attached to that, do not succumb to temptation in the brothel – you are to leave the girls alone. Lord Judge asks the Duke to stand and face the jury Lord Judge: Foreman, do you find the second defendant, the Duke, guilty or not guilty? Foreman: My lords and lady, on the count of dereliction of duty the jury is unanimous and finds the Duke guilty. The Duke: The jury is dismissed! Lord Judge: Duke, the jury has found you guilty and the court has decided that it is time that in Vienna there was a Parliament to hold you to account. Also, that Isabella be allowed to live in a nunnery for 11 months a year for the next 20 years. 5. CONCLUSION BY LORD JUDGE Measure for Measure is for me, one of the greatest William Shakespeare’s plays. The canon of great plays always includes the tragedies: King Lear; Othello; Hamlet; Macbeth. These are about the way in which individuals respond to events so that gradually their characters are skinned and skinned again until they become victims of their own character. The history plays tell history, the way events impact on the characters, think of Richard II and Richard III. But Measure for Measure is one of the plays where Shakespeare examined issues that matter to us all as a society, they matter today and they will matter tomorrow: political power, the tendency of power in any shape or form to corrupt; law, order, justice, mercy, deterrence, guilt, legal guilt and moral guilt, or the lack of it, or not much of it, or even questions like whether it is ever justifiable to commit a crime in order to achieve a greater good. These are questions that are with us and affect us all. I regard the happy ending as a complete contrivance; perhaps Shakespeare was trying to fool the audience into thinking that this play was about fun things. What will happen in Vienna 5 or 10 years after the close of the play, now that the Duke is back in power? It looks like a reversion to the shambles, which the Duke himself identified when he put Angelo in charge. When will the slide into disorder and lawlessness be stopped? And how, if the Duke is in charge? If Angelo is not to be punished, when is anyone ever to be punished? The marriage of Angelo and Mariana is as ‘sure together,/As the winter to foul weather’.28 Is the power of the Duke so absolute that he may subject Isabella to the ‘abhorred pollution’ that she would not entertain at Angelo’s hands? No one actually asked Isabella if she is willing to surrender her virginity to the Duke and give up her vocation as a nun. Perhaps in all this misery, we should wish Claudio and Juliet a joyful marriage with their no doubt ever increasing family. Interestingly, neither of them at any stage in this play has ever been vested with any glimmer of power. Measure for Measure is the ideal vehicle for examining the philosophy of the law and the complexities of the administration of justice. We are indebted to everyone who has participated; from both the English and the Law faculties and King’s College London, for making the mock trial possible. Particular thanks to all the students who acted as counsel, prosecution and defence advocates, witnesses and the jury. Special thanks to Hannah Crawforth who co-taught the class on Shakespeare and the Law. With thanks to the authors of the piece, the 2016 class of Shakespeare and the Law at King’s College London. Sofia Anwar, Anastasia Bartlett, Joshua Deya Jones, Zoe Donaldson, Isabel Feeney, Giacomo Geronico Orlandi, Annabel Glaysher, Nathan Gore, Catriona Gotz, Alia Ismail, Dominik Kawa, Clara Kazis, Pavlos Kopanas, Jack Langham, Chloe Lee, Katherine LeWitt, Eliza Lockhart, Rachel Mannen, Aditi Mukherji, Rosalia Myttas-Perris, Grace O’Driscoll, Anjali Prashad, Masuda Qureshi, Wiktor Rutkowski, Naomi Sirrs, Mayowa Sofekun, Ottilie Thornhill and Kieran Wellington. Eliza Lockhart and Ottilie Thornhill edited the text of the script for publication. Footnotes 1 OED Online (OUP 2016). Web. 24 June 2016. 2 W Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, in The Norton Shakespeare, S Greenblatt (gen ed) (3rd edn, Norton 2016] I.i.65. All further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 3 An Act for the more peaceable Government (43 Eliz 1 c 12). 4 LJ Ross, On Measure for Measure: An Essay in Criticism of Shakespeare’s Drama (1st edn, Associated University Presses 1997) 40. 5 BJ Sokol and M Sokol, Shakespeare, Law and Marriage (1st edn, CUP 2003) 43. 6 W Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, J Klause and JJM Tobin (eds) (1st edn, Wadsworth Cenage Learning 2012) 258. 7 Genesis 41:40. 8 Charles V’s incarceration of Pope Julius II following the Sack of Rome prevented Henry VIII’s divorce from Katherine of Aragon and led in part to the English Reformation. 9 King James VI and I, ‘Sonnet Prefixed to His Majesty’s Instructions to His Dearest Son, Henry the Prince’ in WS Braithwaite (ed), The Book of Elizabethan Verse (1st edn, Herbert B. Turner & Co 1907) 1300. 10 King James VI and I, Basilikon Doron (first published 1599) 18 <https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/printed-edition-of-king-james-vi-and-is-basilikon-doron-or-the-kings-gift-1603>. 11 Romans 13:2. 12 Queen Elizabeth I, Opening Speech to the Eight Parliament of Her Majesty’s Reign (19 February 1593); R Sgroi, 8th Parliament of Queen Elizabeth, 35 Eliz. I (4 April 2012) <http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1558-1603/parliament/1593> accessed 25 June 2016 13 W Shakespeare, Richard II, in The Norton Shakespeare, S Greenblatt (gen ed) (2nd edn, Norton 2013) (III.i.151–52). 14 Definition 1a in (n 1). 15 James I, ‘The True Law of Free Monarchies’ in Anon (ed), A Catalogue of Pamphlets, Tracts, Proclamations, Speeches, Sermons, Trials, Petitions from 1506–1700 in the Library of the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn (2nd edn, Nabu Press 2010) 482. 16 79 ER 34. 17 (31 Eliz 1 c 6). 18 80 ER 20. 19 76 ER 20. 20 See n 16. 21 7 Co Rep 15b, 77. 22 See n 16. 23 FW Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (1st edn, CUP 1919). 24 W Blackstone in G Sharswood (ed), Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books (1st edn, J. B. Lippincott Company 1893) vol 4, 31. 25 John Klause, Measure for Measure: Evans Shakespeare Edition (1st edn, London Evans Shakespeare Editions 2011) 278. 26 Anon, Marriage of Pandarus and Flora (1st edn, G. E. London 1615). 27 James S Hart, The Rule of Law, 1603–1660: Crowns, Courts and Judges (1st edn, Routledge 2003). 28 W Shakespeare, As You Like It, in Greenblatt (n 2) V.iv.126–27. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of International Dispute Settlement Oxford University Press

Measure for Measure on Trial—A Shakespearean Mock Trial

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Abstract

ABSTRACT Mock trials have been a privileged way to teach law for many years. They allow to convey to the students many subtleties in the workings of the law in a way that lecturing probably never can. Among many other things, it helps pinpoint the values in tension in the real life of the law, the drama of a court room, the imaginaries at play, the social pressure and other forces bearing down on the law’s different actors. Shakespeare’s work epitomises this passion, these waves that curl the flat, cool covers of the law books. 1. INTRODUCTION Mock trials have been a privileged way to teach law for many years. They allow to convey to the students many subtleties in the workings of the law in a way that lecturing probably never can. Among many other things, it helps pinpoint the values in tension in the real life of the law, the drama of a court room, the imaginaries at play, the social pressure and other forces bearing down on the law’s different actors. Shakespeare’s work epitomizes this passion, these waves that curl the flat, cool covers of the law books. Dispute settlement is a particular moment, when the life bites into society. Shakespeare provided us with some of the most revealing, and the most enjoyable, accounts of these moments. The idea to stage a Mock Trial based on Shakespeare follows almost naturally. And so it came that, on 23 March 2015, I organized a Shakespeare Mock Trial based on Measure for Measure. The Mock Trial took place at Inner Temple Hall, itself one of the historical Shakespearean venues, where the Twelfth Knight was first performed. Measure for Measure is concerned with law, power and corrupted adjudication: Vienna has collapsed into lawlessness. Sexual promiscuity, which is prohibited, abounds. The laws themselves are draconian but for years the Duke has not enforced them. His remedy is to appoint Angelo in his place, as his Deputy with all his powers. Angelo, believed by the Duke to be a man of high integrity, and himself already engaged