Locating Transformative Justice: Prism or Schism in Transitional Justice?

Locating Transformative Justice: Prism or Schism in Transitional Justice? Is transformative justice a new moment in the transitional justice canon, a prism through which we can assess transitional justice practice in a new light? Or is it a wholesale new approach to achieving justice for contemporary violations rooted in historical oppression, a schism within transitional justice? Transformative justice is considered the ‘fourth generation’1 of transitional justice scholarship, re-envisioning the goals of transitional justice mechanisms to account for long-term structural injustices that remain after the collapse of authoritarianism or end of civil conflict. The substantial body of work on transformative justice is also an effort to think about new ways communities study, advocate for and secure justice beyond the confines of transitional justice measures’ mandates and their officially sanctioned time periods. The three books under review provide a foundation for exploring the place of transformative justice in relation to the transitional justice field. Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice, by Colleen Murphy, signifies the ‘prism’ approach, as she endorses the transformational responsibility of transitional justice. Similarly, Padraig McAuliffe’s Transformative Transitional Justice and the Malleability of Post-Conflict States surveys the transformative justice principles scholars use as a prism to reflect on the mandates of transitional justice mechanisms. McAuliffe reveals a greater degree of scepticism than Murphy as to whether transitional justice and peacebuilding projects can fulfil such transformative goals. Resistance and Transitional Justice, edited by Briony Jones and Julie Bernath, does not explicitly discuss the notion of transformative justice. Through the idea of resistance, however, the contributors discuss ways in which civil society and political actors confront official transitional justice projects through their own articulations and interpretations of justice. In this sense, the inspiration of transformative justice as a field of its own, or the ‘schism’ approach, could find some validation in the questions and findings in this volume. In sum, the three books offer an opportunity to reflect on how the values, practices and goals of transformative justice fit into the broader evolution of democratic projects in both states and societies. They also beg the question of whether the time has come to think of transformative justice as its own field of inquiry, related but not necessarily attached to transitional justice. To the extent that scholars refer to transformative justice as a subfield or, as Padraig McAuliffe notes, a ‘transformative turn’ within transitional justice scholarship (p. 285), it is largely the product of Rama Mani’s path-breaking work on reparative justice. In 2007’s Beyond Retribution, Mani exhorted scholars to see transitional justice beyond the limited paradigm of rectificatory justice, or the redress of injustices suffered by people during conflict.2 She proposed reparative justice, a notion that utilizes ‘legal and social means of reparation, while providing an overarching framework to understand and respond to the various claims for justice for past violations arising in the aftermath of conflict.’3 Reparative justice underscores the necessity of victim-centred justice processes, a ‘social compact’ among all actors in a conflict-ridden society, and holistic remedies for the loss of dignity and livelihoods suffered by victims.4 By embracing reparative justice values, transitional justice projects can be more ‘encompassing, flexible, and sensitive’ to the needs of affected individuals and communities.5 Mani’s work served as a catalyst for the burgeoning scholarship around the theme of transformative justice. Transformative and reparative justice share many values. In general, advocates of the two criticize transitional justice mechanisms’ tendency to focus on ‘injustices related to the consequences of conflict, to the neglect of the injustices implicit in the causes and symptoms of the conflict.’6 Because such scholarship advocates victim-centred processes and sensitivity to cultural norms, it critiques the liberal-legalist values that underpin mainstream transitional justice projects.7 Transitional justice processes risk losing their legitimacy and credibility among the people they serve if they do not account for how war economies, social injustices and unmet development needs intersect with demands for justice by victim-survivors and their communities.8 Consequently, transformative and reparative justice frameworks endorse locally driven processes9 and that transitional justice mandates include economic justice in addition to redress for physical, civil and political violations committed during civil conflict or authoritarianism.10 These demands, as Dustin Sharp notes, ‘now sit alongside concerns from previous eras, such as debates over victor’s justice and the role of amnesties.’11 There is, however, a crucial divide between reparative justice and transformative justice scholarship: the treatment of transformation. Reparative justice requires forging a path towards long-term societal transformation, but it is not a given, nor is it explicitly advocated. For transformative justice scholars, by contrast, societal transformation is both the starting point and the intended result. This ‘transformative turn’ in transitional justice does not guarantee, however, that transformative justice would escape the criticisms raised against transitional justice practice over the years, namely of its sweeping normative promises, mixed evidence of success and concomitant societal disillusionment. In looking at the place of transformative justice, this essay evaluates three main claims levied against it: that transformative justice is defined by what it is not, that it lacks a theory of change, and that transitional justice is the vessel for transformative justice. Ultimately, if we treat transformative justice as a subfield of transitional justice, then scholars and practitioners constrain themselves to the transformative justice principles that transitional justice initiatives are able and willing to embrace and execute. As noted by McAuliffe, ‘little of the transformative justice literature precisely spells out how traditional mechanisms … can generate structural change’ (p. 54). However, if we consider transformative justice as a separate field, then these books offer important pathways to identify the practices and puzzles of an emerging transformative justice field. For example, Murphy argues that the ‘core problem of transitional justice is how to justly pursue societal transformation’ (p. 160). To empirically engage this normative claim, practitioners and scholars can identify metrics for transitional justice mechanisms that measure the effectiveness of the policies and advocacy work supporting the claim. Resistance and Transitional Justice concludes that ‘resistance may in fact take the form of proposing concrete alternatives’ (p. 152), and the chapters suggest several specific proposals emanating from civil society. Future research could compare these proposals to established transitional justice initiatives to assess if they have more transformational impact. Finally, McAuliffe recommends developing a framework that factors in the political processes, actors and power distribution that would determine the successful adoption of a transformative justice agenda. In the end, transitional justice mechanisms may perform transformative justice work, but we should not latch transformative justice expectations to transitional justice processes without proper empirical examinations of this nexus. Claim One: Transformative Justice Is Defined by What It Is Not Given that transformative justice emerged from the transitional justice paradigm, it is logical that it is framed in relation to the work of transitional justice mechanisms. Wendy Lambourne – one of the first to articulate a model of transformative justice – encourages scholars to look beyond the limitations of transitional justice as an ‘interim process that links the past with the future,’ and instead to account for the contexts that may impact on participants’ needs and expectations of justice.12 This concern is apparent in Adou Djané Dit Fatogoma’s argument, in Resistance and Transitional Justice, that transitional justice mandates often do not reflect existing political conditions and tensions, which may render them ineffective. In Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, resistance to transitional justice cannot be decoupled from the country’s ‘political violence continuum context’ (p. 32). To address