Labor Unions and Political Participation in Comparative Perspective

Labor Unions and Political Participation in Comparative Perspective Abstract This research uses comparative survey data to examine the effects of labor union membership on individual political participation. We argue that national political institutions—specifically, democracy and corporatism—shape the ways that unions mobilize their members to engage in the political sphere. Democratic regimes provide structural opportunities and cultural repertoires that lead unions to focus on member mobilization, especially via contentious politics and political parties. Corporatism, which directly links unions to state structures, undercuts the logics and incentives for union mobilization. We draw upon historical cases of Germany, the United States, Chile, and Egypt to illustrate how democracy and corporatism shape unions’ mobilization efforts. Multilevel models of World Values Survey data from roughly 60 countries find that union members participate more than non-members across a range of electoral and extra-institutional political acts, such as demonstrating, occupying buildings, signing petitions, party work, and so forth. In democratic societies, such effects are stronger and participation shifts toward parties and contentious politics. In less democratic societies, union members are particularly likely to work with and through other political organizations. Corporatist arrangements generally dampen the political activities of union members. Introduction Labor unions play a central role in political mobilization across the globe. From Southern Europe to Latin America, labor unions periodically launch mass demonstrations and strikes that can bring societies to a halt. In the United States and many other countries, unions have organized pivotal get-out-the-vote campaigns. In the Middle East, unions were key organizations in several Arab Spring movements. With the sharp decline of union membership and political power in many countries, it is easy to forget that unions are among the largest political organizations in most societies. This research examines the effects of unions on individual political behavior in the contemporary period across a large sample of countries. The paper combines organizational and institutional perspectives on political participation to theorize how union effects differ across comparative/historical context. We present a general framework for understanding comparative differences in union members’ participation, focusing on democracy and corporatism. Democratic institutions provide opportunities and constraints that channel union members toward political parties and contentious politics. Corporatism integrates unions into state structures and policymaking, producing a mix of political opportunities and constraints that generally dampen union efforts to mobilize participation across a range of acts, not only strikes. The paper extends the institutional literature in labor scholarship, which has mainly focused on union membership or the distribution of economic resources (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999; Kerrissey 2015; Martin and Brady 2007; Western 1999). It also advances the largely Anglo-/Eurocentric literature by examining the effects of union membership on political behavior across a broad set of countries, including the global South. We argue that institutions impact far more than the size of unions: they channel how people engage in political life. We illustrate our arguments via discussions of the United States, Germany, Chile, and Egypt in the late twentieth century. We then evaluate arguments using comparative data from the World Values Survey, which includes measures of individual political behavior: demonstrating, boycotting, striking, occupying, signing petitions, volunteering for political parties, volunteering for non-party political organizations, and discussing politics. We supplement these analyses with data on voting for industrialized democracies. We develop multilevel models to examine political participation in roughly 60 countries in 2004 and assess the robustness of our findings via corollary analyses examining 20 affluent democracies from 1981 to 2012 with country and year fixed effects. Extending Theories of Political Participation The classic literature views political participation as a consequence of individual skills and capacities, or interests as defined by one’s structural position within society (Verba and Nie 1972). A later set of studies focus on organizations: civic and political groups, such as churches and voluntary associations, where individuals develop political skills, learn information, and build network ties that pave the way for subsequent political involvement (Putnam 2000; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Moreover, political organizations and social movement groups mobilize individual participation—urging people to vote, write letters to Congress, or protest (Meyer 2007; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Institutional perspectives, by contrast, shift attention away from individuals and organizations and toward the societal structures that are the context for political action (Amenta and Ramsey 2010). Political institutions, which have both organizational and cultural dimensions, define the terrain on which political action and struggles play out (Clemens 1993; Schofer and Fourcade Gourinchas 2001; Skocpol 2003). Historically developed institutional arrangements—such as democratic versus autocratic governance, the type of electoral system, the presence of corporatist structures, concentration of political authority, and so on—construct the political sphere and help explain striking differences in political behavior across societies (Fourcade and Schofer 2016; Jepperson 2002; Paxton 2002). Organizational Dynamics in Institutional Context We argue that organizational dynamics of participation are conditional on institutional context. That is, institutional features of governance have the potential to amplify or dampen the impact of organizations on individual participation. The hard realities of institutional incentives, constraints, and opportunity structures may shift organizational strategies to focus more (or less) on individual participation. Moreover, institutions coevolve with cultural logics or repertoires of participation that “make sense,” shaping organizational strategies and practices (Fourcade and Schofer 2016; Jepperson and Meyer 1991). More specifically, we suggest that key features of the institutional context may explain why unions sometimes focus heavily on mobilizing members to participate in politics and at other times do not. Unions and Political Participation Scholars identify unions as key organizations that animate individual political action. Much scholarship focuses on voting (Gray and Caul 2000; Radcliff and Davis 2000; Rosenfeld 2014), but union membership effects extend to a broad range of political and civic activities (Kerrissey and Schofer 2013). A rich case study literature unpacks the processes and mechanisms involved: unions cultivate political identities and skills, and they directly mobilize individuals (e.g., Terriquez 2011). In one of the few comparative quantitative studies, Norris (2002) finds that union members in industrialized countries express greater willingness to engage in politics. We extend this literature by examining the effects of unions on actual behaviors across a large sample of countries. Based on this prior work, we expect union membership to boost participation across a full spectrum of outcomes, from modest acts like engaging in political discussion, to more substantial acts such as joining a demonstration. We expect the effects to extend beyond industrialized democracies and to be highly general, though prior work suggests that effects may be larger in contentious politics (demonstrating and striking)1 and the electoral arena, which is seen to be central to union agendas (e.g., Gray and Caul 2000; Kerrissey and Schofer 2013). Hypothesis 1: Union members will participate in politics more than non-members. Institutional context: The conditionality of union effects We focus on two features of countries’ political institutions that may moderate union effects on individual political behavior: democracy and corporatism. Democracy. We conceptualize democracy in a conventional manner (e.g., Huntington 1991; Lijphart 1999), as a system of governance involving broad-based citizen participation (typically open, competitive elections), institutionalization of widespread protections for civil and political rights, and constraints on arbitrary exercise of state power. Democratic societies are distinguished by an open political opportunity structure, typically accompanied by a political culture and norms that legitimate individual participation in civic life (Lijphart 1999). Studies find that less democratic societies have less protest (Olzak 2006), association membership (Paxton 2002), voluntary associations (Schofer and Longhofer 2011), and political engagement compared to highly democratic societies (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010). While unions encourage participation generally, we expect unions to have larger effects in democratic societies due to the congenial opportunity structure. We also expect democracy to shift union mobilization efforts. Elections are central venues and critical leverage points in democratic societies, and thus unions often focus mobilization efforts on them. In addition, the rights afforded by democratic institutions make contentious politics a more viable option for unions (Coppedge 1993). Severe repression, common to many non-democratic societies, greatly increases costs for protestors—who risk imprisonment, injury, or death—and the organizations that support contentious politics. Consequently, unions in democratic societies are relatively more apt to mobilize members toward contentious tactics, such as demonstrations. We expect less difference across levels of democracy for more moderate acts, such as signing a petition or discussing politics, which are less likely to trigger sharp repression in non-democratic contexts. Finally, where electoral opportunities are limited and contentious politics are severely repressed, unions generally seek indirect routes to political influence. Unions in less democratic settings are often more embedded in community organizations (Lee 2012), which are less the target of state repression. Unions frequently work via alliances with other political organizations, such as human rights groups. Collaboration with civil society organizations allows space for unionists to build alliances and support in a climate that discourages direct contentious challenges to the state. Hypothesis 2: In highly democratic societies, union membership will be more strongly associated with individual participation in contentious politics and political party volunteering. In less democratic societies, union membership will be associated with participation in other types of political organizations. Corporatism A second critical feature of the institutional landscape is how unions are incorporated into state structures via forms of corporatism. Corporatism refers to formalized systems of political interest representation that are channeled through a limited set of officially sanctioned or legitimated collectivities (Jepperson 2002; Schmitter 1974). In the context of labor relations, corporatism more specifically refers to governance centered around representation of so-called “functional” groups within capitalist societies, including labor, industry, and the state (Korpi and Shalev 1979). In corporatist societies, unions are afforded official status and sanction by the state and labor conflict is resolved via highly institutionalized and regulated systems of negotiation (Birnbaum 1988; Lijphart 1999). A lively literature debates how best to measure corporatism and the extent of its decline. However, scholars agree that there is substantial cross-national variation in corporatism, which sustains and reflects very different political contexts (Kenworthy 2003; Lijphart 1999; Thelen 2012). Scholars tend to focus on corporatism either in industrialized democracies (coined “neo-corporatism”) or in other regions of the world (often called “state corporatism”). We discuss the differences below, but draw out their similarities in shaping political participation. For the most part we expect—and observe—their effects on participation to be similar. In neo-corporatist arrangements, which have characterized a number of European nations, unions accept long-standing agreements to restrain militant action in exchange for institutional access. Almost by definition, union members in corporatist countries are less likely to strike. However, whether union members participate in other forms of politics, such as petitioning or party work, is an open question. We argue that neo-corporatism affects the political behaviors of union members far beyond the scope of traditional employment issues. Corporatism shapes union strategies by defining unions’ primary political opportunities and constraints. Unions in neo-corporatist societies have levels of political access and opportunities far beyond their counterparts in non-corporatist societies. To maintain these opportunities, unions have agreed (both legally and more tacitly) to forgo militant actions in favor of institutionalized negotiation (Hicks 1999; Korpi and Shalev 1979). This tremendous institutional position—a seat at the table—has been a commonly used strategy to effect moderate change, especially compared to “indirect” strategies involving strikes or other forms of political mobilization. Unions in neo-corporatist countries have less incentive to mobilize members in other forms of collective action in part because they already have some—and fear losing—access to decision-making bodies. Neo-corporatism also shapes political participation by routinizing aspects of employer-union relations via elaborate bureaucratic procedures for conflict resolution. By contrast, non-corporatist societies have weak or non-existent institutionalized channels for conflict resolution. Unions respond to the lack of political access by pursuing a range of strategies, including the direct mobilization of members. Neo-corporatism has evolved in an intertwined fashion with a distinctive political culture that stresses coordinated decision-making and frowns on many forms of aggressive contentious politics (Fourcade, Lande, and Schofer 2016; Jepperson 2002; Schmitter 1977). For instance, Scandinavian political repertoires celebrate institutionalized solutions. As a result, unions function more as mediators who mobilize through sanctioned channels. Corporatism in less democratic countries tends have a different flavor: regimes support state-sanctioned unions, often using coercive control. State corporatism typically begins under authoritarian rule, but its elements can persist after democratic openings (e.g., Argentina, Mexico). With state corporatism, independent unions are banned and state officials typically vet union leaders for political allegiance. This produces leaders who are unlikely to organize workers against state interests (Coppedge 1993).2 In exchange for this support, regimes typically promote policies that raise standards of living and job security, as well as rewarding union leaders with benefits. In sum, state control de-powers unions as oppositional actors and reinforces their roles as regime supporters. Despite differences between neo- and state corporatism, we argue that corporatist structures have similar effects: they reduce union members’ participation, especially contentious extra-institutional acts. These historically institutionalized patterns are likely to be intensified due to path dependence. In non-corporatist countries, strike threats are a primary source of union leverage over employers, and consequently unions dedicate substantial energy to cultivating collective action capacity. This capacity to strike opens up avenues for unions—most obviously, engagement in contentious politics. By contrast, unions in corporatist societies tend not to devote as much effort to preparing members for collective action. To the extent that collective action capacity withers, contentious politics become less viable as a political strategy. These arguments are consistent with prior research. The presence of corporatism helps explain a range of political and organizational phenomena, including membership in voluntary associations (Schofer and Fourcade Gourinchas 2001), union density (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999; Western 1999), and coalition building (Baccaro, Hamann, and Turner 2003; Frege, Heery, and Turner 2004). Hypothesis 3: Within corporatist societies, union membership will have a smaller effect on extra-institutional political participation compared to non-corporatist societies. Table 1 summarizes our expectations regarding how democracy and corporatism channel union mobilization efforts. Table 1. Hypothesized effects of unions and interactions by type of participation Interest Contentious extra-institutional Less contentious extra-institutional Institutional Volunteering Discuss politics Strike; demonstrate Petition; boycott Vote, volunteer for political parties Volunteer for other political organizations Union membership + + + + + Union * democracy + + (strong) + + (strong) − Union * corporatism − − (strong) − − − Interest Contentious extra-institutional Less contentious extra-institutional Institutional Volunteering Discuss politics Strike; demonstrate Petition; boycott Vote, volunteer for political parties Volunteer for other political organizations Union membership + + + + + Union * democracy + + (strong) + + (strong) − Union * corporatism − − (strong) − − − Table 1. Hypothesized effects of unions and interactions by type of participation Interest Contentious extra-institutional Less contentious extra-institutional Institutional Volunteering Discuss politics Strike; demonstrate Petition; boycott Vote, volunteer for political parties Volunteer for other political organizations Union membership + + + + + Union * democracy + + (strong) + + (strong) − Union * corporatism − − (strong) − − − Interest Contentious extra-institutional Less contentious extra-institutional Institutional Volunteering Discuss politics Strike; demonstrate Petition; boycott Vote, volunteer for political parties Volunteer for other political organizations Union membership + + + + + Union * democracy + + (strong) + + (strong) − Union * corporatism − − (strong) − − − Illustrations: Germany, United States, Egypt, Chile in the Late Twentieth Century We draw on four cases from the late twentieth century that exemplify different ends of the corporatism and democracy dimensions.3 Our selection follows the diverse case method, which aims to maximize variation (Seawright and Gerring 2008). We sought to incorporate canonical cases wherever possible, and those supported by a large secondary source literature. These illustrations situate our arguments in comparative and historical context, unpack the institutional-organizational dynamics involved, and identify key mechanisms. Figure 1 illustrates our key arguments regarding institutional dimensions and unions’ mobilization strategies.4 Figure 1. View largeDownload slide Union mobilization and institutional context: the effects of corporatism and democracy. Country examples from late 20th century Figure 1. View largeDownload slide Union mobilization and institutional context: the effects of corporatism and democracy. Country examples from late 20th century Germany: High Democracy, High Corporatism Germany in the late twentieth century illustrates how neo-corporatist arrangements shaped unions’ interactions with members. The position of German unions in decision-making structures was strikingly different from those in non-corporatist societies. German unions held a recognized role in institutions and a voice in the macro planning of social and economic policy (Mosley, Keller, and Speckesser 1998). The system was characterized by a high degree of wage coordination and centralized bargaining.5 Bargaining occurred between peak associations (unions and employers’ associations) at the industry or sectoral level. Employers’ association members agreed to adhere to contract terms, and unions agreed to forgo strikes. These corporatist arrangements profoundly shaped the strategies that unions pursued. German unions tended to use legal channels to address problems rather than industrial conflict. Jacobi and colleagues (1998, 191) explain: “Extensive juridification helps to channel and depoliticize industrial conflict and also encourages the professionalization of conflict management.” Unions relied on staff and legal professionals for their activities, including contract negotiations. Because conflict was channeled away from strikes, unions spent less energy in developing a strike-ready workforce. Negotiations at the sectoral level, the role of professionals, and the reduced strike preparation all minimized unions’ need to train and politicize members for mobilization. However, with the weakening of corporatist arrangements over time, unions intermittently began to pursue more member mobilization, consistent with our arguments (Greer 2008; Turner 2009). The United States: High Democracy, Low Corporatism At the other end of the spectrum, unions in the United States had little formal voice in labor market institutions in the late twentieth century (and the contemporary situation is similar). Bargaining was highly decentralization and fragmented. Unlike Germany’s peak associations, most contracts were negotiated between local unions and individual firms, and local leaders often led contract campaigns. The state rarely intervened in bargaining, and few institutionalized channels for mediation existed if bargaining failed. This system had direct implications for union strategies. In the absence of institutional support, unions often used member mobilization to demonstrate their power. Collective action, even modest acts like wearing buttons, signaled unity and implied that a union was strike-ready. Moreover, lacking institutionalized routes to political access, US unions sought to advance their position by mobilizing members and resources to elect labor-friendly politicians and improve labor laws (Dark 2001; Kerrissey and Schofer 2013; Rosenfeld 2014). In this context, unions had incentives to routinely train and mobilize members. Of course, unions differed in their mobilization efforts and many unions leaned toward “service” models, but in general, unions built power through members’ electoral and workplace activism. In sum, the different structural positions that German and US unions inhabited shaped the extent to which they sought member participation. A study of unions’ responses to the outsourcing of telecommunication jobs in Germany and the United States reflects these different orientations. Doellgast (2008) finds that although unions dealt with the same issues, they diverged in tactics. In the United States, the Communication Workers of America built coalitions with other organizations and relied heavily on membership mobilization. By contrast, the German telecommunication union, ver.di, launched a campaign that leveraged their access to strong coordinated bargaining structures. Chile: Low Democracy, Low Corporatism Chile, which was ruled by an authoritarian military dictatorship from 1973 to 1998, illustrates how state repression and the absence of corporatist arrangements can shape unions’ mobilization practices. Prior to the coup, union members were highly mobilized: they had more strike activity than any other Latin American country and they were instrumental in electing the socialist president Salvador Allende (Drake 1996). Following the coup, Pinochet did not seek to fold unions into the fabric of the state, as one would see with state corporatism. Instead, the regime immediately sought to dismantle unions by suspending the constitution, political and civil liberties, and state-backed labor commissions, as well as by banning strikes, collective bargaining, and union elections (Drake 1996). The regime used extreme repression to eradicate unions, including raiding factories, and imprisoning or murdering thousands of unionists. One estimate reports that the regime was responsible for the death or disappearance of 4,000 people and the imprisonment of 60,000 people, many of who were unionists or students (King 1989). The