Gender Perspective in UN Framework for Peace Processes and Transitional Justice: The Need for a Clearer and More Inclusive Notion of Gender

Gender Perspective in UN Framework for Peace Processes and Transitional Justice: The Need for a... Abstract∞ Gender influences the experiences of war and periods of large-scale abuses, and as such it needs to inform peace processes and transitional justice mechanisms. In the past 15 years, the UN Security Council has provided a framework for the inclusion of a gender perspective in peace processes, which includes attention to conflict-related gender-based violence (GBV) through the establishment of the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. This article analyzes how gender is framed and understood in this context and how it impacts the practice of peace processes. It is suggested that in order to effectively tackle the root causes of conflict-related GBV, the WPS architecture should allow for an expansive understanding of gender, avoiding the reproduction of gender stereotypes. This should include the recognition of intersectional experiences of women with violence during conflict, violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and gendered violence committed against men. INTRODUCTION Transitional justice is understood as ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.’1 Its four components, which are interrelated and part of a whole, are truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of nonrepetition.2 These components are rooted in states’ obligations under human rights treaties to respect and ensure human rights.3 In the context of transition from war to peace, an important aspect of transitional justice is embodied in peace negotiations and agreements. As the main organ for maintaining international peace and security, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has a normative role in structuring the conduct of peace processes through its binding resolutions.4 As part of this role, the UNSC has since 2000 provided a framework for the inclusion of a gender perspective in peace processes, which includes attention to conflict-related gender-based violence (GBV), through the establishment of the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.5 Gender-based violence is part of the violence inflicted during war and periods of large-scale abuses, and as such it needs to be accounted for in the context of peace processes and transitional justice mechanisms. To this end, it is essential to understand how gender is framed and understood in UNSC resolutions and how it impacts the practice of peace processes. This article suggests that in order to effectively tackle the root causes of GBV, an expansive gender lens is required to analyze UN resolutions and reports on peace processes and transitional justice. This expansive gender lens is informed by a human rights framework used to understand GBV and its relation to gender stereotyping. It is suggested that in order to effectively identify, understand and remedy conflict-related GBV, the WPS architecture and its implementation should provide an expansive understanding of gender, avoiding the reproduction of gender stereotypes. This should include recognition of the intersectional experiences of women with violence during conflict, violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and gendered violence committed against men. As a background to my argument, the first section explores from a human rights perspective the notions of gender, stereotypes and violence, and their implications in the context of armed conflicts. The second section provides an overview of the evolution of gender throughout UNSC resolutions and reports as well as key limits as developed in critical feminist analysis. Lastly, the third section applies an expansive gender lens to these documents and discusses how this expansion may affect the conduct of peace processes, taking the Colombian peace process as an example. The article uses a human rights legal framework to understand notions of GBV, gender stereotyping and transitional justice. The expansive gender lens builds on these notions as developed in the field of human rights. It is then applied to the UN resolutions and reports forming the WPS architecture, given the normative character of UNSC resolutions. Ultimately, the analysis seeks to address the effectiveness of such documents in conducting peace processes, particularly in recognizing and providing accountability for serious human rights violations committed during conflicts. In doing so, this article seeks to offer a different light on the implications of UN resolutions and reports, while remaining aware of the practical realities that involve the design and adoption of this type of document.6 UNDERSTANDING GENDER, STEREOTYPES, VIOLENCE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMED CONFLICTS The concept of gender is not unanimously defined across disciplines and institutions. This article uses an underlying feminist understanding of gender,7 which is, on the one hand, an identity category. In contrast with sex differences, gender is about the social constructions of masculinities and femininities and what it means to be a man or a woman in the context of society.8 On the other hand, gender is also a structural power relation, as are race, class and religion, among others.9 In this understanding, gender functions as a system of oppression in which the masculine is superior to the feminine. As suggested by Carol Cohn, gender identity is better viewed as performative rather than as a fixed category, which means that it informs ways of being according to different social settings, while at the same time producing, reproducing and altering these social settings.10 These theoretical underpinnings have been unevenly incorporated into international documents using the concept of gender. As Valerie Oosterveld explains, there are two approaches to defining ‘gender’ within the UN.11 The first is the ‘minimalist’ approach taken by states negotiating at the multilateral level: ‘Prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute definition, states basically left the term undefined, either overtly or implicitly.’12 For instance, the term was used in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action with a statement establishing that it was intended to be interpreted and understood in its ‘ordinary, accepted usage.’13 The Rome Statute departs from this trend with its definition of gender, which is understood to refer to ‘the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above.’14 The second approach, taken by the UN and its agencies, is closer to the understanding of gender adopted in this article as it acknowledges its social constructions as opposed to biology. Under this approach, the concept is defined with different focuses and wordings, which share three similar points: first, ‘gender’ is a socially constructed concept; second, the construction of ‘gender’ is complex and is influenced by culture, the roles women and men are expected to play, the relationships among those roles, and the value society places on those roles; and third, the content of ‘gender’ can vary within and among cultures, and over time.15 International human rights law offers a frame to address gender stereotypes and their relation to violence. As suggested by Simone Cusack, the social and cultural norms prescribing the roles men and women are expected to play are embodied in gender stereotypes.16 The obligations to transform gender stereotypes and eliminate wrongful gender stereotyping under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)17 are central to its objective of achieving substantive equality.18 In this context, gender stereotypes are understood to take different and overlapping forms. ‘Sex stereotypes’ are related to the physical, emotional and cognitive attributes and characteristics of men and women; ‘sexual stereotypes’ refer to sexual characteristics and behaviors, typically reinforcing heterosexuality and dominant male sexuality; ‘sex-role stereotypes’ emphasize the roles and behaviors typically assigned to men and women.19 Compounded stereotypes are intersecting stereotypes that produce unique stereotypes for different subgroups of women or men.20 The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (the CEDAW Committee) has recognized that the ‘discrimination of women based on sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste and sexual orientation and gender identity,’ which have compounded negative impacts on women.21 Gender stereotypes are relational in nature, meaning that femininities and masculinities are constructed in relation to one another, usually distinct and mutually reinforcing.22 Thus, although CEDAW focuses on women, male stereotypes must be examined in order to understand how gender hierarchies and male dominance are furthered and causing harms,23 and also how restrictive binary understandings of gender exclude other forms of expression of gender. Gender stereotypes have been recognized as being among the root causes of violence against women. The CEDAW Committee recognizes that wrongful stereotypes perpetuate and justify GBV against women.24 The UN General Assembly (UNGA) notes that violence against women is the manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women and operates to maintain women in a subordinate position compared to men.25 The CEDAW Committee as well as the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACoHR) and the Court of Human Rights both investigated the relation between stereotypes and the high rates of violence against women in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.26 These international human rights bodies found that stereotypes were at the origin of the violent murders and disappearances of women and of the impunity with which these acts were committed. The notion of GBV has been developed in the context of violence against women, which has limited its understanding to violence committed by men towards women. For instance, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women defines violence against women as ‘any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere.’27 The association of GBV to violence against women, especially sexual violence, is consistent with the historical development of international norms in this regard. However, in light of the definitions of gender and the relation between harmful stereotypes and GBV, a more complete understanding of this type of violence should take into account all forms of violence based on gender. Hence, some forms of violence committed against men as well as persons perceived as not conforming to gender stereotypes should be included in the understanding of GBV. However, this inclusion should not serve to obscure the violence committed against women, but rather to provide a better and deeper understanding of this form of violence and its causal relation to harmful stereotypes and gender hierarchies. In this line of thought, it has been increasingly recognized that GBV can be committed against both women and men. The Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) considers gender-based crimes as those committed against persons, whether male or female, because of their sex and/or socially constructed gender roles. Gender-based crimes are not always manifested as a form of sexual violence. These crimes may include non-sexual attacks on women and girls, and men and boys, because of their gender, such as persecution on the grounds of gender.28 Similarly, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) understands GBV as ‘any harmful act directed against individuals or groups of individuals on the basis of their gender.’29 Sexual violence is defined as a form of GBV encompassing any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed against a person’s sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting.30 Violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons is also increasingly recognized as a form of GBV, as it is ‘based on the perception that other persons have on the orientations, identities, expressions and bodies.’31 The UNHCHR has affirmed that homophobic and transphobic violence ‘constitute a form of gender-based violence, driven by a desire to punish individuals whose appearance or behaviour appears to challenge gender stereotypes.’32 In 2015, various UN entities called for ending violence and discrimination against LGBTI persons, recognizing the various forms of violence to which they are subjected because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.33 In a recent report, the special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment provides a gender analysis of the torture and ill-treatment framework which accounts for women, girls and LGBTI persons.34 According to the special rapporteur, ‘gender-based violence, endemic even in peacetime and often amplified during conflict, can be committed against any person because of their sex and socially constructed gender roles.’35 The special rapporteur further added that the purpose and intent elements of torture are always fulfilled if an act is gender-specific or perpetrated against persons based on the basis of their sex, gender identity, real or perceived sexual orientation or non-adherence to social norms around gender and sexuality.36 The recognition of violence against LGBTI persons as GBV is consistent with the understanding of gender adopted in this article. LGBTI persons generally do not perform the physical and sexual characteristics and behaviors attached to the social constructions of masculinities and femininities. This perceived defiance towards socially constructed notions of gender leads to violence committed against LGBTI persons, which is fueled by discriminatory norms and impunity that condone this type of violence. In this regard, Cusack argues that the ‘codification of the male/female binary of gender stereotyping’ under CEDAW limits its broader goal of substantive gender equality: ‘by focusing on stereotypes related to men and women, rather than the broader concept of “gender” stereotypes, the CEDAW and the Committee in its jurisprudence overlook the gradations and complexities of gender and, more specifically, gender stereotyping.’37 In its report on violence against the LGBTI community in Latin America, the IACoHR expresses clearly how this form of violence is linked to gender: Societies in the Americas are dominated by underpinning principles of heteronormativity, cisnormativity, sex hierarchy, sex and gender binary systems, and misogyny. These principles, combined with widespread intolerance towards non-normative sexual orientations, gender identities and expressions, and diverse bodies, legitimize violence and discrimination against LGBTI persons or those perceived as such. Violence against LGBTI persons exists as a consequence of social contexts, societies and States which do not accept, and in fact may punish, non-normative sexualities, identities and bodies which do not fit the socially-accepted notion of what defines persons as either female or male.38 Gender influences the nature of the harm suffered during armed conflicts or periods of large-scale abuses. Because of their unequal position in society, women are affected distinctively in these contexts. On the one hand, they may suffer from the same forms of violence that men do, such as murder, torture and disappearances, but this violence may have different implications for women and for men because of the ‘pre-existing socioeconomic and legal status and the embedded cultural norms in a patriarchal society.’39 These structures affect women’s general experience of conflict. For instance, the period before conflict is often characterized by the disruption of everyday life, and military propaganda often draws on stereotypes of masculinities and femininities. During conflicts, family structures are disrupted and women may take on traditionally male responsibilities in addition to their caregiving roles. After conflict, women are excluded from formal peace processes and political leadership, and ignored or misrepresented in the media.40 On the other hand, women are affected disproportionately by certain forms of violence, such as sexual violence.41 Although it has received less attention, men and LGBTIQ persons also experience gendered harms during conflicts. For instance, sexual violence against men may be used systematically as a tool targeting specific constructions of masculinities.42 As will be addressed in the last section, patterns of violence during the Colombian armed conflict directly targeted LGBTIQ people in order to exterminate the ‘immoral’ or the ‘abnormal.’43 Gendered violence during conflict is exacerbated by existing structures of discrimination and harmful stereotypes.44 Therefore, in order for transitional justice mechanisms ‘to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation,’45 they must address the differential impacts of armed conflicts and large-scale violence for women and men and aim at understanding their relation to gender. In particular, the harmful stereotypes that contributed to the harm suffered should be addressed and transformed in order to avoid recurrence. In sum, the notion of gender refers to the social construction of what it means to be men or women and their respective relation to power. It embodies stereotypes regarding the physical, psychological and emotional characteristics and behaviors expected from both. Harmful stereotypes based on the idea of the inferiority of one gender can serve to increase tolerance of, normalize and encourage GBV. Gender discrimination is among the causes