to Mariana, can be trusted to see that the laws will be applied with their full rigour. Law and order and sexual propriety will be restored. For the time being Duke declares that he will be leaving Vienna, but in fact he stays, in disguise as a friar, to observe what unfolds. Claudio has had sexual intercourse with Juliet, his betrothed. This fact emerges after Angelo has assumed power. In law this crime carries the death penalty. In the Duke’s day no public interest would have been served by a prosecution. The couple would be married in all but name. Claudio’s sister Isabella, who is about to take vows of chastity as a nun, pleads with Angelo, not that Claudio is innocent but for mercy, for her brother’s life. She is offered a stark choice. The price for dispensing with the law is Claudio’s life in exchange for her virginity. She is appalled. Yet when she tells her brother, he begs her to comply with Angelo’s demand. The Duke, still in disguise, solves the problem. Angelo is tricked into believing that Isabella will share his bed, but in the darkness she is replaced by Mariana. Thus Isabella is spared and Angelo has committed the same crime as Claudio, having intercourse with his fiancée. Still believing that he has slept with Isabella, Angelo nevertheless orders the execution of Claudio to proceed. A second substitution is made. The head of a pirate, Ragozine, who died on that night, is substituted for that of Claudio. At last the Duke steps in. Despite his insistence that he should be punished for this own crime, Angelo must marry Mariana, Claudio will marry Juliet, and the Duke proposes, more accurately assumes, that Isabella and he will marry. The idea of the Mock Trial was to bring Vienna’s rulers to court to test their legal responsibility: the Duke Vincentio and his second in command, Angelo, took the stand to defend their record in government and to discharge their responsibility for the downfall of the city. The Mock Trial is not a simple Moot Competition, where advocates present an argument in front of a panel. The Mock Trial attempts to recreate a real trial scene with a jury box, a witness stand, three sitting judges and advocates for the prosecution and for the defence. Students filled all those positions with enthusiasm and engaged in a fabulous trial, presided over by Lord Judge, Judge David Caron and Lady Justice Arden. What follows is the written script prepared in advance, together with the edited transcript of the exchange between the prosecution, the defence and the court. The first part of the Mock Trial deals with the case against Angelo. The second part of the Mock Trial deals with the case against the Duke. 2. THE TRIAL OF ANGELO Lord Judge calls upon the Prosecution to open the trial Prosecution: We seek that the law should be strictly applied to Angelo and find him guilty of blackmail and corruption and therefore warrant a reversal of the Duke’s pardon of Angelo’s unlawful actions. The case against Angelo will be divided into two charges: blackmail and corruption. For the purposes of the prosecution, we submit that blackmail is, ‘Any payment or other benefit extorted by threats or pressure, especially by threatening to reveal a damaging or incriminating secret.’1 Similarly, we define Angelo’s corruption as the misuse of the entrusted power that the Duke bestowed upon him. The defence’s case rests on the argument that Angelo was not liable for his actions due to the power bestowed upon him by the Duke. The prosecution refutes this and draws the court’s attention to Act One, Scene One, where the Duke directed Angelo ‘to enforce or qualify the laws’2 meaning that Angelo had the power to use the law and apply it with moral discretion but did not allow Angelo free reigns to act outside the law. I will now seek to convince the court that Angelo is guilty of blackmail. The 1601 Act for the more peaceable Government,3 which criminalized blackmail and extortion, stipulated that criminals were to be charged with felony. Officers of the court were included, meaning Angelo is criminally liable for any conduct of blackmail under Elizabethan law. In Act Two, Scene Two, the defendant first engaged in blackmail when he approached Isabella with the possibility of ‘lay[ing] down the treasures of your body/to this supposed [II.iv.93–4]’. Here, ‘this supposed’ is the defendant in question, as he openly suggests that it would be beneficial for Isabella to engage in sexual conduct with himself to ‘fetch [her] brother from the manacles of the all-building law [II.iv.88–91]’. The defendant goes on to explicitly say that Claudio will face the full penalty of the law, if Isabella does not agree to the terms of his sexually fuelled blackmail. As Isabella stated: ‘My brother did love Juliet/and you tell me that he should die for it’ and Angelo responded: ‘He shall not Isabel, if you give me love [II.iv.139–41].’ This conversation clearly shows that Angelo intended to misuse his authority as the sole controller of Claudio’s fate for private sexual pleasures. Furthermore, Angelo manipulates the familial love that Isabella holds for her dear brother. Not only does Angelo blackmail Isabella for the clear exchange of sex for life, the defendant then emphasizes the deployment of blackmail by emotionally manipulating Isabella. Angelo states ‘But thy unkindness shall his death draw out/to lingering sufferance [II.iv.163–4].’ Here, Angelo reverses the ‘unkindness’ he has dealt Isabella with and imposes it onto her, arguing that she would be demonstrating ‘unkindness’ towards her brother if she does not submit to Angelo’s blackmail. The defendant has clearly taken advantage of his power and is fully aware of this and the superiority that he has in this situation. Evidenced by the fact that he declares that his lies surpass her honesty, ‘my false, o’erweighs your true [II.iv.167]’. To end the accusation of blackmail, the prosecution will admit the defence’s proposition that Angelo never actually carried through sexual intercourse with Isabella. However, the prosecution argues that the defendant Angelo still carried through the exchange of sex for the exoneration of Claudio, only unknowingly with Mariana. On corruption, we submit to the court that the defendant’s private gain is both the reputation as an effective law enforcer and the sexual contact derived from Isabella. Our accusation is twofold. First, Angelo wrongly used the law to condemn Claudio to death, which he was able to do solely because of his position of power. Secondly, he attempted to corrupt Isabella’s maidenhood through blackmail. Dealing with his treatment of Claudio, the prosecution argues that there was no legal basis for Angelo’s imprisonment and conviction of Claudio. Indeed, Elizabethan law stated that: the ‘Binding nature of Claudio and Julietta’s “true contract”, makes them man and wife.’4 Furthermore, a ‘conditional or de futuro spousal agreement followed by sexual intercourse resulted in an immediate, enforceable and valid marriage’.5 This examination of Elizabethan law illustrates how Angelo acted unlawfully in his imprisonment of Claudio, since it was the law of the time to make couples marry if they have fornicated before their wedding. ‘Betrothed couples’, which was the case of Claudio and Julietta, ‘who conceived a child before their wedding … were regularly summoned to the ecclesiastical courts and ordered to solemnize their unions in church as soon as possible: if they were assigned a penance, it was usually a private one involving confession to a small group of fellow parishioners.’6 Taking this into regard, nowhere in Elizabethan law does it state that sex was punishable by death. The prosecution submits that the defendant, Angelo, has used his newly found position of power to impose himself as a strict and seemingly law-abiding leader. Secondly, Angelo has displayed his corruption as the appointed leader of Vienna by attempting to take Isabella’s maidenhead. Isabella confirms Angelo’s attempt, when relaying his offer to Claudio, ‘If I would yield him my virginity they mightst be freed [III.i.97–98].’ The defendant has shown corruption in the two instances that have been discussed and the prosecution submits that he should face the legal ramifications for this conduct. In conclusion, the prosecution vehemently disagrees with the forthcoming submission from the defence that Angelo acted within his legal rights. The defendant has no right whatsoever to make the law as he sees fits and we have shown that he has acted outside the relevant law of the time. Therefore, we urge the court to reverse the Duke’s pardon of Angelo and find Angelo guilty of blackmail and corruption and restore the scales of justice. Thank you. Lord Judge calls for questions Lady Justice Arden: I’d like to ask a question please of the Prosecution in relation to the blackmail charge. Now, Claudio admits his guilt, that’s right isn’t it? Prosecution: That he slept with Julietta, yes. Lady Justice Arden: And Isabella must have known, as a long-time resident of Vienna, that there was a strict rule that the law did not permit fornication. Prosecution: Well, we have argued that according to the hand-fasting laws of the time any penalty that was to be incurred for pre-marital sexual relations was immediate marriage. Lady Justice Arden: But blackmail was morally wrong. Surely what we know from Angelo was that he was the only person who stood up for consistent application of the law. He said ‘we must not make a scarecrow of the law.’ He was the only person who knew what principle was. Prosecution: I would submit respectfully that if anybody was making a scarecrow of the law it was Angelo himself because of his abandonment of his own betrothed, Marianna. Lord Judge calls upon the defence to present their case Defence: Thank you very much my lord. My learned friends have clearly demonstrated that they find my client to be merciless, hypocritical and cruel. What they have not made clear is how these personal attacks on his character breach the laws. The defence will show that Angelo acted as a rightful regent and thus was above such accusations as he was at the time acting under the Duke’s Divine Right to rule. That being so, his actions are answerable only to the sovereign and the lord our God. My client’s sovereign has pardoned him of all wrongdoing. Having been so judged, I do not see how the prosecution intends to mount an effective case without first questioning the Duke’s Divine right to rule, which I remind them, is an act of treason. To begin, I offer examples of the authority of regents. I ask the jury to recall, from Genesis, the story of Joseph. When in Egypt, Pharaoh appointed him Zaphnath-Paaneah and said ‘Only Pharaoh in the throne shall be higher.’7 It has been the role of regents since the ancient days to act as full agents of divinely appointed authority. Even in our own recent history we have lived under the rule of various regents while sovereigns have been either absent or not of age—Katherine of Aragon in 1513 and the Duke of Somerset and Lord Protector to name but two from the 16th century. Let it be indisputable that the authority of regent’s is as if the King or, in our own Viennese context, Duke himself speaks. Indeed, the Duke explicitly gave Angelo ‘his deputation all the organs of our own power [I.i.21].’ You will all no doubt be aware that according to Frederick V’s conformation of Privilegium Maius in 1453, Austria is the official archduchy of the Holy Roman Empire, and as such my client acted as regent to the emperor. I am sure I need not remind this court of the eminence of the Emperor, nor of the considerable threats that such men have been capable of towards this country, not least the power Charles V was able to exert over the Bishop of Rome in 1527.8 There can be no doubt that my client was acting lawfully through the divine power channels of the sovereign. Previous statements from his grace the Duke to this effect include the following: ‘Hold therefore, Angelo: –/In our remove be thou at full our self;/Mortality and mercy in Vienna/Live in thy tongue and heart…[I.i.42–44].’ ‘A due sincerity governed [V.i.450]’ my client’s deeds. His Majesty King James has written at some length, commenting that we must all: ‘Observe the Statutes of your Heavenly King;/and from his law, make all your Laws to spring:/Since his Lieutenant here ye should remain.’9 According to Basilikon Doron, such a power belongs to a ruler who is ‘ordained for his people, having received from the God a burden of government.’10 I must remind the ladies and gentlemen of the jury of Romans 13, wherein Paul states: ‘Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.’11 I am sure that no man or woman here seeks damnation, and where does the authority of this court stem from but the King? This chamber may do nothing but what Parliament makes law, and Parliament may not function without the involvements and efforts of its majesty the King. No subject may question the royal prerogative, of which the ability to grant pardon is an inherent part. It would be much better that my learned friends adhere to the commands of her late majesty Queen Elizabeth’s comments to Parliament. The House, and we may assume its subsequent authorities, should ‘only to confer upon speedy and effectual remedies against these great and fierce dangers, and not to spend the time in devising of new laws and statutes; whereof there is already so great store’.12 If you are to question the actions of my client you must question the authority upon which he acted, and no court in Christendom has the power to cast aspersions or try the actions of an anointed sovereign. It is within the royal prerogative to administer the law and thus Angelo, as regent was perfectly entitled to sentence Claudio for the crime of fornication, which both he and my learned friends have admitted. It matters little that there is little evidence that this law has ever been enforced rigorously, as it is and remains the law of Vienna. It is left to the agent of the monarchy, in this case Angelo, to administer the application of the law. Otherwise what is to become of us? Are we to ‘sit upon the ground and tell sad stories of the death of Kings’?13 Claudio sits before us in this court, his sister Isabella has not been robbed of her maidenhead and Mariana is now married to Angelo. So I ask, what damage does the prosecution seek to redress? Thank you my lords and lady. Lord Judge: Are you submitting to us that, acting as the Duke’s deputy, Angelo is entitled to blackmail Isabella into sleeping with him? Does royal power go that far? Defence: I would argue that at the time of this blackmail, blackmail is a very sketchily understood concept. I believe it was first brought up as a precise term in a Scottish court in 1530, and involved a specific understanding of property14, rather than actions. Lord Judge calls Angelo Angelo: Thank you my lords and lady. I was told by the Duke to ‘In our remove be thou at full ourself [I.i.43]’ and I would not waver from that which is commanded to me by the Duke, being, ‘always obedient to [his] grace’s will [I.i.25].’ I felt I should follow the law to the letter, as without having a stringent control upon the people under my jurisdiction, the entire society could’ve broken down. I did not act in excess of the law in charging Claudio. As I made clear to Isabella on our first meeting, his ‘fine stands in record [II.ii.41]’, and that I wished to follow out to no greater nor lesser degree. Isabella admitted that it was ‘true’ that her brother appeared to be ‘Accountant to the law upon that pain [II.iv.84].’ In conversation with Escalus, being the virtuous man that I am, I conceded I would happily be accountable to the same punishment that Claudio was subjected to by my hands, if I was found guilty of the same charge: ‘When I, that censure him, do so offend,/Let mine own judgement pattern out my death,/And nothing come in partial [II.i.29–31].’ It is true that I had some amorous feelings towards Isabella—those were moments of weakness, brought on by the devil, of which all people are subject to. As shown when the Duke returned to his position, I did not sleep with Isabella and so the charge of blackmail against me is flawed. I cannot believe I am still being tried under the charges levelled against me. Despite the fact I was cleared by the Duke, who reigns over all the land, you still wish to pursue the claims of Isabella, than trust that ‘my unsoiled name, th’austereness of my life,/… and my place i’ th’ state [II.iv.152–53].’ I find it treasonous, especially after the lies that that woman fed to the Duke to tarnish my name she called me an ‘adulterous thief [V.i.42],’ a strange claim considering my lack of sexual conquest against her, and makes her accusation against me of being ‘a virgin-violator [V.i.45]’ a maddening one. Lord Judge calls Isabella Isabella: I twice met with Angelo to discuss the fate of my brother Claudio. During the first meeting I was accompanied by Lucio, who was privy to this conversation, yet unseen by Angelo, and during the second I was completely alone. It is during this second meeting that he proposed I yield my body to him, thus compromising my position as an aspiring nun in order to free my brother. I had been urged by Lucio to ‘assay the power [II.i.77]’ I have in attempt to make him retract his decision. It soon became apparent as I spent more time in his presence that Angelo was in fact governed by corporeal, carnal desires. I was very much aware of the implications of my brother’s transgression in both worldly and heavenly realms. Nevertheless, as his sister, I felt inclined to attempt to soften Angelo’s resolve, using the notion of mercy. Upon arriving at the first meeting, I introduced my difficult position as both distraught sister and strict adherer to divine rule by saying, ‘There is a vice that most I do abhor/And most desire should meet the blow of justice/For which I would not plead, but that I must;/For which I must not plead, but that I am/At war ‘twixt will and will not [II.ii.30–34].’ I did not err in my plight to become a nun, constantly referring back to God and the importance of religious hierarchy during our conversation, saying: ‘'Better it were a brother die at once,/Than that a sister, by redeeming him/Should die forever. [II.iv.103–5],’ and yet Angelo would not relent. I proclaimed that with ‘outstretched throat [II.iv.155],’ I would tell people of his blackmailing, to which he used his rank to say that no one would believe my accusation. That I did plead with the Duke that he pardon my brother from death when all was revealed is not by any means indicative of me diminishing the torment that he caused me; however, again, my faith permits me to have mercy, I do strongly feel that he needs to be held accountable for his proposition and subsequent blackmail. Lord Judge calls Mariana Mariana: ‘They say, best men are moulded out of faults; and, for the most, become much more the better for being a little bad: so may my husband [V.i.431–33].’ I defended my husband once with these words and they also stand today. It is true that I myself have called my husband, Angelo, a ‘cruel’ [V.i.204] man. But as I told the Duke previously ‘I crave no other, nor no better man [V.i.420].’ I had always believed Angelo to be my husband in my heart, if not in legal binding, and I do not blame him for not pursuing the marriage fully following the loss of my dowry. But now ‘as there comes light from heaven and words from breath, As there is sense in truth and truth in virtue, I am affianced this man’s wife as strongly as words could make up vows [V.i.223–26].’ Leave Angelo to fulfil his duties as my husband; do not punish him for a crime that was not committed. He did not engage in premarital sex, for as the Duke said himself, he was my ‘husband on a pre-contract [IV.i.70].’ There is no crime here. I was a willing participant in the Friar’s plan to reunite Angelo and myself. There is no crime here. I forgave him long ago for the problems surrounding our engagement so they are of no concern to the jury now that we are officially married. There is no crime here. The Duke’s authority in the matter of our marriage and in Angelo’s pardoning must not be ignored. The Duke himself, disguised as a friar who brought me much comfort in my times of trouble at Saint Luke’s, looked to bring us together and allowed Angelo to become my husband. The Duke himself trusted Angelo with the moral authority of Vienna upon his leave. The Duke himself pardoned Angelo, and it is he that holds the authority to do so. Angelo has committed no crime. He is a determinedly moral man, instead of punishing him I call upon the jury to let him use this strong willed nature to aid Vienna. Thank you. Lord Judge calls Escalus Escalus: As chief counsellor to the Duke, and in his absence, Lord Angelo, I feel that I have been a keen spectator of the grievous misbehaviours of the latter, both in his treatment of Claudio and his dereliction of duty to Vienna. I thought from the start that ‘If any in Vienna be of worth [I.i.22]’ to take up the administration it was Lord Angelo. I was mistaken. It was abundantly clear at the time that Lord Angelo could be capable of severity but not yet of injustice. I, in my good nature, had instructed him to be merciful but he insisted that, ‘We must not make a scarecrow of the law,/Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,/And let it keep one shape, till custom make it/Their perch and not their terror [II.i.1–4].’ I did beseech my lord further to have mercy on Claudio whose ‘noble father’ [II.i.7] is known and that he too must have, ‘at sometime in [his] life,/Erred [II.i.14–15]’ but he assured me that ‘Tis one thing to be tempted, Escalus, Another thing to fall. [II.i.17–18].’ I would like it to be noted that I implored the heavens to ‘…forgive him, and forgive us all!/Some rise by sin, and some by virtue fall [II.i.37–38].’ I do believe him to have been juvenile in his attempt to root out corruption. It grieved me that despite my pleas there seemed no remedy for poor Claudio. However, the hypocrisy of my Lord regarding his conduct towards Isabella came as a shock, I must confess I was ‘more amazed at his dishonour/Than at the strangeness of it [V.i.383–84].’ It certainly pained me that ‘one so learned and so wise,/… Should slip so grossly, both in the heat of blood. And lack of tempered judgment afterward [V.i.466–69].’ I don’t think any ruler is above the law, especially when they overplay their hand and misuse justice for selfish ends. Lord Judge calls Claudio Claudio: Thank you my lord. In the Duke’s absence, Angelo imprisoned me and sentenced to death by execution as punishment for fornication. Whilst I understand I acted against the law, I am betrothed to Julietta, ‘she is fast my wife [I.ii.124]’ and we are due to wed. Thus, in accordance with our bond of hand fasting, this promise of marriage permits us conjugal privileges. However, Angelo, in his exchange for my life, bargained to bed my virginal sister. How, my Lord, can this act be admonished in accordance with the law yet the fornication I perpetrated in loving devotion with my betrothed be more reprehensible? When man is granted too much liberty our natures do pursue ‘like rats that raven down their proper bane [I.ii.118].’ I have suffered f–or my transgression. Lustfulness is a ‘thirsty evil, and when we drink we die [I.ii.119].’ I, according to this belief, have already suffered death as a punishment for my fornication. I am remorseful and live with the burden of my action. I was brought to a place of abject misery and for the loss of my sister’s affection towards me; I sought the capital punishment to which I was sentenced. However, I was not and am not deserving of the punishment. He on the other hand, is criminally liable for his actions. I desire justice for my sister and the unnecessary suffering brought upon the both of us. I ask you my Lord, how is Angelo, who ‘bite[s] the law by th’ nose/When he would force it [III.i 108–9],’ a hypocrite, who abused the power granted to him by the Duke, not culpable for his actions? Angelo, in desiring to bed my sister also sanctioned another crime as ‘is’t not a kind of incest to take life/From thine own sister’s shame? [III.i 139–40]’ Angelo’s flagrant disregard for the law and his actions resulting in legal and social discord must be the result in him being held accountable. I therefore agree with the prosecution that Angelo be made criminally liable for his actions. Judge Caron: My question goes to our erstwhile prosecutors. Claudio demands that this court damn, and so we come full circle. ‘“An Angelo for a Claudio, death for death.” Haste still pays haste, and leisure answers leisure;/Like doth quit like, and still measure for measure’ [V.i.403–6]. But, in damning Angelo would this court not possibly remove the chance of absolution? Isn’t the real punishment that by the Duke’s decision he will escape punishment? Prosecution: It is argued that Angelo’s personal preference of punishment, which is death rather than having to wed Marianna, is of absolutely no relevance. He should be subject to the relevant law, which was subject to the 1601 Act for the more peaceable Government, which directs that any criminals guilty of blackmail and extortion were to be charged with felony, without benefit of clergy, their names were to be proclaimed and they were to be imprisoned. Judge Caron: And is there no room for mercy? Prosecution: If Angelo were accused of stealing a loaf of bread because he was hungry then perhaps some mercy. But blackmail and corruption against a nun? No, I don’t think there is room for mercy here. Judge Caron: Thank you for your answer. Lady Justice Arden: I would like to ask a question of the defence, if I may. We’ve heard the evidence of Escalus, the servant of the Duke. And at the very start the Duke says ‘Our government, the properties to unfold/would seem in me t’affect speech and discourse’. So the Duke set about the social experiment, giving the power to somebody while he stayed around in disguise and we see what happened to Angelo. He fell straight into a trap, that was set by the Duke for him. Didn’t he display that the properties of government were corrupt and that absolute power, as Escalus said, corrupts absolutely? Defence: On the face of it the famous phrase ‘power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely’ appears to fit nicely to the situation we find Angelo in. A person who has had absolute power thrust upon him, and then used his position for his own personal gain. He was, however, already a morally questionable person before he came into office, so we can cast doubt on whether or not the attainment of real power changed anything significantly. In addition, when it comes to the governing of the commonwealth, of the common good of the people as he saw fit, as we was instructed by the Duke, he administered the laws faithfully and to the best of his ability. And so I do not think that my Lord was corrupted by power but more, as he said, tempted as all men are by the Devil. 