individual and collective risks to open participation in contentious politics were enormous. Consequently, workers’ actions were “furtive,” including brief wildcat strikes or industrial sabotage (Winn 2004, 22). One tactical response to this repression was to seek coalitions with other organizations. Drake (1996, 47) explains: “…workers came increasingly to rely not only on their own organizations but also surrogate allies, such as human rights groups and intellectuals.” Despite the drop in public activities, unions remained sites of anti-authoritarian mobilization (Klubock 2004). Over time, strikes increased and workers used creative ways to circumvent restrictive laws. In sum: under non-democratic conditions, unions represented important sites of political mobilization. However, extreme authoritarian repression dampened many forms of contentious politics and channeled unions toward, among other things, cooperation with allied organizations. Egypt: Low Democracy, High Corporatism Egyptian labor relations in the last half of the twentieth century illustrate state corporatism.6 Unlike Pinochet, who aimed to eradicate unions in Chile, Egyptian regimes sought to incorporate labor movements. Taking power in the 1950s, Colonel Nasser viewed workers as key to his political legitimacy and unions as the organizational vehicle to mobilize support. Nasser orchestrated a system in which unions were legal, but subordinate, to the state. Union participation was channeled through the mass party, the Arab Socialist Union, where union leaders were screened for loyalty and worked closely with the government. In exchange, Nasser supported populist legislation, from shorter hours to better pensions. While subsequent regimes slowly dismantled this “social pact,” the state subordination of unions continued (Bianchi 1989; Posusney 1997). This form of corporatism differs from corporatism in Germany, where unions were independent from the state. Again, corporatism shaped union members’ activities. Posusney (1997) argues that state-screened union leaders were unlikely to mobilize members to oppose regime policies. However, local leaders often experienced less state vetting than their national counterparts, and some organized workers and protests at the local level. This unsanctioned labor mobilization was often met with harsh repression. Overall, while union activity occurred, regime-aligned leaders and state repression minimized its scope during the last decades of the twentieth century. State corporatism had broken down in Egypt by the 2000s, with the state embracing policies that undercut workers’ wages and job stability. As in the case of Germany, declining corporatism was accompanied by a wave of worker activism, including unsanctioned strikes and factory occupations in the 2000s, as well as slow openings for independent unions (Beinin 2009).7 Data We use cross-national data from the World Values Survey (WVS 2012)/European Values Study to examine the varying effects of union membership on political participation. The WVS asks a module of political participation questions to a large sample of countries in 2004, covering roughly 60 countries and 80,000 individuals. We supplement this with corollary analyses of 20 industrialized nations, which were routinely surveyed between 1981 and 2012. Finally, we obtain an additional dependent variable—voting—from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).8 Dependent Variables Discuss politics The WVS asks if respondents “discuss political matters with friends.” We use a dichotomous measure, with 1 representing “frequently” and 0 representing “occasionally” or “never.” This is perhaps the mildest form of participation available in the survey, and thus serves as a useful reference point. Strikes, demonstrations, occupations, boycotts, and petitions Each form of participation is measured separately with a dichotomous variable coded 1 if individuals have “actually done” this type of activity and 0 if they have not.9 Specifically, the WVS asks respondents about: “joining unofficial strikes,” “attending lawful demonstrations,” “occupying buildings or factories,” “joining in boycotts,” and “signing a petition.” Volunteering for political parties We include a dichotomous measure indicating whether respondents are doing “unpaid volunteer work” for political parties. Volunteering for political organizations We also examine “unpaid volunteer work” in a range of non-party political organizations: human rights, peace, environmental, and women’s groups. Results across these organization types were similar, so we combined them to create a dichotomous measure indicating volunteer work for any such organizations. This measure is not available in some survey waves, and so it is not included in our corollary analyses of industrialized democracies. Voting Because voting data are not available in the WVS, we use the ISSP dataset (2012). We use a dichotomous variable coded 1 for individuals who voted in the previous national election. Individual-Level Independent Variables Union membership A dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent is a member of a labor union. Age and age squared Respondent’s age, measured in years. Including the square of age allows estimation of a non-linear effect, as political participation tends to increase through midlife and then taper. Sex Coded dichotomously (male = 1). Education Coded on a four-point ordinal scale. The WVS includes multiple education measures, including the number of years of schooling and an ordinal measure of school completion. To maximize sample size, we used years of schooling to estimate the highest level of schooling completed when the latter was unavailable. Marital status Coded dichotomously (married = 1). Employment status Coded dichotomously (employed = 1). Country-Level Independent Variables Economic development We measure development by the natural log of real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (World Bank 2013). Democracy We use the Polity IV dataset, which focuses on the institutionalization of mechanisms for citizens to express preferences (e.g., free elections) and the existence of constraints on executive authority (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011). Higher scores represent more democratic nations.10 For robustness, we ran models using alternative democracy measures from Polity IV and Freedom House, including the average over 10 prior years and dichotomized measures (free/unfree). Results were consistent. Corporatism We use two measures: a dichotomous measure that captures general corporatist features for a large sample of countries (table 3) and a detailed measure that is available over time for highly industrialized nations (table 4). Corporatism in industrialized nations Measures of corporatism may attend to the structure of interest group representation in society and/or specific industrial policies, such as wage coordination (Kenworthy 2003). Using the Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention, and Social Pacts, 1960–2014 (Visser 2016), we use a corporatism measure that draws on both of these concepts: wage coordination and centralization. Building on Kenworthy (2003), Visser assembles a yearly five-point scale of wage coordination, ranging from features such as centralized bargaining by peak associations at the high end, to fragmented wage bargaining confined largely to individual firms at the low end. Centralization is a summary measure of the centralization of wage bargaining, taking into account union authority and concentration at multiple levels. We take the z-score and add the two measures, wage coordination and centralization, to create an index.11 Dichotomous measure of corporatism for large sample Available datasets do not cover our full sample and are not easily extended beyond industrialized democracies. To address this, we construct a simpler dichotomous corporatism measure, which we use in the 2004 cross-sectional analysis (table 3). This measure draws on two components: First, we dichotomize the continuous corporatism measure we use for the industrialized democracies (described above). We consider a country to be corporatist if the z-score is above 1, which corresponds with other dichotomous measures of corporatism (e.g., Lijphart 1999). For cases not covered by our existing dataset, we construct an alternative measure of corporatism designed to capture state corporatist arrangements. Collier and Collier (1991, 51) define state-group relations as corporatist to the degree that there exists: 1) state structuring of groups that produce a system of officially sanctioned, noncompetitive, compulsory interest associations; 2) state subsidy of these groups; and 3) state-imposed constraints of demand-making, leadership, and internal governance. Building on this, we code a country as corporatist if: 1) the state only allows a single union (nationally or by industry); or 2) a country has at least two laws that constrain unions’ independent financing or internal governance, specifically, if unions are able to: 1) elect leaders freely; 2) establish a constitution; 3) control union finances; 4) bargain collectively without prior approval by authorities; 5) strike without prior approval by authorities; or 6) be dissolved or suspended through administrative authorities. We code three sources in 2004: US State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights and Practices; reports from the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations and the Committee on Freedom of Association; and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions’ Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights. These are the same sources used to create the Database of Collective Labor Rights (Kucera 2004; Mosley and Uno 2007). We designate a country as corporatist if any of the three sources indicate noncompetitive unions or at least two laws limiting union independence.12 Finally, we address ex-Communist countries in Eastern Europe. State corporatist arrangements characterized industrial relations under communism. We expect inertia in organizational legacies of state corporatism, which likely still affected political participation in our 2004 analysis. Some countries transitioned from state corporatism to models closer to European-style corporatism in the 1990s, although there were different degrees of implementation (Funk and Lesch 2004; Kohl 2008; Ost 2000). Empirically, we observe that union members in these countries behave similarly to those in other corporatist settings: union members are less likely to engage in a range of political acts compared to those in non-corporatist countries.13 As our theoretical expectations and empirical observations are consistent, we include the ex-Communist countries as corporatist for the worldwide models (results are similar when they are excluded). In sum, for the large sample analysis, we code countries as corporatist if they: 1) have a z-score above 1 for industrialized democracies; 2) have noncompetitive unions or state-imposed limitations for finances or internal governance; or 3) are an Eastern European ex-Communist country. We conducted separate analyses for each feature and observed similar results, so we opt to combine the groups for ease of presentation. Appendix A lists countries and codings. Additional economic controls from the World Bank ( Appendix B) include: Inflation Inflation reflects the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. Employment in industry The percent of employees who work in industry, including mining, manufacturing, construction, and public utilities. Trade Trade captures the sum of exports and imports divided by the value of GDP. FDI Foreign Direct Investment is measured by new inflows of investment (FDI as percent of GDP yields similar results). Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the large-sample analysis. Table 2. Descriptive statistics for large sample analyses (table 3) Mean Std. dev. Min Max Dependent variables Strike 0.05 0.21 0 1 Occupy 0.03 0.16 0 1 Demonstrate 0.18 0.38 0 1 Boycott 0.09 0.29 0 1 Petition 0.32 0.47 0 1 Volunteer: Parties 0.03 0.17 0 1 Volunteer: Political organizations 0.08 0.27 0 1 Discuss politics 0.15 0.36 0 1 Independent variablesa Union 0.09 0.29 0 1 Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 Age 41.0 16.1 15 99 Age squared 1,945 1,512 225 9,801 Married 0.58 0.49 0 1 Employed 0.52 0.49 0 1 Education 4.40 2.29 1 8 GDP 8.20 1.47 5.54 10.75 Democracy 5.25 5.69 −10 10 Corporatism 0.42 0.49 0 1 Mean Std. dev. Min Max Dependent variables Strike 0.05 0.21 0 1 Occupy 0.03 0.16 0 1 Demonstrate 0.18 0.38 0 1 Boycott 0.09 0.29 0 1 Petition 0.32 0.47 0 1 Volunteer: Parties 0.03 0.17 0 1 Volunteer: Political organizations 0.08 0.27 0 1 Discuss politics 0.15 0.36 0 1 Independent variablesa Union 0.09 0.29 0 1 Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 Age 41.0 16.1 15 99 Age squared 1,945 1,512 225 9,801 Married 0.58 0.49 0 1 Employed 0.52 0.49 0 1 Education 4.40 2.29 1 8 GDP 8.20 1.47 5.54 10.75 Democracy 5.25 5.69 −10 10 Corporatism 0.42 0.49 0 1 aThe descriptive statistics for the independent variables represent “discuss politics” models. The descriptive statistics for other dependent variables are similar. Table 2. Descriptive statistics for large sample analyses (table 3) Mean Std. dev. Min Max Dependent variables Strike 0.05 0.21 0 1 Occupy 0.03 0.16 0 1 Demonstrate 0.18 0.38 0 1 Boycott 0.09 0.29 0 1 Petition 0.32 0.47 0 1 Volunteer: Parties 0.03 0.17 0 1 Volunteer: Political organizations 0.08 0.27 0 1 Discuss politics 0.15 0.36 0 1 Independent variablesa Union 0.09 0.29 0 1 Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 Age 41.0 16.1 15 99 Age squared 1,945 1,512 225 9,801 Married 0.58 0.49 0 1 Employed 0.52 0.49 0 1 Education 4.40 2.29 1 8 GDP 8.20 1.47 5.54 10.75 Democracy 5.25 5.69 −10 10 Corporatism 0.42 0.49 0 1 Mean Std. dev. Min Max Dependent variables Strike 0.05 0.21 0 1 Occupy 0.03 0.16 0 1 Demonstrate 0.18 0.38 0 1 Boycott 0.09 0.29 0 1 Petition 0.32 0.47 0 1 Volunteer: Parties 0.03 0.17 0 1 Volunteer: Political organizations 0.08 0.27 0 1 Discuss politics 0.15 0.36 0 1 Independent variablesa Union 0.09 0.29 0 1 Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 Age 41.0 16.1 15 99 Age squared 1,945 1,512 225 9,801 Married 0.58 0.49 0 1 Employed 0.52 0.49 0 1 Education 4.40 2.29 1 8 GDP 8.20 1.47 5.54 10.75 Democracy 5.25 5.69 −10 10 Corporatism 0.42 0.49 0 1 aThe descriptive statistics for the independent variables represent “discuss politics” models. The descriptive statistics for other dependent variables are similar. Methods We use multilevel logistic regression models (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002), as individual respondents are nested within countries. Consider a simple model that permits different intercepts across countries: Yij=βXij+μi+νij (1) where X refers to independent variables, μi is a country-specific intercept, and νij represents idiosyncratic error. The intercepts are either estimated as a series of fixed intercept parameters (“fixed effects”), or treated as a normally distributed random variable (“random effects”) under the assumption that μ is uncorrelated with X. One may extend this logic to address time as an additional source of correlated error: individuals nested within both countries and years. Our main analysis is based on a large sample of countries in 2004 and uses random effects models (table 3). We further examine highly industrialized democracies, pooling cases from multiple waves of the WVS spanning 1981 to 2012 (table 4) to explore variation across both countries and time. We use “two-way” fixed effects models with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country (Cameron and Miller 2015).14 Rather than focusing on cross-national differences, this analysis addresses the question of whether political behaviors shift as countries become more or less corporatist over time. Table 3. Multilevel logistic regression models: the interaction effects of union membership with democracy and corporatism on participation, 2004 Strike Occupy Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Discuss politics Union 0.765*** 0.712*** 0.773*** 0.602*** 0.541*** 1.296*** 0.995*** 0.495*** (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) Male 0.532*** 0.456*** 0.423*** 0.393*** 0.105*** 0.795*** −0.474*** 0.569*** (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) Age 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.054*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000* −0.000** −0.000*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.237*** −0.227*** −0.200*** −0.216*** −0.051* −0.013 −0.064+ −0.027 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) Education 0.092*** 0.057*** 0.194*** 0.175*** 0.201*** 0.126*** 0.110*** 0.178*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Employed 0.026 −0.051 0.047* −0.032 0.142*** 0.007 0.099** −0.010 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) GDP logged 0.026 −0.005 0.052 0.250** 0.551*** −0.330+ −0.060 −0.082+ (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.12) (0.05) Democracy 0.073** 0.051 0.045* −0.032 0.040+ 0.156** −0.058 0.002 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) Union * Democracy 0.064** 0.032 0.032*** 0.030* 0.013 0.047*** −0.019* 0.016* (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist −0.490* −0.358 −0.059 −0.140 −0.020 0.393 −0.754** 0.223+ (0.21) (0.30) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.44) (0.29) (0.12) Union * Corporatist −0.262** −0.358* −0.374*** −0.331*** −0.221*** −0.616*** −0.620*** −0.295*** (0.10) (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) Constant −5.455*** −5.103*** −4.316*** −7.023*** −7.795*** −3.860* −3.009** −3.770*** (0.77) (1.09) (0.66) (0.71) (0.67) (1.52) (1.03) (0.43) Observations 75,709 74,405 78,399 76,556 78,092 90,115 65,797 88,561 Countries 57 56 58 58 58 62 50 62 Strike Occupy Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Discuss politics Union 0.765*** 0.712*** 0.773*** 0.602*** 0.541*** 1.296*** 0.995*** 0.495*** (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) Male 0.532*** 0.456*** 0.423*** 0.393*** 0.105*** 0.795*** −0.474*** 0.569*** (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) Age 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.054*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000* −0.000** −0.000*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.237*** −0.227*** −0.200*** −0.216*** −0.051* −0.013 −0.064+ −0.027 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) Education 0.092*** 0.057*** 0.194*** 0.175*** 0.201*** 0.126*** 0.110*** 0.178*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Employed 0.026 −0.051 0.047* −0.032 0.142*** 0.007 0.099** −0.010 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) GDP logged 0.026 −0.005 0.052 0.250** 0.551*** −0.330+ −0.060 −0.082+ (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.12) (0.05) Democracy 0.073** 0.051 0.045* −0.032 0.040+ 0.156** −0.058 0.002 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) Union * Democracy 0.064** 0.032 0.032*** 0.030* 0.013 0.047*** −0.019* 0.016* (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist −0.490* −0.358 −0.059 −0.140 −0.020 0.393 −0.754** 0.223+ (0.21) (0.30) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.44) (0.29) (0.12) Union * Corporatist −0.262** −0.358* −0.374*** −0.331*** −0.221*** −0.616*** −0.620*** −0.295*** (0.10) (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) Constant −5.455*** −5.103*** −4.316*** −7.023*** −7.795*** −3.860* −3.009** −3.770*** (0.77) (1.09) (0.66) (0.71) (0.67) (1.52) (1.03) (0.43) Observations 75,709 74,405 78,399 76,556 78,092 90,115 65,797 88,561 Countries 57 56 58 58 58 62 50 62 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10; two-tailed tests. Table 3. Multilevel logistic regression models: the interaction effects of union membership with democracy and corporatism on participation, 2004 Strike Occupy Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Discuss politics Union 0.765*** 0.712*** 0.773*** 0.602*** 0.541*** 1.296*** 0.995*** 0.495*** (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) Male 0.532*** 0.456*** 0.423*** 0.393*** 0.105*** 0.795*** −0.474*** 0.569*** (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) Age 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.054*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000* −0.000** −0.000*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.237*** −0.227*** −0.200*** −0.216*** −0.051* −0.013 −0.064+ −0.027 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) Education 0.092*** 0.057*** 0.194*** 0.175*** 0.201*** 0.126*** 0.110*** 0.178*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Employed 0.026 −0.051 0.047* −0.032 0.142*** 0.007 0.099** −0.010 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) GDP logged 0.026 −0.005 0.052 0.250** 0.551*** −0.330+ −0.060 −0.082+ (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.12) (0.05) Democracy 0.073** 0.051 0.045* −0.032 0.040+ 0.156** −0.058 0.002 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) Union * Democracy 0.064** 0.032 0.032*** 0.030* 0.013 0.047*** −0.019* 0.016* (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist −0.490* −0.358 −0.059 −0.140 −0.020 0.393 −0.754** 0.223+ (0.21) (0.30) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.44) (0.29) (0.12) Union * Corporatist −0.262** −0.358* −0.374*** −0.331*** −0.221*** −0.616*** −0.620*** −0.295*** (0.10) (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) Constant −5.455*** −5.103*** −4.316*** −7.023*** −7.795*** −3.860* −3.009** −3.770*** (0.77) (1.09) (0.66) (0.71) (0.67) (1.52) (1.03) (0.43) Observations 75,709 74,405 78,399 76,556 78,092 90,115 65,797 88,561 Countries 57 56 58 58 58 62 50 62 Strike Occupy Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Discuss politics Union 0.765*** 0.712*** 0.773*** 0.602*** 0.541*** 1.296*** 0.995*** 0.495*** (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) Male 0.532*** 0.456*** 0.423*** 0.393*** 0.105*** 0.795*** −0.474*** 0.569*** (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) Age 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.054*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000* −0.000** −0.000*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.237*** −0.227*** −0.200*** −0.216*** −0.051* −0.013 −0.064+ −0.027 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) Education 0.092*** 0.057*** 0.194*** 0.175*** 0.201*** 0.126*** 0.110*** 0.178*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Employed 0.026 −0.051 0.047* −0.032 0.142*** 0.007 0.099** −0.010 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) GDP logged 0.026 −0.005 0.052 0.250** 0.551*** −0.330+ −0.060 −0.082+ (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.12) (0.05) Democracy 0.073** 0.051 0.045* −0.032 0.040+ 0.156** −0.058 0.002 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) Union * Democracy 0.064** 0.032 0.032*** 0.030* 0.013 0.047*** −0.019* 0.016* (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist −0.490* −0.358 −0.059 −0.140 −0.020 0.393 −0.754** 0.223+ (0.21) (0.30) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.44) (0.29) (0.12) Union * Corporatist −0.262** −0.358* −0.374*** −0.331*** −0.221*** −0.616*** −0.620*** −0.295*** (0.10) (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) Constant −5.455*** −5.103*** −4.316*** −7.023*** −7.795*** −3.860* −3.009** −3.770*** (0.77) (1.09) (0.66) (0.71) (0.67) (1.52) (1.03) (0.43) Observations 75,709 74,405 78,399 76,556 78,092 90,115 65,797 88,561 Countries 57 56 58 58 58 62 50 62 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10; two-tailed tests. Table 4. Logistic regression models with two-way fixed effects: the interaction effects of union membership and corporatism on political participation in industrialized democracies, 1981–2012 Strike Occupya Demonstrate Boycott Petitiona Volunteer: Partiesab Discuss politicsa Votec Union 1.179*** 0.758*** 0.835*** 0.609*** 0.519*** 0.870*** 0.378*** 0.253* (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) Male 0.609*** 0.621*** 0.323*** 0.205** −0.038 0.545*** −0.686*** −0.045 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) Age 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.037*** 0.082*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.118*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000** −0.000*** −0.001*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.249*** −0.337*** −0.226*** −0.231*** −0.016 0.099* −0.047 0.319*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) Education −0.094+ −0.179* 0.033 −0.016 0.148*** 0.107* −0.074 0.224*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) Employed 0.098* 0.230*** 0.410*** 0.396*** 0.360*** 0.273*** 0.315*** 0.215*** (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) GDP logged −0.186+ −0.188 0.189*** −0.023 0.131 −1.374 0.946 −2.451*** (0.11) (0.59) (0.04) (0.07) (0.71) (1.64) (0.94) (0.43) Corporatist 0.061 0.064 0.043 −0.056 0.059 0.085 0.084 −0.396*** (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) Union * Corporatist −0.069* −0.187*** −0.065* −0.096*** −0.043 0.018 −0.052 −0.038 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) Constant −4.575*** −4.415 −4.410*** −4.585*** −3.096 6.743 −14.366 22.272*** (1.08) (5.64) (0.37) (0.73) (6.73) (15.58) (9.34) (4.62) Observations 74,731 68,782 90,609 87,318 89,639 93,892 44,983 37,486 Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 14 Strike Occupya Demonstrate Boycott Petitiona Volunteer: Partiesab Discuss politicsa Votec Union 1.179*** 0.758*** 0.835*** 0.609*** 0.519*** 0.870*** 0.378*** 0.253* (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) Male 0.609*** 0.621*** 0.323*** 0.205** −0.038 0.545*** −0.686*** −0.045 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) Age 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.037*** 0.082*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.118*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000** −0.000*** −0.001*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.249*** −0.337*** −0.226*** −0.231*** −0.016 0.099* −0.047 0.319*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) Education −0.094+ −0.179* 0.033 −0.016 0.148*** 0.107* −0.074 0.224*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) Employed 0.098* 0.230*** 0.410*** 0.396*** 0.360*** 0.273*** 0.315*** 0.215*** (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) GDP logged −0.186+ −0.188 0.189*** −0.023 0.131 −1.374 0.946 −2.451*** (0.11) (0.59) (0.04) (0.07) (0.71) (1.64) (0.94) (0.43) Corporatist 0.061 0.064 0.043 −0.056 0.059 0.085 0.084 −0.396*** (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) Union * Corporatist −0.069* −0.187*** −0.065* −0.096*** −0.043 0.018 −0.052 −0.038 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) Constant −4.575*** −4.415 −4.410*** −4.585*** −3.096 6.743 −14.366 22.272*** (1.08) (5.64) (0.37) (0.73) (6.73) (15.58) (9.34) (4.62) Observations 74,731 68,782 90,609 87,318 89,639 93,892 44,983 37,486 Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 14 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10; two-tailed tests. aThis question was not asked in WVS Wave 6; these analyses go through 2005. b“Volunteer for other political organizations” was not available for this sample. cVoting data, drawn from ISSP, include years 1985–2006. Table 4. Logistic regression models with two-way fixed effects: the interaction effects of union membership and corporatism on political participation in industrialized democracies, 1981–2012 Strike Occupya Demonstrate Boycott Petitiona Volunteer: Partiesab Discuss politicsa Votec Union 1.179*** 0.758*** 0.835*** 0.609*** 0.519*** 0.870*** 0.378*** 0.253* (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) Male 0.609*** 0.621*** 0.323*** 0.205** −0.038 0.545*** −0.686*** −0.045 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) Age 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.037*** 0.082*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.118*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000** −0.000*** −0.001*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.249*** −0.337*** −0.226*** −0.231*** −0.016 0.099* −0.047 0.319*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) Education −0.094+ −0.179* 0.033 −0.016 0.148*** 0.107* −0.074 0.224*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) Employed 0.098* 0.230*** 0.410*** 0.396*** 0.360*** 0.273*** 0.315*** 0.215*** (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) GDP logged −0.186+ −0.188 0.189*** −0.023 0.131 −1.374 0.946 −2.451*** (0.11) (0.59) (0.04) (0.07) (0.71) (1.64) (0.94) (0.43) Corporatist 0.061 0.064 0.043 −0.056 0.059 0.085 0.084 −0.396*** (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) Union * Corporatist −0.069* −0.187*** −0.065* −0.096*** −0.043 0.018 −0.052 −0.038 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) Constant −4.575*** −4.415 −4.410*** −4.585*** −3.096 6.743 −14.366 22.272*** (1.08) (5.64) (0.37) (0.73) (6.73) (15.58) (9.34) (4.62) Observations 74,731 68,782 90,609 87,318 89,639 93,892 44,983 37,486 Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 14 Strike Occupya Demonstrate Boycott Petitiona Volunteer: Partiesab Discuss politicsa Votec Union 1.179*** 0.758*** 0.835*** 0.609*** 0.519*** 0.870*** 0.378*** 0.253* (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) Male 0.609*** 0.621*** 0.323*** 0.205** −0.038 0.545*** −0.686*** −0.045 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) Age 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.037*** 0.082*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.118*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000** −0.000*** −0.001*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.249*** −0.337*** −0.226*** −0.231*** −0.016 0.099* −0.047 0.319*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) Education −0.094+ −0.179* 0.033 −0.016 0.148*** 0.107* −0.074 0.224*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) Employed 0.098* 0.230*** 0.410*** 0.396*** 0.360*** 0.273*** 0.315*** 0.215*** (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) GDP logged −0.186+ −0.188 0.189*** −0.023 0.131 −1.374 0.946 −2.451*** (0.11) (0.59) (0.04) (0.07) (0.71) (1.64) (0.94) (0.43) Corporatist 0.061 0.064 0.043 −0.056 0.059 0.085 0.084 −0.396*** (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) Union * Corporatist −0.069* −0.187*** −0.065* −0.096*** −0.043 0.018 −0.052 −0.038 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) Constant −4.575*** −4.415 −4.410*** −4.585*** −3.096 6.743 −14.366 22.272*** (1.08) (5.64) (0.37) (0.73) (6.73) (15.58) (9.34) (4.62) Observations 74,731 68,782 90,609 87,318 89,639 93,892 44,983 37,486 Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 14 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10; two-tailed tests. aThis question was not asked in WVS Wave 6; these analyses go through 2005. b“Volunteer for other political organizations” was not available for this sample. cVoting data, drawn from ISSP, include years 1985–2006. Results Union membership is positively associated with all forms of participation: strike, occupy, demonstrate, boycott, petition, volunteer for political parties, volunteer for other political organizations, and discuss politics. Table 3 reports that union members have over two times the odds of participating in contentious acts, including demonstrations (exp(0.773) = 2.17), occupying buildings or factories (exp(0.712) = 2.04), and strikes (exp(0.765) = 2.15), compared to non-members. We also observe strong union effects for a range of less contentious acts: boycotts (exp(0.602) = 1.83), petitions (exp(0.541) = 1.72), and political discussions (exp(0.495) = 1.64). In particular, union members have much higher odds of volunteering for political parties, more than triple the odds of non-members (exp(1.296) = 3.66). Union members are also more likely to volunteer for political organizations other than parties, though the effects are a bit smaller (exp(0.995) = 2.71). To explore generalizability, we examine subsets of countries based on institutional differences and geographic regions. The strong mobilizing role of unions remains significant and positive throughout, including analyses looking exclusively at the global South and among less democratic countries (available upon request). How does institutional context condition the effects of union membership? Table 3 reports that the interaction between union membership and democracy is positive and significant for strikes and demonstrations. This suggests that while union members are generally more likely to strike and demonstrate than non-members, the effects are larger in more democratic societies. We do not observe a significant interaction for occupations, which is the least frequent act (just 3 percent of respondents). We also observe that democracy’s effects extend to milder acts, including boycotts and political discussion (but not petitions). To unpack these findings, figure 2 presents the predicted probability that union members and non-members participate in demonstrations at varying democracy levels. The difference between union members and non-members becomes larger at high levels of democracy.15 Figure 2. View largeDownload slide Predicted probability of participation in a demonstration by level of democracy, with 95 percent CI Figure 2. View largeDownload slide Predicted probability of participation in a demonstration by level of democracy, with 95 percent CI We next examine volunteering for parties and other political groups. The interaction between union membership and democracy is positive and significant, suggesting that union members are especially likely to volunteer for political parties in highly democratic countries. By contrast, in less democratic settings, union members are particularly likely to work with other political organizations, such as human rights, peace, women’s, and environmental groups. The negative and significant interaction suggests that the effects of union membership on volunteering for political organizations are largest when democracy is low. The discussion of Chile, above, provides one plausible interpretation: as state repression limits contentious politics, union members turned efforts toward cooperation with other political organizations, such as human rights groups (Drake 1996). To illustrate this, figure 3 shows the predicted probability of political volunteering and party volunteering among union members. Party volunteering is virtually absent among low-democracy societies, but increases rapidly at the highest levels of democracy. Political organization volunteering, which is somewhat more common across the board, shows the opposite pattern: it is most common in less democratic countries. Figure 3. View largeDownload slide Predicted probability of party volunteering and “other” political organization volunteering for union members, by level of democracy, with 95 percent CI Figure 3. View largeDownload slide Predicted probability of party volunteering and “other” political organization volunteering for union members, by level of democracy, with 95 percent CI Next, we turn to the effects of corporatist arrangements on union members’ participation. Corporatism is designed to minimize strikes. Indeed, we observe that the direct effect of corporatism on strikes is negative and significant. Moreover, the negative interaction term suggests that it specifically reduces strike participation among union members. What about forms of political activity that are not specifically regulated by corporatist structures? The interaction between union membership and corporatism is negative and significant for all types of participation, from more contentious (e.g., demonstrations) to more institutional (e.g., party work). Union membership still tends to boost participation in corporatist countries—but the effects are smaller than in non-corporatist societies. Interestingly, the direct effects of corporatism are often insignificant, once a union-corporatism interaction is included. This suggests that the quiescence of corporatist societies is largely due to unions and their members. However, we are hesitant to draw strong conclusions, as the main effects of corporatism are generally in the expected direction; future studies with larger country samples may clarify the issue. Figure 4 shows the predicted probability of participation in demonstrations. The effect of union membership is much larger in non-corporatist societies. Figure 4 puts the difference between corporatist and non-corporatist societies in a new light: societal differences appear to be largely driven by the behavior of union members. Figure 4. View largeDownload slide Predicted probability of participating in a demonstration in non-corporatist vs corporatist countries, with 95 percent CI Figure 4. View largeDownload slide Predicted probability of participating in a demonstration in non-corporatist vs corporatist countries, with 95 percent CI Table 4 examines highly industrialized democracies, where we are able to take advantage of six WVS waves, ISSP voting measures, and a richer continuous measure of corporatism. Our models include fixed effects for both country and wave, with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country. Country fixed effects models highlight within-country change over time. Again, union membership has positive, significant effects on all types of participation, with the largest effects among contentious actions. Union members have over three times greater odds of striking (exp(1.179) = 3.25), and two times of demonstrating (exp(0.835) = 2.31) and occupying (exp(0.758) = 2.13). They also have substantially greater odds of less contentious acts, including boycotting (exp(0.609) = 1.84), petitioning (exp(0.519) = 1.68), and discussing politics (exp(0.378) = 1.46). Again, we see that union members are deeply involved in electoral politics in highly democratic contexts. The odds of volunteering for a party is roughly 2.4 times higher for union members, and the odds of voting is 1.3 times greater. Again, we observe that the strong positive effect of union membership on participation is mediated by corporatism. The interactions between union and corporatism are negative and significant for contentious acts—strikes, occupations, and demonstrations—as well as for boycotts. This suggests that corporatism reduces many forms of extra-institutional politics. However, we do not observe significant interactions for several less contentious acts, including signing petitions, discussing politics, volunteering for political parties, or voting, which were significant in the full sample reported in table 3 (except for voting, which was unavailable for the full sample). This might result from our small and rather homogeneous sample (14 to 20 countries, all affluent democracies). However, it is possible that the significant results for discussing politics, petitioning, and party volunteering in table 3 are spurious, and that the two-way fixed effects models do a better job at accurately describing the relationship. Alternately, it is possible that this lack of significance is particular to types of activities that are embedded in political structures. Voting, volunteering for parties, and discussing politics are all activities that are deeply entwined in slow-changing political institutions, which the span of available WVS waves may not be long enough to capture. Overall, the results in table 4 suggest that the dampening effects of corporatism are concentrated more on contentious and extra-institutional acts, which is consistent with our expectations (but different from the results in table 3). Corollary Analyses A wide range of corollary analyses address possible methodological concerns and test the robustness of our results (available upon request). Macro-economic context Basic economic factors as well as large-scale macro-economic change may affect the political participation of union members; however, systematic studies are rare. In one of the few studies, Silver (2003) shows that as capital relocates around the world, worker unrest follows. We considered a range of economic and globalization measures, including FDI, trade openness, inflation, and industrial employment, as well as the interaction between each economic measure and union membership. Appendix B includes one such table, showing general controls for economic context. These results show that macro-economic variables provide little leverage on understanding variation in political participation. If anything, trade openness is associated with less political participation. The interaction between union membership and economic context variables, likewise, did not have consistent effects. Overall, these results are consonant with prior work in the social movement literature, which finds that economic context and grievances, alone, are typically insufficient to explain political action. They also echo research in less developed countries, which show that institutional factors largely explain union membership (Martin and Brady 2007). Union density Changes in union density could affect how unions mobilize members. On the one hand, unions may mobilize members in response to decline; on the other, declining unions may not have the resources for mass mobilization or the belief that such efforts will be effective. We included a measure of the change in union density (raw and percentage change over time) for industrialized democracies. Neither union density nor its interaction with union membership was significant. Employment Because most, but not all, union members are employed, we replicated our main tables using a sample of only employed workers. Results were similar. Measures of corporatism Multiple measures of corporatism are available for industrialized democracies. We present a combination of structural measures and wage coordination. As we describe in the Data section, we examined multiple measures and observed similar results. Varieties of corporatism While corporatism comes in several flavors, we expected (and observed) similar effects of neo-corporatism and state corporatism. We conducted disaggregated analyses for table 3, focusing separately on these varieties of corporatism. Results were generally consistent. Union interactions with state corporatist countries of the global South did not reach significance for some acts, including volunteering for political parties. We hesitate to draw strong conclusions from this, as the sample size is low. We also analyzed post-Communist regimes of Eastern Europe separately; union interactions were negative and significant across all political acts. Democracy-corporatism interactions We considered the possibility that democracy and corporatism interact to influence union mobilization, generating complex joint configurations. However, interaction terms were generally insignificant, suggesting that the two dimensions simply combine in an additive fashion.16 Endogeneity One potential challenge to studying the effect of organizational membership on participation is that high-participators may be “joiners” who select into organizational membership (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Countries vary in how much choice workers have in union membership. Some countries have union security practices, which require workers to be union members or pay dues.17 Others have open-shop policies in which unions must persuade workers to become members. In this context, activists may be more likely to join unions, which would partially explain why union members are more politically active than non-union members. Prior literature suggests that this is less of a concern for union studies, as exogenous factors substantially determine the possibility of union membership, including prior educational and occupational choices (Kerrissey and Schofer 2013; Martin and Brady 2007; Stegmueller and Becher 2014). Structural factors still shape the possibility of union membership. For instance, in Germany, which has an open shop, union membership is strongly related to firm size, the existence of work councils, occupational characteristics, and broader norms around union membership (Goerke and Pannenberg 2004; Schnabel and Wagner 2005). Nevertheless, we conducted corollary analyses to address some potential sources of endogeneity. First, we included a general control for association membership—essentially taking into account one’s propensity to be a “joiner.” Second, we included a control for political ideology, as left-oriented individuals might be more likely to join unions and to participate actively in politics.18 Third, we examined Scandinavian countries, where membership is high due to it being tied to parts of the social security system, as well as union security provisions that limit individual discretion to opt out of membership. These countries are less likely to have a selection effect of activists into unions. All corollary analyses were consistent with our main findings. Heterogeneous choice models Following Williams (2009), we explored heterogeneous choice models to address Allison’s (1999) concern that group differences in logistic regression coefficients, such as interaction effects, may be an artifact of unequal residual variation. Results were nearly identical to comparable logistic regression results.19 Discussion and Conclusion We provide systematic evidence that union members participate much more in political life across a diverse sample of 60 countries. Substantively, these effects are large and span a broad set of activities. Union membership in some cases may double or even triple the odds of participating in demonstrations, occupations, strikes, boycotts, petitions, political party work, and voluntary work with other political organizations. The case of unions allows us to extend theories of political participation. We show that the impact of organizations—in this case labor unions—on participation is not a given, but rather depends on institutional context. Labor movements aim to mobilize members and build political capital everywhere—but the extent to which they do so, and how they channel participation, differs across national contexts. Institutions define the playing field of politics, and consequently serve to construct the interests and strategies of organizations and individuals. Future research could extend the argument to other types of organizations, from churches to social movement organizations, and could consider other dimensions of institutional variation such as centralization and state capacity (e.g., Fourcade and Schofer 2016). Democracy appears to have profound implications for unions, and in particular the political strategies and activities that unions pursue. While we expected democracies to have particularly strong effects on the most contentious acts, the far-reaching effects of democratic institutions appear to spill over into milder actions, such as discussing politics. Democracy also affects the types of organizational volunteering union members pursue. In more democratic settings, union members are particularly likely to work with political parties. Non-democratic societies shift union strategies away from contentious politics and parties—instead, their members work with and through other politically oriented associations. In other words, unions generally work to build political capital, but the form of political capital depends on the national context. In democracies, unions often leverage their large membership to build influence with parties, while in non-democracies they tend to form networks and alliances with other political and opposition groups. Corporatism appears to substantially dampen the participation of union members. This is obviously the case for strikes, which corporatist arrangements purposefully diffuse. However, we find that almost all forms of participation are reduced in corporatist settings (though some effects are weaker in longitudinal analyses of affluent democracies in table 4). We raise the possibility that corporatism is particularly important for reducing the most contentious acts, and less so for highly institutional politics (e.g., party work and voting), which we observe in industrialized democracies (table 4). It is notable that these general patterns appear to be consistent across corporatist societies, despite substantial differences among them (e.g., neo-corporatism versus state corporatism). We do not suggest that corporatism is uniform. To the contrary, our illustrations suggest important differences in the underlying mechanisms yielding convergent outcomes. The literature on participation has increasingly focused on organizational factors that encourage political involvement—but with little sensitivity to the ways that organizational factors may operate differently across time and space. Labor unions inhabit a very different position in corporatist societies versus non-corporatist societies and democratic versus non-democratic ones. To understand comparative differences in political life, it is important to incorporate institutional dimensions into analyses of organizational dynamics. These