of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence. A broad and coherent understanding of gender should be able to address violence committed against men and LGBTI persons when it is based on their gender. However, this recognition is recent and has been uneven throughout the UN. The next sections review how these notions are used in the context of peace processes and transitional justice. MAINSTREAMING GENDER IN PEACE PROCESSES AND POLICY DOCUMENTS: MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AND CRITIQUES In the last nearly two decades, the UN has increasingly recognized that gender stereotypes and relations inform the experience of individuals during wars and periods of large-scale violence. Gender-based violence is part of the violence committed and may be exacerbated in these contexts. It has been recognized that GBV is linked to preexisting structures of discrimination, which in turn affects peace processes as well as the design and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. Gender considerations were officially brought into the international peace and security sphere with the adoption, thanks to the work of women and feminist organizations, of Resolution 1325 by the UNSC in 2000, which established the WPS agenda.46 The UNSC’s adoption and implementation of the WPS agenda marked a fundamental turn in mainstreaming gender in UN action related to peace processes and transitional justice.47 Despite the undeniably positive achievement embodied by Resolution 1325 and subsequent ones adopted under the WPS agenda,48 the way gender is framed and understood in these normative documents and in UN reports on their implementation, has raised important questions and criticisms. This section presents an overview of key developments as well as limits to the WPS architecture in relation to the notion of gender and its implications for peace processes and transitional justice. It is not intended as a comprehensive review of the important literature that already exists on the WPS agenda, but rather as a background to the next section, which builds on arguments developed in feminist and queer critical analysis. At this point it is also necessary to situate the analysis in the general UN architecture. The UN is composed of numerous organs and agencies which enjoy varying degrees of autonomy and can therefore adopt more or less different understandings of the concept of gender. Its central deliberative organ is the UNGA, composed of all member states, whose resolutions, although they are not binding on states per se, are influential and may express international custom or contribute to its formation.49 The UNSC, composed of 15 members, five of which are permanent and enjoy a veto power, is the primary body responsible for maintaining international peace and security, which is one of the main purposes of the UN.50 The UNSC resolutions are binding on states and it has the power to order coercive measures in case of threat to or breach of international peace and security.51 In addition to its organs, the UN counts on various programs, funds and specialized agencies, such as UN Women.52 The UN human rights system is composed of both Charter-based and treaty-based bodies in charge of monitoring human rights. UN Charter-based bodies include special procedures such as special rapporteurs and working groups composed of independent experts addressing thematic or geographic human rights issues,53 while treaty-based bodies are composed of independent experts created by specific human right treaties, such as the CEDAW Committee.54 Targeting the UNSC through the adoption of UN Resolution 1325, which was groundbreaking for framing women’s rights as an international security matter,55 allowed for gender to be mainstreamed throughout the whole architecture of the UN. However, UNSC resolutions are taken by states according to different sets of interests and power relations. Hence, although they are a source of international law as such, their content is likely to reflect interests other than genuine gender equality. To the contrary, documents emanating from the UN human rights system, in particular those adopted by independent experts, are less subject to influences. In this context, the analysis is directed at UNSC resolutions and their implementation, which are contrasted with human rights documents, keeping in mind the different rationales to which the adoption of these two sets of documents respond. Resolution 1325 and its progeniture stressed the need to include women in all aspects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The WPS architecture is based on four pillars: the protection of both the rights and bodies of women and girls in conflict; their participation in peace and security governance; prevention of conflict; and relief and recovery for conflict survivors.56 Four resolutions have focused on the protection component, especially from sexual violence, while three have focused on participation.57 The implementation of the WPS agenda is monitored through annual reports submitted by the UN secretary-general (UNSG) to the UNSC.58 In addition, since 2012 the UNSC requires a separate report on conflict-related sexual violence.59 A UN special representative on sexual violence in conflict has also been appointed, as well as a team of experts on the rule of law and sexual violence in conflict, which assists governments and reports directly to the special representative. Despite these significant developments, concerns have been expressed at the framing of Resolution 1325, which has been considered ‘poorly formulated to address the wide and complex array of gendered peace and conflict challenges.’60 The loose meaning of gender and its conflation with women in the WPS architecture is among its limiting characteristics. The notions of ‘gender’ and ‘gender perspective’ are used in UNSC resolutions adopted under the WPS umbrella without definition. For instance, the meaning of adopting a ‘gender perspective’ in the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements, as provided in UNSC Resolution 1325, is unclear.61 Similarly, UNSG reports on conflict-related sexual violence use the notions of ‘gender’ and ‘gender-based violence’ without defining them. While the UNHCHR and the ICC Office of the Prosecutor both understand sexual violence as a form of GBV, the same is not as clear in the UNSC resolutions and the reports on their implementation. In this regard, sexual violence committed against women is commonly referred to as GBV, while it is not necessarily true for sexual violence committed against men or against persons based on their real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.62 Hence, the notion of ‘gender’ as used in the WPS architecture does not refer to the social construction of women and men, but rather exclusively to women.63 The interchangeable use of ‘gender’ and ‘women,’ consistent throughout the resolutions forming the WPS architecture as well as the reports on its implementation, has been criticized. Conflating these two notions limits the engagement with underlying structures that produce violence committed against women during conflicts and the experience of women more generally. Dina Haynes and colleagues find that too little has been done to define what ‘women’s needs’ are.64 They argue that: International community perpetually defaults to a masculine way of thinking in which thinking about women (when it happens at all) leads first, and reflexively, to patriarchal protection schemes (such as ending sexual violence), but seems unwilling to address the very masculinities and structures that produce that systemic sexual violence. The relentless focus on sexual violence raises the following important issue – what questions are women being asked if and when they are consulted about what they need to feel safe?65 The need for a ‘gender-centered approach to the causalities of human rights violations’66 has been stressed, which should make sure that the notion of gender is used more coherently throughout UN documents and reports rather than referring exclusively to women in a way that essentializes them. In line with this limiting representation of women in UNSC resolutions, their narrow focus on the physical, specifically sexual, security of women, has been criticized for failing to effectively bring more security to women.67 Identifying sexual violence may serve to render visible a form of violence that has historically been silenced or mischaracterized.68 However, it has also been argued that focusing on vulnerable women and girls as victims of sexual violence contributes to reproducing gender stereotypes and limits the transformation of the root causes of sexual violence.69 Following this line of thought, essentializing women’s experience of conflicts or large-scale violence to being victims of sexual violence results in limiting ‘women’s discursive space’: When women are defined solely as victims, women’s experience is valued as long as it correlates with the experience of victimhood. Women may, therefore, be invited to weigh in on matters concerning women’s physical safety but little else. The focus on victimization acts as a constraint on discourse.70 In fact, it has been noted that women continue to be excluded from transitional justice processes and substance, which ‘often function as a means to reassert elite male control over political systems in ways that definitely ouster women.’71 Coupled with the silence around sexualized violence committed against men and boys,72 the strengthening of women and girls as vulnerable subjects in need of protection ‘limits our ability to theorize sexual violence and has serious implications for the kind of society that is established post-conflict, and for who gets to participate fully in it.’73 Although protection has remained the main pillar of the WPS architecture benefitting from the greatest attention,74 later resolutions have shifted the focus onto the participation as well as the prevention components, to a lesser extent. These resolutions and the UNSG reports on their implementation are more carefully worded and provide an increasingly broad understanding of women’s experience of conflict. For instance, the 2016 UNSG report on conflict-related sexual violence stresses in general terms that the root causes of such violence must be addressed and harmful sociocultural norms transformed in order to ensure that ‘wartime atrocities do not become entrenched in the post-conflict period.’75 The report provides illustrations of the gendered causes and implications of sexual violence, for instance when describing that sexual violence has been used against high-profile women as a ‘tool of social and moral control to relegate women to the private sphere and to punish perceived “countercultural” behavior.’76 Similarly, UNSC Resolution 2122 adopted in 2013 addressed the persistent gaps in the implementation of the WPS agenda77 identified by the UNSG in his report.78 The resolution is less focused on sexual violence and stresses the need to address the ‘full range of threats and human rights violations and abuses’ experienced by women.79 There is less emphasis on protecting vulnerable women or fulfilling their ‘special needs,’ and more emphasis on their participation, empowerment and equality.80 Rather than picturing all women as vulnerable, the resolution is more carefully written, for instance when it recognizes that ‘those women and girls who are particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged may be specifically targeted or at increased risk of violence.’81 UNSG reports on the implementation of the WPS from 2013 acknowledge the need to address the full range of violations of human rights of women during conflict, as well as identify and transform the discriminatory legal frameworks and practices that further these violations and the impunity for such violence.82 However, despite the recent shift in the WPS architecture from a heavy focus on the protection pillar to increased attention to the participation and prevention components, the rhetorical nature of the resolutions and reports has been criticized. In this regard, the 2015 global review on the implementation of Resolution 1325 conveyed by the UNSG83 identified significant gaps in the implementation of the WPS agenda: 27 percent of the peace agreements concluded from the adoption of Resolution 1325 (2000) until 1 January 2015 included references to women, and only a few had comprehensive gender equality considerations, which were poorly implemented.84 In addition, despite a broadened scope of the experience of women in conflict, peace negotiation and peacebuilding, the WPS resolutions and reports still provide little engagement with intersectional forms of violence,85 gendered forms of violence against men as well as violence based on real or perceived sexual orientation and gender identity. The notion of gender remains loosely used, undefined and attached only to women as opposed to a broader understanding of its social context. The essentialization of women throughout the WPS architecture has been criticized, as well as how it reinforces and reproduces gender stereotypes, limiting its transformative nature.86 As noted by Cusack, feminists and women’s rights movements, including CEDAW, play a role in ‘reproducing gender stereotypes and related mythologies.’87 In contrast to the UNSC resolutions and the UNSG reports, the UNHCHR study, focusing specifically on gender-based and sexual violence in relation to transitional justice, adopted a broader and more coherent understanding of gender which takes into account its social construction. Its definition of GBV refers explicitly to CEDAW’s General Recommendation No. 19.88 The study addresses the participation of ‘victims’ and the different needs and opportunities of women, men and children with regard to truth seeking, justice, reparation and institutional reform.89 Thus, it is interested in the differential impacts of conflicts and the measures implemented postconflict on both men and women, rather than focusing exclusively on women’s and girls’ vulnerabilities. The study insists on the full range of human rights violations faced by women, their root causes, and offers a broader understanding of gender. Transitional justice is understood as a process that can ‘help to realize the rights of victims of [gender-based and sexual violence] and can be instrumental in identifying and dismantling the underlying structural discrimination that enabled it to occur.’90 In this regard, meaningful consultations are considered essential, during which women and girls should be represented ‘in all their diversity. Consultations with women should not solely focus on their experience of victimization, but should take account of the evolution of gender roles during and after conflict and the multiple roles women play in such situations.’91 The UNHCHR identified truth-seeking processes as adequate tools to address not only sexual violence, but also its systemic nature and other forms of GBV.92 It allows for documentation of the full range of violations experienced by women during conflict, and can make recommendations aimed at addressing entrenched cultures of discrimination.93 The potential of truth-seeking mechanisms to account for the gendered dimensions of conflict has also been identified in the literature.94 The introduction of gender considerations in the international peace and security framework through the WPS architecture, although constituting a significant step foreword in advancing women’s rights in security settings, suffers important limits in its framing. These limits undermine the transformative potential of the WPS agenda and have important impacts on the monitoring and reporting of gendered violence during conflict. Despite understandings of women’s experience in conflict having moved away from an almost exclusive focus on sexual violence, their representation in resolutions and reports remains essentializing and recognition of intersectional experiences remains limited. Based on a broader understanding of gender such as that presented in the UNHCHR’s report on conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, the next section suggests an expansive gender frame for UN policy documents on WPS, which should take into account the gendered dimensions of the harm suffered by men and LGBTIQ individuals. INCLUDING INTERSECTIONALITY, LGBTI PERSONS AND MEN IN GENDER ANALYSIS OF UN PEACE PROCESSES AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE DOCUMENTS Based on the review of the critical analysis of gender in the WPS architecture, I argue for an expanded gender lens in UN peace processes and transitional justice documents. This position is in line with recent literature that has stressed the blind spot of LGBTIQ experience in conflict and male sexual violence, as well as human rights developments regarding GBV. It is suggested that UNSC resolutions offer a foundation that can be built on, as shown by the increasingly broad understanding of gender and hints of recognition in recent UNSG reports of sexual violence committed against male and LGBTIQ persons. However, these hints are not sufficient yet and require a more complete and coherent articulation of a broader notion of gender. The Colombian peace process shows how the WPS architecture can be used by local LGBTIQ organizations to voice their perspective and experience of conflict, while also evidencing the challenges of working with an expansive gender frame. Recent literature has argued that conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence should include male sexual violence as well as the experience of LGBTIQ individuals in conflict. For instance, Oosterveld argues that the Rome Statute fails to recognize the gendered nature of sexual crimes committed against men and boys.95 She notes that ‘sexual violence is not about sex per se, but it is about body parts and socially-constructed norms of what is “sexual”.’96 The author suggests that men may face similar barriers to reporting acts of sexual violence as women, but also specific barriers such as the perceived need to live up to masculine gender norms heightened as a result of war, a lack of cultural expressions or terms to describe male sexual violence, or a perception that men and boys simply cannot be victims of sexual violence.97 Rosemary Grey and Laura Shepherd stress the near invisibility of male victims of sexualized violence in the literature on addressing conflict-related sexual violence, which results in a lack of attention to these victims in peacebuilding and postconflict reconstruction programs.98 The authors suggest that violence should be theorized with careful attention to gender in order to avoid perpetuating models of masculinity and war rape that have potentially pernicious effects.99 In the context of humanitarian interventions on GBV, Chris Dolan argues that: For mainstream humanitarian approaches significantly to increase the effectiveness of prevention, mitigation and response to [GBV], the 2005 focus on sexual violence cannot be lost. However, the range of victims and survivors that are not just recognized but also addressed needs to be more inclusive – most urgently male and [LGBTI] victims and survivors – and a range of non-sexual forms of [GBV] must also become the target of humanitarian attention.100 Regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity in the understanding and monitoring of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, Jamie Hagen recently demonstrated that the WPS architecture ‘can be a force of oppression and erasure of LGBTQ experience’ because of the framing of gender in WPS resolutions on sexual and gender-based violence, which results in the exclusion of LGBTQ individuals from monitoring and reporting.101 Noting the variation in the use of the term ‘gender’ across WPS documents and the interchangeable use of ‘woman’ and ‘gender,’ the author finds that this limiting framing of gender overlooks LGBTQ individuals as a marginalized and vulnerable population, which has ‘policy implications when translated into the categories used to develop indicators and to determine which vulnerable populations deserve targeted services and funding.’102 It is suggested that the discourse of gender can be used to address concerns related to sexual orientation and gender identity without the need to seek a resolution to protect LGBTQ individuals in conflict.103 This recent literature is consistent with human rights law developments on GBV and its relation to gender stereotyping. As mentioned, the UNHCHR, the UN special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and the IACoHR recognize that violence committed against persons appearing to challenge social norms around gender and sexuality is a form of GBV. In a study on gender-based and sexual violence in relation to transitional justice, the UNHCHR notes that in ‘some contexts, it is also important to take into consideration violence perpetrated against persons perceived as not conforming to traditional notions of masculinity or femininity, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons.’104 The report further mentions that attention must be given to the practical barriers to consultation which are specific to women, men and children, including practical barriers for male, LGBT and other marginalized victims of sexual violence.105 In the context of international criminal law, authors have suggested that persecution based on sexual orientation or gender identity could fit into the frame of gender and constitute a crime against humanity in certain circumstances.106 Echoing Hagen’s argument, I suggest that UNSG reports on the implementation of the WPS agenda should integrate a broader notion of gender encompassing the intersectional experience of women in conflict, the experience of LGBTIQ individuals as well as male sexual violence. The articulation of this understanding of gender can build on recent expansions, although uneven and insufficient, of the UNSG’s understanding of the gendered experience of conflict-related violence. In this regard, the 2016 UNSG report on the implementation of the WPS agenda, in addition to reiterating the call for ‘justice measures that respond to the full range of women’s human rights violations,’107 opens the doors to intersecting forms of discrimination. The UNSG acknowledges that efforts under the WPS agenda should be inclusive: There is a growing understanding of the need to address multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, including those based on disabilities, indigenous status, sexual orientation or other factors. In order to ensure realistically that no one is left behind, inclusivity must be fully integrated into efforts to build and sustain peace.108 However, this call for inclusivity, especially with regard to intersecting forms of discrimination, is not further developed in the report. The only reference is the UNSG’s ongoing study on youth, peace and security, which he notes will ‘shed light on the twofold discrimination young women face due to age and gender.’109 In this report, the UNSG also provides hints of recognition of the gendered dimensions of violence against men. Referring to his 2016 report on conflict-related sexual violence, the UNSG identifies sexual violence committed against men and boys as an emerging concern.110 Similarly, the UNSG 2017 report on conflict-related sexual violence identifies occurrences of sexual violence against men, for instance in detention centers, as well as the stigma associated with the homosexuality taboo for male survivors of sexual violence, the limited availability of services and the risks of arrest due to the criminalization of same-sex relations in some countries.111 The 2017 report also mentions the need to change outdated and incomplete definitions of sexual violence in national laws, such as those that exclude male victims from protection, as well as the potential of transitional justice in helping to transform inadequate laws and harmful societal norms.112 However, the UNSG reports provide only a limited engagement with the underlying gender roles and norms contributing to this type of violence and its consequences. Thus, the notions of gender or GBV, which are used in the report without definition, seem to remain associated exclusively with women or sexual violence,113 despite the recognition of male sexual violence as an issue requiring attention. With regard to violence committed against LGBTIQ individuals, the UNSG reports on conflict-related sexual violence recognize since 2015 that the risks they face have been a ‘blind spot in the monitoring of civilian protection concerns.’114 The UNSG noted that individuals were targeted for physical and sexual violence on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation.115 However, this concern did not make its way into his report on the implementation of the WPS agenda, in which he limits himself to noting the need for inclusion with regard to intersecting forms of discrimination such as on the basis of sexual orientation.116 Furthermore, the 2017 report of the UNSG on conflict-related sexual violence, while explicitly referring to sexual orientation and gender identity as a basis for targeting victims of conflict-based sexual violence, does not provide further analysis or mention occurrences of this form of violence. Thus, the ‘blind spot’ in monitoring sexual violence committed on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity has clearly not been effectively remedied and LGBTIQ individuals continue to be excluded from monitoring of conflict-related sexual violence. The limited inclusion of LGBTI persons in the gender analysis of peace processes and transitional justice can be explained by the general reluctance of states to even recognize the violence against LGBTI persons as an issue worth addressing. The resolutions adopted by the Human Rights Council on violence against LGBTI persons are limited in scope as they only require reports on the matter by the UNHCHR and do not adopt any specific position on the issue.117 The controversial nature of the issue and the absence of consensus is illustrated by the vote on both resolutions, with 23 to 19 and three abstentions in 2011, and 25 to 14 with seven abstentions in 2014.118 As of mid-2016, 73 states continue to criminalize same-sex conduct between consenting adults.119 This result is part of a larger resistance by many states to recognize ‘LGBT rights.’120 In this divided context, recognizing LGBTIQ in the scope of GBV runs the risk of undermining the general efforts to address violence against women. One example of this is the debates that surrounded the reauthorization of the Violence against Women Act (VAWA) in the USA in 2013,121 when it was suggested that violence among same-sex partners be included in the scope of the Act. This created heated debates in Congress, but same-sex couples were eventually included in the reauthorization. This inclusion aimed at responding to the reality of same-sex domestic violence, which is more than or equally prevalent as heterosexual domestic violence, and guaranteeing the same protection to all victims.122 Proponents argued in favor of this inclusion for reasons of legal realism, the human rights of victims entitled to protection and antidiscrimination in access to services.123 Opponents’ arguments were based on politics, given the Republican party’s platform opposing same-sex marriage equality, the already gender-neutral wording of the Act (although in fact same-sex couples were denied services), and the potential impacts of legislative inclusion of same-sex marriage on other legislations.124 These debates show how joining efforts to fight violence against women and against LGBTIQ persons can prove controversial, despite the general acceptance of provisions providing for the protection of the former. In addition to possibly undermining the efforts addressing violence against women, the inclusion of LGBTIQ persons into the scope of GBV could blur the specificity of both types of violence and fail to recognize the potentially different causes and consequences that each entail. For instance, civil society organizations have noted that the ‘LGBTI’ acronym in itself has weaknesses as it refers to groups of persons who may face significantly different human rights violations.125 If the distinctions among lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex persons are already undermined by the LGBTI acronym, including them under efforts to fight GBV could contribute to rendering less visible these specificities. Keeping these arguments in mind, it nevertheless seems that a meaningful understanding of GBV should be able to include and address the specific experiences of women, men and LGBTI persons. Failing to do so is not consistent with an understanding of gender as a socially constructed concept. This is harmful for both women and LGBTI persons, given that ‘the same gender constructions give rise to SGBV [sexual and gender-based violence] against woman and against the LGBTQ population.’126 In addition, the women’s movement should use the broad acceptance it has gained to bring historically excluded groups into the conversation. Failing to do so could reinforce dynamics of power in the women’s movement. The Colombian peace process provides a valuable case study on how the WPS architecture relates to the practice of peace processes, and the challenges in working with an expanded gender framework in this context. LGBTI persons have suffered from GBV throughout the Colombian internal armed conflict, at the hands of all armed groups involved.127 Patterns of violence targeting LGBTI persons included social and economic control and extermination of the ‘immoral’ or ‘abnormal,’ which forced them to flee their communities.128 During the peace talks between the guerrilla group FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the Colombian government, a subcommission on gender was created and integrated both women and LGBTI organizations.129 This subcommission reviewed all agreements that had been reached and included a meaningful gender perspective throughout the entire peace agreement. This gender perspective recognized the differential impacts of the conflict on women and LGBTI persons based on their gender, made the harm suffered visible and included dispositions to ensure accountability for this harm and the participation of excluded groups in peacebuilding.130 The gender perspective in the Colombian peace agreements was applauded by the international community as an example of successful integration of a gender perspective.131 However, the agreement was submitted to a referendum for acceptance by the Colombian people, who rejected it by a thin margin.132 One of the arguments advanced by opponents to the agreement was that its gender focus would advance ‘gay rights’ and the liberalization of abortion, which they perceived had nothing to do with the armed conflict.133 In response to the vote, the parties modified the agreement in light of the criticisms it had received from opponents.134 As a result, the notion of gender was narrowed to refer exclusively to women, references to LGBTI persons were detached from the notion of gender and attached to the notion of equality, and other explicit references were replaced by a broader category of ‘vulnerable groups.’135 This wording is similar to that of the VAWA 2013 in the USA, which included LGBTI persons under the definition of ‘underserved populations’ and the provision of ‘non-discrimination.’136 The reaction to the gender focus in the peace agreements among the Colombian population is symptomatic of the deeply rooted structures of discrimination and exclusion of persons not conforming to traditional understandings of gender identities and roles.137 It shows the controversial nature of such issues and the refusal to acknowledge specific harm suffered by LGBTI persons. As suggested by Lina Céspedes-Báez, the deal’s rejection echoes the backlash women and LGBTI rights have been suffering around the world at the hands of conservative and religious factions, [which] have framed the United Nations’ and Inter-American System’s efforts to protect LGBTI rights as cultural imperialism.138 Nevertheless, as Hagen suggests, the involvement of LGBTI organizations in the Colombian peace process shows that despite the lack of consideration given to sexual orientation and gender identity in policy and analysis, the WPS architecture allows for grassroots engagement and thereby offers an opportunity for local lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (LBT) activists to define their needs on their own terms.139 Despite the narrowing of the notion of gender used in the peace agreement, LGBTI organizations remain involved in the implementation of its gender perspective. In this regard, one representative of the LGBTI sector is integrated into the seven-member special entity in charge of ensuring that a gender perspective is mainstreamed in the implementation of the agreements. This special entity makes recommendations to the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement.140 Thus, the Colombian example shows that it is possible for women and LGBTI organizations to work together in mainstreaming an inclusive notion of gender, using WPS policy documents to voice their experience and make sure their perspective is acknowledged. As the ‘gender panic’ around the acceptance of the agreement shows, this process is not without challenges, but they are not insurmountable. CONCLUSION Despite an increasingly broad understanding of a gender perspective throughout peace processes and transitional justice with relation to women’s experience, the effectiveness of such attention has remained limited. Certain dimensions, such as intersecting forms of discrimination affecting the specific harms experienced by women, sexual violence committed against men, and violence against LGBTI persons in the context of conflict, have been mostly overlooked in UNSC resolutions and reports on the WPS agenda. This article has suggested that a more complete and coherent understanding of gender in UN documents on peace processes and transitional justice should include these dimensions. This would be beneficial not only for victims whose experience has been excluded from mechanisms, but also for the more meaningful understanding of women’s experience. However, such inclusion remains a controversial task, as illustrated by the case of Colombia. Nevertheless, the Colombian peace process shows how UN documents can serve grassroot organizations in voicing their experience of conflicts and advancing their claims throughout the peace process. UN normative documents and the monitoring of their implementation should adjust to this practical example of the way gender can be expanded in order to include victims and survivors of all forms of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence. Footnotes 1 ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,’ UN Doc. S/2004/616 (23 August 2004), para. 8 [hereinafter ‘Report on the Rule of Law, 2004’]. 2 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, Pablo de Greiff,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/21/46 (9 August 2012). 