such issues of timing, Lambourne argues that transitional justice needs to engage in the ‘long-term, sustainable processes embedded in society and adoption of psychosocial, political and economic, as well as legal, perspectives on justice.’13 In addition to taking on this sweeping task, the longer time horizon such a process would require is said to enable transformative justice to pursue policies and programmes necessary to address the underlying causes of conflict. Matthew Evans thus explains that transformative justice ‘emerges particularly in the context of the need to address structural violence and socioeconomic rights issues that precipitate, and are produced and reproduced by, conflict and authoritarianism.’14 On occasion, the needs that justify transformative justice may clash with the immediate goals of transitional justice. For example, in her chapter in Resistance and Transitional Justice, Julie Bernath details the tensions that emerged when Cambodian victims felt that more financial resources were committed to the transitional justice process itself than to their livelihood needs (p. 112). In response, and after consultation with victims, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia made a concerted effort to ‘introduce more meaningful and transformative reparation measures for civil parties’ (p. 109). In response to such claims by victims in multiple contexts, Paul Gready and Simon Robins have formulated transformative justice as ‘transformative change that emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of process rather than preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting power relationships and structures of exclusion at both the local and the global level.’15 This idea of ‘transformative change’ as a ‘process’ rather than an ‘outcome’ is not entirely satisfactory for some, who criticize its vagueness. McAuliffe dissects the claims made by transformative justice scholars and argues that political minefields persist even when transitional justice practice is re-envisioned. He claims that ‘transformative justice is defined not by what it is but what it is not’ and is more of a ‘critical response’ to transitional justice’s inattention to broader issues such as poverty (p. 167).16 Furthermore, by referring to transformative justice as transformative transitional justice, McAuliffe implies that the transformative justice literature is as much about stacking the transitional justice agenda with normative expectations as it is about criticizing transitional justice for what it has failed to accomplish. Clearly, McAuliffe positions ‘transformative transitional justice’ as an outgrowth of and response to transitional justice work by exploring how it may actually be realized in a postconflict society. Murphy also interrogates the relationship between transformative and transitional justice, although she offers a stronger endorsement of their conceptual ties than McAuliffe’s conclusions. Murphy contends that transitional justice itself is distinctive from other forms of justice in that it is explicitly in the business of societal transformation. There are ‘four circumstances’ that make transitional justice the salient form of justice during transitional periods: ‘pervasive structural inequality, normalized collective and political wrongdoing, serious existential uncertainty, and fundamental uncertainty about authority’ (p. 41).17 Because of these specific circumstances, other forms of justice – including retributive, corrective or distributive – are too limited in their respective designs and mandates to address appropriately the violations committed. Therefore, transitional justice is ‘not simply reducible’ to these other types of justice (p. 111). Even though Murphy does not use the term ‘transformative justice,’ one can make the claim that she dissolves the notion of transformative justice into transitional justice. Murphy defines transformation as ‘overhauling the terms of interaction structuring political relationships among citizens and between citizens and officials’ (p. 160). As part of that societal transformation, transitional justice mechanisms must be holistic and complementary in order to achieve ‘the moral objectives of responses to victims of normalized collective and political wrongdoing … recognition of the victim’s basic humanity and status as an equal member of apolitical community, reparation and nonrecurrence’ (p. 195). As scholars continue to construct a working definition of transformative justice, they must confront a crucial question: Is transformative justice a set of ideals for states and societies to incorporate into established transitional justice initiatives, or is it a new phenomenon emerging in transitional and posttransitional societies that we are in the preliminary stages of mapping? The answer requires, first, a systematic codification of the ways in which transformative justice differs from transitional justice and, second, the identification of a relevant set of indicators of transformation. Claim Two: Transformative Justice Lacks a Theory of Change The second claim raised against transformative justice – most strenuously advanced by McAuliffe – is that it lacks a theory of change that would allow scholars to locate it, as opposed to just advocating for it. A theory of change, according to McAuliffe, is required ‘because without concrete proposals for how transitional justice can achieve these aspirations, it is difficult to engage critically with, or build upon, the transformative turn as an intellectual endeavour’ (p. 167). Evans, meanwhile, argues that ‘it is necessary for participation in transformative justice to be pursued primarily via a different toolkit.’18 Transformative justice scholars thoroughly engage with the reasons why transitional justice should assume transformative justice principles, but much less attention is devoted to identifying the paths by which transformative justice can achieve change. For example, transformative justice appeals highlight ‘the need to account for the underlying politics of transitional justice work, the need to balance local and international agency, and the need for greater economic justice.’19 In this sense, scholars advocate for ‘bottom-up’ practices of justice as an alternative to state-led initiatives. Less scholarly attention is given to how to address the realities on the ground that prevent the adoption of long-term solutions aimed at reforming structural inequalities and improving livelihood opportunities. As McAuliffe describes, ‘local elites frequently capture peacebuilding in a manner that does more to reproduce than transform existing patrimonial or economically regressive structures at the micro-level’ (p. 262). Moreover, local peace agreements need the state to ‘regulate or control the lawful exercise of force’ (p. 275). McAuliffe offers a persuasive and thorough analysis to demonstrate how any transformative transitional justice project would be privy to the same political and economic constraints that shape the scope of transitional justice and peacebuilding projects today. McAuliffe’s criticisms of the empirics associated with the transformative character of transitional justice are difficult to dismiss, whereas Murphy’s ambitious work to provide the ‘conceptual foundations’ for transitional justice, as rich as it is, fails to provide a convincing theory of change. In this sense, Murphy’s foundations are subject to the criticisms raised by McAuliffe. Murphy’s theoretical foundation for transitional justice relies on the notions of jus ad bellum (the justice of recourse to war) and jus in bello (justice in the conduct of war) within just war theory (p. 35). Accordingly, she states that ‘societal transformation is the jus ad bellum dimension of transitional justice, and the fitting treatment of victims and perpetrators the jus in bello dimension’ (p. 196). It is unclear why Murphy deviates from the existing transitional justice literature to explain the ‘moral requirements for pursuing societal transformation justly’ and instead embraces just war theory, arguably a far more limiting body of literature rooted mainly in military ethics and concerning the behaviour of nation-states during times of conflict. While Murphy acknowledges the debates concerning the reformulation of just war theory, she still does not explain why the considerable work on jus post bellum (justice after war) – another dimension, albeit a contentious one, of just war theory – is not considered. Murphy declares that her interest ‘is not in the particular criteria for just war but rather in the widely recognized structure of just war theory’ (p. 115), but arguably it is important to at least identify the contributions made by jus post bellum theorists since they hold values similar to