findings build on the institutional lens of labor scholars, which has attended mostly to issues of union membership. Institutions are also central to shaping union members’ political lives, and these effects extend far beyond voting or only industrialized democracies. This institutional lens offers additional leverage to understand how workers respond to economic and workplace grievances. A possible counternarrative to institutional arguments may be that economic conditions explain shifts in worker mobilization. To address this, we controlled for economic factors, including inflation, trade, and so forth. While these measures likely matter in particular contexts and at particular times, they provided little leverage to explain broad comparative patterns of union members’ political participation. Research on the relationship between long-term shifts in institutional arrangements, economic conditions, and union mobilization is needed. While institutional structures appear to broadly shape union strategies, unions have, at particular historical junctures, helped influence those structures, sometimes playing important roles in democratization movements (Collier and Mahoney 1997; Kraus 2007) and strengthening corporatist structures (Hicks 1999; Korpi and Shalev 1979). Whereas our study focuses exclusively on the recent past, studies with a broader longitudinal scope could further unpack the historical interplay between institutional structure and labor mobilization. Future research might also attend more directly to the different strains of corporatism. Our study emphasized the commonalities among corporatist societies, and we observed broadly similar patterns in our analyses. But the underlying paths to those outcomes may be very different. In neo-corporatist arrangements, we suspect that conflict mediation mechanisms and political access shape union strategies, while state corporatism frequently involves direct co-optation of union agendas. Also, studies that draw on more detailed political participation measures may yet discern important differences across the varieties of corporatism. Finally, we offer some remarks on the future of labor mobilization. Drawing on Marx, labor scholars often note that the reorganization of production creates new opportunities for labor movements (Evans 2010; Silver 2003). We propose that changing institutional arrangements also creates new opportunities. With the “third wave” of democratization, democratic regimes have replaced authoritarian regimes across much of the global South (Haggard 1995; Huntington 1991). This shift in institutional context may alter the way that unions attempt to mobilize members. Concurrently, corporatist arrangements have been eroding. This hurts unions in many ways, including undercutting political access and membership. At the same time, this erosion is likely to change the role of unions in political life—shifting them more toward mobilizing organizations. Indeed, the uptick in union mobilization in some European countries in the twenty-first century may already be reflecting such changes. These two historical shifts—the third wave of democratization and the erosion of corporatist arrangements—are likely to produce greater mobilization among union members in the years to come. At the same time, long-term political and economic trends have threatened unions, and many traditional union strongholds have weakened in the last decades. It remains to be seen whether increased member mobilization will provide a meaningful force in the face of such challenges. Countries in table 3 Albaniac Algeriaa Argentinaa Austriab Bangladesh Belgiumb Bulgariac Belarusa Canada Chile Chinaa Croatia Czech Republicc Denmarkb Egypta Estoniac Finlandb France Germanyb Greece Hungaryc India Indonesia Irana Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japanb Jordan Kyrgyzstan Latviac Lithuania Luxembourg Mexicoa Moldova Morocco Netherlandsb Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Polandc Portugal Romaniac Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Slovakiac Sloveniac South Africa South Korea Spain Swedenb Tanzania Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom United States Venezuela Zimbabwe Albaniac Algeriaa Argentinaa Austriab Bangladesh Belgiumb Bulgariac Belarusa Canada Chile Chinaa Croatia Czech Republicc Denmarkb Egypta Estoniac Finlandb France Germanyb Greece Hungaryc India Indonesia Irana Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japanb Jordan Kyrgyzstan Latviac Lithuania Luxembourg Mexicoa Moldova Morocco Netherlandsb Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Polandc Portugal Romaniac Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Slovakiac Sloveniac South Africa South Korea Spain Swedenb Tanzania Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom United States Venezuela Zimbabwe Countries in table 3 Albaniac Algeriaa Argentinaa Austriab Bangladesh Belgiumb Bulgariac Belarusa Canada Chile Chinaa Croatia Czech Republicc Denmarkb Egypta Estoniac Finlandb France Germanyb Greece Hungaryc India Indonesia Irana Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japanb Jordan Kyrgyzstan Latviac Lithuania Luxembourg Mexicoa Moldova Morocco Netherlandsb Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Polandc Portugal Romaniac Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Slovakiac Sloveniac South Africa South Korea Spain Swedenb Tanzania Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom United States Venezuela Zimbabwe Albaniac Algeriaa Argentinaa Austriab Bangladesh Belgiumb Bulgariac Belarusa Canada Chile Chinaa Croatia Czech Republicc Denmarkb Egypta Estoniac Finlandb France Germanyb Greece Hungaryc India Indonesia Irana Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japanb Jordan Kyrgyzstan Latviac Lithuania Luxembourg Mexicoa Moldova Morocco Netherlandsb Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Polandc Portugal Romaniac Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Slovakiac Sloveniac South Africa South Korea Spain Swedenb Tanzania Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom United States Venezuela Zimbabwe Countries in table 4 (mean corporatism scores adjacent) Australia 0.01 Austria 4.29 Belgium 2.10 Canada −1.78 Denmark 1.66 Finland 1.84 France −1.25 Germany 1.37 Ireland 1.13 Italy −0.25 Japan 0.84 Netherlands 2.26 New Zealand −2.39 Norway 2.36 Portugal 0.84 Spain −0.21 Sweden 1.91 Switzerland −0.01 United Kingdom −2.89 United States −2.60 Australia 0.01 Austria 4.29 Belgium 2.10 Canada −1.78 Denmark 1.66 Finland 1.84 France −1.25 Germany 1.37 Ireland 1.13 Italy −0.25 Japan 0.84 Netherlands 2.26 New Zealand −2.39 Norway 2.36 Portugal 0.84 Spain −0.21 Sweden 1.91 Switzerland −0.01 United Kingdom −2.89 United States −2.60 Note: Because the WVS did not ask all questions in all countries, we had to exclude a handful of countries from some of our analyses. The following dependent variables were not asked for these countries: demonstrate, boycott, petition, political party work (China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia); strike (China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Singapore); volunteer for political organizations (Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela). The subscripts note the coding for corporatism measures for table 3. Our dichotomous measure for corporatism is coded as “1” for subscripts a, b, and c. aCountry is coded as 1 for state corporatism. bCountry is coded as 1 for neo-corporatism. cCountry is coded as 1 for “Eastern European.” Countries in table 4 (mean corporatism scores adjacent) Australia 0.01 Austria 4.29 Belgium 2.10 Canada −1.78 Denmark 1.66 Finland 1.84 France −1.25 Germany 1.37 Ireland 1.13 Italy −0.25 Japan 0.84 Netherlands 2.26 New Zealand −2.39 Norway 2.36 Portugal 0.84 Spain −0.21 Sweden 1.91 Switzerland −0.01 United Kingdom −2.89 United States −2.60 Australia 0.01 Austria 4.29 Belgium 2.10 Canada −1.78 Denmark 1.66 Finland 1.84 France −1.25 Germany 1.37 Ireland 1.13 Italy −0.25 Japan 0.84 Netherlands 2.26 New Zealand −2.39 Norway 2.36 Portugal 0.84 Spain −0.21 Sweden 1.91 Switzerland −0.01 United Kingdom −2.89 United States −2.60 Note: Because the WVS did not ask all questions in all countries, we had to exclude a handful of countries from some of our analyses. The following dependent variables were not asked for these countries: demonstrate, boycott, petition, political party work (China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia); strike (China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Singapore); volunteer for political organizations (Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela). The subscripts note the coding for corporatism measures for table 3. Our dichotomous measure for corporatism is coded as “1” for subscripts a, b, and c. aCountry is coded as 1 for state corporatism. bCountry is coded as 1 for neo-corporatism. cCountry is coded as 1 for “Eastern European.” Appendix B. Logistic regression models with random effects: The interaction effects of union membership with democracy and corporatism on political participation, including additional economic controls, 2004 Discuss politics Strike Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Union 0.503*** 0.782*** 0.771*** 0.598*** 0.548*** 1.313*** 0.996*** (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) Male 0.598*** 0.569*** 0.422*** 0.399*** 0.119*** 0.804*** −0.493*** (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) Age 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.054*** 0.023* 0.026*** (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000 −0.000** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.040 −0.241*** −0.200*** −0.218*** −0.062** 0.011 −0.053 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Education 0.183*** 0.089*** 0.188*** 0.171*** 0.197*** 0.125*** 0.106*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Employed 0.018 −0.025 0.043+ −0.042 0.135*** 0.013 0.108** (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) GDP logged −0.087+ −0.032 0.098 0.359*** 0.572*** −0.549** −0.173 (0.05) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12) Inflation 0.046 −0.092 −0.040 −0.071 −0.094 −0.291* −0.367*** (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10) FDI 0.138** 0.062 0.090 0.040 0.115 0.200 0.193 (0.05) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.15) Trade, % GDP −0.003** 0.001 −0.004+ −0.007** −0.006** −0.000 −0.004 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Industry, % −0.013+ 0.017 −0.014 −0.020 −0.015 −0.002 −0.001 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) Democracy 0.001 0.076** 0.028 −0.057* 0.025 0.125** −0.077* (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Union*Democracy 0.013+ 0.066** 0.036*** 0.039** 0.016+ 0.054*** −0.016+ (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist 0.371*** −0.659** 0.029 0.151 0.082 −0.134 −0.711** (0.11) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.39) (0.28) Union*Corporatist −0.304*** −0.302** −0.411*** −0.353*** −0.253*** −0.687*** −0.660*** (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) Constant −3.391*** −5.428*** −4.007*** −6.758*** −6.957*** −1.097 −1.414 (0.44) (0.93) (0.80) (0.77) (0.75) (1.50) (1.05) Observations 75,510 66,868 69,431 67,716 69,042 76,803 60,449 Countries 53 50 51 51 51 53 46 Discuss politics Strike Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Union 0.503*** 0.782*** 0.771*** 0.598*** 0.548*** 1.313*** 0.996*** (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) Male 0.598*** 0.569*** 0.422*** 0.399*** 0.119*** 0.804*** −0.493*** (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) Age 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.054*** 0.023* 0.026*** (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000 −0.000** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.040 −0.241*** −0.200*** −0.218*** −0.062** 0.011 −0.053 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Education 0.183*** 0.089*** 0.188*** 0.171*** 0.197*** 0.125*** 0.106*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Employed 0.018 −0.025 0.043+ −0.042 0.135*** 0.013 0.108** (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) GDP logged −0.087+ −0.032 0.098 0.359*** 0.572*** −0.549** −0.173 (0.05) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12) Inflation 0.046 −0.092 −0.040 −0.071 −0.094 −0.291* −0.367*** (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10) FDI 0.138** 0.062 0.090 0.040 0.115 0.200 0.193 (0.05) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.15) Trade, % GDP −0.003** 0.001 −0.004+ −0.007** −0.006** −0.000 −0.004 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Industry, % −0.013+ 0.017 −0.014 −0.020 −0.015 −0.002 −0.001 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) Democracy 0.001 0.076** 0.028 −0.057* 0.025 0.125** −0.077* (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Union*Democracy 0.013+ 0.066** 0.036*** 0.039** 0.016+ 0.054*** −0.016+ (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist 0.371*** −0.659** 0.029 0.151 0.082 −0.134 −0.711** (0.11) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.39) (0.28) Union*Corporatist −0.304*** −0.302** −0.411*** −0.353*** −0.253*** −0.687*** −0.660*** (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) Constant −3.391*** −5.428*** −4.007*** −6.758*** −6.957*** −1.097 −1.414 (0.44) (0.93) (0.80) (0.77) (0.75) (1.50) (1.05) Observations 75,510 66,868 69,431 67,716 69,042 76,803 60,449 Countries 53 50 51 51 51 53 46 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10; two-tailed tests. Appendix B. Logistic regression models with random effects: The interaction effects of union membership with democracy and corporatism on political participation, including additional economic controls, 2004 Discuss politics Strike Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Union 0.503*** 0.782*** 0.771*** 0.598*** 0.548*** 1.313*** 0.996*** (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) Male 0.598*** 0.569*** 0.422*** 0.399*** 0.119*** 0.804*** −0.493*** (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) Age 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.054*** 0.023* 0.026*** (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000 −0.000** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.040 −0.241*** −0.200*** −0.218*** −0.062** 0.011 −0.053 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Education 0.183*** 0.089*** 0.188*** 0.171*** 0.197*** 0.125*** 0.106*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Employed 0.018 −0.025 0.043+ −0.042 0.135*** 0.013 0.108** (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) GDP logged −0.087+ −0.032 0.098 0.359*** 0.572*** −0.549** −0.173 (0.05) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12) Inflation 0.046 −0.092 −0.040 −0.071 −0.094 −0.291* −0.367*** (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10) FDI 0.138** 0.062 0.090 0.040 0.115 0.200 0.193 (0.05) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.15) Trade, % GDP −0.003** 0.001 −0.004+ −0.007** −0.006** −0.000 −0.004 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Industry, % −0.013+ 0.017 −0.014 −0.020 −0.015 −0.002 −0.001 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) Democracy 0.001 0.076** 0.028 −0.057* 0.025 0.125** −0.077* (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Union*Democracy 0.013+ 0.066** 0.036*** 0.039** 0.016+ 0.054*** −0.016+ (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist 0.371*** −0.659** 0.029 0.151 0.082 −0.134 −0.711** (0.11) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.39) (0.28) Union*Corporatist −0.304*** −0.302** −0.411*** −0.353*** −0.253*** −0.687*** −0.660*** (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) Constant −3.391*** −5.428*** −4.007*** −6.758*** −6.957*** −1.097 −1.414 (0.44) (0.93) (0.80) (0.77) (0.75) (1.50) (1.05) Observations 75,510 66,868 69,431 67,716 69,042 76,803 60,449 Countries 53 50 51 51 51 53 46 Discuss politics Strike Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Union 0.503*** 0.782*** 0.771*** 0.598*** 0.548*** 1.313*** 0.996*** (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) Male 0.598*** 0.569*** 0.422*** 0.399*** 0.119*** 0.804*** −0.493*** (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) Age 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.054*** 0.023* 0.026*** (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000 −0.000** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.040 −0.241*** −0.200*** −0.218*** −0.062** 0.011 −0.053 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Education 0.183*** 0.089*** 0.188*** 0.171*** 0.197*** 0.125*** 0.106*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Employed 0.018 −0.025 0.043+ −0.042 0.135*** 0.013 0.108** (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) GDP logged −0.087+ −0.032 0.098 0.359*** 0.572*** −0.549** −0.173 (0.05) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12) Inflation 0.046 −0.092 −0.040 −0.071 −0.094 −0.291* −0.367*** (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10) FDI 0.138** 0.062 0.090 0.040 0.115 0.200 0.193 (0.05) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.15) Trade, % GDP −0.003** 0.001 −0.004+ −0.007** −0.006** −0.000 −0.004 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Industry, % −0.013+ 0.017 −0.014 −0.020 −0.015 −0.002 −0.001 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) Democracy 0.001 0.076** 0.028 −0.057* 0.025 0.125** −0.077* (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Union*Democracy 0.013+ 0.066** 0.036*** 0.039** 0.016+ 0.054*** −0.016+ (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist 0.371*** −0.659** 0.029 0.151 0.082 −0.134 −0.711** (0.11) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.39) (0.28) Union*Corporatist −0.304*** −0.302** −0.411*** −0.353*** −0.253*** −0.687*** −0.660*** (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) Constant −3.391*** −5.428*** −4.007*** −6.758*** −6.957*** −1.097 −1.414 (0.44) (0.93) (0.80) (0.77) (0.75) (1.50) (1.05) Observations 75,510 66,868 69,431 67,716 69,042 76,803 60,449 Countries 53 50 51 51 51 53 46 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10; two-tailed tests. Notes 1 Scholars distinguish between more and less “confrontational” or “contentious” political acts (e.g., Dalton 2014; Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Drawing on this, we characterize demonstrating, occupying, and striking as contentious acts. Voting, volunteering, and discussing politics are generally not as contentious. We also lump petitions and boycotts in the non-contentious category, though we acknowledge that they have varied meanings across societies, and especially boycotts may represent a middle ground in some contexts. 2 We do note that “demonstrations” in this context may be in support of the state. 3 In this period, the United States and Chile were low corporatism; Egypt and Germany were on the higher end. Germany and the United States had high democracy scores (10). Egypt and Chile had low democracy scores in the 1980s (−6); Chile grew more democratic toward the 2000s (we discuss the non-democratic period). 4 Because democracy and corporatism are dimensions rather than crisp dichotomies, some cases fell in the middle rather than neatly into the quadrants’ corners. For instance, Spain, Ireland, and Turkey had elements of corporatism, and would fall somewhere in the middle of that dimension. 5 Germany has a dual structure of worker representation. Unions bargain over wages and employment conditions. Work councils negotiate other firm-level issues. 6 Corporatist arrangements weakened over time in Egypt. By the 2000s, many of the economic elements had been abandoned, though independent unions remained illegal. 7 How unions respond to the erosion of corporatism varies. Contentious protest, as occurred in Egypt, is only one potential outcome (Murillo 2001). 8 For survey details, see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp; http://www.issp.org/. 9 Questions are retrospective in nature. Respondents may make errors in recall of events. We focus on behaviors rather than attitudes, because the former are more likely to be recalled correctly (e.g., Smith 1984). 10 We mean-center democracy scores for regression analyses. We use the raw scores for figures for ease of interpretation. 11 We examined other measures of corporatism, including ones focused on primarily on interest group representation (e.g., measures for Lijphart [1999] as well as the union “centralization” score from Visser) and industrial policies (e.g., Visser’s wage coordination score). We also reran models using Jahn’s (2014) summary score of corporatism, derived from Visser’s measures. Results are substantively similar across these various measures. We opt to use this measure because it satisfies several requirements: it is time varying and covers a larger group of countries, it combines aspects from the various “camps” of corporatism measures, and results are consistent with other measures of corporatism. 12 It is generally straightforward to distinguish between corporatist and non-corporatist societies, but a few cases are the subject of debate, such as Venezuela (e.g., Coppedge 1993). We conducted sensitivity analyses to see if reclassification of those particular cases altered our findings; results were consistent. 13 However, we observe one difference: Eastern European union members were particularly unlikely to strike. Funk and Lesch (2004, 270) attribute these low strike levels to many Eastern European workers’ beliefs that structural change was necessary, as well as inexperience with mass mobilization. 14 Additional adjustment of standard errors for clustering by time yielded similar results. 15 Few countries in our sample have extremely low levels of democracy, so confidence intervals are very large. Interpret predicted probabilities at the bottom of the spectrum with caution. 16 We did observe one significant three-way interaction between democracy, corporatism, and union membership for demonstrate. This suggests that union members are even more likely to demonstrate compared to their non-union counterparts in countries with both high levels of democracies and low corporatism—such as the United States. 17 Many countries have provisions for union security practices at the time of this study, including Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Japan, the Philippines, the Scandinavian countries, and some states within the United States. 18 Because organizational membership and ideology are likely consequences of union membership, we did not think it appropriate to include these in our main tables. 19 Williams’ STATA code does not support random effects, so we were only able to compare with conventional logit models. Appendix A. About the Authors Jasmine Kerrissey is Assistant Professor of Sociology and faculty of the Labor Center at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. She holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of California, Irvine, and a BS in Industrial and Labor Relations from Cornell University. Her research examines the historical and contemporary role of labor movements in shaping working conditions, inequality, and political participation. Evan Schofer is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Irvine. His work has explored global expansions of education, science, and environmentalism. His research in comparative political sociology addresses variation in political participation as well as the worldwide growth of civil society organizations in recent decades. Much of his work seeks to develop and extend world society theory, to better understand global patterns of social change. He received his PhD in Sociology from Stanford University. References Allison , Paul D. 1999 . “ Comparing Logit and Probit Coefficients Across Groups .” Sociological Methods and Research 28 ( 2 ): 186 – 208 . 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Author notes We thank members of the Irvine Comparative Sociology Workshop and the UMass Organizations and Networks Group for their helpful comments, as well as Marion Fourcade, David J. Frank, Ron Jepperson, Tom Juravich, Ann Hironaka, Joya Misra, Jeff Schuhrke, and Don Tomaskovic-Devey. Work on this project was supported by a seed grant from the Center for the Study of Democracy at the University of California, Irvine. © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/about_us/legal/notices) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Social Forces Oxford University Press

Labor Unions and Political Participation in Comparative Perspective