3 ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,’ 999 UNTS 171 (16 December 1966); ‘American Convention on Human Rights,’ 1144 UNTS 143 (22 November 1969); ‘General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant,’ UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C No. 4. 4 Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945 [hereinafter ‘UN Charter’]. 5 ‘Resolution 1325 (2000),’ UN Doc. S/RES/1325 (2000) [hereinafter ‘Resolution 1325’]. See also, the following resolutions: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1894 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013). 6 As pointed out by Pamela Scully, ‘Vulnerable Women: A Critical Reflection on Human Rights Discourse and Sexual Violence,’ Emory International Law Review 23 (2009): 113–124. 7 This understanding can be identified within the ‘diversity stage’ in feminist theory, in response to earlier stages which were criticized as essentializing. See generally, Martha Chamallas, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory, 2nd ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003). 8 Carol Cohn, ‘Women and Wars: Toward a Conceptual Framework,’ in Women and Wars, ed. Carol Cohn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), citing Cynthia Enloe. 9 Ibid.; Laura Shepherd, Gender, UN, Peacebuilding, and the Politics of Space: Locating Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). On different systems of social divisions and their interactions, see, Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘Intersectionality and Feminist Politics,’ European Journal of Women’s Studies 13(3) (2006): 193–209. 10 Cohn, supra n 8. See also, Judith Butler, ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory,’ Theatre Journal 40(4) (1988): 519–531. 11 Valerie Oosterveld, ‘The Definition of Gender in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice,’ Harvard Human Rights Journal 18 (2005): 55–84. 12 Ibid., 66. 13 ‘Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995,’ UN Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (1996), Addendum, Annex IV. 14 ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,’ 2187 UNTS 3 (17 July 1998), art. 7(3). Outside the UN, the term is also defined, in a broader manner, in the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, 11 May 2011, Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 210, art. 3(c), which entered into force in 2014 and has only 14 states parties: ‘“gender” shall mean the socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men.’ 15 Oosterveld, supra n 11 at 67. 16 Simone Cusack, ‘The CEDAW as a Legal Framework for Transnational Discourse on Gender Stereotyping,’ in Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in International, Regional and National Law, ed. Anne Hellum and Henriette Sinding Aasen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 17 ‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,’ 1249 UNTS 13 (18 December 1979) [hereinafter ‘CEDAW’]. 18 Cusack, supra n 16. See also, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Gender Stereotyping as a Human Rights Violation (2013). 19 OHCHR, supra n 18 at 10–13. 20 Ibid. This call for considering intersecting oppressions is related to developments on intersectionality. See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,’ Stanford Law Review 43(6) (1991): 1241–1299; Patricia Hill Collins, ‘Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas,’ Annual Review of Sociology 41(1) (2015): 1–20. 21 CEDAW, ‘General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of State Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,’ CEDAW/C/GC/28 (2010), para. 18. 22 Cusack, supra n 16; OHCHR, supra n 18. For instance, women are generally assigned roles associated with the private sphere (caregivers, homemakers), while men are assigned roles associated with the public sphere (decision-makers, heads of households), the latter being generally more valued in society. 23 Cusack, supra n 16. 24 CEDAW, ‘General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against Women,’ A/47/38 (1992). See also, Cusack, supra n 16. 25 ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women,’ A/RES/48/104 (20 December 1993) [hereinafter ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence’]. 26 CEDAW, ‘Report on Mexico Produced by the CEDAW under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention, and Reply from the Government of Mexico,’ CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO (2005); ‘The Situation of the Rights of Women in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico: The Right to be Free from Violence and Discrimination,’ OEA/SER.L/V/II.117 Doc. 44 (2003); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Gonzalez et al (“Cotton Field”) v Mexico, [2009] Series C No. 205. 27 ‘Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women “Convention Belem Do Para”,’ OASTS No A-61 (9 June 1994), art. 1 (emphasis added). See also, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence. 28 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes (2014), para. 16. 29 UNHCHR, ‘Analytical Study Focusing on Gender-Based and Sexual Violence in Relation to Transitional Justice,’ A/HRC/27/21 (2014), para. 3. 30 Ibid. 31 IACoHR, ‘Violence against LGBTI Persons in the Americas,’ OAS/Ser.L/V/II.rev.1 (2015), para. 15. 32 ‘Report of the UNHCHR on Discrimination and Violence against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,’ A/HRC/29/23 (2015), para. 21. See also, ‘Report of the UNHCHR on Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,’ A/HRC/19/41 (2011). 33 UN entities, Joint Statement on Ending Violence and Discrimination against LGBTI People (2015). 34 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,’ A/HRC/31/57 (2016). 35 Ibid., para. 7. 36 Ibid., para. 8. 37 Cusack, supra n 16 at 145. 38 IACoHR, supra n 31 at para. 48. 39 Laura C. Turano, ‘The Gender Dimension of Transitional Justice Mechanisms,’ International Law and Politics 43 (2010): 1060–1061, citing Ruth Rubio-Marín, ‘The Gender of Reparations: Setting the Agenda,’ in What Happened to the Women? Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marín (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2006). 40 Ibid. 41 UNHCHR, supra n 29. 42 For instance, Oosterveld argued that acts of forced circumcision in the Kenyatta case at the ICC constituted gendered violence as it involved the socially constructed norms of what is ‘sexual,’ in particular the sexualized cultural norms attached to circumcision and noncircumcision. Valerie Oosterveld, ‘Sexual Violence Directed against Men and Boys in Armed Conflict or Mass Atrocity: Addressing a Gendered Harm in International Criminal Tribunals,’ Journal of International Law and International Relations 10 (2014): 107–128. 43 See, infra n 128. Similar accounts were reported in Iraq. See, Human Rights Watch, ‘“They Want Us Exterminated”: Murder, Torture, Sexual Orientation and Gender in Iraq,’ August 2009, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0809web.pdf (accessed 26 November 2017). 44 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security,’ S/2002/1154 (2002) [hereinafter ‘SG Report on WPS, 2002’]. See also, Sara E. Davies and Jacqui True, ‘Reframing Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence: Bringing Gender Analysis Back in,’ Security Dialogue 46(6) (2015): 495–512. 45 Report on the Rule of Law, 2004, para. 8. 46 Resolution 1325. 47 Nicole George and Laura J. Shepherd, ‘Women, Peace and Security: Exploring the Implementation and Integration of UNSCR 1325,’ International Political Science Review 37(3) (2016): 297–306; Carol Cohn, ‘Mainstreaming Gender in UN Security Policy: A Path to Political Transformation?’ in Global Governance: Feminist Perspectives, ed. S.M. Rai and G. Waylen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 48 UNSC resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1894 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015). 49 See, UN Charter. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 The UN organization dedicated to gender equality and the empowerment of women, established through UNGA Resolution 64/689. ‘System-Wide Coherence,’ A/RES/64/289 (2010). 53 Such as the special rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, and the special rapporteur on torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, created, respectively, through resolutions A/CN.4/RES/1994/45 and A/CN.4/RES/1985/33. 54 See, CEDAW, art. 17 et ss. 55 Cohn, supra n 47. 56 George and Shepherd, supra n 47. 57 Resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888(2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) on protection; 1889 (2009), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015) on participation. George and Shepherd, supra n 47; Soumita Basu and Catia Confortini, ‘Weakest “P” in the 1325 Pod? Realizing Conflict Prevention through Security Council Resolution 1325,’ International Studies Perspectives 18(1) (2017): 43–63. 58 See, the first and the latest reports: SG Report on WPS, 2002; ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security,’ UN Doc. S/2016/822 (28 September 2016) [hereinafter ‘SG Report on WPS, 2016’]. 59 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,’ A/66/657-S/2012/33 (2012); ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,’ UN Doc. S/2016/361 (20 April 2016) [hereinafter ‘SG Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 2016’]. 60 George and Shepherd, supra n 47 at 301. 61 See, Resolution 1325, para. 8. 62 See, e.g., UNHCHR, supra n 29. 63 Christine Bell, ‘Text and Context: Evaluating Peace Agreements for their “Gender Perspective”,’ Political Settlements Research Programme, 2015, http://www.politicalsettlements.org/files/2015/10/Text-and-Context-11-October-2015-Executive-Summary.pdf (accessed 26 November 2017). 64 Dina Francesca Haynes, Naomi Cahn and Fionnuala Ní Aolaín, ‘Women in the Post-Conflict Process: Reviewing the Impact of Recent UN Actions in Achieving Gender Centrality,’ Santa Clara Journal of International Law 11(1) (2012): 189–217. 65 Ibid., 210. See also, Sofaer’s comment on the article, acknowledging the need to move ‘beyond women’s “protection”.’ Abraham D. Sofaer, ‘“Mainstreaming” Women through UN Security Council Resolutions: Comments on a Paper by Haynes, Cahn & Aolaín,’ Santa Clara Journal of International Law 11(1) (2012): 221. 66 Kris Brown and Fionnuala Ní Aolaín, ‘Through the Looking Glass: Transitional Justice Futures through the Lens of Nationalism, Feminism and Transformative Change,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 9(1) (2015): 129. See also, Johanna Bond, ‘Victimization, Mainstreaming, and the Complexity of Gender in Armed Conflict,’ Santa Clara Journal of International Law 11(1) (2012): 225–235. 67 Haynes, Cahn and Ní Aolaín, supra n 64. 68 On the invisibility and mischaracterization of sexual harm throughout history, see, Turano, supra n 39. 69 Scully, supra n 6. 70 Bond, supra n 66 at 232. See also, Laura J. Shepherd, ‘Victims of Violence or Agents of Change? Representations of Women in UN Peacebuilding Discourse,’ Peacebuilding 4(2) (2016): 123–135; Natalie Florea Hudson, ‘UNSCR 1325: The Challenges of Framing Women’s Rights as a Security Matter,’ policy brief, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, March 2013. 71 Brown and Ní Aolaín, supra n 66 at 135. 72 On male sexual violence, see, Elisabeth Jean Wood, ‘Variation in Sexual Violence during War,’ Politics and Society 34(3) (2006): 307–341. 73 Scully, supra n 6 at 118. 74 Basu and Confortini, supra n 57. 75 SG Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 2016, para. 11; see also, para. 89. 76 Ibid., para. 13. 77 ‘Resolution 2122,’ S/RES/2122 (2013) [hereinafter ‘Resolution 2122’]. 78 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security,’ S/2013/525 (2013) [hereinafter ‘Report of the SG on WPS, 2013’]. 79 Resolution 2122, Preamble, para. 7. 80 Ibid. See, e.g., paras. 4, 5, 7, 8. 81 Ibid., Preamble, para. 7 chapeau and (a) (emphasis added). 82 Report of the SG on WPS, 2013; ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security,’ S/2015/716 (2015) [hereinafter ‘Report of the SG on WPS, 2015’]. 83 As required by Resolution 2122. The study was led by former special rapporteur on violence against women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, and hosted by the secretariat of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (UN Women). See, Radhika Coomaraswamy and UN Women, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2015). 84 Report of the SG on WPS, 2015. 85 The UNSG report does contain one mention of ‘particularly vulnerable groups of women’ in the context of economic recovery and access to resources, which suggests different layers of vulnerability, and it is noted that organizations supporting women victims of intersectional discrimination should be given support as part of civil society’s role in peacebuilding. See, SG Report on WPS, 2015, paras. 26, 124. 86 Shepherd, supra n 70; Cohn, supra n 8. 87 Cusack, supra n 16 at 144. The author uses as an example art. 6 of CEDAW on human trafficking, which reproduces implicit stereotypes. 88 Art. 6 of CEDAW on human trafficking. 89 UNHCHR, supra n 29. 90 Ibid., para. 7. 91 Ibid., para. 10. 92 Ibid. The UNSG adopted a similar position. See, Report of the SG on WPS, 2013. 93 UNHCHR, supra n 29. 94 Brown and Ní Aolaín, supra n 66. See also, generally, Turano, supra n 39. Mibenge also identified failures of international tribunals in recognizing the depth and breadth of the harm suffered by women during armed conflict. Chiseche Salome Mibenge, Sex and International Tribunals: The Erasure of Gender from the War Narrative (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 95 Oosterveld, supra n 42. 96 Ibid., 122. 97 Ibid., 127. 98 Rosemary Grey and Laura J. Shepherd, ‘“Stop Rape Now?”: Masculinity, Responsibility, and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,’ Men and Masculinities 16(1) (2012): 115–135. See also, R. Charli Carpenter, ‘Recognizing Gender-Based Violence against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations,’ Security Dialogue 37(1) (2006): 83–103. 99 Grey and Shepherd, supra n 98. 100 Chris Dolan, ‘Letting Go of the Gender Binary: Charting New Pathways for Humanitarian Interventions on Gender-Based Violence,’ International Review of the Red Cross 96(894) (2014): 486. For a contrary opinion, see, Jeanne Ward, ‘It’s Not About the Gender Binary, It’s About the Gender Hierarchy: A Reply to “Letting Go of the Gender Binary”,’ International Review of the Red Cross 98(901) (2016): 275–298. 101 Jamie J. Hagen, ‘Queering Women, Peace and Security,’ International Affairs 92(2) (2016): 314. See also, Laura J. Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg, ‘Trans-Bodies in/of War(s): Cisprivilege and Contemporary Security Strategy,’ Feminist Review 101(1) (2012): 5–23. 102 Hagen, supra n 101 at 327. 103 Ibid. 104 UNHCHR, supra n 29 at para. 4. 105 Ibid. 106 Josh Scheinert, ‘Is Criminalization Criminal?: Antisodomy Laws and the Crime against Humanity of Persecution,’ Tulane Journal of Law and Sexuality 24 (2015): 99–144; Charles Barrera Moore, ‘Embracing Ambiguity and Adopting Propriety: Using Comparative Law to Explore Avenues for Protecting the LGBT Population under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,’ Minnesota Law Review 101 (2016): 1287–1330. 107 SG Report on WPS, 2016, para. 64. 108 Ibid., para. 5. 109 Ibid., para. 46. 110 Ibid., referring to SG Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 2016. 111 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,’ S/2017/249 (2017). 112 Ibid. 113 See, e.g., SG Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 2016. 114 Ibid., para. 14; ‘Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Report of the Secretary-General,’ UN Doc. S/2015/203 (23 March 2015). 115 SG Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 2016. 116 SG Report on WPS, 2016. 117 ‘Resolution Adopted by the HRC 17/19 on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,’ A/HRC/RES/17/19 (2011); ‘Resolution Adopted by the HRC 27/32 on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,’ A/HRC/RES/27/32 (2014). 118 Ibid. 119 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Living Free and Equal: What States Are Doing to Tackle Violence and Discrimination against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex People (2016). 120 Cai Wilkinson and Anthony J. Langlois, ‘Special Issue: Not Such an International Human Rights Norm? Local Resistance to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights – Preliminary Comments,’ Journal of Human Rights 13(3) (2014): 249–255. 121 USA, Violence against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, secs. 1–1264, 127 Stat. 54 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ‘VAWA 2013’]. 122 Ashley LeBrun, ‘Are We There Yet? – VAWA 2013: Same-Sex Legal Acceptance,’ Seton Hall Legislative Journal 39(1) (2015): 101–124. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 IACoHR, supra n 31. 126 Hagen, supra n 101 at 316. 127 According to the Victims’ Unit, 1,818 victims are registered for their victimization in the context of the armed conflict on the basis of the category of LGBTI persons, and 56,639 refused to identify their gender (victims can register under the category of men, women, LGBTI or refuse to identify). ‘Registro Único de Víctimas (RUV),’ http://rni.unidadvictimas.gov.co/RUV (accessed 26 November 2017). 