transitional justice as their central concern within the just war paradigm.20 In general, the transitional justice literature has shown more sophistication in dealing with the complex issues of violations during internal conflict than just war theory. Moreover, the application of just war theory may be relevant for postconflict societies – although even in these situations, this is debatable – but not necessarily for societies transitioning away from authoritarianism. For their part, Jones and Bernath offer preliminary elements of a theory of change by developing a useful foundation for designing a transformative justice research agenda. The volume is an examination of the diverse actors who confront and resist transitional justice processes. The editors define resistance as the ‘subjective position of the actor who is resisting or labelling an act as resistance’ (p. 2). The concept of resistance then becomes the starting point – or the entryway, if you will – for understanding how receptive elites and civil society actors are to transitional justice and the potential contestations that may emerge from the outset. By starting one’s analysis with questions such as who opposes transitional justice and why they resist it, alternative conceptualizations of justice may emerge, as well as different interpretations of the impact transitional justice has on state and society relations. Gready and Robins acknowledge that for transformative justice to take place, it is essential to rethink the role of outsiders. Towards that goal, they propose that scholars need a new ‘theory of intervention.’21Resistance and Transitional Justice unpacks the political engagement of communities both inside and outside the transitional justice process, communities broadly referred to as ‘the resistance.’ Through case study analyses of Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi and Cambodia, different contributors to the volume show the value of problematizing the traditional conception of transitional justice as normatively good and inherently beneficial to the development of democracy and human rights norms. Several contributors stress that this uncritical view implies that any actor who resists or rejects the conceptualization of justice offered by transitional justice mechanisms is either a spoiler or a deviant. For example, Jones interviews a representative from the Civil Society Convention of Côte D’Ivoire who defends citizen resistance to transitional justice as ‘citizens’ independence, making proposals on national issues’ (p. 47). Similarly, Gérard Birantamije introduces the term ‘resisting by making’ to describe the decisions of civil society actors in Burundi to ‘write press releases, hold memoranda, conduct surveys, organize workshops and send suggestions to the government’ to offer alternative approaches to the existing transitional justice process (p. 86). These examples show how the misguided labelling of the actors as ‘spoilers’ could lead scholars and practitioners to miss opportunities to work with groups and individuals who propose alternative – and possibly more transformative – forms of justice. Transformative justice scholars can build a theory of change by identifying the actors and initiatives working towards forms of justice that do not necessarily coincide with the work of transitional justice. Jones and Bernath encourage researchers to expand the definition of resistance to include civil society and state actors focused on securing justice but who may be sceptical of the mechanisms created through transitional justice processes. In this sense, transformative justice – if conceived of as a field in its own right – has a responsibility to identify the actors involved in creating spaces for transformational forms of justice and the political process they require. For example, Jones and Bernath reference the work of nongovernmental organizations in Colombia that resist certain mechanisms ‘not because they oppose transitional justice but to advocate for a more radical approach including political transformation’ (p. 7). In this case, the mechanisms are the starting point, and subsequently these actors play, at best, a supporting role in the analysis of the mechanisms’ impact. However, if these actors’ demands (and those of the groups that want transformative justice to take place) become the departure point, then the analytical focus shifts to the work they conduct, with an accompanying interrogation of the political and economic context that may affect their goals. Consideration of how and why transitional justice mechanisms support these transformative efforts would then become secondary, although still essential, to that analysis. Based on Jones and Bernath’s reflections about resistance, transformative justice scholars must recognize that the population at large might not readily accept their normative values. ‘If one takes transitional justice as a given, as a starting point,’ as Jones and Bernath caution, ‘then the most pertinent questions around participation become how actors come to accept the good that is being offered to them. Lack of buy-in implies lack of understanding’ (p. 144). To resolve this dilemma, scholars should avoid framing research questions centred on the normative promises of transformative justice. As McAuliffe stresses, scholars have extensively covered the reasons why transitional justice mechanisms should adopt transformative justice principles and policies. Future analyses should factor in the ‘post-conflict distribution of power, the capacity of the state concerned, the resources available to transitional justice actors and other interveners’ and other actors who may support or suppress transformative justice initiatives (p. 32). Research questions concerning transformative justice should transcend transitional justice practice. It may well be that there are transitional justice initiatives that engage in transformative justice (however it is defined) or open the way for transformative practice, but we need to look beyond the initiatives and try to identify the actors and processes underway that may not necessarily coincide with the traditional stakeholders of transitional justice. In sum, the challenge we face if we are to conceive of transformative justice as a separate field is to develop a theory of change that counterbalances its heavily normative character and that is not subsidiary to transitional justice practice. Claim Three: The Vessel for Transformative Justice Is Transitional Justice McAuliffe posits that the rise in transformative justice theorizing is a response to critiques that transitional justice mechanisms have ‘acquiesced to the conscious exclusion of economic justice’ to serve a ‘pro-market liberal peacebuilding model’ (p. 185). McAuliffe does not contest these critiques, but emphasizes that any call for transformative transitional justice should be modest in its expectations (p. 294). A myriad problems may emerge when ‘domestic governments pay lip-service’ to transitional justice (p. 51) or when the mechanisms themselves lack the capacity and resources to translate prescriptions into policy (p. 54). With this in mind, it may well be that transformative justice initiatives emerge from transitional justice practices, but advocates should not be quick to assign transformative justice tasks to transitional justice mechanisms, because these mechanisms may be incapable of delivering such transformation. To ensure transformation, an acknowledgement that transitional justice is not the appropriate vessel to carry that goal may be necessary. As Evans observes, ‘transitional justice on its own cannot adequately resolve structural, socioeconomic issues.’22 One possible path for a transformative justice agenda detached from transitional justice is to adopt the ‘structural violence reduction matrix’ suggested by Dáire McGill.23 This matrix allows scholars and policy makers to identify and assess the performance of transformative justice through three dimensions: ‘as a diagnostic tool, a process requirement, and an outcome objective.’24 It forces us to look beyond transitional justice mechanisms and instead consider all of the state and nonstate actors and institutions targeting structural violence and redressing broad societal inequities. Most of the literature on both transitional and transformative justice emanates from the global North, whereas most actual transitional justice initiatives and processes are implemented in the global South. The rift between who is doing the studying and who is studied reflects historical patterns that are reproduced as long as the transformative justice research agenda is driven by the adoption of transitional justice mechanisms. An expansion of the case selection allows for a comparative analysis of how transformative