3. THE TRIAL OF THE DUKE Lord Judge opens the trial of the Duke and calls upon the Prosecution to present their arguments Prosecution: the Prosecution humbly seeks judgement against the defendant on two grounds. The first is that we seek the Court find the Duke guilty of dereliction of duty and the second is that we seek the Court declare void the Duke’s trial at the end of Measure for Measure. May it please the court; we will begin by presenting our arguments as to why the Duke is guilty of dereliction of duty. My Lords and Lady; you see before you a man who, through his maladministration and dereliction of duty, has almost brought the fair city of Vienna to its knees. The defendant is the Duke of Vienna and therefore he is duty bound to protect the city and its peoples, and enforce its laws. We submit that principles of sovereign immunity and royal prerogative are not applicable to the Duke because he is not a monarch but an aristocratic governor. Our illustrious monarch King James I is a supporter of this view, as he clearly states in his 1598 treatise The True Law of Free Monarchies: ‘I mean always of such free Monarchies as our king is, and not of elective kings, and much less of such sort of governors, as the dukes of Venice are, whose Aristocratic and limited government, is nothing like to free Monarchies’.15 Although the Duke has been called ‘royal’ and ‘Prince’, we would submit that such comments are mere formalities made by subjects who are accustomed to paying such tributes, and are not representative of the defendant’s legal standing. Therefore, we submit that the defendant can be prosecuted for his gross dereliction of duty. By his own admission, the defendant has neglected to effectively enforce the laws of Vienna for 14 years, resulting in social chaos. As the defendant confessed to Friar Thomas: We have strict statutes and most biting laws, The needful bits and curbs to headstrong jades, Which for this fourteen years we have let slip;            … so our decrees, Dead to infliction, to themselves are dead; And liberty plucks justice by the nose [I.iii.19–29]. The defendant did not attempt to take responsibility for his mismanagement and enforce the law, as he is duty bound to do. Instead, the defendant ‘elected him [Angelo] our absence to supply [I.i.18],’ that is, the defendant appointed Angelo as his agent and tasked Angelo with rectifying his maladministration. The defendant did so in order to avoid confronting the public outcry, and consequent reputation damage, that he knew the restoration of law and order would illicit from the people of Vienna. As the defendant stated in Act 1, Scene 3: Sith ‘twas my fault to give the people scope, ‘Twould be my tyranny to strike and gall them          … Therefore indeed, my father, I have on Angelo imposed the office, Who may, in th’ambush of my name strike home, And yet my nature never in the fight To do in slander [I.iii.35–43]. In appointing Angelo as his agent, the defendant chose a man he knew to have previously acted unlawfully. In Act 3 Scene 1, the defendant revealed his knowledge of Angelo’s repudiation of his marriage contract to Mariana and the fact that Angelo subsequently attempted to justify his unlawful breach by slandering the good lady. It is reasonable to ask why the defendant would, with as he states ‘prepared choice [I.i.52],’ place the city he was bound to protect in the hands of a man he knew to be of questionable character? The answer is that it was indeed, a prepared choice because the defendant intended from the outset for Angelo to fail. Only through Angelo’s disgrace, could the defendant ensure that he could return to office with his authority and reputation restored. The fact that the defendant knowingly and negligently entrusted the city of Vienna to an unsuitable agent is further evidenced by the fact that once the defendant was made aware of Angelo’s inappropriate behaviour towards Isabella—the defendant did not revoke the agency. Instead, not only did the defendant allow the agency to remain in place, but in order to secure the restoration of his reputation and his triumphant return to office, the defendant orchestrated his own agent’s downfall by organizing for Mariana to engage in extramarital fornication with Angelo. Thus, the defendant himself engaged in criminal behaviour as the incitement of prostitution was deemed unlawful in the Baude’s Case of 1603.16 That the defendant appointed a criminal as his agent and was prepared to act as an illegal bawd in order to ensure the downfall of that agent, just to secure his return to power, demonstrates the depths of his hypocrisy and his complete dereliction of duty. On both legal and moral grounds, such a man must be removed from office. We will now move to our second ground, that we seek the Court declare void the Duke’s trial at the end of Measure for Measure. Beginning on a policy point, it is well known that in these early years of the reign of our most magnanimous monarch King James I, heightened importance has been given to political and legal stability. It is submitted that the Duke’s actions threatened said stability, particularly during the trial, and thus violated the Rule of Law itself. The Duke has engaged in unlawful and illicit activities in order to gain ‘the upper hand’ in the trial, perverting the very principles of justice upon which our system is predicated. He does so most prominently by committing three different crimes. First, and as previously demonstrated, the Duke encourages Mariana to engage in extramarital and unlawful fornication. He does so with the clear objective of putting Angelo in a detrimental position during the trial scene. Secondly, he impersonates a religious officer, specifically a friar, contrary to the Simony Act 1588 c 6, sections 6 and 8.17 He uses his guise for the sole purpose of influencing the outcome of the trial. This is evidenced when he knowingly misinforms the participants of the trial about the death of Claudio, or when he finds Lucio criminally liable for slander, and when he acts as being completely alien to the facts of the trial. Thirdly, and most importantly, he is guilty on several instances of committing perjury. The precedents of Core vMorton (1601)18 and Brittridge’s case (1602)19 show us that the Duke is guilty of perjury because his words during the trial scene ‘import an act done’. A few examples are: when the Duke as Friar said: ‘Where is the Duke? ‘Tis he should hear me speak’; [V.i.298] and when the Duke as Friar said: Be not so hot. The Duke dare No more stretch this finger of mine than he Dare rack his own. His subject I am not, Nor here provincial. My business in this state Made me a looker-on here in Vienna’. [V.1.318–321] My Lords and Lady, we are, as such, faced by a man who, exhibiting extreme cunning and malice, committed several crimes in order to influence the outcome of a trial. In doing so, he has perverted the principles of Justice that lay at the core of our legal system. It follows, then, that the trial should, and must, be voided. Before concluding our submissions, it is imperative to draw attention to the defence’s arguments. Their’s rests on the assumption that the Duke possesses the same legal standing as a monarch. They will seek to claim that a sovereign cannot be held criminally liable, on the basis of them being above legal reproach and that to hold a monarch accountable would lead to perverting the principle that the King maintains the peace. As stated previously, we do not consider the Duke to enjoy the same legal position as a King. However, were the Court to find this interpretation unsatisfactory, it is worth noting that the defence’s submissions ignores what, in the words of our King, is the duty by which a true monarch is bound to his people. I quote from the True Law of Free Monarchies: By the Law of Nature the King becomes a natural Father to all