128 IACoHR, ‘Chapter V Follow-Up of Recommendations Issued by the IACHR in Its Country or Thematic Reports,’ Annual Report 2014, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2014/docs-en/Annual2014-chap5-Colombia.pdf (accessed 26 November 2017), para. 298; Colombia Diversa, Caribe Afirmativo and Santamaría Fundación, Cuerpos excluidos, rostros de impunidad. Informe de violencia hacia personas LGBT en Colombia (2015). See also, Historical Memory Group, Aniquilar la diferencia: Lesbianas, gays, bisexuales y transgeneristas en el marco del conflicto armado colombiano (2015). 129 ‘Comunicado Conjunto 82: Enfoque de género en acuerdos de paz de La Habana,’ 24 July 2016, http://equipopazgobierno.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/Paginas/comunicado-conjunto-82-enfoque-genero-acuerdos-paz-habana-cololmbia.aspx (accessed 26 November 2017). 130 For instance, gender-specific provisions were included in the agreement’s points 1 (integral rural reform), 2 (political participation), 4 (drugs) and 5 (victims). Point 5 provides for the creation of a working group on gender within the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition. Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, ‘Debunking the Myths about “Gender Ideology” in Colombia,’ WOLA, 25 October 2016, https://www.wola.org/analysis/debunking-myths-gender-ideology-colombia/ (accessed 26 November 2017); ‘ABC Preguntas y respuestas sobre enfoque de genero en los acuerdos de paz,’ 23 July 2016, http://equipopazgobierno.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/declaraciones/Paginas/abc-preguntas-respuestas-enfoque-genero-acuerdos-paz-habana-colombia.aspx’ (accessed 26 November 2017). 131 UN, press release, ‘United Nations Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura, Commends the Signing of the Colombian Peace Agreement and Calls for Women to Remain at the Forefront in its Implementation,’ Cartagena, 27 September 2016; UN, ‘Press Release of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura, to Commemorate the National Day for the Dignity of Women Victims of Sexual Violence in the Internal Armed Conflict in Colombia,’ Havana, 26 May 2015; SG Report on WPS, 2016; ‘Agenda of the 7793rd Meeting on Women and Peace and Security,’ UN Doc. S/PV.7793 (25 October 2016). 132 Julia Symmes Cobb and Nicholas Casey, ‘Colombia Peace Deal Is Defeated, Leaving a Nation in Shock,’ New York Times, 2 October 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/world/colombia-peace-deal-defeat.html (accessed 27 November 2017). 133 Lina M. Céspedes-Báez, ‘Gender Panic and the Failure of a Peace Agreement,’ American Journal of International Law 110 (2016): 183–187. 134 Equipo Paz Gobierno and Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, ‘Notas Sobre los Cambios, Ajustes y Precisiones del Nuevo Acuerdo Final para la Terminacion del Conflicto y la Construccion de la Paz Estable y Duradera,’ Havana, 13 November 2016, http://equipopazgobierno.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/NOTAS-SOBRE-LOS-CAMBIOS-AJUSTES-PRECISIONES-NUEVO-ACUERDO-FINAL.pdf (accessed 27 November 2017). 135 See, e.g., pp. 11, 22, 25, 43 and 47 of the new agreement compared to pp. 9, 18, 21, 38 and 41 of the previous agreement; pp. 79, 117 and 234 compared to pp. 72, 105 and 207; and p. 193 of the new agreement. For an online tool comparing the previous and new agreements, see, http://equipopazgobierno.presidencia.gov.co/acuerdos/Paginas/acuerdos-mesa-conversaciones-gobierno-farc.aspx (accessed 27 November 2017). 136 VAWA 2013, secs. 3(a)(18) and 3(b)(4). 137 As noted in recent human rights reports on Colombia. See, ‘Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/31/3/Add.2 (23 June 2016); ‘Observaciones finales sobre el séptimo informe periódico de Colombia,’ UN Doc. CCPR/C/COL/CO/7 (17 November 2016). 138 Céspedes-Báez, supra n 133 at 183–184. 139 Jamie J. Hagen, ‘Queering Women, Peace and Security in Colombia,’ Critical Studies on Security 5(1) (2017): 127. 140 Comunicado Conjunto No. 18, ‘Instancia Especial para contribuir a garantizar el enfoque de género en la implementación del Acuerdo Final,’ Bogota, 11 April 2017, http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/documentos-y-comunicados-conjuntos/Paginas/Comunicado-Conjunto-No-18.aspx (accessed 27 November 2017); ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Colombia,’ S/2017/539 (23 June 2017). © The Author(s) (2017). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email journals.permissions@oup.com http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Journal of Transitional Justice Oxford University Press

Gender Perspective in UN Framework for Peace Processes and Transitional Justice: The Need for a Clearer and More Inclusive Notion of Gender

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Abstract

Abstract∞ Gender influences the experiences of war and periods of large-scale abuses, and as such it needs to inform peace processes and transitional justice mechanisms. In the past 15 years, the UN Security Council has provided a framework for the inclusion of a gender perspective in peace processes, which includes attention to conflict-related gender-based violence (GBV) through the establishment of the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. This article analyzes how gender is framed and understood in this context and how it impacts the practice of peace processes. It is suggested that in order to effectively tackle the root causes of conflict-related GBV, the WPS architecture should allow for an expansive understanding of gender, avoiding the reproduction of gender stereotypes. This should include the recognition of intersectional experiences of women with violence during conflict, violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and gendered violence committed against men. INTRODUCTION Transitional justice is understood as ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.’1 Its four components, which are interrelated and part of a whole, are truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of nonrepetition.2 These components are rooted in states’ obligations under human rights treaties to respect and ensure human rights.3 In the context of transition from war to peace, an important aspect of transitional justice is embodied in peace negotiations and agreements. As the main organ for maintaining international peace and security, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has a normative role in structuring the conduct of peace processes through its binding resolutions.4 As part of this role, the UNSC has since 2000 provided a framework for the inclusion of a gender perspective in peace processes, which includes attention to conflict-related gender-based violence (GBV), through the establishment of the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.5 Gender-based violence is part of the violence inflicted during war and periods of large-scale abuses, and as such it needs to be accounted for in the context of peace processes and transitional justice mechanisms. To this end, it is essential to understand how gender is framed and understood in UNSC resolutions and how it impacts the practice of peace processes. This article suggests that in order to effectively tackle the root causes of GBV, an expansive gender lens is required to analyze UN resolutions and reports on peace processes and transitional justice. This expansive gender lens is informed by a human rights framework used to understand GBV and its relation to gender stereotyping. It is suggested that in order to effectively identify, understand and remedy conflict-related GBV, the WPS architecture and its implementation should provide an expansive understanding of gender, avoiding the reproduction of gender stereotypes. This should include recognition of the intersectional experiences of women with violence during conflict, violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and gendered violence committed against men. As a background to my argument, the first section explores from a human rights perspective the notions of gender, stereotypes and violence, and their implications in the context of armed conflicts. The second section provides an overview of the evolution of gender throughout UNSC resolutions and reports as well as key limits as developed in critical feminist analysis. Lastly, the third section applies an expansive gender lens to these documents and discusses how this expansion may affect the conduct of peace processes, taking the Colombian peace process as an example. The article uses a human rights legal framework to understand notions of GBV, gender stereotyping and transitional justice. The expansive gender lens builds on these notions as developed in the field of human rights. It is then applied to the UN resolutions and reports forming the WPS architecture, given the normative character of UNSC resolutions. Ultimately, the analysis seeks to address the effectiveness of such documents in conducting peace processes, particularly in recognizing and providing accountability for serious human rights violations committed during conflicts. In doing so, this article seeks to offer a different light on the implications of UN resolutions and reports, while remaining aware of the practical realities that involve the design and adoption of this type of document.6 UNDERSTANDING GENDER, STEREOTYPES, VIOLENCE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMED CONFLICTS The concept of gender is not unanimously defined across disciplines and institutions. This article uses an underlying feminist understanding of gender,7 which is, on the one hand, an identity category. In contrast with sex differences, gender is about the social constructions of masculinities and femininities and what it means to be a man or a woman in the context of society.8 On the other hand, gender is also a structural power relation, as are race, class and religion, among others.9 In this understanding, gender functions as a system of oppression in which the masculine is superior to the feminine. As suggested by Carol Cohn, gender identity is better viewed as performative rather than as a fixed category, which means that it informs ways of being according to different social settings, while at the same time producing, reproducing and altering these social settings.10 These theoretical underpinnings have been unevenly incorporated into international documents using the concept of gender. As Valerie Oosterveld explains, there are two approaches to defining ‘gender’ within the UN.11 The first is the ‘minimalist’ approach taken by states negotiating at the multilateral level: ‘Prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute definition, states basically left the term undefined, either overtly or implicitly.’12 For instance, the term was used in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action with a statement establishing that it was intended to be interpreted and understood in its ‘ordinary, accepted usage.’13 The Rome Statute departs from this trend with its definition of gender, which is understood to refer to ‘the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above.’14 The second approach, taken by the UN and its agencies, is closer to the understanding of gender adopted in this article as it acknowledges its social constructions as opposed to biology. Under this approach, the concept is defined with different focuses and wordings, which share three similar points: first, ‘gender’ is a socially constructed concept; second, the construction of ‘gender’ is complex and is influenced by culture, the roles women and men are expected to play, the relationships among those roles, and the value society places on those roles; and third, the content of ‘gender’ can vary within and among cultures, and over time.15 International human rights law offers a frame to address gender stereotypes and their relation to violence. As suggested by Simone Cusack, the social and cultural norms prescribing the roles men and women are expected to play are embodied in gender stereotypes.16 The obligations to transform gender stereotypes and eliminate wrongful gender stereotyping under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)17 are central to its objective of achieving substantive equality.18 In this context, gender stereotypes are understood to take different and overlapping forms. ‘Sex stereotypes’ are related to the physical, emotional and cognitive attributes and characteristics of men and women; ‘sexual stereotypes’ refer to sexual characteristics and behaviors, typically reinforcing heterosexuality and dominant male sexuality; ‘sex-role stereotypes’ emphasize the roles and behaviors typically assigned to men and women.19 Compounded stereotypes are intersecting stereotypes that produce unique stereotypes for different subgroups of women or men.20 The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (the CEDAW Committee) has recognized that the ‘discrimination of women based on sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste and sexual orientation and gender identity,’ which have compounded negative impacts on women.21 Gender stereotypes are relational in nature, meaning that femininities and masculinities are constructed in relation to one another, usually distinct and mutually reinforcing.22 Thus, although CEDAW focuses on women, male stereotypes must be examined in order to understand how gender hierarchies and male dominance are furthered and causing harms,23 and also how restrictive binary understandings of gender exclude other forms of expression of gender. Gender stereotypes have been recognized as being among the root causes of violence against women. The CEDAW Committee recognizes that wrongful stereotypes perpetuate and justify GBV against women.24 The UN General Assembly (UNGA) notes that violence against women is the manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women and operates to maintain women in a subordinate position compared to men.25 The CEDAW Committee as well as the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACoHR) and the Court of Human Rights both investigated the relation between stereotypes and the high rates of violence against women in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.26 These international human rights bodies found that stereotypes were at the origin of the violent murders and disappearances of women and of the impunity with which these acts were committed. The notion of GBV has been developed in the context of violence against women, which has limited its understanding to violence committed by men towards women. For instance, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women defines violence against women as ‘any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere.’27 The association of GBV to violence against women, especially sexual violence, is consistent with the historical development of international norms in this regard. However, in light of the definitions of gender and the relation between harmful stereotypes and GBV, a more complete understanding of this type of violence should take into account all forms of violence based on gender. Hence, some forms of violence committed against men as well as persons perceived as not conforming to gender stereotypes should be included in the understanding of GBV. However, this inclusion should not serve to obscure the violence committed against women, but rather to provide a better and deeper understanding of this form of violence and its causal relation to harmful stereotypes and gender hierarchies. In this line of thought, it has been increasingly recognized that GBV can be committed against both women and men. The Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) considers gender-based crimes as those committed against persons, whether male or female, because of their sex and/or socially constructed gender roles. Gender-based crimes are not always manifested as a form of sexual violence. These crimes may include non-sexual attacks on women and girls, and men and boys, because of their gender, such as persecution on the grounds of gender.28 Similarly, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) understands GBV as ‘any harmful act directed against individuals or groups of individuals on the basis of their gender.’29 Sexual violence is defined as a form of GBV encompassing any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed against a person’s sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting.30 Violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons is also increasingly recognized as a form of GBV, as it is ‘based on the perception that other persons have on the orientations, identities, expressions and bodies.’31 The UNHCHR has affirmed that homophobic and transphobic violence ‘constitute a form of gender-based violence, driven by a desire to punish individuals whose appearance or behaviour appears to challenge gender stereotypes.’32 In 2015, various UN entities called for ending violence and discrimination against LGBTI persons, recognizing the various forms of violence to which they are subjected because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.33 In a recent report, the special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment provides a gender analysis of the torture and ill-treatment framework which accounts for women, girls and LGBTI persons.34 According to the special rapporteur, ‘gender-based violence, endemic even in peacetime and often amplified during conflict, can be committed against any person because of their sex and socially constructed gender roles.’35 The special rapporteur further added that the purpose and intent elements of torture are always fulfilled if an act is gender-specific or perpetrated against persons based on the basis of their sex, gender identity, real or perceived sexual orientation or non-adherence to social norms around gender