justice processes unfold in different phases of democratic transition and consolidation. One advantage of conceptualizing transformative justice as a distinct field is to remove from it the almost unavoidable geographical link that transitional justice has with the global South. A transformative justice research agenda that is conceptually detached from transitional justice would embrace questions of justice in countries with consolidated democracies that still continue to commit violations against communities and individuals who have historically confronted oppression, marginalization and discrimination. As Brinton Lykes and Hugo van der Merwe poignantly note about the US and Australia, despite their commitment to universal human rights, widespread disparities in health, education and well-being within Native communities and among people of colour suggest that historical genocidal violence and its legacies have not only not been redressed but their underlying causes have been institutionalized in neoliberal economic and political systems. Moreover, these nation states have not ‘transitioned’ in any sense of the term.25 For these reasons, a transformative justice research agenda could encompass the study of justice movements emerging in the global North, such as Black Lives Matter and the Dakota Access Pipeline protests. Here, the transitional justice mechanism is no longer granted ontological primacy. Instead, calls for and actions related to justice for contemporary violations rooted in historical institutional contexts become the central preoccupation of the transformative justice project. If the state employs a transitional justice mechanism to carry out transformative justice policies, then the nexus between transformative and transitional justice becomes relevant in the research project. Scholars need not anchor the work and values of transformative justice to only those spaces and locations where transitional justice exists. In this manner, research evolves beyond transitional societies and includes societies that are undergoing or have undergone a regime transition. These transitions may not be as radical as regime change or peacebuilding, and instead could be justice or peace processes challenging existing norms or policies rooted in historical oppression. One of the ways transformative justice as an independent field of inquiry might address and overcome the criticisms raised against the North-centric transitional justice scholarship is to adopt the collaborative approach advocated in Resistance and Transitional Justice. For each country case study, there are two chapters, ‘one of which is written by a member of the original Swiss research team and one of which is written by a national of that country’ (p. 11). This synergic approach has been successful in a slightly different fashion elsewhere26 and highlights ways scholars in the global North and global South can strengthen their collaboration through the cross-pollination of approaches and perspectives from different epistemic communities and advocacy groups. Decoupling Transformative Justice from Transitional Justice Transitional justice mechanisms – whether truth commissions, prosecutions or reparations programmes – anchor most analyses of transformative justice. When the transitional justice mechanism is the departure point for why and how a ‘transitional society’ constructs transformative justice, significant conceptual limitations emerge, especially as the political preconditions for the transformative work of transitional justice are usually left unaddressed. Efforts to use transformative justice as a framework to address the shortcomings of transitional justice prevent us from building transformative justice on its own terms rather than in reaction to transitional justice challenges and consequences. While its conceptual relationship with transitional justice should not be completely severed, pinning transformative justice ideals onto transitional justice praxis hinders the development of a proper theory of change – one that may extend beyond transitional justice. By decoupling the two, scholars are in a stronger position to address the criticism that transitional justice reproduces the hegemonic divide between the global North and South. It may be time to start imagining transformative justice as a field in its own right, as a project that breaks from and transcends transitional justice, and subsequently demands a research agenda that moves beyond the transitional justice mechanism as the entry point for addressing legacies of conflict, injustice and authoritarianism. Doing so would allow for new projects that examine sites of transformation without relying on pre-established or pre-packaged justice initiatives. It would also push scholars to heed McAuliffe’s call to ‘calibrate justice interventions to the most salient political conditions’ (p. 12), while identifying the important empirical work that reflects ‘the components of transformation that are in need of cultivation’ noted by Murphy (p. 199). In sum, the location of transformative justice – either as a subfield of transitional justice or as a field of its own – determines the impact of its contributions. The books reviewed here show how one’s stance on the location of transformative justice vis-à-vis transitional justice drives how one assesses its promises and pitfalls. To treat transformative justice as a body of literature that stands on its own requires a different set of normative and empirical questions than the ones traditionally posed in the transitional justice literature. While there may be some overlap in the study and practice of transformative and transitional justice, transformative justice – including its conceptualization and practice – deserves a set of standards to assess properly its evolution and effectiveness in societies confronting demands for change. Footnotes 1 Dustin N. Sharp, ‘Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation Transitional Justice,’ Harvard Human Rights Journal 26 (2013): 157. 2 Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 5. 3 Ibid., 174. 4 Ibid., 172. 5 Ibid., 178. 6 Rama Mani, ‘Balancing Peace with Justice in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict,’ Development 48(3) (2005): 27. 7 Rebekka Friedman, ‘Implementing Transformative Justice: Survivors and Ex-combatants at the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación in Peru,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 41(4) (2017): 4; Simon Robins, ‘Failing Victims? The Limits of Transitional Justice in Addressing the Needs of Victims of Violations,’ International Legal Discourse 11(1) (2017): 50. 8 Rama Mani, ‘Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus between Transitional Justice and Development,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 2(3) (2008): 253–265. 9 Erin Daly, ‘Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation,’ International Legal Perspectives 12 (2001): 73–183; Paul Gready and Simon Robins, ‘From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for Practice,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 8(3) (2014): 339–361. 10 Zinaida Miller, ‘Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the “Economic” in Transitional Justice,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 2(3) (2008): 266–291. 11 Sharp, supra n 1 at 157. 12 Wendy Lambourne, ‘Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 3(1) (2009): 30. 13 Ibid., 30. 14 Matthew Evans, ‘Structural Violence, Socioeconomic Rights, and Transformative Justice,’ Journal of Human Rights 15(1) (2016): 9. 15 Gready and Robins, supra n 9 at 340. 16 Emphasis added. 17 Emphasis in original. 18 Evans, supra n 14 at 7. 19 Sharp, supra n 1 at 157. 20 Larry May and Elizabeth Edenberg, eds., Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 21 Gready and Robins, supra n 9 at 360. 22 Evans, supra n 14 at 14. 23 Dáire McGill, ‘Different Violence, Different Justice? Taking Structural Violence Seriously in Post-Conflict and Transitional Justice Processes,’ State Crime Journal 6(1) (2017): 90. 24 Ibid., 91. 25 M. Brinton Lykes and Hugo van der Merwe, ‘Exploring/Expanding the Reach of Transitional justice,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 11(3) (2017): 374. 26 Elin Skaar, Jemima García-Godos and Cath Collins, eds., Transitional Justice in Latin America: The Uneven Road from Impunity towards Accountability (London: Routledge, 2016); Scott Mainwaring, Ana María Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, eds., The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). © The Author(s) (2018). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. 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Locating Transformative Justice: Prism or Schism in Transitional Justice?