his Lieges at his Coronation: And as the Father of his fatherly duty is bound to care for the nourishing, education, and virtuous government of his children; even so is the king bound to care for all his subjects.20 It has been shown that the Duke violated his duty to care for his peoples when he first appointed a criminal as a substitute ruler, effectively derelicting his duty; and secondly, when he engaged in criminal enterprise during and prior to the events at the aforementioned trial. In conclusion, the Duke has acted unlawfully, harming his subjects and perverting the Rule of Law himself. To allow him to escape liability would lead the general loss of faith in our legal system and the ability of our most Gracious King to protect the peoples living herein. Such a morally bankrupt head of state cannot be allowed to remain in power. Judge Caron: You ask that we judge that which is sovereign. I must admit that I am thankful for the appointment that he granted me but I am open to your argument. But by what law can we try the Duke as sovereign? And if we dared to do so, is he not entitled to a jury of his peers? Prosecution: My lord, putting a head of state on trial and even removing a head of state is not a novel concept. In 1327, leading barons and members of the clergy demanded and received the abdication of Edward II on the basis of his weak and incompetent leadership. In 1553, Parliament rescinded Lady Jane Grey’s proclamation as queen. She was subsequently tried, convicted and executed for high treason. In 1586, Mary Queen of Scots, an anointed queen, was similarly placed on trial, convicted and later executed for high treason. These trials, convictions and even executions of prior heads of state were lawfully effected by special commissions of Parliament and did not require a jury of the defendant’s peers. Judge Caron: And is this a special commission created by Parliament? Prosecution: Arguably it is, your Honour. Lord Judge: Arguably that is very well done, thank you. Lord Judge asks the defence to present their arguments Defence: My Lords, it is respectfully put to this court that none of the grounds advocated by my learned friends counsel for the prosecution can defy the immunity that the Duke enjoys by virtue of his sovereign position or invalidate his exercise of the royal prerogative. There is a long constitutional and jurisprudential tradition supporting this. With due respect, it is submitted that my learned friends, the counsel for the prosecution, appear to have overlooked that in the play the Duke is clearly equated to a sovereign monarch, who enjoys similar powers and liberties as the King of England. We would like to draw you honours’ attention to Act 5, Scene 1, where Isabella states ‘Justice, O royal Duke’, [V.i.22] referring to Duke Vincentio. If it pleases the court, we would like to move to our second submission, which pertains to the charge of dereliction of duty: that no criminal liability can be imposed on the Duke, as his actions are non-justifiable and immune from any kind of prosecution. Indeed, the general rule at common and civil law is that no proceedings, civil or criminal, are maintainable against the monarch in person, for the courts, being the monarch’s own, can have no jurisdiction over him. Therefore, there can be no prosecution of Duke Vincentio for his actions in Measure for Measure, however immoral, undesirable and dissolute they might be. The origins of the Crown’s immunity are rooted in feudalism and, in particular, in the monarch’s role as dispenser of justice and in the inability to sue a lord in his own courts. The immunity is derived from the medieval maxim Rex non potest peccare (King can do no wrong). If whatever the monarch does is right, there can be no question of the monarch committing criminal acts, or being subject to criminal proceedings. Indeed, the imposition of criminal liability upon the Crown would offend the fundamental idea that the criminal law protects the King’s peace, that the Crown cannot be both prosecutor and defendant, that fines cannot be paid to the Crown to itself; and, that if imprisonment were a possibility, the Crown could not be imprisoned. Such things are impossible given that the Crown is indivisible and not subject to the coercive jurisdiction of the courts. Judge Caron: Are you recommending that we first remove the accused from office? Defence: No my lord, with due respect we submit that this court cannot prosecute the Duke because he is immune. The inconvenience that might result from some particular mischief of the sovereign is well recompensed by the peace of the public and security of government, in the person of the sovereign, the Duke, being set out of the reach of distracting legal proceedings, such as these. The statesmen and legal scholars of Elizabeth’s reign have distinctly held that the king in parliament is absolutely supreme, above the law. Courts of justice have also affirmed the immunity of the sovereign. Popham CJKB in The Case of Swans (1592)21 explained that the king’s absolute prerogatives: ‘are not examinable or determinable by any course of justice and only by the King’. Lord Judge: Which absolute prerogative are you relying on? Defence: My lord, the prerogative, as we have heard in the previous trial, is the sovereign’s power to act, as he likes, without being subject to any judicial review. I would like to draw the court’s attention to James I’s The True Law of Free Monarchies, in which he claimed that the ‘Monarchy is the true paternal of Divinity’.22 James furthermore used the example of King David to demonstrate that a monarch is God’s minister, leading to his point of immunity, and that only God has the right to judge the King. In summary, it is submitted that the law has thus no coercive power against the Duke. If any person has, in point of property, a just demand upon the sovereign, he can only petition him in his Court of Chancery. With the court’s permission, we would now like to turn to our third submission; that the Duke’s trial at the end of Measure for Measure cannot be declared void nor can his pardons be annulled. Indeed, it falls to the sovereign, by virtue of his royal prerogative, to create new courts and grant pardons as it pleases him.23 The monarch’s power to erect new courts was exercised in the Middle Ages. Nothing was commoner that for the king by his charter to grant to some town or some lord of manor the right to hold a court. As a matter of fact, the prerogative power of erecting new courts has not been used in England for quite some time. Consequently, it may be argued that this has now fallen into disuse, yet this prerogative was never superseded, either implicitly or explicitly, by an Act of Parliament. Therefore, we cannot say that the prerogative is gone; at any moment if might become important, as it has in the present case. It has never been expressly taken away, and I therefore submit that the Duke’s court in Measure for Measure is legitimate. If it pleases the court, we turn to the Duke’s decision at the end of the trial. We submit that the prosecution of all public offences and breaches of the peace are brought in the sovereign’s name, as he is the person injured in the eyes of the law. And so arises another branch of the Royal prerogative, that of pardoning offences, for it is reasonable that he only who is injured should have the power of forgiving. This power was declared in Parliament, by the Jurisdiction in Liberties Act 1535, that no other person has power to pardon or remit any treason or felonies whatsoever; but that the king has the whole and sole power thereof. There is therefore a magistrate, the sovereign, who has it in his power to extend mercy, wherever he thinks it is deserved: borrowing Blackstone’s language, the Duke holds ‘a court of equity in his own breast, to soften the rigour of the general law, in such criminal cases as merit an exemption from punishment’.24 It is, thus, put to the court that this prerogative power and the validity of the Duke’s pardons, and indeed the whole trial, cannot be questioned, regardless of their effects and implications. Lady Justice Arden: This is a very modest court and it knows that it is said in the Gospels that with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to your gain, which I think has been taken for the title of some bawdy play that has been played out in the Inner Temple. But why shouldn’t the same apply to the king? After Magna Carta, one of our most outstanding Chief Justices and legal scholars, Bracton, said that the King was subject to God and the law, so why shouldn’t the Duke be subject to God and the law? Defence: It is submitted that King John was a tyrant and the Duke is not. Lord Judge: That is a very interesting