and sexuality.36 The recognition of violence against LGBTI persons as GBV is consistent with the understanding of gender adopted in this article. LGBTI persons generally do not perform the physical and sexual characteristics and behaviors attached to the social constructions of masculinities and femininities. This perceived defiance towards socially constructed notions of gender leads to violence committed against LGBTI persons, which is fueled by discriminatory norms and impunity that condone this type of violence. In this regard, Cusack argues that the ‘codification of the male/female binary of gender stereotyping’ under CEDAW limits its broader goal of substantive gender equality: ‘by focusing on stereotypes related to men and women, rather than the broader concept of “gender” stereotypes, the CEDAW and the Committee in its jurisprudence overlook the gradations and complexities of gender and, more specifically, gender stereotyping.’37 In its report on violence against the LGBTI community in Latin America, the IACoHR expresses clearly how this form of violence is linked to gender: Societies in the Americas are dominated by underpinning principles of heteronormativity, cisnormativity, sex hierarchy, sex and gender binary systems, and misogyny. These principles, combined with widespread intolerance towards non-normative sexual orientations, gender identities and expressions, and diverse bodies, legitimize violence and discrimination against LGBTI persons or those perceived as such. Violence against LGBTI persons exists as a consequence of social contexts, societies and States which do not accept, and in fact may punish, non-normative sexualities, identities and bodies which do not fit the socially-accepted notion of what defines persons as either female or male.38 Gender influences the nature of the harm suffered during armed conflicts or periods of large-scale abuses. Because of their unequal position in society, women are affected distinctively in these contexts. On the one hand, they may suffer from the same forms of violence that men do, such as murder, torture and disappearances, but this violence may have different implications for women and for men because of the ‘pre-existing socioeconomic and legal status and the embedded cultural norms in a patriarchal society.’39 These structures affect women’s general experience of conflict. For instance, the period before conflict is often characterized by the disruption of everyday life, and military propaganda often draws on stereotypes of masculinities and femininities. During conflicts, family structures are disrupted and women may take on traditionally male responsibilities in addition to their caregiving roles. After conflict, women are excluded from formal peace processes and political leadership, and ignored or misrepresented in the media.40 On the other hand, women are affected disproportionately by certain forms of violence, such as sexual violence.41 Although it has received less attention, men and LGBTIQ persons also experience gendered harms during conflicts. For instance, sexual violence against men may be used systematically as a tool targeting specific constructions of masculinities.42 As will be addressed in the last section, patterns of violence during the Colombian armed conflict directly targeted LGBTIQ people in order to exterminate the ‘immoral’ or the ‘abnormal.’43 Gendered violence during conflict is exacerbated by existing structures of discrimination and harmful stereotypes.44 Therefore, in order for transitional justice mechanisms ‘to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation,’45 they must address the differential impacts of armed conflicts and large-scale violence for women and men and aim at understanding their relation to gender. In particular, the harmful stereotypes that contributed to the harm suffered should be addressed and transformed in order to avoid recurrence. In sum, the notion of gender refers to the social construction of what it means to be men or women and their respective relation to power. It embodies stereotypes regarding the physical, psychological and emotional characteristics and behaviors expected from both. Harmful stereotypes based on the idea of the inferiority of one gender can serve to increase tolerance of, normalize and encourage GBV. Gender discrimination is among the causes of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence. A broad and coherent understanding of gender should be able to address violence committed against men and LGBTI persons when it is based on their gender. However, this recognition is recent and has been uneven throughout the UN. The next sections review how these notions are used in the context of peace processes and transitional justice. MAINSTREAMING GENDER IN PEACE PROCESSES AND POLICY DOCUMENTS: MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AND CRITIQUES In the last nearly two decades, the UN has increasingly recognized that gender stereotypes and relations inform the experience of individuals during wars and periods of large-scale violence. Gender-based violence is part of the violence committed and may be exacerbated in these contexts. It has been recognized that GBV is linked to preexisting structures of discrimination, which in turn affects peace processes as well as the design and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. Gender considerations were officially brought into the international peace and security sphere with the adoption, thanks to the work of women and feminist organizations, of Resolution 1325 by the UNSC in 2000, which established the WPS agenda.46 The UNSC’s adoption and implementation of the WPS agenda marked a fundamental turn in mainstreaming gender in UN action related to peace processes and transitional justice.47 Despite the undeniably positive achievement embodied by Resolution 1325 and subsequent ones adopted under the WPS agenda,48 the way gender is framed and understood in these normative documents and in UN reports on their implementation, has raised important questions and criticisms. This section presents an overview of key developments as well as limits to the WPS architecture in relation to the notion of gender and its implications for peace processes and transitional justice. It is not intended as a comprehensive review of the important literature that already exists on the WPS agenda, but rather as a background to the next section, which builds on arguments developed in feminist and queer critical analysis. At this point it is also necessary to situate the analysis in the general UN architecture. The UN is composed of numerous organs and agencies which enjoy varying degrees of autonomy and can therefore adopt more or less different understandings of the concept of gender. Its central deliberative organ is the UNGA, composed of all member states, whose resolutions, although they are not binding on states per se, are influential and may express international custom or contribute to its formation.49 The UNSC, composed of 15 members, five of which are permanent and enjoy a veto power, is the primary body responsible for maintaining international peace and security, which is one of the main purposes of the UN.50 The UNSC resolutions are binding on states and it has the power to order coercive measures in case of threat to or breach of international peace and security.51 In addition to its organs, the UN counts on various programs, funds and specialized agencies, such as UN Women.52 The UN human rights system is composed of both Charter-based and treaty-based bodies in charge of monitoring human rights. UN Charter-based bodies include special procedures such as special rapporteurs and working groups composed of independent experts addressing thematic or geographic human rights issues,53 while treaty-based bodies are composed of independent experts created by specific human right treaties, such as the CEDAW Committee.54 Targeting the UNSC through the adoption of UN Resolution 1325, which was groundbreaking for framing women’s rights as an international security matter,55 allowed for gender to be mainstreamed throughout the whole architecture of the UN. However, UNSC resolutions are taken by states according to different sets of interests and power relations. Hence, although they are a source of international law as such, their content is likely to reflect interests other than genuine gender equality. To the contrary, documents emanating from the UN human rights system, in particular those adopted by independent experts, are less subject to influences. In this context, the analysis is directed at UNSC resolutions and their implementation, which are contrasted with human rights documents, keeping in mind the different rationales to which the adoption of these two sets of documents respond. Resolution 1325 and its progeniture stressed the need to include women in all aspects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The WPS architecture is based on four pillars: the protection of both the rights and bodies of women and girls in conflict; their participation in peace and security governance; prevention of conflict; and relief and recovery for conflict survivors.56 Four resolutions have focused on the protection component, especially from sexual violence, while three have focused on participation.57 The implementation of the WPS agenda is monitored through annual reports submitted by the UN secretary-general (UNSG) to the UNSC.58 In addition, since 2012 the UNSC requires a separate report on conflict-related sexual violence.59 A UN special representative on sexual violence in conflict has also been appointed, as well as a team of experts on the rule of law and sexual violence in conflict, which assists governments and reports directly to the special representative. Despite these significant developments, concerns have been expressed at the framing of Resolution 1325, which has been considered ‘poorly formulated to address the wide and complex array of gendered peace and conflict challenges.’60 The loose meaning of gender and its conflation with women in the WPS architecture is among its limiting characteristics. The notions of ‘gender’ and ‘gender perspective’ are used in UNSC resolutions adopted under the WPS umbrella without definition. For instance, the meaning of adopting a ‘gender perspective’ in the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements, as provided in UNSC Resolution 1325, is unclear.61 Similarly, UNSG reports on conflict-related sexual violence use the notions of ‘gender’ and ‘gender-based violence’ without defining them. While the UNHCHR and the ICC Office of the Prosecutor both understand sexual violence as a form of GBV, the same is not as clear in the UNSC resolutions and the reports on their implementation. In this regard, sexual violence committed against women is commonly referred to as GBV, while it is not necessarily true for sexual violence committed against men or against persons based on their real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.62 Hence, the notion of ‘gender’ as used in the WPS architecture does not refer to the social construction of women and men, but rather exclusively to women.63 The interchangeable use of ‘gender’ and ‘women,’ consistent throughout the resolutions forming the WPS architecture as well as the reports on its implementation, has been criticized. Conflating these two notions limits the engagement with underlying structures that produce violence committed against women during conflicts and the experience of women more generally. Dina Haynes and colleagues find that too little has been done to define what ‘women’s needs’ are.64 They argue that: International community perpetually defaults to a masculine way of thinking in which thinking about women (when it happens at all) leads first, and reflexively, to patriarchal protection schemes (such as ending sexual violence), but seems unwilling to address the very masculinities and structures that produce that systemic sexual violence. The relentless focus on sexual violence raises the following important issue – what questions are women being asked if and when they are consulted about what they need to feel safe?65 The need for a ‘gender-centered approach to the causalities of human rights violations’66 has been stressed, which should make sure that the notion of gender is used more coherently throughout UN documents and reports rather than referring exclusively to women in a way that essentializes them. In line with this limiting representation of women in UNSC resolutions, their narrow focus on the physical, specifically sexual, security of women, has been criticized for failing to effectively bring more security to women.67 Identifying sexual violence may serve to render visible a form of violence that has historically been silenced or mischaracterized.68 However, it has also been argued that focusing on vulnerable women and girls as victims of sexual violence contributes to reproducing gender stereotypes and limits the transformation of the root causes of sexual violence.69 Following this line of thought, essentializing women’s experience of conflicts or large-scale violence to being victims of sexual violence results in limiting ‘women’s discursive space’: When women are defined solely as victims, women’s experience is valued as long as it correlates with the experience of victimhood. Women may, therefore, be invited to weigh in on matters concerning women’s physical safety but little else. The focus on victimization acts as a constraint on discourse.70 In fact, it has been noted that women continue to be excluded from transitional justice processes and substance, which ‘often function as a means to reassert elite male control over political systems in ways that definitely ouster women.’71 Coupled with the silence around sexualized violence committed against men and boys,72 the strengthening of women and girls as vulnerable subjects in need of protection ‘limits our ability to theorize sexual violence and has serious implications for the kind of society that is established post-conflict, and for who gets to participate fully in it.’73 Although protection has remained the main pillar of the WPS architecture benefitting from the greatest attention,74 later resolutions have shifted the focus onto the participation as well as the prevention components, to a lesser extent. These resolutions and the UNSG reports on their implementation are more carefully worded and provide an increasingly broad understanding of women’s experience of conflict. For instance, the 2016 UNSG report on conflict-related sexual violence stresses in general terms that the root causes of such violence must be addressed and harmful sociocultural norms transformed in order to ensure that ‘wartime atrocities do not become entrenched in the post-conflict period.’75 The report provides illustrations of the gendered causes and implications of sexual violence, for instance when describing that sexual violence has been used against high-profile women as a ‘tool of social and moral control to relegate women to the private sphere and to punish perceived “countercultural” behavior.’76 Similarly, UNSC Resolution 2122 adopted in 2013 addressed the persistent gaps in the implementation of the WPS agenda77 identified by the UNSG in his report.78 The resolution is less focused on sexual violence and stresses the need to address the ‘full range of threats and human rights violations and abuses’ experienced by women.79 There is less emphasis on protecting vulnerable women or fulfilling their ‘special needs,’ and more emphasis on their participation, empowerment and equality.80 Rather than picturing all women as vulnerable, the resolution is more carefully written, for instance when it recognizes that ‘those women and girls who are particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged may be specifically targeted or at increased risk of violence.’81 UNSG reports on the implementation of the WPS from 2013 acknowledge the need to address the full range of violations of human rights of women during conflict, as well as identify and transform the discriminatory legal frameworks and practices that further these violations and the impunity for such violence.82 However, despite the recent shift in the WPS architecture from a heavy focus on the protection pillar to increased attention to the participation and prevention components, the rhetorical nature of the resolutions and reports has been criticized. In this regard, the 2015 global review on the implementation of Resolution 1325 conveyed by the UNSG83 identified significant gaps in the implementation of the WPS agenda: 27 percent of the peace agreements concluded from the adoption of Resolution 1325 (2000) until 1 January 2015 included references to women, and only a few had comprehensive gender equality considerations, which were poorly implemented.84 In addition, despite a broadened scope of the experience of women in conflict, peace negotiation and peacebuilding, the WPS resolutions and reports still provide little engagement with intersectional forms of violence,85 gendered forms of violence against men as well as violence based on real or perceived sexual orientation and gender identity. The notion of gender remains loosely used, undefined and attached only to women as opposed to a broader understanding of its social context. The essentialization of women throughout the WPS architecture has been criticized, as well as how it reinforces and reproduces gender stereotypes, limiting its transformative nature.86 As noted by Cusack, feminists and women’s rights movements, including CEDAW, play a role in ‘reproducing gender stereotypes and related