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Abstract

Is transformative justice a new moment in the transitional justice canon, a prism through which we can assess transitional justice practice in a new light? Or is it a wholesale new approach to achieving justice for contemporary violations rooted in historical oppression, a schism within transitional justice? Transformative justice is considered the ‘fourth generation’1 of transitional justice scholarship, re-envisioning the goals of transitional justice mechanisms to account for long-term structural injustices that remain after the collapse of authoritarianism or end of civil conflict. The substantial body of work on transformative justice is also an effort to think about new ways communities study, advocate for and secure justice beyond the confines of transitional justice measures’ mandates and their officially sanctioned time periods. The three books under review provide a foundation for exploring the place of transformative justice in relation to the transitional justice field. Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice, by Colleen Murphy, signifies the ‘prism’ approach, as she endorses the transformational responsibility of transitional justice. Similarly, Padraig McAuliffe’s Transformative Transitional Justice and the Malleability of Post-Conflict States surveys the transformative justice principles scholars use as a prism to reflect on the mandates of transitional justice mechanisms. McAuliffe reveals a greater degree of scepticism than Murphy as to whether transitional justice and peacebuilding projects can fulfil such transformative goals. Resistance and Transitional Justice, edited by Briony Jones and Julie Bernath, does not explicitly discuss the notion of transformative justice. Through the idea of resistance, however, the contributors discuss ways in which civil society and political actors confront official transitional justice projects through their own articulations and interpretations of justice. In this sense, the inspiration of transformative justice as a field of its own, or the ‘schism’ approach, could find some validation in the questions and findings in this volume. In sum, the three books offer an opportunity to reflect on how the values, practices and goals of transformative justice fit into the broader evolution of democratic projects in both states and societies. They also beg the question of whether the time has come to think of transformative justice as its own field of inquiry, related but not necessarily attached to transitional justice. To the extent that scholars refer to transformative justice as a subfield or, as Padraig McAuliffe notes, a ‘transformative turn’ within transitional justice scholarship (p. 285), it is largely the product of Rama Mani’s path-breaking work on reparative justice. In 2007’s Beyond Retribution, Mani exhorted scholars to see transitional justice beyond the limited paradigm of rectificatory justice, or the redress of injustices suffered by people during conflict.2 She proposed reparative justice, a notion that utilizes ‘legal and social means of reparation, while providing an overarching framework to understand and respond to the various claims for justice for past violations arising in the aftermath of conflict.’3 Reparative justice underscores the necessity of victim-centred justice processes, a ‘social compact’ among all actors in a conflict-ridden society, and holistic remedies for the loss of dignity and livelihoods suffered by victims.4 By embracing reparative justice values, transitional justice projects can be more ‘encompassing, flexible, and sensitive’ to the needs of affected individuals and communities.5 Mani’s work served as a catalyst for the burgeoning scholarship around the theme of transformative justice. Transformative and reparative justice share many values. In general, advocates of the two criticize transitional justice mechanisms’ tendency to focus on ‘injustices related to the consequences of conflict, to the neglect of the injustices implicit in the causes and symptoms of the conflict.’6 Because such scholarship advocates victim-centred processes and sensitivity to cultural norms, it critiques the liberal-legalist values that underpin mainstream transitional justice projects.7 Transitional justice processes risk losing their legitimacy and credibility among the people they serve if they do not account for how war economies, social injustices and unmet development needs intersect with demands for justice by victim-survivors and their communities.8 Consequently, transformative and reparative justice frameworks endorse locally driven processes9 and that transitional justice mandates include economic justice in addition to redress for physical, civil and political violations committed during civil conflict or authoritarianism.10 These demands, as Dustin Sharp notes, ‘now sit alongside concerns from previous eras, such as debates over victor’s justice and the role of amnesties.’11 There is, however, a crucial divide between reparative justice and transformative justice scholarship: the treatment of transformation. Reparative justice requires forging a path towards long-term societal transformation, but it is not a given, nor is it explicitly advocated. For transformative justice scholars, by contrast, societal transformation is both the starting point and the intended result. This ‘transformative turn’ in transitional justice does not guarantee, however, that transformative justice would escape the criticisms raised against transitional justice practice over the years, namely of its sweeping normative promises, mixed evidence of success and concomitant societal disillusionment. In looking at the place of transformative justice, this essay evaluates three main claims levied against it: that transformative justice is defined by what it is not, that it lacks a theory of change, and that transitional justice is the vessel for transformative justice. Ultimately, if we treat transformative justice as a subfield of transitional justice, then scholars and practitioners constrain themselves to the transformative justice principles that transitional justice initiatives are able and willing to embrace and execute. As noted by McAuliffe, ‘little of the transformative justice literature precisely spells out how traditional mechanisms … can generate structural change’ (p. 54). However, if we consider transformative justice as a separate field, then these books offer important pathways to identify the practices and puzzles of an emerging transformative justice field. For example, Murphy argues that the ‘core problem of transitional justice is how to justly pursue societal transformation’ (p. 160). To empirically engage this normative claim, practitioners and scholars can identify metrics for transitional justice mechanisms that measure the effectiveness of the policies and advocacy work supporting the claim. Resistance and Transitional Justice concludes that ‘resistance may in fact take the form of proposing concrete alternatives’ (p. 152), and the chapters suggest several specific proposals emanating from civil society. Future research could compare these proposals to established transitional justice initiatives to assess if they have more transformational impact. Finally, McAuliffe recommends developing a framework that factors in the political processes, actors and power distribution that would determine the successful adoption of a transformative justice agenda. In the end, transitional justice mechanisms may perform transformative justice work, but we should not latch transformative justice expectations to transitional justice processes without proper empirical examinations of this nexus. Claim One: Transformative Justice Is Defined by What It Is Not Given that transformative justice emerged from the transitional justice paradigm, it is logical that it is framed in relation to the work of transitional justice mechanisms. Wendy Lambourne – one of the first to articulate a model of transformative justice – encourages scholars to look beyond the limitations of transitional justice as an ‘interim process that links the past with the future,’ and instead to account for the contexts that may impact on participants’ needs and expectations of justice.12 This concern is apparent in Adou Djané Dit Fatogoma’s argument, in Resistance and Transitional Justice, that transitional justice mandates often do not reflect existing political conditions and tensions, which may render them ineffective. In Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, resistance to transitional justice cannot be decoupled from the country’s ‘political violence continuum context’ (p. 32). To address such issues of timing, Lambourne argues that transitional justice needs to engage in