Social Forces , Volume 97 (1) – Sep 1, 2018

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Abstract

Abstract This research uses comparative survey data to examine the effects of labor union membership on individual political participation. We argue that national political institutions—specifically, democracy and corporatism—shape the ways that unions mobilize their members to engage in the political sphere. Democratic regimes provide structural opportunities and cultural repertoires that lead unions to focus on member mobilization, especially via contentious politics and political parties. Corporatism, which directly links unions to state structures, undercuts the logics and incentives for union mobilization. We draw upon historical cases of Germany, the United States, Chile, and Egypt to illustrate how democracy and corporatism shape unions’ mobilization efforts. Multilevel models of World Values Survey data from roughly 60 countries find that union members participate more than non-members across a range of electoral and extra-institutional political acts, such as demonstrating, occupying buildings, signing petitions, party work, and so forth. In democratic societies, such effects are stronger and participation shifts toward parties and contentious politics. In less democratic societies, union members are particularly likely to work with and through other political organizations. Corporatist arrangements generally dampen the political activities of union members. Introduction Labor unions play a central role in political mobilization across the globe. From Southern Europe to Latin America, labor unions periodically launch mass demonstrations and strikes that can bring societies to a halt. In the United States and many other countries, unions have organized pivotal get-out-the-vote campaigns. In the Middle East, unions were key organizations in several Arab Spring movements. With the sharp decline of union membership and political power in many countries, it is easy to forget that unions are among the largest political organizations in most societies. This research examines the effects of unions on individual political behavior in the contemporary period across a large sample of countries. The paper combines organizational and institutional perspectives on political participation to theorize how union effects differ across comparative/historical context. We present a general framework for understanding comparative differences in union members’ participation, focusing on democracy and corporatism. Democratic institutions provide opportunities and constraints that channel union members toward political parties and contentious politics. Corporatism integrates unions into state structures and policymaking, producing a mix of political opportunities and constraints that generally dampen union efforts to mobilize participation across a range of acts, not only strikes. The paper extends the institutional literature in labor scholarship, which has mainly focused on union membership or the distribution of economic resources (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999; Kerrissey 2015; Martin and Brady 2007; Western 1999). It also advances the largely Anglo-/Eurocentric literature by examining the effects of union membership on political behavior across a broad set of countries, including the global South. We argue that institutions impact far more than the size of unions: they channel how people engage in political life. We illustrate our arguments via discussions of the United States, Germany, Chile, and Egypt in the late twentieth century. We then evaluate arguments using comparative data from the World Values Survey, which includes measures of individual political behavior: demonstrating, boycotting, striking, occupying, signing petitions, volunteering for political parties, volunteering for non-party political organizations, and discussing politics. We supplement these analyses with data on voting for industrialized democracies. We develop multilevel models to examine political participation in roughly 60 countries in 2004 and assess the robustness of our findings via corollary analyses examining 20 affluent democracies from 1981 to 2012 with country and year fixed effects. Extending Theories of Political Participation The classic literature views political participation as a consequence of individual skills and capacities, or interests as defined by one’s structural position within society (Verba and Nie 1972). A later set of studies focus on organizations: civic and political groups, such as churches and voluntary associations, where individuals develop political skills, learn information, and build network ties that pave the way for subsequent political involvement (Putnam 2000; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Moreover, political organizations and social movement groups mobilize individual participation—urging people to vote, write letters to Congress, or protest (Meyer 2007; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Institutional perspectives, by contrast, shift attention away from individuals and organizations and toward the societal structures that are the context for political action (Amenta and Ramsey 2010). Political institutions, which have both organizational and cultural dimensions, define the terrain on which political action and struggles play out (Clemens 1993; Schofer and Fourcade Gourinchas 2001; Skocpol 2003). Historically developed institutional arrangements—such as democratic versus autocratic governance, the type of electoral system, the presence of corporatist structures, concentration of political authority, and so on—construct the political sphere and help explain striking differences in political behavior across societies (Fourcade and Schofer 2016; Jepperson 2002; Paxton 2002). Organizational Dynamics in Institutional Context We argue that organizational dynamics of participation are conditional on institutional context. That is, institutional features of governance have the potential to amplify or dampen the impact of organizations on individual participation. The hard realities of institutional incentives, constraints, and opportunity structures may shift organizational strategies to focus more (or less) on individual participation. Moreover, institutions coevolve with cultural logics or repertoires of participation that “make sense,” shaping organizational strategies and practices (Fourcade and Schofer 2016; Jepperson and Meyer 1991). More specifically, we suggest that key features of the institutional context may explain why unions sometimes focus heavily on mobilizing members to participate in politics and at other times do not. Unions and Political Participation Scholars identify unions as key organizations that animate individual political action. Much scholarship focuses on voting (Gray and Caul 2000; Radcliff and Davis 2000; Rosenfeld 2014), but union membership effects extend to a broad range of political and civic activities (Kerrissey and Schofer 2013). A rich case study literature unpacks the processes and mechanisms involved: unions cultivate political identities and skills, and they directly mobilize individuals (e.g., Terriquez 2011). In one of the few comparative quantitative studies, Norris (2002) finds that union members in industrialized countries express greater willingness to engage in politics. We extend this literature by examining the effects of unions on actual behaviors across a large sample of countries. Based on this prior work, we expect union membership to boost participation across a full spectrum of outcomes, from modest acts like engaging in political discussion, to more substantial acts such as joining a demonstration. We expect the effects to extend beyond industrialized democracies and to be highly general, though prior work suggests that effects may be larger in contentious politics (demonstrating and striking)1 and the electoral arena, which is seen to be central to union agendas (e.g., Gray and Caul 2000; Kerrissey and Schofer 2013). Hypothesis 1: Union members will participate in politics more than non-members. Institutional context: The conditionality of union effects We focus on two features of countries’ political institutions that may moderate union effects on individual political behavior: democracy and corporatism. Democracy. We conceptualize democracy in a conventional manner (e.g., Huntington 1991; Lijphart 1999), as a system of governance involving broad-based citizen participation (typically open, competitive elections), institutionalization of widespread protections for civil and political rights, and constraints on arbitrary exercise of state power. Democratic societies are distinguished by an open political opportunity structure, typically accompanied by a political culture and norms that legitimate individual participation in civic life (Lijphart 1999). Studies find that less democratic societies have less protest (Olzak 2006), association membership (Paxton 2002), voluntary associations (Schofer and Longhofer 2011), and political engagement compared to highly democratic societies (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010). While unions encourage participation generally, we expect unions to have larger effects in democratic societies due to the congenial opportunity structure. We also expect democracy to shift union mobilization efforts. Elections are central venues and critical leverage points in democratic societies, and thus unions often focus mobilization efforts on them. In addition, the rights afforded by democratic institutions make contentious politics a more viable option for unions (Coppedge 1993). Severe repression, common to many non-democratic societies, greatly increases costs for protestors—who risk imprisonment, injury, or death—and the organizations that support contentious politics. Consequently, unions in democratic societies are relatively more apt to mobilize members toward contentious tactics, such as demonstrations. We expect less difference across levels of democracy for more moderate acts, such as signing a petition or discussing politics, which are less likely to trigger sharp repression in non-democratic contexts. Finally, where electoral opportunities are limited and contentious politics are severely repressed, unions generally seek indirect routes to political influence. Unions in less democratic settings are often more embedded in community organizations (Lee 2012), which are less the target of state repression. Unions frequently work via alliances with other political organizations, such as human rights groups. Collaboration with civil society organizations allows space for unionists to build alliances and support in a climate that discourages direct contentious challenges to the state. Hypothesis 2: In highly democratic societies, union membership will be more strongly associated with individual participation in contentious politics and political party volunteering. In less democratic societies, union membership will be associated with participation in other types of political organizations. Corporatism A second critical feature of the institutional landscape is how unions are incorporated into state structures via forms of corporatism. Corporatism refers to formalized systems of political interest representation that are channeled through a limited set of officially sanctioned or legitimated collectivities (Jepperson 2002; Schmitter 1974). In the context of labor relations, corporatism more specifically refers to governance centered around representation of so-called “functional” groups within capitalist societies, including labor, industry, and the state (Korpi and Shalev 1979). In corporatist societies, unions are afforded official status and sanction by the state and labor conflict is resolved via highly institutionalized and regulated systems of negotiation (Birnbaum 1988; Lijphart 1999). A lively literature debates how best to measure corporatism and the extent of its decline. However, scholars agree that there is substantial cross-national variation in corporatism, which sustains and reflects very different political contexts (Kenworthy 2003; Lijphart 1999; Thelen 2012). Scholars tend to focus on corporatism either in industrialized democracies (coined “neo-corporatism”) or in other regions of the world (often called “state corporatism”). We discuss the differences below, but draw out their similarities in shaping political participation. For the most part we expect—and observe—their effects on participation to be similar. In neo-corporatist arrangements, which have characterized a number of European nations, unions accept long-standing agreements to restrain militant action in exchange for institutional access. Almost by definition, union members in corporatist countries are less likely to strike. However, whether union members participate in other forms of politics, such as petitioning or party work, is an open question. We argue that neo-corporatism affects the political behaviors of union members far beyond the scope of traditional employment issues. Corporatism shapes union strategies by defining unions’ primary political opportunities and constraints. Unions in neo-corporatist societies have levels of political access and opportunities far beyond their counterparts in non-corporatist societies. To maintain these opportunities, unions have agreed (both legally and more tacitly) to forgo militant actions in favor of institutionalized negotiation (Hicks 1999; Korpi and Shalev 1979). This tremendous institutional position—a seat at the table—has been a commonly used strategy to effect moderate change, especially compared to “indirect” strategies involving strikes or other forms of political mobilization. Unions in neo-corporatist countries have less incentive to mobilize members in other forms of collective action in part because they already have some—and fear losing—access to decision-making bodies. Neo-corporatism also shapes political participation by routinizing aspects of employer-union relations via elaborate bureaucratic procedures for conflict resolution. By contrast, non-corporatist societies have weak or non-existent institutionalized channels for conflict resolution. Unions respond to the lack of political access by pursuing a range of strategies, including the direct mobilization of members. Neo-corporatism has evolved in an intertwined fashion with a distinctive political culture that stresses coordinated decision-making and frowns on many forms of aggressive contentious politics (Fourcade, Lande, and Schofer 2016; Jepperson 2002; Schmitter 1977). For instance, Scandinavian political repertoires celebrate institutionalized solutions. As a result, unions function more as mediators who mobilize through sanctioned channels. Corporatism in less democratic countries tends have a different flavor: regimes support state-sanctioned unions, often using coercive control. State corporatism typically begins under authoritarian rule, but its elements can persist after democratic openings (e.g., Argentina, Mexico). With state corporatism, independent unions are banned and state officials typically vet union leaders for political allegiance. This produces leaders who are unlikely to organize workers against state interests (Coppedge 1993).2 In exchange for this support, regimes typically promote policies that raise standards of living and job security, as well as rewarding union leaders with benefits. In sum, state control de-powers unions as oppositional actors and reinforces their roles as regime supporters. Despite differences between neo- and state corporatism, we argue that corporatist structures have similar effects: they reduce union members’ participation, especially contentious extra-institutional acts. These historically institutionalized patterns are likely to be intensified due to path dependence. In non-corporatist countries, strike threats are a primary source of union leverage over employers, and consequently unions dedicate substantial energy to cultivating collective action capacity. This capacity to strike opens up avenues for unions—most obviously, engagement in contentious politics. By contrast, unions in corporatist societies tend not to devote as much effort to preparing members for collective action. To the extent that collective action capacity withers, contentious politics become less viable as a political strategy. These arguments are consistent with prior research. The presence of corporatism helps explain a range of political and organizational phenomena, including membership in voluntary associations (Schofer and Fourcade Gourinchas 2001), union density (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999; Western 1999), and coalition building (Baccaro, Hamann, and Turner 2003; Frege, Heery, and Turner 2004). Hypothesis 3: Within corporatist societies, union membership will have a smaller effect on extra-institutional political participation compared to non-corporatist societies. Table 1 summarizes our expectations regarding how democracy and corporatism channel union mobilization efforts. Table 1. Hypothesized effects of unions and interactions by type of participation Interest Contentious extra-institutional Less contentious extra-institutional Institutional Volunteering Discuss politics Strike; demonstrate Petition; boycott Vote, volunteer for political parties Volunteer for other political organizations Union membership + + + + + Union * democracy + + (strong) + + (strong) − Union * corporatism − − (strong) − − − Interest Contentious extra-institutional Less contentious extra-institutional Institutional Volunteering Discuss politics Strike; demonstrate Petition; boycott Vote, volunteer for political parties Volunteer for other political organizations Union membership + + + + + Union * democracy + + (strong) + + (strong) − Union * corporatism − − (strong) − − − Table 1. Hypothesized effects of unions and interactions by type of participation Interest Contentious extra-institutional Less contentious extra-institutional Institutional Volunteering Discuss politics Strike; demonstrate Petition; boycott Vote, volunteer for political parties Volunteer for other political organizations Union membership + + + + + Union * democracy + + (strong) + + (strong) − Union * corporatism − − (strong) − − − Interest Contentious extra-institutional Less contentious extra-institutional Institutional Volunteering Discuss politics Strike; demonstrate Petition; boycott Vote, volunteer for political parties Volunteer for other political organizations Union membership + + + + + Union * democracy + + (strong) + + (strong) − Union * corporatism − − (strong) − − − Illustrations: Germany, United States, Egypt, Chile in the Late Twentieth Century We draw on four cases from the late twentieth century that exemplify different ends of the corporatism and democracy dimensions.3 Our selection follows the diverse case method, which aims to maximize variation (Seawright and Gerring 2008). We sought to incorporate canonical cases wherever possible, and those supported by a large secondary source literature. These illustrations situate our arguments in comparative and historical context, unpack the institutional-organizational dynamics involved, and identify key mechanisms. Figure 1 illustrates our key arguments regarding institutional dimensions and unions’ mobilization strategies.4 Figure 1. View largeDownload slide Union mobilization and institutional context: the effects of corporatism and democracy. Country examples from late 20th century Figure 1. View largeDownload slide Union mobilization and institutional context: the effects of corporatism and democracy. Country examples from late 20th century Germany: High Democracy, High Corporatism Germany in the late twentieth century illustrates how neo-corporatist arrangements shaped unions’ interactions with members. The position of German unions in decision-making structures was strikingly different from those in non-corporatist societies. German unions held a recognized role in institutions and a voice in the macro planning of social and economic policy (Mosley, Keller, and Speckesser 1998). The system was characterized by a high degree of wage coordination and centralized bargaining.5 Bargaining occurred between peak associations (unions and employers’ associations) at the industry or sectoral level. Employers’ association members agreed to adhere to contract terms, and unions agreed to forgo strikes. These corporatist arrangements profoundly shaped the strategies that unions pursued. German unions tended to use legal channels to address problems rather than industrial conflict. Jacobi and colleagues (1998, 191) explain: “Extensive juridification helps to channel and depoliticize industrial conflict and also encourages the professionalization of conflict management.” Unions relied on staff and legal professionals for their activities, including contract negotiations. Because conflict was channeled away from strikes, unions spent less energy in developing a strike-ready workforce. Negotiations at the sectoral level, the role of professionals, and the reduced strike preparation all minimized unions’ need to train and politicize members for mobilization. However, with the weakening of corporatist arrangements over time, unions intermittently began to pursue more member mobilization, consistent with our arguments (Greer 2008; Turner 2009). The United States: High Democracy, Low Corporatism At the other end of the spectrum, unions in the United States had little formal voice in labor market institutions in the late twentieth century (and the contemporary situation is similar). Bargaining was highly decentralization and fragmented. Unlike Germany’s peak associations, most contracts were negotiated between local unions and individual firms, and local leaders often led contract campaigns. The state rarely intervened in bargaining, and few institutionalized channels for mediation existed if bargaining failed. This system had direct implications for union strategies. In the absence of institutional support, unions often used member mobilization to demonstrate their power. Collective action, even modest acts like wearing buttons, signaled unity and implied that a union was strike-ready. Moreover, lacking institutionalized routes to political access, US unions sought to advance their position by mobilizing members and resources to elect labor-friendly politicians and improve labor laws (Dark 2001; Kerrissey and Schofer 2013; Rosenfeld 2014). In this context, unions had incentives to routinely train and mobilize members. Of course, unions differed in their mobilization efforts and many unions leaned toward “service” models, but in general, unions built power through members’ electoral and workplace activism. In sum, the different structural positions that German and US unions inhabited shaped the extent to which they sought member participation. A study of unions’ responses to the outsourcing of telecommunication jobs in Germany and the United States reflects these different orientations. Doellgast (2008) finds that although unions dealt with the same issues, they diverged in tactics. In the United States, the Communication Workers of America built coalitions with other organizations and relied heavily on membership mobilization. By contrast, the German telecommunication union, ver.di, launched a campaign that leveraged their access to strong coordinated bargaining structures. Chile: Low Democracy, Low Corporatism Chile, which was ruled by an authoritarian military dictatorship from 1973 to 1998, illustrates how state repression and the absence of corporatist arrangements can shape unions’ mobilization practices. Prior to the coup, union members were highly mobilized: they had more strike activity than any other Latin American country and they were instrumental in electing the socialist president Salvador Allende (Drake 1996). Following the coup, Pinochet did not seek to fold unions into the fabric of the state, as one would see with state corporatism. Instead, the regime immediately sought to dismantle unions by suspending the constitution, political and civil liberties, and state-backed labor commissions, as well as by banning strikes, collective bargaining, and union elections (Drake 1996). The regime used extreme repression to eradicate unions, including raiding factories, and imprisoning or murdering thousands of unionists. One estimate reports that the regime was responsible for the death or disappearance of 4,000 people and the imprisonment of 60,000 people, many of who were unionists or students (King 1989). The individual and collective risks to open participation