mythologies.’87 In contrast to the UNSC resolutions and the UNSG reports, the UNHCHR study, focusing specifically on gender-based and sexual violence in relation to transitional justice, adopted a broader and more coherent understanding of gender which takes into account its social construction. Its definition of GBV refers explicitly to CEDAW’s General Recommendation No. 19.88 The study addresses the participation of ‘victims’ and the different needs and opportunities of women, men and children with regard to truth seeking, justice, reparation and institutional reform.89 Thus, it is interested in the differential impacts of conflicts and the measures implemented postconflict on both men and women, rather than focusing exclusively on women’s and girls’ vulnerabilities. The study insists on the full range of human rights violations faced by women, their root causes, and offers a broader understanding of gender. Transitional justice is understood as a process that can ‘help to realize the rights of victims of [gender-based and sexual violence] and can be instrumental in identifying and dismantling the underlying structural discrimination that enabled it to occur.’90 In this regard, meaningful consultations are considered essential, during which women and girls should be represented ‘in all their diversity. Consultations with women should not solely focus on their experience of victimization, but should take account of the evolution of gender roles during and after conflict and the multiple roles women play in such situations.’91 The UNHCHR identified truth-seeking processes as adequate tools to address not only sexual violence, but also its systemic nature and other forms of GBV.92 It allows for documentation of the full range of violations experienced by women during conflict, and can make recommendations aimed at addressing entrenched cultures of discrimination.93 The potential of truth-seeking mechanisms to account for the gendered dimensions of conflict has also been identified in the literature.94 The introduction of gender considerations in the international peace and security framework through the WPS architecture, although constituting a significant step foreword in advancing women’s rights in security settings, suffers important limits in its framing. These limits undermine the transformative potential of the WPS agenda and have important impacts on the monitoring and reporting of gendered violence during conflict. Despite understandings of women’s experience in conflict having moved away from an almost exclusive focus on sexual violence, their representation in resolutions and reports remains essentializing and recognition of intersectional experiences remains limited. Based on a broader understanding of gender such as that presented in the UNHCHR’s report on conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, the next section suggests an expansive gender frame for UN policy documents on WPS, which should take into account the gendered dimensions of the harm suffered by men and LGBTIQ individuals. INCLUDING INTERSECTIONALITY, LGBTI PERSONS AND MEN IN GENDER ANALYSIS OF UN PEACE PROCESSES AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE DOCUMENTS Based on the review of the critical analysis of gender in the WPS architecture, I argue for an expanded gender lens in UN peace processes and transitional justice documents. This position is in line with recent literature that has stressed the blind spot of LGBTIQ experience in conflict and male sexual violence, as well as human rights developments regarding GBV. It is suggested that UNSC resolutions offer a foundation that can be built on, as shown by the increasingly broad understanding of gender and hints of recognition in recent UNSG reports of sexual violence committed against male and LGBTIQ persons. However, these hints are not sufficient yet and require a more complete and coherent articulation of a broader notion of gender. The Colombian peace process shows how the WPS architecture can be used by local LGBTIQ organizations to voice their perspective and experience of conflict, while also evidencing the challenges of working with an expansive gender frame. Recent literature has argued that conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence should include male sexual violence as well as the experience of LGBTIQ individuals in conflict. For instance, Oosterveld argues that the Rome Statute fails to recognize the gendered nature of sexual crimes committed against men and boys.95 She notes that ‘sexual violence is not about sex per se, but it is about body parts and socially-constructed norms of what is “sexual”.’96 The author suggests that men may face similar barriers to reporting acts of sexual violence as women, but also specific barriers such as the perceived need to live up to masculine gender norms heightened as a result of war, a lack of cultural expressions or terms to describe male sexual violence, or a perception that men and boys simply cannot be victims of sexual violence.97 Rosemary Grey and Laura Shepherd stress the near invisibility of male victims of sexualized violence in the literature on addressing conflict-related sexual violence, which results in a lack of attention to these victims in peacebuilding and postconflict reconstruction programs.98 The authors suggest that violence should be theorized with careful attention to gender in order to avoid perpetuating models of masculinity and war rape that have potentially pernicious effects.99 In the context of humanitarian interventions on GBV, Chris Dolan argues that: For mainstream humanitarian approaches significantly to increase the effectiveness of prevention, mitigation and response to [GBV], the 2005 focus on sexual violence cannot be lost. However, the range of victims and survivors that are not just recognized but also addressed needs to be more inclusive – most urgently male and [LGBTI] victims and survivors – and a range of non-sexual forms of [GBV] must also become the target of humanitarian attention.100 Regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity in the understanding and monitoring of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, Jamie Hagen recently demonstrated that the WPS architecture ‘can be a force of oppression and erasure of LGBTQ experience’ because of the framing of gender in WPS resolutions on sexual and gender-based violence, which results in the exclusion of LGBTQ individuals from monitoring and reporting.101 Noting the variation in the use of the term ‘gender’ across WPS documents and the interchangeable use of ‘woman’ and ‘gender,’ the author finds that this limiting framing of gender overlooks LGBTQ individuals as a marginalized and vulnerable population, which has ‘policy implications when translated into the categories used to develop indicators and to determine which vulnerable populations deserve targeted services and funding.’102 It is suggested that the discourse of gender can be used to address concerns related to sexual orientation and gender identity without the need to seek a resolution to protect LGBTQ individuals in conflict.103 This recent literature is consistent with human rights law developments on GBV and its relation to gender stereotyping. As mentioned, the UNHCHR, the UN special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and the IACoHR recognize that violence committed against persons appearing to challenge social norms around gender and sexuality is a form of GBV. In a study on gender-based and sexual violence in relation to transitional justice, the UNHCHR notes that in ‘some contexts, it is also important to take into consideration violence perpetrated against persons perceived as not conforming to traditional notions of masculinity or femininity, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons.’104 The report further mentions that attention must be given to the practical barriers to consultation which are specific to women, men and children, including practical barriers for male, LGBT and other marginalized victims of sexual violence.105 In the context of international criminal law, authors have suggested that persecution based on sexual orientation or gender identity could fit into the frame of gender and constitute a crime against humanity in certain circumstances.106 Echoing Hagen’s argument, I suggest that UNSG reports on the implementation of the WPS agenda should integrate a broader notion of gender encompassing the intersectional experience of women in conflict, the experience of LGBTIQ individuals as well as male sexual violence. The articulation of this understanding of gender can build on recent expansions, although uneven and insufficient, of the UNSG’s understanding of the gendered experience of conflict-related violence. In this regard, the 2016 UNSG report on the implementation of the WPS agenda, in addition to reiterating the call for ‘justice measures that respond to the full range of women’s human rights violations,’107 opens the doors to intersecting forms of discrimination. The UNSG acknowledges that efforts under the WPS agenda should be inclusive: There is a growing understanding of the need to address multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, including those based on disabilities, indigenous status, sexual orientation or other factors. In order to ensure realistically that no one is left behind, inclusivity must be fully integrated into efforts to build and sustain peace.108 However, this call for inclusivity, especially with regard to intersecting forms of discrimination, is not further developed in the report. The only reference is the UNSG’s ongoing study on youth, peace and security, which he notes will ‘shed light on the twofold discrimination young women face due to age and gender.’109 In this report, the UNSG also provides hints of recognition of the gendered dimensions of violence against men. Referring to his 2016 report on conflict-related sexual violence, the UNSG identifies sexual violence committed against men and boys as an emerging concern.110 Similarly, the UNSG 2017 report on conflict-related sexual violence identifies occurrences of sexual violence against men, for instance in detention centers, as well as the stigma associated with the homosexuality taboo for male survivors of sexual violence, the limited availability of services and the risks of arrest due to the criminalization of same-sex relations in some countries.111 The 2017 report also mentions the need to change outdated and incomplete definitions of sexual violence in national laws, such as those that exclude male victims from protection, as well as the potential of transitional justice in helping to transform inadequate laws and harmful societal norms.112 However, the UNSG reports provide only a limited engagement with the underlying gender roles and norms contributing to this type of violence and its consequences. Thus, the notions of gender or GBV, which are used in the report without definition, seem to remain associated exclusively with women or sexual violence,113 despite the recognition of male sexual violence as an issue requiring attention. With regard to violence committed against LGBTIQ individuals, the UNSG reports on conflict-related sexual violence recognize since 2015 that the risks they face have been a ‘blind spot in the monitoring of civilian protection concerns.’114 The UNSG noted that individuals were targeted for physical and sexual violence on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation.115 However, this concern did not make its way into his report on the implementation of the WPS agenda, in which he limits himself to noting the need for inclusion with regard to intersecting forms of discrimination such as on the basis of sexual orientation.116 Furthermore, the 2017 report of the UNSG on conflict-related sexual violence, while explicitly referring to sexual orientation and gender identity as a basis for targeting victims of conflict-based sexual violence, does not provide further analysis or mention occurrences of this form of violence. Thus, the ‘blind spot’ in monitoring sexual violence committed on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity has clearly not been effectively remedied and LGBTIQ individuals continue to be excluded from monitoring of conflict-related sexual violence. The limited inclusion of LGBTI persons in the gender analysis of peace processes and transitional justice can be explained by the general reluctance of states to even recognize the violence against LGBTI persons as an issue worth addressing. The resolutions adopted by the Human Rights Council on violence against LGBTI persons are limited in scope as they only require reports on the matter by the UNHCHR and do not adopt any specific position on the issue.117 The controversial nature of the issue and the absence of consensus is illustrated by the vote on both resolutions, with 23 to 19 and three abstentions in 2011, and 25 to 14 with seven abstentions in 2014.118 As of mid-2016, 73 states continue to criminalize same-sex conduct between consenting adults.119 This result is part of a larger resistance by many states to recognize ‘LGBT rights.’120 In this divided context, recognizing LGBTIQ in the scope of GBV runs the risk of undermining the general efforts to address violence against women. One example of this is the debates that surrounded the reauthorization of the Violence against Women Act (VAWA) in the USA in 2013,121 when it was suggested that violence among same-sex partners be included in the scope of the Act. This created heated debates in Congress, but same-sex couples were eventually included in the reauthorization. This inclusion aimed at responding to the reality of same-sex domestic violence, which is more than or equally prevalent as heterosexual domestic violence, and guaranteeing the same protection to all victims.122 Proponents argued in favor of this inclusion for reasons of legal realism, the human rights of victims entitled to protection and antidiscrimination in access to services.123 Opponents’ arguments were based on politics, given the Republican party’s platform opposing same-sex marriage equality, the already gender-neutral wording of the Act (although in fact same-sex couples were denied services), and the potential impacts of legislative inclusion of same-sex marriage on other legislations.124 These debates show how joining efforts to fight violence against women and against LGBTIQ persons can prove controversial, despite the general acceptance of provisions providing for the protection of the former. In addition to possibly undermining the efforts addressing violence against women, the inclusion of LGBTIQ persons into the scope of GBV could blur the specificity of both types of violence and fail to recognize the potentially different causes and consequences that each entail. For instance, civil society organizations have noted that the ‘LGBTI’ acronym in itself has weaknesses as it refers to groups of persons who may face significantly different human rights violations.125 If the distinctions among lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex persons are already undermined by the LGBTI acronym, including them under efforts to fight GBV could contribute to rendering less visible these specificities. Keeping these arguments in mind, it nevertheless seems that a meaningful understanding of GBV should be able to include and address the specific experiences of women, men and LGBTI persons. Failing to do so is not consistent with an understanding of gender as a socially constructed concept. This is harmful for both women and LGBTI persons, given that ‘the same gender constructions give rise to SGBV [sexual and gender-based violence] against woman and against the LGBTQ population.’126 In addition, the women’s movement should use the broad acceptance it has gained to bring historically excluded groups into the conversation. Failing to do so could reinforce dynamics of power in the women’s movement. The Colombian peace process provides a valuable case study on how the WPS architecture relates to the practice of peace processes, and the challenges in working with an expanded gender framework in this context. LGBTI persons have suffered from GBV throughout the Colombian internal armed conflict, at the hands of all armed groups involved.127 Patterns of violence targeting LGBTI persons included social and economic control and extermination of the ‘immoral’ or ‘abnormal,’ which forced them to flee their communities.128 During the peace talks between the guerrilla group FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the Colombian government, a subcommission on gender was created and integrated both women and LGBTI organizations.129 This subcommission reviewed all agreements that had been reached and included a meaningful gender perspective throughout the entire peace agreement. This gender perspective recognized the differential impacts of the conflict on women and LGBTI persons based on their gender, made the harm suffered visible and included dispositions to ensure accountability for this harm and the participation of excluded groups in peacebuilding.130 The gender perspective in the Colombian peace agreements was applauded by the international community as an example of successful integration of a gender perspective.131 However, the agreement was submitted to a referendum for acceptance by the Colombian people, who rejected it by a thin margin.132 One of the arguments advanced by opponents to the agreement was that its gender focus would advance ‘gay rights’ and the liberalization of abortion, which they perceived had nothing to do with the armed conflict.133 In response to