the ‘long-term, sustainable processes embedded in society and adoption of psychosocial, political and economic, as well as legal, perspectives on justice.’13 In addition to taking on this sweeping task, the longer time horizon such a process would require is said to enable transformative justice to pursue policies and programmes necessary to address the underlying causes of conflict. Matthew Evans thus explains that transformative justice ‘emerges particularly in the context of the need to address structural violence and socioeconomic rights issues that precipitate, and are produced and reproduced by, conflict and authoritarianism.’14 On occasion, the needs that justify transformative justice may clash with the immediate goals of transitional justice. For example, in her chapter in Resistance and Transitional Justice, Julie Bernath details the tensions that emerged when Cambodian victims felt that more financial resources were committed to the transitional justice process itself than to their livelihood needs (p. 112). In response, and after consultation with victims, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia made a concerted effort to ‘introduce more meaningful and transformative reparation measures for civil parties’ (p. 109). In response to such claims by victims in multiple contexts, Paul Gready and Simon Robins have formulated transformative justice as ‘transformative change that emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of process rather than preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting power relationships and structures of exclusion at both the local and the global level.’15 This idea of ‘transformative change’ as a ‘process’ rather than an ‘outcome’ is not entirely satisfactory for some, who criticize its vagueness. McAuliffe dissects the claims made by transformative justice scholars and argues that political minefields persist even when transitional justice practice is re-envisioned. He claims that ‘transformative justice is defined not by what it is but what it is not’ and is more of a ‘critical response’ to transitional justice’s inattention to broader issues such as poverty (p. 167).16 Furthermore, by referring to transformative justice as transformative transitional justice, McAuliffe implies that the transformative justice literature is as much about stacking the transitional justice agenda with normative expectations as it is about criticizing transitional justice for what it has failed to accomplish. Clearly, McAuliffe positions ‘transformative transitional justice’ as an outgrowth of and response to transitional justice work by exploring how it may actually be realized in a postconflict society. Murphy also interrogates the relationship between transformative and transitional justice, although she offers a stronger endorsement of their conceptual ties than McAuliffe’s conclusions. Murphy contends that transitional justice itself is distinctive from other forms of justice in that it is explicitly in the business of societal transformation. There are ‘four circumstances’ that make transitional justice the salient form of justice during transitional periods: ‘pervasive structural inequality, normalized collective and political wrongdoing, serious existential uncertainty, and fundamental uncertainty about authority’ (p. 41).17 Because of these specific circumstances, other forms of justice – including retributive, corrective or distributive – are too limited in their respective designs and mandates to address appropriately the violations committed. Therefore, transitional justice is ‘not simply reducible’ to these other types of justice (p. 111). Even though Murphy does not use the term ‘transformative justice,’ one can make the claim that she dissolves the notion of transformative justice into transitional justice. Murphy defines transformation as ‘overhauling the terms of interaction structuring political relationships among citizens and between citizens and officials’ (p. 160). As part of that societal transformation, transitional justice mechanisms must be holistic and complementary in order to achieve ‘the moral objectives of responses to victims of normalized collective and political wrongdoing … recognition of the victim’s basic humanity and status as an equal member of apolitical community, reparation and nonrecurrence’ (p. 195). As scholars continue to construct a working definition of transformative justice, they must confront a crucial question: Is transformative justice a set of ideals for states and societies to incorporate into established transitional justice initiatives, or is it a new phenomenon emerging in transitional and posttransitional societies that we are in the preliminary stages of mapping? The answer requires, first, a systematic codification of the ways in which transformative justice differs from transitional justice and, second, the identification of a relevant set of indicators of transformation. Claim Two: Transformative Justice Lacks a Theory of Change The second claim raised against transformative justice – most strenuously advanced by McAuliffe – is that it lacks a theory of change that would allow scholars to locate it, as opposed to just advocating for it. A theory of change, according to McAuliffe, is required ‘because without concrete proposals for how transitional justice can achieve these aspirations, it is difficult to engage critically with, or build upon, the transformative turn as an intellectual endeavour’ (p. 167). Evans, meanwhile, argues that ‘it is necessary for participation in transformative justice to be pursued primarily via a different toolkit.’18 Transformative justice scholars thoroughly engage with the reasons why transitional justice should assume transformative justice principles, but much less attention is devoted to identifying the paths by which transformative justice can achieve change. For example, transformative justice appeals highlight ‘the need to account for the underlying politics of transitional justice work, the need to balance local and international agency, and the need for greater economic justice.’19 In this sense, scholars advocate for ‘bottom-up’ practices of justice as an alternative to state-led initiatives. Less scholarly attention is given to how to address the realities on the ground that prevent the adoption of long-term solutions aimed at reforming structural inequalities and improving livelihood opportunities. As McAuliffe describes, ‘local elites frequently capture peacebuilding in a manner that does more to reproduce than transform existing patrimonial or economically regressive structures at the micro-level’ (p. 262). Moreover, local peace agreements need the state to ‘regulate or control the lawful exercise of force’ (p. 275). McAuliffe offers a persuasive and thorough analysis to demonstrate how any transformative transitional justice project would be privy to the same political and economic constraints that shape the scope of transitional justice and peacebuilding projects today. McAuliffe’s criticisms of the empirics associated with the transformative character of transitional justice are difficult to dismiss, whereas Murphy’s ambitious work to provide the ‘conceptual foundations’ for transitional justice, as rich as it is, fails to provide a convincing theory of change. In this sense, Murphy’s foundations are subject to the criticisms raised by McAuliffe. Murphy’s theoretical foundation for transitional justice relies on the notions of jus ad bellum (the justice of recourse to war) and jus in bello (justice in the conduct of war) within just war theory (p. 35). Accordingly, she states that ‘societal transformation is the jus ad bellum dimension of transitional justice, and the fitting treatment of victims and perpetrators the jus in bello dimension’ (p. 196). It is unclear why Murphy deviates from the existing transitional justice literature to explain the ‘moral requirements for pursuing societal transformation justly’ and instead embraces just war theory, arguably a far more limiting body of literature rooted mainly in military ethics and concerning the behaviour of nation-states during times of conflict. While Murphy acknowledges the debates concerning the reformulation of just war theory, she still does not explain why the considerable work on jus post bellum (justice after war) – another dimension, albeit a contentious one, of just war theory – is not considered. Murphy declares that her interest ‘is not in the particular criteria for just war but rather in the widely recognized structure of just war theory’ (p. 115), but arguably it is important to at least identify the contributions made by jus post bellum theorists since they hold values similar to transitional justice as their central concern within the just war paradigm.20 In general, the