in contentious politics were enormous. Consequently, workers’ actions were “furtive,” including brief wildcat strikes or industrial sabotage (Winn 2004, 22). One tactical response to this repression was to seek coalitions with other organizations. Drake (1996, 47) explains: “…workers came increasingly to rely not only on their own organizations but also surrogate allies, such as human rights groups and intellectuals.” Despite the drop in public activities, unions remained sites of anti-authoritarian mobilization (Klubock 2004). Over time, strikes increased and workers used creative ways to circumvent restrictive laws. In sum: under non-democratic conditions, unions represented important sites of political mobilization. However, extreme authoritarian repression dampened many forms of contentious politics and channeled unions toward, among other things, cooperation with allied organizations. Egypt: Low Democracy, High Corporatism Egyptian labor relations in the last half of the twentieth century illustrate state corporatism.6 Unlike Pinochet, who aimed to eradicate unions in Chile, Egyptian regimes sought to incorporate labor movements. Taking power in the 1950s, Colonel Nasser viewed workers as key to his political legitimacy and unions as the organizational vehicle to mobilize support. Nasser orchestrated a system in which unions were legal, but subordinate, to the state. Union participation was channeled through the mass party, the Arab Socialist Union, where union leaders were screened for loyalty and worked closely with the government. In exchange, Nasser supported populist legislation, from shorter hours to better pensions. While subsequent regimes slowly dismantled this “social pact,” the state subordination of unions continued (Bianchi 1989; Posusney 1997). This form of corporatism differs from corporatism in Germany, where unions were independent from the state. Again, corporatism shaped union members’ activities. Posusney (1997) argues that state-screened union leaders were unlikely to mobilize members to oppose regime policies. However, local leaders often experienced less state vetting than their national counterparts, and some organized workers and protests at the local level. This unsanctioned labor mobilization was often met with harsh repression. Overall, while union activity occurred, regime-aligned leaders and state repression minimized its scope during the last decades of the twentieth century. State corporatism had broken down in Egypt by the 2000s, with the state embracing policies that undercut workers’ wages and job stability. As in the case of Germany, declining corporatism was accompanied by a wave of worker activism, including unsanctioned strikes and factory occupations in the 2000s, as well as slow openings for independent unions (Beinin 2009).7 Data We use cross-national data from the World Values Survey (WVS 2012)/European Values Study to examine the varying effects of union membership on political participation. The WVS asks a module of political participation questions to a large sample of countries in 2004, covering roughly 60 countries and 80,000 individuals. We supplement this with corollary analyses of 20 industrialized nations, which were routinely surveyed between 1981 and 2012. Finally, we obtain an additional dependent variable—voting—from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).8 Dependent Variables Discuss politics The WVS asks if respondents “discuss political matters with friends.” We use a dichotomous measure, with 1 representing “frequently” and 0 representing “occasionally” or “never.” This is perhaps the mildest form of participation available in the survey, and thus serves as a useful reference point. Strikes, demonstrations, occupations, boycotts, and petitions Each form of participation is measured separately with a dichotomous variable coded 1 if individuals have “actually done” this type of activity and 0 if they have not.9 Specifically, the WVS asks respondents about: “joining unofficial strikes,” “attending lawful demonstrations,” “occupying buildings or factories,” “joining in boycotts,” and “signing a petition.” Volunteering for political parties We include a dichotomous measure indicating whether respondents are doing “unpaid volunteer work” for political parties. Volunteering for political organizations We also examine “unpaid volunteer work” in a range of non-party political organizations: human rights, peace, environmental, and women’s groups. Results across these organization types were similar, so we combined them to create a dichotomous measure indicating volunteer work for any such organizations. This measure is not available in some survey waves, and so it is not included in our corollary analyses of industrialized democracies. Voting Because voting data are not available in the WVS, we use the ISSP dataset (2012). We use a dichotomous variable coded 1 for individuals who voted in the previous national election. Individual-Level Independent Variables Union membership A dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent is a member of a labor union. Age and age squared Respondent’s age, measured in years. Including the square of age allows estimation of a non-linear effect, as political participation tends to increase through midlife and then taper. Sex Coded dichotomously (male = 1). Education Coded on a four-point ordinal scale. The WVS includes multiple education measures, including the number of years of schooling and an ordinal measure of school completion. To maximize sample size, we used years of schooling to estimate the highest level of schooling completed when the latter was unavailable. Marital status Coded dichotomously (married = 1). Employment status Coded dichotomously (employed = 1). Country-Level Independent Variables Economic development We measure development by the natural log of real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (World Bank 2013). Democracy We use the Polity IV dataset, which focuses on the institutionalization of mechanisms for citizens to express preferences (e.g., free elections) and the existence of constraints on executive authority (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011). Higher scores represent more democratic nations.10 For robustness, we ran models using alternative democracy measures from Polity IV and Freedom House, including the average over 10 prior years and dichotomized measures (free/unfree). Results were consistent. Corporatism We use two measures: a dichotomous measure that captures general corporatist features for a large sample of countries (table 3) and a detailed measure that is available over time for highly industrialized nations (table 4). Corporatism in industrialized nations Measures of corporatism may attend to the structure of interest group representation in society and/or specific industrial policies, such as wage coordination (Kenworthy 2003). Using the Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention, and Social Pacts, 1960–2014 (Visser 2016), we use a corporatism measure that draws on both of these concepts: wage coordination and centralization. Building on Kenworthy (2003), Visser assembles a yearly five-point scale of wage coordination, ranging from features such as centralized bargaining by peak associations at the high end, to fragmented wage bargaining confined largely to individual firms at the low end. Centralization is a summary measure of the centralization of wage bargaining, taking into account union authority and concentration at multiple levels. We take the z-score and add the two measures, wage coordination and centralization, to create an index.11 Dichotomous measure of corporatism for large sample Available datasets do not cover our full sample and are not easily extended beyond industrialized democracies. To address this, we construct a simpler dichotomous corporatism measure, which we use in the 2004 cross-sectional analysis (table 3). This measure draws on two components: First, we dichotomize the continuous corporatism measure we use for the industrialized democracies (described above). We consider a country to be corporatist if the z-score is above 1, which corresponds with other dichotomous measures of corporatism (e.g., Lijphart 1999). For cases not covered by our existing dataset, we construct an alternative measure of corporatism designed to capture state corporatist arrangements. Collier and Collier (1991, 51) define state-group relations as corporatist to the degree that there exists: 1) state structuring of groups that produce a system of officially sanctioned, noncompetitive, compulsory interest associations; 2) state subsidy of these groups; and 3) state-imposed constraints of demand-making, leadership, and internal governance. Building on this, we code a country as corporatist if: 1) the state only allows a single union (nationally or by industry); or 2) a country has at least two laws that constrain unions’ independent financing or internal governance, specifically, if unions are able to: 1) elect leaders freely; 2) establish a constitution; 3) control union finances; 4) bargain collectively without prior approval by authorities; 5) strike without prior approval by authorities; or 6) be dissolved or suspended through administrative authorities. We code three sources in 2004: US State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights and Practices; reports from the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations and the Committee on Freedom of Association; and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions’ Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights. These are the same sources used to create the Database of Collective Labor Rights (Kucera 2004; Mosley and Uno 2007). We designate a country as corporatist if any of the three sources indicate noncompetitive unions or at least two laws limiting union independence.12 Finally, we address ex-Communist countries in Eastern Europe. State corporatist arrangements characterized industrial relations under communism. We expect inertia in organizational legacies of state corporatism, which likely still affected political participation in our 2004 analysis. Some countries transitioned from state corporatism to models closer to European-style corporatism in the 1990s, although there were different degrees of implementation (Funk and Lesch 2004; Kohl 2008; Ost 2000). Empirically, we observe that union members in these countries behave similarly to those in other corporatist settings: union members are less likely to engage in a range of political acts compared to those in non-corporatist countries.13 As our theoretical expectations and empirical observations are consistent, we include the ex-Communist countries as corporatist for the worldwide models (results are similar when they are excluded). In sum, for the large sample analysis, we code countries as corporatist if they: 1) have a z-score above 1 for industrialized democracies; 2) have noncompetitive unions or state-imposed limitations for finances or internal governance; or 3) are an Eastern European ex-Communist country. We conducted separate analyses for each feature and observed similar results, so we opt to combine the groups for ease of presentation. Appendix A lists countries and codings. Additional economic controls from the World Bank ( Appendix B) include: Inflation Inflation reflects the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. Employment in industry The percent of employees who work in industry, including mining, manufacturing, construction, and public utilities. Trade Trade captures the sum of exports and imports divided by the value of GDP. FDI Foreign Direct Investment is measured by new inflows of investment (FDI as percent of GDP yields similar results). Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the large-sample analysis. Table 2. Descriptive statistics for large sample analyses (table 3) Mean Std. dev. Min Max Dependent variables Strike 0.05 0.21 0 1 Occupy 0.03 0.16 0 1 Demonstrate 0.18 0.38 0 1 Boycott 0.09 0.29 0 1 Petition 0.32 0.47 0 1 Volunteer: Parties 0.03 0.17 0 1 Volunteer: Political organizations 0.08 0.27 0 1 Discuss politics 0.15 0.36 0 1 Independent variablesa Union 0.09 0.29 0 1 Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 Age 41.0 16.1 15 99 Age squared 1,945 1,512 225 9,801 Married 0.58 0.49 0 1 Employed 0.52 0.49 0 1 Education 4.40 2.29 1 8 GDP 8.20 1.47 5.54 10.75 Democracy 5.25 5.69 −10 10 Corporatism 0.42 0.49 0 1 Mean Std. dev. Min Max Dependent variables Strike 0.05 0.21 0 1 Occupy 0.03 0.16 0 1 Demonstrate 0.18 0.38 0 1 Boycott 0.09 0.29 0 1 Petition 0.32 0.47 0 1 Volunteer: Parties 0.03 0.17 0 1 Volunteer: Political organizations 0.08 0.27 0 1 Discuss politics 0.15 0.36 0 1 Independent variablesa Union 0.09 0.29 0 1 Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 Age 41.0 16.1 15 99 Age squared 1,945 1,512 225 9,801 Married 0.58 0.49 0 1 Employed 0.52 0.49 0 1 Education 4.40 2.29 1 8 GDP 8.20 1.47 5.54 10.75 Democracy 5.25 5.69 −10 10 Corporatism 0.42 0.49 0 1 aThe descriptive statistics for the independent variables represent “discuss politics” models. The descriptive statistics for other dependent variables are similar. Table 2. Descriptive statistics for large sample analyses (table 3) Mean Std. dev. Min Max Dependent variables Strike 0.05 0.21 0 1 Occupy 0.03 0.16 0 1 Demonstrate 0.18 0.38 0 1 Boycott 0.09 0.29 0 1 Petition 0.32 0.47 0 1 Volunteer: Parties 0.03 0.17 0 1 Volunteer: Political organizations 0.08 0.27 0 1 Discuss politics 0.15 0.36 0 1 Independent variablesa Union 0.09 0.29 0 1 Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 Age 41.0 16.1 15 99 Age squared 1,945 1,512 225 9,801 Married 0.58 0.49 0 1 Employed 0.52 0.49 0 1 Education 4.40 2.29 1 8 GDP 8.20 1.47 5.54 10.75 Democracy 5.25 5.69 −10 10 Corporatism 0.42 0.49 0 1 Mean Std. dev. Min Max Dependent variables Strike 0.05 0.21 0 1 Occupy 0.03 0.16 0 1 Demonstrate 0.18 0.38 0 1 Boycott 0.09 0.29 0 1 Petition 0.32 0.47 0 1 Volunteer: Parties 0.03 0.17 0 1 Volunteer: Political organizations 0.08 0.27 0 1 Discuss politics 0.15 0.36 0 1 Independent variablesa Union 0.09 0.29 0 1 Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 Age 41.0 16.1 15 99 Age squared 1,945 1,512 225 9,801 Married 0.58 0.49 0 1 Employed 0.52 0.49 0 1 Education 4.40 2.29 1 8 GDP 8.20 1.47 5.54 10.75 Democracy 5.25 5.69 −10 10 Corporatism 0.42 0.49 0 1 aThe descriptive statistics for the independent variables represent “discuss politics” models. The descriptive statistics for other dependent variables are similar. Methods We use multilevel logistic regression models (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002), as individual respondents are nested within countries. Consider a simple model that permits different intercepts across countries: Yij=βXij+μi+νij (1) where X refers to independent variables, μi is a country-specific intercept, and νij represents idiosyncratic error. The intercepts are either estimated as a series of fixed intercept parameters (“fixed effects”), or treated as a normally distributed random variable (“random effects”) under the assumption that μ is uncorrelated with X. One may extend this logic to address time as an additional source of correlated error: individuals nested within both countries and years. Our main analysis is based on a large sample of countries in 2004 and uses random effects models (table 3). We further examine highly industrialized democracies, pooling cases from multiple waves of the WVS spanning 1981 to 2012 (table 4) to explore variation across both countries and time. We use “two-way” fixed effects models with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country (Cameron and Miller 2015).14 Rather than focusing on cross-national differences, this analysis addresses the question of whether political behaviors shift as countries become more or less corporatist over time. Table 3. Multilevel logistic regression models: the interaction effects of union membership with democracy and corporatism on participation, 2004 Strike Occupy Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Discuss politics Union 0.765*** 0.712*** 0.773*** 0.602*** 0.541*** 1.296*** 0.995*** 0.495*** (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) Male 0.532*** 0.456*** 0.423*** 0.393*** 0.105*** 0.795*** −0.474*** 0.569*** (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) Age 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.054*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000* −0.000** −0.000*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.237*** −0.227*** −0.200*** −0.216*** −0.051* −0.013 −0.064+ −0.027 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) Education 0.092*** 0.057*** 0.194*** 0.175*** 0.201*** 0.126*** 0.110*** 0.178*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Employed 0.026 −0.051 0.047* −0.032 0.142*** 0.007 0.099** −0.010 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) GDP logged 0.026 −0.005 0.052 0.250** 0.551*** −0.330+ −0.060 −0.082+ (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.12) (0.05) Democracy 0.073** 0.051 0.045* −0.032 0.040+ 0.156** −0.058 0.002 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) Union * Democracy 0.064** 0.032 0.032*** 0.030* 0.013 0.047*** −0.019* 0.016* (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist −0.490* −0.358 −0.059 −0.140 −0.020 0.393 −0.754** 0.223+ (0.21) (0.30) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.44) (0.29) (0.12) Union * Corporatist −0.262** −0.358* −0.374*** −0.331*** −0.221*** −0.616*** −0.620*** −0.295*** (0.10) (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) Constant −5.455*** −5.103*** −4.316*** −7.023*** −7.795*** −3.860* −3.009** −3.770*** (0.77) (1.09) (0.66) (0.71) (0.67) (1.52) (1.03) (0.43) Observations 75,709 74,405 78,399 76,556 78,092 90,115 65,797 88,561 Countries 57 56 58 58 58 62 50 62 Strike Occupy Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Discuss politics Union 0.765*** 0.712*** 0.773*** 0.602*** 0.541*** 1.296*** 0.995*** 0.495*** (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) Male 0.532*** 0.456*** 0.423*** 0.393*** 0.105*** 0.795*** −0.474*** 0.569*** (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) Age 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.054*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000* −0.000** −0.000*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.237*** −0.227*** −0.200*** −0.216*** −0.051* −0.013 −0.064+ −0.027 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) Education 0.092*** 0.057*** 0.194*** 0.175*** 0.201*** 0.126*** 0.110*** 0.178*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Employed 0.026 −0.051 0.047* −0.032 0.142*** 0.007 0.099** −0.010 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) GDP logged 0.026 −0.005 0.052 0.250** 0.551*** −0.330+ −0.060 −0.082+ (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.12) (0.05) Democracy 0.073** 0.051 0.045* −0.032 0.040+ 0.156** −0.058 0.002 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) Union * Democracy 0.064** 0.032 0.032*** 0.030* 0.013 0.047*** −0.019* 0.016* (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist −0.490* −0.358 −0.059 −0.140 −0.020 0.393 −0.754** 0.223+ (0.21) (0.30) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.44) (0.29) (0.12) Union * Corporatist −0.262** −0.358* −0.374*** −0.331*** −0.221*** −0.616*** −0.620*** −0.295*** (0.10) (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) Constant −5.455*** −5.103*** −4.316*** −7.023*** −7.795*** −3.860* −3.009** −3.770*** (0.77) (1.09) (0.66) (0.71) (0.67) (1.52) (1.03) (0.43) Observations 75,709 74,405 78,399 76,556 78,092 90,115 65,797 88,561 Countries 57 56 58 58 58 62 50 62 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10; two-tailed tests. Table 3. Multilevel logistic regression models: the interaction effects of union membership with democracy and corporatism on participation, 2004 Strike Occupy Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Discuss politics Union 0.765*** 0.712*** 0.773*** 0.602*** 0.541*** 1.296*** 0.995*** 0.495*** (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) Male 0.532*** 0.456*** 0.423*** 0.393*** 0.105*** 0.795*** −0.474*** 0.569*** (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) Age 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.054*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000* −0.000** −0.000*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.237*** −0.227*** −0.200*** −0.216*** −0.051* −0.013 −0.064+ −0.027 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) Education 0.092*** 0.057*** 0.194*** 0.175*** 0.201*** 0.126*** 0.110*** 0.178*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Employed 0.026 −0.051 0.047* −0.032 0.142*** 0.007 0.099** −0.010 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) GDP logged 0.026 −0.005 0.052 0.250** 0.551*** −0.330+ −0.060 −0.082+ (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.12) (0.05) Democracy 0.073** 0.051 0.045* −0.032 0.040+ 0.156** −0.058 0.002 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) Union * Democracy 0.064** 0.032 0.032*** 0.030* 0.013 0.047*** −0.019* 0.016* (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist −0.490* −0.358 −0.059 −0.140 −0.020 0.393 −0.754** 0.223+ (0.21) (0.30) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.44) (0.29) (0.12) Union * Corporatist −0.262** −0.358* −0.374*** −0.331*** −0.221*** −0.616*** −0.620*** −0.295*** (0.10) (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) Constant −5.455*** −5.103*** −4.316*** −7.023*** −7.795*** −3.860* −3.009** −3.770*** (0.77) (1.09) (0.66) (0.71) (0.67) (1.52) (1.03) (0.43) Observations 75,709 74,405 78,399 76,556 78,092 90,115 65,797 88,561 Countries 57 56 58 58 58 62 50 62 Strike Occupy Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Discuss politics Union 0.765*** 0.712*** 0.773*** 0.602*** 0.541*** 1.296*** 0.995*** 0.495*** (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) Male 0.532*** 0.456*** 0.423*** 0.393*** 0.105*** 0.795*** −0.474*** 0.569*** (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) Age 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.054*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000* −0.000** −0.000*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.237*** −0.227*** −0.200*** −0.216*** −0.051* −0.013 −0.064+ −0.027 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) Education 0.092*** 0.057*** 0.194*** 0.175*** 0.201*** 0.126*** 0.110*** 0.178*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Employed 0.026 −0.051 0.047* −0.032 0.142*** 0.007 0.099** −0.010 (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) GDP logged 0.026 −0.005 0.052 0.250** 0.551*** −0.330+ −0.060 −0.082+ (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.12) (0.05) Democracy 0.073** 0.051 0.045* −0.032 0.040+ 0.156** −0.058 0.002 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) Union * Democracy 0.064** 0.032 0.032*** 0.030* 0.013 0.047*** −0.019* 0.016* (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist −0.490* −0.358 −0.059 −0.140 −0.020 0.393 −0.754** 0.223+ (0.21) (0.30) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.44) (0.29) (0.12) Union * Corporatist −0.262** −0.358* −0.374*** −0.331*** −0.221*** −0.616*** −0.620*** −0.295*** (0.10) (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) Constant −5.455*** −5.103*** −4.316*** −7.023*** −7.795*** −3.860* −3.009** −3.770*** (0.77) (1.09) (0.66) (0.71) (0.67) (1.52) (1.03) (0.43) Observations 75,709 74,405 78,399 76,556 78,092 90,115 65,797 88,561 Countries 57 56 58 58 58 62 50 62 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10; two-tailed tests. Table 4. Logistic regression models with two-way fixed effects: the interaction effects of union membership and corporatism on political participation in industrialized democracies, 1981–2012 Strike Occupya Demonstrate Boycott Petitiona Volunteer: Partiesab Discuss politicsa Votec Union 1.179*** 0.758*** 0.835*** 0.609*** 0.519*** 0.870*** 0.378*** 0.253* (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) Male 0.609*** 0.621*** 0.323*** 0.205** −0.038 0.545*** −0.686*** −0.045 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) Age 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.037*** 0.082*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.118*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000** −0.000*** −0.001*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.249*** −0.337*** −0.226*** −0.231*** −0.016 0.099* −0.047 0.319*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) Education −0.094+ −0.179* 0.033 −0.016 