submission. Lord Judge asks the first witness, Lucio, to give evidence Lucio: The Duke is not divine and yet he had the audacity to disguise himself as a divine figure, to play God, to usurp a holy position on his unrelenting quest for power. He meddled in the lives of his own people in his sacrilegious façade, fraudulently hearing confessions from his subjects and doing nothing as Angelo rampantly handed out sentences to honest men whilst acting dishonestly himself. The Duke abused his position to learn the secrets of the people of Vienna, whilst dishonourably abandoning his duties to the very same people. I, myself, bore witness to the act, and spoke to the deceptive fellow one day while he was snooping around in the prison cells. It was I that unmasked the ‘Friar’, who was ‘honest in nothing but his clothes’, and made him a Duke once again. Not only did the Duke act malevolently and manipulatively whilst impersonating a Friar, but in the time that he was parading around in costume, he appointed a tyrant in his place. Angelo treated a ‘familiar sin’ as worthy of death, and sentenced Claudio as if playing a ‘game of tick-tack’. I stand to my word that Angelo’s ‘blood is snow-broth’ and his natural edge is blunt; he placed a heavy sentence upon my dear friend in order to make an example. The Duke knew of Angelo’s actions but made no effort to amend his mistake of appointing a hypocritical despot, instead manipulating the situation in his own favour and betraying the citizens of Vienna. It is for these reasons and for the benefit of Vienna itself that the Duke must be punished. Lord Judge asks the second witness, Mistress Overdone, to give evidence Mistress Overdone: The Duke is guilty because he has violated the contract of duty he had towards me and the economic prosperity of the city. I had stated in Act 1, Scene 2 that: Thus, what with the war, what with the sweat, what with the gallows, and what with poverty, I am custom-shrunk. [I.ii.74–76] As you can hear, I was already losing all my costumers over the war, the plague, and above all capital punishment. The brothel was my income and helped regulate the trade of the city. Yet, as the Duke had gone away and left Angelo in charge, Angelo had started imposing laws that would affect my business. My brothels in particular, play an important role in society as ‘betrothed couples who conceived a child before their wedding, were regularly summoned to the ecclesiastical courts and ordered to solemnize their unions in church as soon as possible’.25 Therefore, my brothels not only had significance in the economy but also social relations, as it created a union between people. As the Duke had gone away, he broke down both the economic and social unifying pillar of this city. An Early Modern Broadside Ballad about Mistress Flora’s marriage to Pandarus called: The Marriage of Pandarus and Flora was sung as: Let every street, of Trading meet, The Wedding to adore-a, Both he and she of Brothelry26 This shows that Mistress Flora, like myself, was part of a brothel in the city, relying on ‘trade’ to create her income. Yet, like myself, she also had a place in society and was able to marry and lead a normal life. As transgressive as I seem I, like Mistress Flora of the ballad, am trying to lead a normal life and provide for Lucio’s daughter who was begotten by Mistress Kate Keepdown. In Act 3, Scene 1, I declared: Mistress Kate Keepdown was with child by him in the Duke’s time; he promised her marriage. His child is a year and a quarter old, come Philip and Jacob. I have kept it myself, and see how he goes about to abuse me! [III.i.433–436] Needless to say, despite these broken promises like the Duke’s broken promise to uphold my financial stability, I have been left to take care of Lucio and Kate’s illegitimate child. I heard that Francis Bacon once claimed, if the Common Laws of England ‘are rightly administered, they are the best, the equallest, by which the king has justest Prerogative, and the People the best Liberty’.27 Therefore, the Duke should have kept my brothels open without retreating because in doing so, he has wrongly ‘administered’ the law and has not given ‘liberty’ to the people. Lucio’s child and I are suffering due to the financial strain we are under. The Duke has abandoned his duty to me, as well Lucio’s child, but also the regular citizens of the city who now do not have the ‘liberty’ to go to the brothel. Lord Judge asks the third witness, Elbow, to give evidence Elbow: I am the Duke’s constable and for seven and half years, not seven but seven and a half—I have served this great Duke in Vienna and I have defectively guaranteed the administration of justice. I trust the Duke and his questionable judgments should be maintained. There should be a doubt about that. He is the appointed ruler that God has chosen and this should be upheld if we are ever to keep Vienna under control. Anybody who questions the authority of the Duke, questions the authority of God. It is not an easy task putting a lock on men and their codpieces. I mean, just last week my wife was beget with child yet again—this speaks to the nature of sexual liberties within the city. At this moment, Vienna is under great risk of infection. We are on the brink of a plague. But this is an ungodly plague. Within this city there is much fornication, it is scourged with bawds and licentiousness ekes out of every street corner. Many men are at risk of blindness because their trousers seek to lead them, rather than their mind. Men, good Christian men, I implore you to consider the fact that the only man we can trust to maintain Vienna is the Duke. The Duke has been a good governor and this was shown when he agreed with my decision, as the best and only constable in this land, to send Pompey to jail. He admonished Pompey and believed sending him to jail would help cure him of this aforementioned plague. The Duke is a malevolent leader and I am sure you can all agree that he did was not to punish Pompey, but correct him like a good father would do his own child. Despite Angelo taking over the Duke, my role and my moral compass have not been changed. There has been constancy in enforcing the law within the streets of Vienna and this is a testament to the Duke’s good nature and direction as a leader and of course my appointment as a constable. This very trial threatens to shake the foundations in which the government of Vienna stands—that men should be upright and just of which the Duke is and seeks others to emulate. In all, the Duke is a reliable leader, and therefore he is liable for this crime. Lord Judge addresses the counsel for the defence Lord Judge: Do you wish to call the Duke to give evidence in his own defence, or are you standing on principle and declining to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court? Defence: My lord, the Duke wishes to make his own statement. Lord Judge: By doing so, you acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court. Would you like to advise your client? Defence: My lord, the Duke still wants to give evidence. Lord Judge: Very well. Lord Judge asks the defendant, the Duke, to give evidence The Duke: I was heavily surprised having received the subpoena. So I asked some of my fellow Dukes, starting with Duke Solinus in The Comedy of Errors, the Duke of Milan in The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Duke Theseus in A Midsummer Night’s Dream and concluding with my most beloved fellow in The Merchant of Venice for their advice. This is what they said. In The Comedy of Errors, the Duke decides to exercise executive clemency and exempt Egeon entirely from the force of the law – he neither has to pay the one thousand marks nor be put to death. Antipholus of Ephesus says, ‘These ducats pawn I for my father here’, but the Duke makes it clear that Egeon is fully pardoned, saying, ‘It shall not need. Thy father hath his life’ [V.i.391–2]. By taking this step, the Duke effectively thwarted an application of the law that was never intended by its drafters. In The Two Gentlemen of Verona, the Duke of Milan lifts the sentence of banishment that he had pronounced: ‘Know then, I here forget all former griefs,/Cancel all grudge, repeal thee home again’ [V.4.139–140]. Valentine pleads for clemency for the rest of the outlaws, and the Duke, underscoring his newfound respect for Valentine, replies, ‘Thou hast prevailed; I pardon them and thee./Dispose of them as thou know’st their deserts’ [V.4.155–156]. It is worth noting that, however deserving Valentine might have been of clemency, there is no reason to think that the rest of the outlaws were equally so. Nevertheless, no one questions the Duke’s power to take this action, nor his prerogative to allow Valentine to ‘dispose of them’ as he saw fit. In A Midsummer Night’s Dream, it again is political hierarchy that matters: Egeus’ ‘natural’ right as a father to dictate his daughter’s marriage can be overborne by Theseus’s political right as Duke. His right to do so is not questioned and rightly so. In The Merchant of Venice, Shylock seems very unlucky in the end. But matters could have been worse: my fellow Duke might have decided that his life was forfeit; or he might have simply sent Shylock home empty-handed based on a finding that the contract was unenforceable; or permitted him to settle for late payment of the 3000 ducats by Bassanio. Not least, one should bear in mind that it was Portia who escalated matters by moving from contract to punishment for attempted murder. Lord Judge: Forgive me your Grace, but you are quoting to us from the jottings of some poor fellow from Warwickshire. What is the legal authority? The Duke: I am the legal authority. Lord Judge: Thank you, your Grace. In that case, we do not need to hear any further as we have understood your point. Any further questions? David Caron: No further questions. Lady Justice Arden: No further questions. Lord Judge: The jury has a very difficult question to answer in this case. We will ask you to retire and then return to pronounce your verdict. 