transitional justice literature has shown more sophistication in dealing with the complex issues of violations during internal conflict than just war theory. Moreover, the application of just war theory may be relevant for postconflict societies – although even in these situations, this is debatable – but not necessarily for societies transitioning away from authoritarianism. For their part, Jones and Bernath offer preliminary elements of a theory of change by developing a useful foundation for designing a transformative justice research agenda. The volume is an examination of the diverse actors who confront and resist transitional justice processes. The editors define resistance as the ‘subjective position of the actor who is resisting or labelling an act as resistance’ (p. 2). The concept of resistance then becomes the starting point – or the entryway, if you will – for understanding how receptive elites and civil society actors are to transitional justice and the potential contestations that may emerge from the outset. By starting one’s analysis with questions such as who opposes transitional justice and why they resist it, alternative conceptualizations of justice may emerge, as well as different interpretations of the impact transitional justice has on state and society relations. Gready and Robins acknowledge that for transformative justice to take place, it is essential to rethink the role of outsiders. Towards that goal, they propose that scholars need a new ‘theory of intervention.’21Resistance and Transitional Justice unpacks the political engagement of communities both inside and outside the transitional justice process, communities broadly referred to as ‘the resistance.’ Through case study analyses of Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi and Cambodia, different contributors to the volume show the value of problematizing the traditional conception of transitional justice as normatively good and inherently beneficial to the development of democracy and human rights norms. Several contributors stress that this uncritical view implies that any actor who resists or rejects the conceptualization of justice offered by transitional justice mechanisms is either a spoiler or a deviant. For example, Jones interviews a representative from the Civil Society Convention of Côte D’Ivoire who defends citizen resistance to transitional justice as ‘citizens’ independence, making proposals on national issues’ (p. 47). Similarly, Gérard Birantamije introduces the term ‘resisting by making’ to describe the decisions of civil society actors in Burundi to ‘write press releases, hold memoranda, conduct surveys, organize workshops and send suggestions to the government’ to offer alternative approaches to the existing transitional justice process (p. 86). These examples show how the misguided labelling of the actors as ‘spoilers’ could lead scholars and practitioners to miss opportunities to work with groups and individuals who propose alternative – and possibly more transformative – forms of justice. Transformative justice scholars can build a theory of change by identifying the actors and initiatives working towards forms of justice that do not necessarily coincide with the work of transitional justice. Jones and Bernath encourage researchers to expand the definition of resistance to include civil society and state actors focused on securing justice but who may be sceptical of the mechanisms created through transitional justice processes. In this sense, transformative justice – if conceived of as a field in its own right – has a responsibility to identify the actors involved in creating spaces for transformational forms of justice and the political process they require. For example, Jones and Bernath reference the work of nongovernmental organizations in Colombia that resist certain mechanisms ‘not because they oppose transitional justice but to advocate for a more radical approach including political transformation’ (p. 7). In this case, the mechanisms are the starting point, and subsequently these actors play, at best, a supporting role in the analysis of the mechanisms’ impact. However, if these actors’ demands (and those of the groups that want transformative justice to take place) become the departure point, then the analytical focus shifts to the work they conduct, with an accompanying interrogation of the political and economic context that may affect their goals. Consideration of how and why transitional justice mechanisms support these transformative efforts would then become secondary, although still essential, to that analysis. Based on Jones and Bernath’s reflections about resistance, transformative justice scholars must recognize that the population at large might not readily accept their normative values. ‘If one takes transitional justice as a given, as a starting point,’ as Jones and Bernath caution, ‘then the most pertinent questions around participation become how actors come to accept the good that is being offered to them. Lack of buy-in implies lack of understanding’ (p. 144). To resolve this dilemma, scholars should avoid framing research questions centred on the normative promises of transformative justice. As McAuliffe stresses, scholars have extensively covered the reasons why transitional justice mechanisms should adopt transformative justice principles and policies. Future analyses should factor in the ‘post-conflict distribution of power, the capacity of the state concerned, the resources available to transitional justice actors and other interveners’ and other actors who may support or suppress transformative justice initiatives (p. 32). Research questions concerning transformative justice should transcend transitional justice practice. It may well be that there are transitional justice initiatives that engage in transformative justice (however it is defined) or open the way for transformative practice, but we need to look beyond the initiatives and try to identify the actors and processes underway that may not necessarily coincide with the traditional stakeholders of transitional justice. In sum, the challenge we face if we are to conceive of transformative justice as a separate field is to develop a theory of change that counterbalances its heavily normative character and that is not subsidiary to transitional justice practice. Claim Three: The Vessel for Transformative Justice Is Transitional Justice McAuliffe posits that the rise in transformative justice theorizing is a response to critiques that transitional justice mechanisms have ‘acquiesced to the conscious exclusion of economic justice’ to serve a ‘pro-market liberal peacebuilding model’ (p. 185). McAuliffe does not contest these critiques, but emphasizes that any call for transformative transitional justice should be modest in its expectations (p. 294). A myriad problems may emerge when ‘domestic governments pay lip-service’ to transitional justice (p. 51) or when the mechanisms themselves lack the capacity and resources to translate prescriptions into policy (p. 54). With this in mind, it may well be that transformative justice initiatives emerge from transitional justice practices, but advocates should not be quick to assign transformative justice tasks to transitional justice mechanisms, because these mechanisms may be incapable of delivering such transformation. To ensure transformation, an acknowledgement that transitional justice is not the appropriate vessel to carry that goal may be necessary. As Evans observes, ‘transitional justice on its own cannot adequately resolve structural, socioeconomic issues.’22 One possible path for a transformative justice agenda detached from transitional justice is to adopt the ‘structural violence reduction matrix’ suggested by Dáire McGill.23 This matrix allows scholars and policy makers to identify and assess the performance of transformative justice through three dimensions: ‘as a diagnostic tool, a process requirement, and an outcome objective.’24 It forces us to look beyond transitional justice mechanisms and instead consider all of the state and nonstate actors and institutions targeting structural violence and redressing broad societal inequities. Most of the literature on both transitional and transformative justice emanates from the global North, whereas most actual transitional justice initiatives and processes are implemented in the global South. The rift between who is doing the studying and who is studied reflects historical patterns that are reproduced as long as the transformative justice research agenda is driven by the adoption of transitional justice mechanisms. An expansion of the case selection allows for a comparative analysis of how transformative justice processes unfold in different phases of democratic transition and consolidation. One