0.148*** 0.107* −0.074 0.224*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) Employed 0.098* 0.230*** 0.410*** 0.396*** 0.360*** 0.273*** 0.315*** 0.215*** (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) GDP logged −0.186+ −0.188 0.189*** −0.023 0.131 −1.374 0.946 −2.451*** (0.11) (0.59) (0.04) (0.07) (0.71) (1.64) (0.94) (0.43) Corporatist 0.061 0.064 0.043 −0.056 0.059 0.085 0.084 −0.396*** (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) Union * Corporatist −0.069* −0.187*** −0.065* −0.096*** −0.043 0.018 −0.052 −0.038 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) Constant −4.575*** −4.415 −4.410*** −4.585*** −3.096 6.743 −14.366 22.272*** (1.08) (5.64) (0.37) (0.73) (6.73) (15.58) (9.34) (4.62) Observations 74,731 68,782 90,609 87,318 89,639 93,892 44,983 37,486 Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 14 Strike Occupya Demonstrate Boycott Petitiona Volunteer: Partiesab Discuss politicsa Votec Union 1.179*** 0.758*** 0.835*** 0.609*** 0.519*** 0.870*** 0.378*** 0.253* (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) Male 0.609*** 0.621*** 0.323*** 0.205** −0.038 0.545*** −0.686*** −0.045 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) Age 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.037*** 0.082*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.118*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000** −0.000*** −0.001*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.249*** −0.337*** −0.226*** −0.231*** −0.016 0.099* −0.047 0.319*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) Education −0.094+ −0.179* 0.033 −0.016 0.148*** 0.107* −0.074 0.224*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) Employed 0.098* 0.230*** 0.410*** 0.396*** 0.360*** 0.273*** 0.315*** 0.215*** (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) GDP logged −0.186+ −0.188 0.189*** −0.023 0.131 −1.374 0.946 −2.451*** (0.11) (0.59) (0.04) (0.07) (0.71) (1.64) (0.94) (0.43) Corporatist 0.061 0.064 0.043 −0.056 0.059 0.085 0.084 −0.396*** (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) Union * Corporatist −0.069* −0.187*** −0.065* −0.096*** −0.043 0.018 −0.052 −0.038 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) Constant −4.575*** −4.415 −4.410*** −4.585*** −3.096 6.743 −14.366 22.272*** (1.08) (5.64) (0.37) (0.73) (6.73) (15.58) (9.34) (4.62) Observations 74,731 68,782 90,609 87,318 89,639 93,892 44,983 37,486 Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 14 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10; two-tailed tests. aThis question was not asked in WVS Wave 6; these analyses go through 2005. b“Volunteer for other political organizations” was not available for this sample. cVoting data, drawn from ISSP, include years 1985–2006. Table 4. Logistic regression models with two-way fixed effects: the interaction effects of union membership and corporatism on political participation in industrialized democracies, 1981–2012 Strike Occupya Demonstrate Boycott Petitiona Volunteer: Partiesab Discuss politicsa Votec Union 1.179*** 0.758*** 0.835*** 0.609*** 0.519*** 0.870*** 0.378*** 0.253* (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) Male 0.609*** 0.621*** 0.323*** 0.205** −0.038 0.545*** −0.686*** −0.045 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) Age 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.037*** 0.082*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.118*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000** −0.000*** −0.001*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.249*** −0.337*** −0.226*** −0.231*** −0.016 0.099* −0.047 0.319*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) Education −0.094+ −0.179* 0.033 −0.016 0.148*** 0.107* −0.074 0.224*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) Employed 0.098* 0.230*** 0.410*** 0.396*** 0.360*** 0.273*** 0.315*** 0.215*** (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) GDP logged −0.186+ −0.188 0.189*** −0.023 0.131 −1.374 0.946 −2.451*** (0.11) (0.59) (0.04) (0.07) (0.71) (1.64) (0.94) (0.43) Corporatist 0.061 0.064 0.043 −0.056 0.059 0.085 0.084 −0.396*** (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) Union * Corporatist −0.069* −0.187*** −0.065* −0.096*** −0.043 0.018 −0.052 −0.038 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) Constant −4.575*** −4.415 −4.410*** −4.585*** −3.096 6.743 −14.366 22.272*** (1.08) (5.64) (0.37) (0.73) (6.73) (15.58) (9.34) (4.62) Observations 74,731 68,782 90,609 87,318 89,639 93,892 44,983 37,486 Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 14 Strike Occupya Demonstrate Boycott Petitiona Volunteer: Partiesab Discuss politicsa Votec Union 1.179*** 0.758*** 0.835*** 0.609*** 0.519*** 0.870*** 0.378*** 0.253* (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) Male 0.609*** 0.621*** 0.323*** 0.205** −0.038 0.545*** −0.686*** −0.045 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) Age 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.037*** 0.082*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.118*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000** −0.000*** −0.001*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.249*** −0.337*** −0.226*** −0.231*** −0.016 0.099* −0.047 0.319*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) Education −0.094+ −0.179* 0.033 −0.016 0.148*** 0.107* −0.074 0.224*** (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) Employed 0.098* 0.230*** 0.410*** 0.396*** 0.360*** 0.273*** 0.315*** 0.215*** (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) GDP logged −0.186+ −0.188 0.189*** −0.023 0.131 −1.374 0.946 −2.451*** (0.11) (0.59) (0.04) (0.07) (0.71) (1.64) (0.94) (0.43) Corporatist 0.061 0.064 0.043 −0.056 0.059 0.085 0.084 −0.396*** (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) Union * Corporatist −0.069* −0.187*** −0.065* −0.096*** −0.043 0.018 −0.052 −0.038 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) Constant −4.575*** −4.415 −4.410*** −4.585*** −3.096 6.743 −14.366 22.272*** (1.08) (5.64) (0.37) (0.73) (6.73) (15.58) (9.34) (4.62) Observations 74,731 68,782 90,609 87,318 89,639 93,892 44,983 37,486 Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 14 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10; two-tailed tests. aThis question was not asked in WVS Wave 6; these analyses go through 2005. b“Volunteer for other political organizations” was not available for this sample. cVoting data, drawn from ISSP, include years 1985–2006. Results Union membership is positively associated with all forms of participation: strike, occupy, demonstrate, boycott, petition, volunteer for political parties, volunteer for other political organizations, and discuss politics. Table 3 reports that union members have over two times the odds of participating in contentious acts, including demonstrations (exp(0.773) = 2.17), occupying buildings or factories (exp(0.712) = 2.04), and strikes (exp(0.765) = 2.15), compared to non-members. We also observe strong union effects for a range of less contentious acts: boycotts (exp(0.602) = 1.83), petitions (exp(0.541) = 1.72), and political discussions (exp(0.495) = 1.64). In particular, union members have much higher odds of volunteering for political parties, more than triple the odds of non-members (exp(1.296) = 3.66). Union members are also more likely to volunteer for political organizations other than parties, though the effects are a bit smaller (exp(0.995) = 2.71). To explore generalizability, we examine subsets of countries based on institutional differences and geographic regions. The strong mobilizing role of unions remains significant and positive throughout, including analyses looking exclusively at the global South and among less democratic countries (available upon request). How does institutional context condition the effects of union membership? Table 3 reports that the interaction between union membership and democracy is positive and significant for strikes and demonstrations. This suggests that while union members are generally more likely to strike and demonstrate than non-members, the effects are larger in more democratic societies. We do not observe a significant interaction for occupations, which is the least frequent act (just 3 percent of respondents). We also observe that democracy’s effects extend to milder acts, including boycotts and political discussion (but not petitions). To unpack these findings, figure 2 presents the predicted probability that union members and non-members participate in demonstrations at varying democracy levels. The difference between union members and non-members becomes larger at high levels of democracy.15 Figure 2. View largeDownload slide Predicted probability of participation in a demonstration by level of democracy, with 95 percent CI Figure 2. View largeDownload slide Predicted probability of participation in a demonstration by level of democracy, with 95 percent CI We next examine volunteering for parties and other political groups. The interaction between union membership and democracy is positive and significant, suggesting that union members are especially likely to volunteer for political parties in highly democratic countries. By contrast, in less democratic settings, union members are particularly likely to work with other political organizations, such as human rights, peace, women’s, and environmental groups. The negative and significant interaction suggests that the effects of union membership on volunteering for political organizations are largest when democracy is low. The discussion of Chile, above, provides one plausible interpretation: as state repression limits contentious politics, union members turned efforts toward cooperation with other political organizations, such as human rights groups (Drake 1996). To illustrate this, figure 3 shows the predicted probability of political volunteering and party volunteering among union members. Party volunteering is virtually absent among low-democracy societies, but increases rapidly at the highest levels of democracy. Political organization volunteering, which is somewhat more common across the board, shows the opposite pattern: it is most common in less democratic countries. Figure 3. View largeDownload slide Predicted probability of party volunteering and “other” political organization volunteering for union members, by level of democracy, with 95 percent CI Figure 3. View largeDownload slide Predicted probability of party volunteering and “other” political organization volunteering for union members, by level of democracy, with 95 percent CI Next, we turn to the effects of corporatist arrangements on union members’ participation. Corporatism is designed to minimize strikes. Indeed, we observe that the direct effect of corporatism on strikes is negative and significant. Moreover, the negative interaction term suggests that it specifically reduces strike participation among union members. What about forms of political activity that are not specifically regulated by corporatist structures? The interaction between union membership and corporatism is negative and significant for all types of participation, from more contentious (e.g., demonstrations) to more institutional (e.g., party work). Union membership still tends to boost participation in corporatist countries—but the effects are smaller than in non-corporatist societies. Interestingly, the direct effects of corporatism are often insignificant, once a union-corporatism interaction is included. This suggests that the quiescence of corporatist societies is largely due to unions and their members. However, we are hesitant to draw strong conclusions, as the main effects of corporatism are generally in the expected direction; future studies with larger country samples may clarify the issue. Figure 4 shows the predicted probability of participation in demonstrations. The effect of union membership is much larger in non-corporatist societies. Figure 4 puts the difference between corporatist and non-corporatist societies in a new light: societal differences appear to be largely driven by the behavior of union members. Figure 4. View largeDownload slide Predicted probability of participating in a demonstration in non-corporatist vs corporatist countries, with 95 percent CI Figure 4. View largeDownload slide Predicted probability of participating in a demonstration in non-corporatist vs corporatist countries, with 95 percent CI Table 4 examines highly industrialized democracies, where we are able to take advantage of six WVS waves, ISSP voting measures, and a richer continuous measure of corporatism. Our models include fixed effects for both country and wave, with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country. Country fixed effects models highlight within-country change over time. Again, union membership has positive, significant effects on all types of participation, with the largest effects among contentious actions. Union members have over three times greater odds of striking (exp(1.179) = 3.25), and two times of demonstrating (exp(0.835) = 2.31) and occupying (exp(0.758) = 2.13). They also have substantially greater odds of less contentious acts, including boycotting (exp(0.609) = 1.84), petitioning (exp(0.519) = 1.68), and discussing politics (exp(0.378) = 1.46). Again, we see that union members are deeply involved in electoral politics in highly democratic contexts. The odds of volunteering for a party is roughly 2.4 times higher for union members, and the odds of voting is 1.3 times greater. Again, we observe that the strong positive effect of union membership on participation is mediated by corporatism. The interactions between union and corporatism are negative and significant for contentious acts—strikes, occupations, and demonstrations—as well as for boycotts. This suggests that corporatism reduces many forms of extra-institutional politics. However, we do not observe significant interactions for several less contentious acts, including signing petitions, discussing politics, volunteering for political parties, or voting, which were significant in the full sample reported in table 3 (except for voting, which was unavailable for the full sample). This might result from our small and rather homogeneous sample (14 to 20 countries, all affluent democracies). However, it is possible that the significant results for discussing politics, petitioning, and party volunteering in table 3 are spurious, and that the two-way fixed effects models do a better job at accurately describing the relationship. Alternately, it is possible that this lack of significance is particular to types of activities that are embedded in political structures. Voting, volunteering for parties, and discussing politics are all activities that are deeply entwined in slow-changing political institutions, which the span of available WVS waves may not be long enough to capture. Overall, the results in table 4 suggest that the dampening effects of corporatism are concentrated more on contentious and extra-institutional acts, which is consistent with our expectations (but different from the results in table 3). Corollary Analyses A wide range of corollary analyses address possible methodological concerns and test the robustness of our results (available upon request). Macro-economic context Basic economic factors as well as large-scale macro-economic change may affect the political participation of union members; however, systematic studies are rare. In one of the few studies, Silver (2003) shows that as capital relocates around the world, worker unrest follows. We considered a range of economic and globalization measures, including FDI, trade openness, inflation, and industrial employment, as well as the interaction between each economic measure and union membership. Appendix B includes one such table, showing general controls for economic context. These results show that macro-economic variables provide little leverage on understanding variation in political participation. If anything, trade openness is associated with less political participation. The interaction between union membership and economic context variables, likewise, did not have consistent effects. Overall, these results are consonant with prior work in the social movement literature, which finds that economic context and grievances, alone, are typically insufficient to explain political action. They also echo research in less developed countries, which show that institutional factors largely explain union membership (Martin and Brady 2007). Union density Changes in union density could affect how unions mobilize members. On the one hand, unions may mobilize members in response to decline; on the other, declining unions may not have the resources for mass mobilization or the belief that such efforts will be effective. We included a measure of the change in union density (raw and percentage change over time) for industrialized democracies. Neither union density nor its interaction with union membership was significant. Employment Because most, but not all, union members are employed, we replicated our main tables using a sample of only employed workers. Results were similar. Measures of corporatism Multiple measures of corporatism are available for industrialized democracies. We present a combination of structural measures and wage coordination. As we describe in the Data section, we examined multiple measures and observed similar results. Varieties of corporatism While corporatism comes in several flavors, we expected (and observed) similar effects of neo-corporatism and state corporatism. We conducted disaggregated analyses for table 3, focusing separately on these varieties of corporatism. Results were generally consistent. Union interactions with state corporatist countries of the global South did not reach significance for some acts, including volunteering for political parties. We hesitate to draw strong conclusions from this, as the sample size is low. We also analyzed post-Communist regimes of Eastern Europe separately; union interactions were negative and significant across all political acts. Democracy-corporatism interactions We considered the possibility that democracy and corporatism interact to influence union mobilization, generating complex joint configurations. However, interaction terms were generally insignificant, suggesting that the two dimensions simply combine in an additive fashion.16 Endogeneity One potential challenge to studying the effect of organizational membership on participation is that high-participators may be “joiners” who select into organizational membership (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Countries vary in how much choice workers have in union membership. Some countries have union security practices, which require workers to be union members or pay dues.17 Others have open-shop policies in which unions must persuade workers to become members. In this context, activists may be more likely to join unions, which would partially explain why union members are more politically active than non-union members. Prior literature suggests that this is less of a concern for union studies, as exogenous factors substantially determine the possibility of union membership, including prior educational and occupational choices (Kerrissey and Schofer 2013; Martin and Brady 2007; Stegmueller and Becher 2014). Structural factors still shape the possibility of union membership. For instance, in Germany, which has an open shop, union membership is strongly related to firm size, the existence of work councils, occupational characteristics, and broader norms around union membership (Goerke and Pannenberg 2004; Schnabel and Wagner 2005). Nevertheless, we conducted corollary analyses to address some potential sources of endogeneity. First, we included a general control for association membership—essentially taking into account one’s propensity to be a “joiner.” Second, we included a control for political ideology, as left-oriented individuals might be more likely to join unions and to participate actively in politics.18 Third, we examined Scandinavian countries, where membership is high due to it being tied to parts of the social security system, as well as union security provisions that limit individual discretion to opt out of membership. These countries are less likely to have a selection effect of activists into unions. All corollary analyses were consistent with our main findings. Heterogeneous choice models Following Williams (2009), we explored heterogeneous choice models to address Allison’s (1999) concern that group differences in logistic regression coefficients, such as interaction effects, may be an artifact of unequal residual variation. Results were nearly identical to comparable logistic regression results.19 Discussion and Conclusion We provide systematic evidence that union members participate much more in political life across a diverse sample of 60 countries. Substantively, these effects are large and span a broad set of activities. Union membership in some cases may double or even triple the odds of participating in demonstrations, occupations, strikes, boycotts, petitions, political party work, and voluntary work with other political organizations. The case of unions allows us to extend theories of political participation. We show that the impact of organizations—in this case labor unions—on participation is not a given, but rather depends on institutional context. Labor movements aim to mobilize members and build political capital everywhere—but the extent to which they do so, and how they channel participation, differs across national contexts. Institutions define the playing field of politics, and consequently serve to construct the interests and strategies of organizations and individuals. Future research could extend the argument to other types of organizations, from churches to social movement organizations, and could consider other dimensions of institutional variation such as centralization and state capacity (e.g., Fourcade and Schofer 2016). Democracy appears to have profound implications for unions, and in particular the political strategies and activities that unions pursue. While we expected democracies to have particularly strong effects on the most contentious acts, the far-reaching effects of democratic institutions appear to spill over into milder actions, such as discussing politics. Democracy also affects the types of organizational volunteering union members pursue. In more democratic settings, union members are particularly likely to work with political parties. Non-democratic societies shift union strategies away from contentious politics and parties—instead, their members work with and through other politically oriented associations. In other words, unions generally work to build political capital, but the form of political capital depends on the national context. In democracies, unions often leverage their large membership to build influence with parties, while in non-democracies they tend to form networks and alliances with other political and opposition groups. Corporatism appears to substantially dampen the participation of union members. This is obviously the case for strikes, which corporatist arrangements purposefully diffuse. However, we find that almost all forms of participation are reduced in corporatist settings (though some effects are weaker in longitudinal analyses of affluent democracies in table 4). We raise the possibility that corporatism is particularly important for reducing the most contentious acts, and less so for highly institutional politics (e.g., party work and voting), which we observe in industrialized democracies (table 4). It is notable that these general patterns appear to be consistent across corporatist societies, despite substantial differences among them (e.g., neo-corporatism versus state corporatism). We do not suggest that corporatism is uniform. To the contrary, our illustrations suggest important differences in the underlying mechanisms yielding convergent outcomes. The literature on participation has increasingly focused on organizational factors that encourage political involvement—but with little sensitivity to the ways that organizational factors may operate differently across time and space. Labor unions inhabit a very different position in corporatist societies versus non-corporatist societies and democratic versus non-democratic ones. To understand comparative differences in political life, it is important to incorporate institutional dimensions into analyses of organizational dynamics. These findings build on the institutional lens of