4. VERDICT AND SENTENCING Lord Judge asks Angelo to stand and face the jury Lord Judge: Foreman, do you find the first defendant, Angelo, guilty or not guilty? Foreman: My lords and lady, on the counts of blackmail and corruption, the jury finds Angelo guilty. Lord Judge: Is that the verdict of you all or a verdict of the majority? Foreman: It is the verdict of us all. Lord Judge: Angelo, the jury has found you guilty on overwhelming evidence. We thought your counsel did very well in the face of overwhelming odds. The sentence of the court is that you will help Mistress Overdone by cleaning out her brothels every single day for a year. There is a condition attached to that, do not succumb to temptation in the brothel – you are to leave the girls alone. Lord Judge asks the Duke to stand and face the jury Lord Judge: Foreman, do you find the second defendant, the Duke, guilty or not guilty? Foreman: My lords and lady, on the count of dereliction of duty the jury is unanimous and finds the Duke guilty. The Duke: The jury is dismissed! Lord Judge: Duke, the jury has found you guilty and the court has decided that it is time that in Vienna there was a Parliament to hold you to account. Also, that Isabella be allowed to live in a nunnery for 11 months a year for the next 20 years. 5. CONCLUSION BY LORD JUDGE Measure for Measure is for me, one of the greatest William Shakespeare’s plays. The canon of great plays always includes the tragedies: King Lear; Othello; Hamlet; Macbeth. These are about the way in which individuals respond to events so that gradually their characters are skinned and skinned again until they become victims of their own character. The history plays tell history, the way events impact on the characters, think of Richard II and Richard III. But Measure for Measure is one of the plays where Shakespeare examined issues that matter to us all as a society, they matter today and they will matter tomorrow: political power, the tendency of power in any shape or form to corrupt; law, order, justice, mercy, deterrence, guilt, legal guilt and moral guilt, or the lack of it, or not much of it, or even questions like whether it is ever justifiable to commit a crime in order to achieve a greater good. These are questions that are with us and affect us all. I regard the happy ending as a complete contrivance; perhaps Shakespeare was trying to fool the audience into thinking that this play was about fun things. What will happen in Vienna 5 or 10 years after the close of the play, now that the Duke is back in power? It looks like a reversion to the shambles, which the Duke himself identified when he put Angelo in charge. When will the slide into disorder and lawlessness be stopped? And how, if the Duke is in charge? If Angelo is not to be punished, when is anyone ever to be punished? The marriage of Angelo and Mariana is as ‘sure together,/As the winter to foul weather’.28 Is the power of the Duke so absolute that he may subject Isabella to the ‘abhorred pollution’ that she would not entertain at Angelo’s hands? No one actually asked Isabella if she is willing to surrender her virginity to the Duke and give up her vocation as a nun. Perhaps in all this misery, we should wish Claudio and Juliet a joyful marriage with their no doubt ever increasing family. Interestingly, neither of them at any stage in this play has ever been vested with any glimmer of power. Measure for Measure is the ideal vehicle for examining the philosophy of the law and the complexities of the administration of justice. We are indebted to everyone who has participated; from both the English and the Law faculties and King’s College London, for making the mock trial possible. Particular thanks to all the students who acted as counsel, prosecution and defence advocates, witnesses and the jury. Special thanks to Hannah Crawforth who co-taught the class on Shakespeare and the Law. With thanks to the authors of the piece, the 2016 class of Shakespeare and the Law at King’s College London. Sofia Anwar, Anastasia Bartlett, Joshua Deya Jones, Zoe Donaldson, Isabel Feeney, Giacomo Geronico Orlandi, Annabel Glaysher, Nathan Gore, Catriona Gotz, Alia Ismail, Dominik Kawa, Clara Kazis, Pavlos Kopanas, Jack Langham, Chloe Lee, Katherine LeWitt, Eliza Lockhart, Rachel Mannen, Aditi Mukherji, Rosalia Myttas-Perris, Grace O’Driscoll, Anjali Prashad, Masuda Qureshi, Wiktor Rutkowski, Naomi Sirrs, Mayowa Sofekun, Ottilie Thornhill and Kieran Wellington. Eliza Lockhart and Ottilie Thornhill edited the text of the script for publication. Footnotes 1 OED Online (OUP 2016). Web. 24 June 2016. 2 W Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, in The Norton Shakespeare, S Greenblatt (gen ed) (3rd edn, Norton 2016] I.i.65. All further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 3 An Act for the more peaceable Government (43 Eliz 1 c 12). 4 LJ Ross, On Measure for Measure: An Essay in Criticism of Shakespeare’s Drama (1st edn, Associated University Presses 1997) 40. 5 BJ Sokol and M Sokol, Shakespeare, Law and Marriage (1st edn, CUP 2003) 43. 6 W Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, J Klause and JJM Tobin (eds) (1st edn, Wadsworth Cenage Learning 2012) 258. 7 Genesis 41:40. 8 Charles V’s incarceration of Pope Julius II following the Sack of Rome prevented Henry VIII’s divorce from Katherine of Aragon and led in part to the English Reformation. 9 King James VI and I, ‘Sonnet Prefixed to His Majesty’s Instructions to His Dearest Son, Henry the Prince’ in WS Braithwaite (ed), The Book of Elizabethan Verse (1st edn, Herbert B. Turner & Co 1907) 1300. 10 King James VI and I, Basilikon Doron (first published 1599) 18 <https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/printed-edition-of-king-james-vi-and-is-basilikon-doron-or-the-kings-gift-1603>. 11 Romans 13:2. 12 Queen Elizabeth I, Opening Speech to the Eight Parliament of Her Majesty’s Reign (19 February 1593); R Sgroi, 8th Parliament of Queen Elizabeth, 35 Eliz. I (4 April 2012) <http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1558-1603/parliament/1593> accessed 25 June 2016 13 W Shakespeare, Richard II, in The Norton Shakespeare, S Greenblatt (gen ed) (2nd edn, Norton 2013) (III.i.151–52). 14 Definition 1a in (n 1). 15 James I, ‘The True Law of Free Monarchies’ in Anon (ed), A Catalogue of Pamphlets, Tracts, Proclamations, Speeches, Sermons, Trials, Petitions from 1506–1700 in the Library of the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn (2nd edn, Nabu Press 2010) 482. 16 79 ER 34. 17 (31 Eliz 1 c 6). 18 80 ER 20. 19 76 ER 20. 20 See n 16. 21 7 Co Rep 15b, 77. 22 See n 16. 23 FW Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (1st edn, CUP 1919). 24 W Blackstone in G Sharswood (ed), Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books (1st edn, J. B. Lippincott Company 1893) vol 4, 31. 25 John Klause, Measure for Measure: Evans Shakespeare Edition (1st edn, London Evans Shakespeare Editions 2011) 278. 26 Anon, Marriage of Pandarus and Flora (1st edn, G. E. London 1615). 27 James S Hart, The Rule of Law, 1603–1660: Crowns, Courts and Judges (1st edn, Routledge 2003). 28 W Shakespeare, As You Like It, in Greenblatt (n 2) V.iv.126–27. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com

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Journal of International Dispute SettlementOxford University Press

Published: Mar 1, 2018

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