advantage of conceptualizing transformative justice as a distinct field is to remove from it the almost unavoidable geographical link that transitional justice has with the global South. A transformative justice research agenda that is conceptually detached from transitional justice would embrace questions of justice in countries with consolidated democracies that still continue to commit violations against communities and individuals who have historically confronted oppression, marginalization and discrimination. As Brinton Lykes and Hugo van der Merwe poignantly note about the US and Australia, despite their commitment to universal human rights, widespread disparities in health, education and well-being within Native communities and among people of colour suggest that historical genocidal violence and its legacies have not only not been redressed but their underlying causes have been institutionalized in neoliberal economic and political systems. Moreover, these nation states have not ‘transitioned’ in any sense of the term.25 For these reasons, a transformative justice research agenda could encompass the study of justice movements emerging in the global North, such as Black Lives Matter and the Dakota Access Pipeline protests. Here, the transitional justice mechanism is no longer granted ontological primacy. Instead, calls for and actions related to justice for contemporary violations rooted in historical institutional contexts become the central preoccupation of the transformative justice project. If the state employs a transitional justice mechanism to carry out transformative justice policies, then the nexus between transformative and transitional justice becomes relevant in the research project. Scholars need not anchor the work and values of transformative justice to only those spaces and locations where transitional justice exists. In this manner, research evolves beyond transitional societies and includes societies that are undergoing or have undergone a regime transition. These transitions may not be as radical as regime change or peacebuilding, and instead could be justice or peace processes challenging existing norms or policies rooted in historical oppression. One of the ways transformative justice as an independent field of inquiry might address and overcome the criticisms raised against the North-centric transitional justice scholarship is to adopt the collaborative approach advocated in Resistance and Transitional Justice. For each country case study, there are two chapters, ‘one of which is written by a member of the original Swiss research team and one of which is written by a national of that country’ (p. 11). This synergic approach has been successful in a slightly different fashion elsewhere26 and highlights ways scholars in the global North and global South can strengthen their collaboration through the cross-pollination of approaches and perspectives from different epistemic communities and advocacy groups. Decoupling Transformative Justice from Transitional Justice Transitional justice mechanisms – whether truth commissions, prosecutions or reparations programmes – anchor most analyses of transformative justice. When the transitional justice mechanism is the departure point for why and how a ‘transitional society’ constructs transformative justice, significant conceptual limitations emerge, especially as the political preconditions for the transformative work of transitional justice are usually left unaddressed. Efforts to use transformative justice as a framework to address the shortcomings of transitional justice prevent us from building transformative justice on its own terms rather than in reaction to transitional justice challenges and consequences. While its conceptual relationship with transitional justice should not be completely severed, pinning transformative justice ideals onto transitional justice praxis hinders the development of a proper theory of change – one that may extend beyond transitional justice. By decoupling the two, scholars are in a stronger position to address the criticism that transitional justice reproduces the hegemonic divide between the global North and South. It may be time to start imagining transformative justice as a field in its own right, as a project that breaks from and transcends transitional justice, and subsequently demands a research agenda that moves beyond the transitional justice mechanism as the entry point for addressing legacies of conflict, injustice and authoritarianism. Doing so would allow for new projects that examine sites of transformation without relying on pre-established or pre-packaged justice initiatives. It would also push scholars to heed McAuliffe’s call to ‘calibrate justice interventions to the most salient political conditions’ (p. 12), while identifying the important empirical work that reflects ‘the components of transformation that are in need of cultivation’ noted by Murphy (p. 199). In sum, the location of transformative justice – either as a subfield of transitional justice or as a field of its own – determines the impact of its contributions. The books reviewed here show how one’s stance on the location of transformative justice vis-à-vis transitional justice drives how one assesses its promises and pitfalls. To treat transformative justice as a body of literature that stands on its own requires a different set of normative and empirical questions than the ones traditionally posed in the transitional justice literature. While there may be some overlap in the study and practice of transformative and transitional justice, transformative justice – including its conceptualization and practice – deserves a set of standards to assess properly its evolution and effectiveness in societies confronting demands for change. Footnotes 1 Dustin N. Sharp, ‘Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation Transitional Justice,’ Harvard Human Rights Journal 26 (2013): 157. 2 Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 5. 3 Ibid., 174. 4 Ibid., 172. 5 Ibid., 178. 6 Rama Mani, ‘Balancing Peace with Justice in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict,’ Development 48(3) (2005): 27. 7 Rebekka Friedman, ‘Implementing Transformative Justice: Survivors and Ex-combatants at the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación in Peru,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 41(4) (2017): 4; Simon Robins, ‘Failing Victims? The Limits of Transitional Justice in Addressing the Needs of Victims of Violations,’ International Legal Discourse 11(1) (2017): 50. 8 Rama Mani, ‘Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus between Transitional Justice and Development,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 2(3) (2008): 253–265. 9 Erin Daly, ‘Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation,’ International Legal Perspectives 12 (2001): 73–183; Paul Gready and Simon Robins, ‘From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for Practice,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 8(3) (2014): 339–361. 10 Zinaida Miller, ‘Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the “Economic” in Transitional Justice,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 2(3) (2008): 266–291. 11 Sharp, supra n 1 at 157. 12 Wendy Lambourne, ‘Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 3(1) (2009): 30. 13 Ibid., 30. 14 Matthew Evans, ‘Structural Violence, Socioeconomic Rights, and Transformative Justice,’ Journal of Human Rights 15(1) (2016): 9. 15 Gready and Robins, supra n 9 at 340. 16 Emphasis added. 17 Emphasis in original. 18 Evans, supra n 14 at 7. 19 Sharp, supra n 1 at 157. 20 Larry May and Elizabeth Edenberg, eds., Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 21 Gready and Robins, supra n 9 at 360. 22 Evans, supra n 14 at 14. 23 Dáire McGill, ‘Different Violence, Different Justice? Taking Structural Violence Seriously in Post-Conflict and Transitional Justice Processes,’ State Crime Journal 6(1) (2017): 90. 24 Ibid., 91. 25 M. Brinton Lykes and Hugo van der Merwe, ‘Exploring/Expanding the Reach of Transitional justice,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 11(3) (2017): 374. 26 Elin Skaar, Jemima García-Godos and Cath Collins, eds., Transitional Justice in Latin America: The Uneven Road from Impunity towards Accountability (London: Routledge, 2016); Scott Mainwaring, Ana María Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, eds., The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). © The Author(s) (2018). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/about_us/legal/notices)

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International Journal of Transitional JusticeOxford University Press

Published: Mar 15, 2018

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