labor scholars, which has attended mostly to issues of union membership. Institutions are also central to shaping union members’ political lives, and these effects extend far beyond voting or only industrialized democracies. This institutional lens offers additional leverage to understand how workers respond to economic and workplace grievances. A possible counternarrative to institutional arguments may be that economic conditions explain shifts in worker mobilization. To address this, we controlled for economic factors, including inflation, trade, and so forth. While these measures likely matter in particular contexts and at particular times, they provided little leverage to explain broad comparative patterns of union members’ political participation. Research on the relationship between long-term shifts in institutional arrangements, economic conditions, and union mobilization is needed. While institutional structures appear to broadly shape union strategies, unions have, at particular historical junctures, helped influence those structures, sometimes playing important roles in democratization movements (Collier and Mahoney 1997; Kraus 2007) and strengthening corporatist structures (Hicks 1999; Korpi and Shalev 1979). Whereas our study focuses exclusively on the recent past, studies with a broader longitudinal scope could further unpack the historical interplay between institutional structure and labor mobilization. Future research might also attend more directly to the different strains of corporatism. Our study emphasized the commonalities among corporatist societies, and we observed broadly similar patterns in our analyses. But the underlying paths to those outcomes may be very different. In neo-corporatist arrangements, we suspect that conflict mediation mechanisms and political access shape union strategies, while state corporatism frequently involves direct co-optation of union agendas. Also, studies that draw on more detailed political participation measures may yet discern important differences across the varieties of corporatism. Finally, we offer some remarks on the future of labor mobilization. Drawing on Marx, labor scholars often note that the reorganization of production creates new opportunities for labor movements (Evans 2010; Silver 2003). We propose that changing institutional arrangements also creates new opportunities. With the “third wave” of democratization, democratic regimes have replaced authoritarian regimes across much of the global South (Haggard 1995; Huntington 1991). This shift in institutional context may alter the way that unions attempt to mobilize members. Concurrently, corporatist arrangements have been eroding. This hurts unions in many ways, including undercutting political access and membership. At the same time, this erosion is likely to change the role of unions in political life—shifting them more toward mobilizing organizations. Indeed, the uptick in union mobilization in some European countries in the twenty-first century may already be reflecting such changes. These two historical shifts—the third wave of democratization and the erosion of corporatist arrangements—are likely to produce greater mobilization among union members in the years to come. At the same time, long-term political and economic trends have threatened unions, and many traditional union strongholds have weakened in the last decades. It remains to be seen whether increased member mobilization will provide a meaningful force in the face of such challenges. Countries in table 3 Albaniac Algeriaa Argentinaa Austriab Bangladesh Belgiumb Bulgariac Belarusa Canada Chile Chinaa Croatia Czech Republicc Denmarkb Egypta Estoniac Finlandb France Germanyb Greece Hungaryc India Indonesia Irana Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japanb Jordan Kyrgyzstan Latviac Lithuania Luxembourg Mexicoa Moldova Morocco Netherlandsb Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Polandc Portugal Romaniac Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Slovakiac Sloveniac South Africa South Korea Spain Swedenb Tanzania Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom United States Venezuela Zimbabwe Albaniac Algeriaa Argentinaa Austriab Bangladesh Belgiumb Bulgariac Belarusa Canada Chile Chinaa Croatia Czech Republicc Denmarkb Egypta Estoniac Finlandb France Germanyb Greece Hungaryc India Indonesia Irana Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japanb Jordan Kyrgyzstan Latviac Lithuania Luxembourg Mexicoa Moldova Morocco Netherlandsb Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Polandc Portugal Romaniac Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Slovakiac Sloveniac South Africa South Korea Spain Swedenb Tanzania Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom United States Venezuela Zimbabwe Countries in table 3 Albaniac Algeriaa Argentinaa Austriab Bangladesh Belgiumb Bulgariac Belarusa Canada Chile Chinaa Croatia Czech Republicc Denmarkb Egypta Estoniac Finlandb France Germanyb Greece Hungaryc India Indonesia Irana Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japanb Jordan Kyrgyzstan Latviac Lithuania Luxembourg Mexicoa Moldova Morocco Netherlandsb Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Polandc Portugal Romaniac Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Slovakiac Sloveniac South Africa South Korea Spain Swedenb Tanzania Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom United States Venezuela Zimbabwe Albaniac Algeriaa Argentinaa Austriab Bangladesh Belgiumb Bulgariac Belarusa Canada Chile Chinaa Croatia Czech Republicc Denmarkb Egypta Estoniac Finlandb France Germanyb Greece Hungaryc India Indonesia Irana Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japanb Jordan Kyrgyzstan Latviac Lithuania Luxembourg Mexicoa Moldova Morocco Netherlandsb Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Polandc Portugal Romaniac Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Slovakiac Sloveniac South Africa South Korea Spain Swedenb Tanzania Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom United States Venezuela Zimbabwe Countries in table 4 (mean corporatism scores adjacent) Australia 0.01 Austria 4.29 Belgium 2.10 Canada −1.78 Denmark 1.66 Finland 1.84 France −1.25 Germany 1.37 Ireland 1.13 Italy −0.25 Japan 0.84 Netherlands 2.26 New Zealand −2.39 Norway 2.36 Portugal 0.84 Spain −0.21 Sweden 1.91 Switzerland −0.01 United Kingdom −2.89 United States −2.60 Australia 0.01 Austria 4.29 Belgium 2.10 Canada −1.78 Denmark 1.66 Finland 1.84 France −1.25 Germany 1.37 Ireland 1.13 Italy −0.25 Japan 0.84 Netherlands 2.26 New Zealand −2.39 Norway 2.36 Portugal 0.84 Spain −0.21 Sweden 1.91 Switzerland −0.01 United Kingdom −2.89 United States −2.60 Note: Because the WVS did not ask all questions in all countries, we had to exclude a handful of countries from some of our analyses. The following dependent variables were not asked for these countries: demonstrate, boycott, petition, political party work (China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia); strike (China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Singapore); volunteer for political organizations (Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela). The subscripts note the coding for corporatism measures for table 3. Our dichotomous measure for corporatism is coded as “1” for subscripts a, b, and c. aCountry is coded as 1 for state corporatism. bCountry is coded as 1 for neo-corporatism. cCountry is coded as 1 for “Eastern European.” Countries in table 4 (mean corporatism scores adjacent) Australia 0.01 Austria 4.29 Belgium 2.10 Canada −1.78 Denmark 1.66 Finland 1.84 France −1.25 Germany 1.37 Ireland 1.13 Italy −0.25 Japan 0.84 Netherlands 2.26 New Zealand −2.39 Norway 2.36 Portugal 0.84 Spain −0.21 Sweden 1.91 Switzerland −0.01 United Kingdom −2.89 United States −2.60 Australia 0.01 Austria 4.29 Belgium 2.10 Canada −1.78 Denmark 1.66 Finland 1.84 France −1.25 Germany 1.37 Ireland 1.13 Italy −0.25 Japan 0.84 Netherlands 2.26 New Zealand −2.39 Norway 2.36 Portugal 0.84 Spain −0.21 Sweden 1.91 Switzerland −0.01 United Kingdom −2.89 United States −2.60 Note: Because the WVS did not ask all questions in all countries, we had to exclude a handful of countries from some of our analyses. The following dependent variables were not asked for these countries: demonstrate, boycott, petition, political party work (China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia); strike (China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Singapore); volunteer for political organizations (Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela). The subscripts note the coding for corporatism measures for table 3. Our dichotomous measure for corporatism is coded as “1” for subscripts a, b, and c. aCountry is coded as 1 for state corporatism. bCountry is coded as 1 for neo-corporatism. cCountry is coded as 1 for “Eastern European.” Appendix B. Logistic regression models with random effects: The interaction effects of union membership with democracy and corporatism on political participation, including additional economic controls, 2004 Discuss politics Strike Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Union 0.503*** 0.782*** 0.771*** 0.598*** 0.548*** 1.313*** 0.996*** (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) Male 0.598*** 0.569*** 0.422*** 0.399*** 0.119*** 0.804*** −0.493*** (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) Age 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.054*** 0.023* 0.026*** (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000 −0.000** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.040 −0.241*** −0.200*** −0.218*** −0.062** 0.011 −0.053 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Education 0.183*** 0.089*** 0.188*** 0.171*** 0.197*** 0.125*** 0.106*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Employed 0.018 −0.025 0.043+ −0.042 0.135*** 0.013 0.108** (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) GDP logged −0.087+ −0.032 0.098 0.359*** 0.572*** −0.549** −0.173 (0.05) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12) Inflation 0.046 −0.092 −0.040 −0.071 −0.094 −0.291* −0.367*** (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10) FDI 0.138** 0.062 0.090 0.040 0.115 0.200 0.193 (0.05) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.15) Trade, % GDP −0.003** 0.001 −0.004+ −0.007** −0.006** −0.000 −0.004 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Industry, % −0.013+ 0.017 −0.014 −0.020 −0.015 −0.002 −0.001 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) Democracy 0.001 0.076** 0.028 −0.057* 0.025 0.125** −0.077* (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Union*Democracy 0.013+ 0.066** 0.036*** 0.039** 0.016+ 0.054*** −0.016+ (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist 0.371*** −0.659** 0.029 0.151 0.082 −0.134 −0.711** (0.11) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.39) (0.28) Union*Corporatist −0.304*** −0.302** −0.411*** −0.353*** −0.253*** −0.687*** −0.660*** (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) Constant −3.391*** −5.428*** −4.007*** −6.758*** −6.957*** −1.097 −1.414 (0.44) (0.93) (0.80) (0.77) (0.75) (1.50) (1.05) Observations 75,510 66,868 69,431 67,716 69,042 76,803 60,449 Countries 53 50 51 51 51 53 46 Discuss politics Strike Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Union 0.503*** 0.782*** 0.771*** 0.598*** 0.548*** 1.313*** 0.996*** (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) Male 0.598*** 0.569*** 0.422*** 0.399*** 0.119*** 0.804*** −0.493*** (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) Age 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.054*** 0.023* 0.026*** (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000 −0.000** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.040 −0.241*** −0.200*** −0.218*** −0.062** 0.011 −0.053 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Education 0.183*** 0.089*** 0.188*** 0.171*** 0.197*** 0.125*** 0.106*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Employed 0.018 −0.025 0.043+ −0.042 0.135*** 0.013 0.108** (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) GDP logged −0.087+ −0.032 0.098 0.359*** 0.572*** −0.549** −0.173 (0.05) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12) Inflation 0.046 −0.092 −0.040 −0.071 −0.094 −0.291* −0.367*** (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10) FDI 0.138** 0.062 0.090 0.040 0.115 0.200 0.193 (0.05) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.15) Trade, % GDP −0.003** 0.001 −0.004+ −0.007** −0.006** −0.000 −0.004 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Industry, % −0.013+ 0.017 −0.014 −0.020 −0.015 −0.002 −0.001 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) Democracy 0.001 0.076** 0.028 −0.057* 0.025 0.125** −0.077* (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Union*Democracy 0.013+ 0.066** 0.036*** 0.039** 0.016+ 0.054*** −0.016+ (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist 0.371*** −0.659** 0.029 0.151 0.082 −0.134 −0.711** (0.11) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.39) (0.28) Union*Corporatist −0.304*** −0.302** −0.411*** −0.353*** −0.253*** −0.687*** −0.660*** (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) Constant −3.391*** −5.428*** −4.007*** −6.758*** −6.957*** −1.097 −1.414 (0.44) (0.93) (0.80) (0.77) (0.75) (1.50) (1.05) Observations 75,510 66,868 69,431 67,716 69,042 76,803 60,449 Countries 53 50 51 51 51 53 46 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10; two-tailed tests. Appendix B. Logistic regression models with random effects: The interaction effects of union membership with democracy and corporatism on political participation, including additional economic controls, 2004 Discuss politics Strike Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Union 0.503*** 0.782*** 0.771*** 0.598*** 0.548*** 1.313*** 0.996*** (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) Male 0.598*** 0.569*** 0.422*** 0.399*** 0.119*** 0.804*** −0.493*** (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) Age 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.054*** 0.023* 0.026*** (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000 −0.000** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.040 −0.241*** −0.200*** −0.218*** −0.062** 0.011 −0.053 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Education 0.183*** 0.089*** 0.188*** 0.171*** 0.197*** 0.125*** 0.106*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Employed 0.018 −0.025 0.043+ −0.042 0.135*** 0.013 0.108** (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) GDP logged −0.087+ −0.032 0.098 0.359*** 0.572*** −0.549** −0.173 (0.05) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12) Inflation 0.046 −0.092 −0.040 −0.071 −0.094 −0.291* −0.367*** (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10) FDI 0.138** 0.062 0.090 0.040 0.115 0.200 0.193 (0.05) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.15) Trade, % GDP −0.003** 0.001 −0.004+ −0.007** −0.006** −0.000 −0.004 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Industry, % −0.013+ 0.017 −0.014 −0.020 −0.015 −0.002 −0.001 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) Democracy 0.001 0.076** 0.028 −0.057* 0.025 0.125** −0.077* (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Union*Democracy 0.013+ 0.066** 0.036*** 0.039** 0.016+ 0.054*** −0.016+ (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist 0.371*** −0.659** 0.029 0.151 0.082 −0.134 −0.711** (0.11) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.39) (0.28) Union*Corporatist −0.304*** −0.302** −0.411*** −0.353*** −0.253*** −0.687*** −0.660*** (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) Constant −3.391*** −5.428*** −4.007*** −6.758*** −6.957*** −1.097 −1.414 (0.44) (0.93) (0.80) (0.77) (0.75) (1.50) (1.05) Observations 75,510 66,868 69,431 67,716 69,042 76,803 60,449 Countries 53 50 51 51 51 53 46 Discuss politics Strike Demonstrate Boycott Petition Volunteer: Parties Volunteer: Political orgs Union 0.503*** 0.782*** 0.771*** 0.598*** 0.548*** 1.313*** 0.996*** (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) Male 0.598*** 0.569*** 0.422*** 0.399*** 0.119*** 0.804*** −0.493*** (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) Age 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.054*** 0.023* 0.026*** (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000 −0.000** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Married −0.040 −0.241*** −0.200*** −0.218*** −0.062** 0.011 −0.053 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Education 0.183*** 0.089*** 0.188*** 0.171*** 0.197*** 0.125*** 0.106*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Employed 0.018 −0.025 0.043+ −0.042 0.135*** 0.013 0.108** (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) GDP logged −0.087+ −0.032 0.098 0.359*** 0.572*** −0.549** −0.173 (0.05) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12) Inflation 0.046 −0.092 −0.040 −0.071 −0.094 −0.291* −0.367*** (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10) FDI 0.138** 0.062 0.090 0.040 0.115 0.200 0.193 (0.05) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.15) Trade, % GDP −0.003** 0.001 −0.004+ −0.007** −0.006** −0.000 −0.004 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Industry, % −0.013+ 0.017 −0.014 −0.020 −0.015 −0.002 −0.001 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) Democracy 0.001 0.076** 0.028 −0.057* 0.025 0.125** −0.077* (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) Union*Democracy 0.013+ 0.066** 0.036*** 0.039** 0.016+ 0.054*** −0.016+ (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Corporatist 0.371*** −0.659** 0.029 0.151 0.082 −0.134 −0.711** (0.11) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.39) (0.28) Union*Corporatist −0.304*** −0.302** −0.411*** −0.353*** −0.253*** −0.687*** −0.660*** (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) Constant −3.391*** −5.428*** −4.007*** −6.758*** −6.957*** −1.097 −1.414 (0.44) (0.93) (0.80) (0.77) (0.75) (1.50) (1.05) Observations 75,510 66,868 69,431 67,716 69,042 76,803 60,449 Countries 53 50 51 51 51 53 46 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 + p < 0.10; two-tailed tests. Notes 1 Scholars distinguish between more and less “confrontational” or “contentious” political acts (e.g., Dalton 2014; Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Drawing on this, we characterize demonstrating, occupying, and striking as contentious acts. Voting, volunteering, and discussing politics are generally not as contentious. We also lump petitions and boycotts in the non-contentious category, though we acknowledge that they have varied meanings across societies, and especially boycotts may represent a middle ground in some contexts. 2 We do note that “demonstrations” in this context may be in support of the state. 3 In this period, the United States and Chile were low corporatism; Egypt and Germany were on the higher end. Germany and the United States had high democracy scores (10). Egypt and Chile had low democracy scores in the 1980s (−6); Chile grew more democratic toward the 2000s (we discuss the non-democratic period). 4 Because democracy and corporatism are dimensions rather than crisp dichotomies, some cases fell in the middle rather than neatly into the quadrants’ corners. For instance, Spain, Ireland, and Turkey had elements of corporatism, and would fall somewhere in the middle of that dimension. 5 Germany has a dual structure of worker representation. Unions bargain over wages and employment conditions. Work councils negotiate other firm-level issues. 6 Corporatist arrangements weakened over time in Egypt. By the 2000s, many of the economic elements had been abandoned, though independent unions remained illegal. 7 How unions respond to the erosion of corporatism varies. Contentious protest, as occurred in Egypt, is only one potential outcome (Murillo 2001). 8 For survey details, see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp; http://www.issp.org/. 9 Questions are retrospective in nature. Respondents may make errors in recall of events. We focus on behaviors rather than attitudes, because the former are more likely to be recalled correctly (e.g., Smith 1984). 10 We mean-center democracy scores for regression analyses. We use the raw scores for figures for ease of interpretation. 11 We examined other measures of corporatism, including ones focused on primarily on interest group representation (e.g., measures for Lijphart [1999] as well as the union “centralization” score from Visser) and industrial policies (e.g., Visser’s wage coordination score). We also reran models using Jahn’s (2014) summary score of corporatism, derived from Visser’s measures. Results are substantively similar across these various measures. We opt to use this measure because it satisfies several requirements: it is time varying and covers a larger group of countries, it combines aspects from the various “camps” of corporatism measures, and results are consistent with other measures of corporatism. 12 It is generally straightforward to distinguish between corporatist and non-corporatist societies, but a few cases are the subject of debate, such as Venezuela (e.g., Coppedge 1993). We conducted sensitivity analyses to see if reclassification of those particular cases altered our findings; results were consistent. 13 However, we observe one difference: Eastern European union members were particularly unlikely to strike. Funk and Lesch (2004, 270) attribute these low strike levels to many Eastern European workers’ beliefs that structural change was necessary, as well as inexperience with mass mobilization. 14 Additional adjustment of standard errors for clustering by time yielded similar results. 15 Few countries in our sample have extremely low levels of democracy, so confidence intervals are very large. Interpret predicted probabilities at the bottom of the spectrum with caution. 16 We did observe one significant three-way interaction between democracy, corporatism, and union membership for demonstrate. This suggests that union members are even more likely to demonstrate compared to their non-union counterparts in countries with both high levels of democracies and low corporatism—such as the United States. 17 Many countries have provisions for union security practices at the time of this study, including Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Japan, the Philippines, the Scandinavian countries, and some states within the United States. 18 Because organizational membership and ideology are likely consequences of union membership, we did not think it appropriate to include these in our main tables. 19 Williams’ STATA code does not support random effects, so we were only able to compare with conventional logit models. Appendix A. About the Authors Jasmine Kerrissey is Assistant Professor of Sociology and faculty of the Labor Center at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. She holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of California, Irvine, and a BS in Industrial and Labor Relations from Cornell University. Her research examines the historical and contemporary role of labor movements in shaping working conditions, inequality, and political participation. Evan Schofer is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Irvine. His work has explored global expansions of education, science, and environmentalism. His research in comparative political sociology addresses variation in political participation as well as the worldwide growth of civil society organizations in recent decades. Much of his work seeks to develop and extend world society theory, to better understand global patterns of social change. He received his PhD in Sociology from Stanford University. References Allison , Paul D. 1999 . “ Comparing Logit and Probit Coefficients Across Groups .” Sociological Methods and Research 28 ( 2 ): 186 – 208 . 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Author notes We thank members of the Irvine Comparative Sociology Workshop and the UMass Organizations and Networks Group for their helpful comments, as well as Marion Fourcade, David J. Frank, Ron Jepperson, Tom Juravich, Ann Hironaka, Joya Misra, Jeff Schuhrke, and Don Tomaskovic-Devey. Work on this project was supported by a seed grant from the Center for the Study of Democracy at the University of California, Irvine. © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/about_us/legal/notices)

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Social ForcesOxford University Press

Published: Sep 1, 2018

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