the vote, the parties modified the agreement in light of the criticisms it had received from opponents.134 As a result, the notion of gender was narrowed to refer exclusively to women, references to LGBTI persons were detached from the notion of gender and attached to the notion of equality, and other explicit references were replaced by a broader category of ‘vulnerable groups.’135 This wording is similar to that of the VAWA 2013 in the USA, which included LGBTI persons under the definition of ‘underserved populations’ and the provision of ‘non-discrimination.’136 The reaction to the gender focus in the peace agreements among the Colombian population is symptomatic of the deeply rooted structures of discrimination and exclusion of persons not conforming to traditional understandings of gender identities and roles.137 It shows the controversial nature of such issues and the refusal to acknowledge specific harm suffered by LGBTI persons. As suggested by Lina Céspedes-Báez, the deal’s rejection echoes the backlash women and LGBTI rights have been suffering around the world at the hands of conservative and religious factions, [which] have framed the United Nations’ and Inter-American System’s efforts to protect LGBTI rights as cultural imperialism.138 Nevertheless, as Hagen suggests, the involvement of LGBTI organizations in the Colombian peace process shows that despite the lack of consideration given to sexual orientation and gender identity in policy and analysis, the WPS architecture allows for grassroots engagement and thereby offers an opportunity for local lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (LBT) activists to define their needs on their own terms.139 Despite the narrowing of the notion of gender used in the peace agreement, LGBTI organizations remain involved in the implementation of its gender perspective. In this regard, one representative of the LGBTI sector is integrated into the seven-member special entity in charge of ensuring that a gender perspective is mainstreamed in the implementation of the agreements. This special entity makes recommendations to the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement.140 Thus, the Colombian example shows that it is possible for women and LGBTI organizations to work together in mainstreaming an inclusive notion of gender, using WPS policy documents to voice their experience and make sure their perspective is acknowledged. As the ‘gender panic’ around the acceptance of the agreement shows, this process is not without challenges, but they are not insurmountable. CONCLUSION Despite an increasingly broad understanding of a gender perspective throughout peace processes and transitional justice with relation to women’s experience, the effectiveness of such attention has remained limited. Certain dimensions, such as intersecting forms of discrimination affecting the specific harms experienced by women, sexual violence committed against men, and violence against LGBTI persons in the context of conflict, have been mostly overlooked in UNSC resolutions and reports on the WPS agenda. This article has suggested that a more complete and coherent understanding of gender in UN documents on peace processes and transitional justice should include these dimensions. This would be beneficial not only for victims whose experience has been excluded from mechanisms, but also for the more meaningful understanding of women’s experience. However, such inclusion remains a controversial task, as illustrated by the case of Colombia. Nevertheless, the Colombian peace process shows how UN documents can serve grassroot organizations in voicing their experience of conflicts and advancing their claims throughout the peace process. UN normative documents and the monitoring of their implementation should adjust to this practical example of the way gender can be expanded in order to include victims and survivors of all forms of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence. Footnotes 1 ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,’ UN Doc. S/2004/616 (23 August 2004), para. 8 [hereinafter ‘Report on the Rule of Law, 2004’]. 2 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, Pablo de Greiff,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/21/46 (9 August 2012). 3 ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,’ 999 UNTS 171 (16 December 1966); ‘American Convention on Human Rights,’ 1144 UNTS 143 (22 November 1969); ‘General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant,’ UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C No. 4. 4 Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945 [hereinafter ‘UN Charter’]. 5 ‘Resolution 1325 (2000),’ UN Doc. S/RES/1325 (2000) [hereinafter ‘Resolution 1325’]. See also, the following resolutions: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1894 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013). 6 As pointed out by Pamela Scully, ‘Vulnerable Women: A Critical Reflection on Human Rights Discourse and Sexual Violence,’ Emory International Law Review 23 (2009): 113–124. 7 This understanding can be identified within the ‘diversity stage’ in feminist theory, in response to earlier stages which were criticized as essentializing. See generally, Martha Chamallas, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory, 2nd ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003). 8 Carol Cohn, ‘Women and Wars: Toward a Conceptual Framework,’ in Women and Wars, ed. Carol Cohn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), citing Cynthia Enloe. 9 Ibid.; Laura Shepherd, Gender, UN, Peacebuilding, and the Politics of Space: Locating Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). On different systems of social divisions and their interactions, see, Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘Intersectionality and Feminist Politics,’ European Journal of Women’s Studies 13(3) (2006): 193–209. 10 Cohn, supra n 8. See also, Judith Butler, ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory,’ Theatre Journal 40(4) (1988): 519–531. 11 Valerie Oosterveld, ‘The Definition of Gender in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice,’ Harvard Human Rights Journal 18 (2005): 55–84. 12 Ibid., 66. 13 ‘Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995,’ UN Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (1996), Addendum, Annex IV. 14 ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,’ 2187 UNTS 3 (17 July 1998), art. 7(3). Outside the UN, the term is also defined, in a broader manner, in the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, 11 May 2011, Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 210, art. 3(c), which entered into force in 2014 and has only 14 states parties: ‘“gender” shall mean the socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men.’ 15 Oosterveld, supra n 11 at 67. 16 Simone Cusack, ‘The CEDAW as a Legal Framework for Transnational Discourse on Gender Stereotyping,’ in Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in International, Regional and National Law, ed. Anne Hellum and Henriette Sinding Aasen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 17 ‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,’ 1249 UNTS 13 (18 December 1979) [hereinafter ‘CEDAW’]. 18 Cusack, supra n 16. See also, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Gender Stereotyping as a Human Rights Violation (2013). 19 OHCHR, supra n 18 at 10–13. 20 Ibid. This call for considering intersecting oppressions is related to developments on intersectionality. See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,’ Stanford Law Review 43(6) (1991): 1241–1299; Patricia Hill Collins, ‘Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas,’ Annual Review of Sociology 41(1) (2015): 1–20. 21 CEDAW, ‘General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of State Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,’ CEDAW/C/GC/28 (2010), para. 18. 22 Cusack, supra n 16; OHCHR, supra n 18. For instance, women are generally assigned roles associated with the private sphere (caregivers, homemakers), while men are assigned roles associated with the public sphere (decision-makers, heads of households), the latter being generally more valued in society. 23 Cusack, supra n 16. 24 CEDAW, ‘General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against Women,’ A/47/38 (1992). See also, Cusack, supra n 16. 25 ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women,’ A/RES/48/104 (20 December 1993) [hereinafter ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence’]. 26 CEDAW, ‘Report on Mexico Produced by the CEDAW under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention, and Reply from the Government of Mexico,’ CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO (2005); ‘The Situation of the Rights of Women in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico: The Right to be Free from Violence and Discrimination,’ OEA/SER.L/V/II.117 Doc. 44 (2003); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Gonzalez et al (“Cotton Field”) v Mexico, [2009] Series C No. 205. 27 ‘Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women “Convention Belem Do Para”,’ OASTS No A-61 (9 June 1994), art. 1 (emphasis added). See also, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence. 28 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes (2014), para. 16. 29 UNHCHR, ‘Analytical Study Focusing on Gender-Based and Sexual Violence in Relation to Transitional Justice,’ A/HRC/27/21 (2014), para. 3. 30 Ibid. 31 IACoHR, ‘Violence against LGBTI Persons in the Americas,’ OAS/Ser.L/V/II.rev.1 (2015), para. 15. 32 ‘Report of the UNHCHR on Discrimination and Violence against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,’ A/HRC/29/23 (2015), para. 21. See also, ‘Report of the UNHCHR on Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,’ A/HRC/19/41 (2011). 33 UN entities, Joint Statement on Ending Violence and Discrimination against LGBTI People (2015). 34 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,’ A/HRC/31/57 (2016). 35 Ibid., para. 7. 36 Ibid., para. 8. 37 Cusack, supra n 16 at 145. 38 IACoHR, supra n 31 at para. 48. 39 Laura C. Turano, ‘The Gender Dimension of Transitional Justice Mechanisms,’ International Law and Politics 43 (2010): 1060–1061, citing Ruth Rubio-Marín, ‘The Gender of Reparations: Setting the Agenda,’ in What Happened to the Women? Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marín (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2006). 40 Ibid. 41 UNHCHR, supra n 29. 42 For instance, Oosterveld argued that acts of forced circumcision in the Kenyatta case at the ICC constituted gendered violence as it involved the socially constructed norms of what is ‘sexual,’ in particular the sexualized cultural norms attached to circumcision and noncircumcision. Valerie Oosterveld, ‘Sexual Violence Directed against Men and Boys in Armed Conflict or Mass Atrocity: Addressing a Gendered Harm in International Criminal Tribunals,’ Journal of International Law and International Relations 10 (2014): 107–128. 43 See, infra n 128. Similar accounts were reported in Iraq. See, Human Rights Watch, ‘“They Want Us Exterminated”: Murder, Torture, Sexual Orientation and Gender in Iraq,’ August 2009, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0809web.pdf (accessed 26 November 2017). 44 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security,’ S/2002/1154 (2002) [hereinafter ‘SG Report on WPS, 2002’]. See also, Sara E. Davies and Jacqui True, ‘Reframing Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence: Bringing Gender Analysis Back in,’ Security Dialogue 46(6) (2015): 495–512. 45 Report on the Rule of Law, 2004, para. 8. 46 Resolution 1325. 47 Nicole George and Laura J. Shepherd, ‘Women, Peace and Security: Exploring the Implementation and Integration of UNSCR 1325,’ International Political Science Review 37(3) (2016): 297–306; Carol Cohn, ‘Mainstreaming Gender in UN Security Policy: A Path to Political Transformation?’ in Global Governance: Feminist Perspectives, ed. S.M. Rai and G. Waylen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 48 UNSC resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1894 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015). 49 See, UN Charter. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 The UN organization dedicated to gender equality and the empowerment of women, established through UNGA Resolution 64/689. ‘System-Wide Coherence,’ A/RES/64/289 (2010). 53 Such as the special rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, and the special rapporteur on torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, created, respectively, through resolutions A/CN.4/RES/1994/45 and A/CN.4/RES/1985/33. 54 See, CEDAW, art. 17 et ss. 55 Cohn, supra n 47. 56 George and Shepherd, supra n 47. 57 Resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888(2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) on protection; 1889 (2009), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015) on participation. George and Shepherd, supra n 47; Soumita Basu and Catia Confortini, ‘Weakest “P” in the 1325 Pod? Realizing Conflict Prevention through Security Council Resolution 1325,’ International Studies Perspectives 18(1) (2017): 43–63. 58 See, the first and the latest reports: SG Report on WPS, 2002; ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security,’ UN Doc. S/2016/822 (28 September 2016) [hereinafter ‘SG Report on WPS, 2016’]. 59 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,’ A/66/657-S/2012/33 (2012); ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,’ UN Doc. S/2016/361 (20 April 2016) [hereinafter ‘SG Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 2016’]. 60 George and Shepherd, supra n 47 at 301. 61 See, Resolution 1325, para. 8. 62 See, e.g., UNHCHR, supra n 29. 63 Christine Bell, ‘Text and Context: Evaluating Peace Agreements for their “Gender Perspective”,’ Political Settlements Research Programme, 2015, http://www.politicalsettlements.org/files/2015/10/Text-and-Context-11-October-2015-Executive-Summary.pdf (accessed 26 November 2017). 64 Dina Francesca Haynes, Naomi Cahn and Fionnuala Ní Aolaín, ‘Women in the Post-Conflict Process: Reviewing the Impact of Recent UN Actions in Achieving Gender Centrality,’ Santa Clara Journal of International Law 11(1) (2012): 189–217. 65 Ibid., 210. See also, Sofaer’s comment on the article, acknowledging the need to move ‘beyond women’s “protection”.’ Abraham D. Sofaer, ‘“Mainstreaming” Women through UN Security Council Resolutions: Comments on a Paper by Haynes, Cahn & Aolaín,’ Santa Clara Journal of International Law 11(1) (2012): 221. 66 Kris Brown and Fionnuala Ní Aolaín, ‘Through the Looking Glass: Transitional Justice Futures through the Lens of Nationalism, Feminism and Transformative Change,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 9(1) (2015): 129. See also, Johanna Bond, ‘Victimization, Mainstreaming, and the Complexity of Gender in Armed Conflict,’ Santa Clara Journal of International Law 11(1) (2012): 225–235. 67 Haynes, Cahn and Ní Aolaín, supra n 64. 68 On the invisibility and mischaracterization of sexual harm throughout history, see, Turano, supra n 39. 69 Scully, supra n 6. 70 Bond, supra n 66 at 232. See also, Laura J. Shepherd, ‘Victims of Violence or Agents of Change? Representations of Women in UN Peacebuilding Discourse,’ Peacebuilding 4(2) (2016): 123–135; Natalie Florea Hudson, ‘UNSCR 1325: The Challenges of Framing Women’s Rights as a Security Matter,’ policy brief, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, March 2013. 71 Brown and Ní Aolaín, supra n 66 at 135. 72 On male sexual violence, see, Elisabeth Jean Wood, ‘Variation in Sexual Violence during War,’ Politics and Society 34(3) (2006): 307–341. 73 Scully, supra n 6 at 118. 74 Basu and Confortini, supra n 57. 75 SG Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 2016, para. 11; see also, para. 89. 76 Ibid., para. 13. 77 ‘Resolution 2122,’ S/RES/2122 (2013) [hereinafter ‘Resolution 2122’]. 78 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security,’ S/2013/525 (2013) [hereinafter ‘Report of the SG on WPS, 2013’]. 79 Resolution 2122, Preamble, para. 7. 80 Ibid. See, e.g., paras. 4, 5, 7, 8. 81 Ibid., Preamble, para. 7 chapeau and (a) (emphasis added). 82 Report of the SG on WPS, 2013; ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security,’ S/2015/716 (2015) [hereinafter ‘Report of the SG on WPS, 2015’]. 83 As required by Resolution 2122. The study was led by former special rapporteur on violence against women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, and hosted by the secretariat of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (UN Women). See, Radhika Coomaraswamy and UN Women, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2015). 84 Report of the SG on WPS, 2015. 85 The UNSG report does contain one mention of ‘particularly vulnerable groups of women’ in the context of economic recovery and access to resources, which suggests different layers of vulnerability, and it is noted that organizations supporting women victims of intersectional discrimination should be given support as part of civil society’s role in peacebuilding. See, SG Report on WPS, 2015, paras. 26, 124. 86 Shepherd, supra n 70; Cohn, supra n 8. 87 Cusack, supra n 16 at 144. The author uses as an example art. 6 of CEDAW on human trafficking, which reproduces implicit stereotypes. 88 Art. 6 of CEDAW on human trafficking. 89 UNHCHR, supra n 29. 90 Ibid., para. 7. 91 Ibid., para. 10. 92 Ibid. The UNSG adopted a similar position. See, Report of the SG on WPS, 2013. 93 UNHCHR, supra n 29. 94 Brown and Ní Aolaín, supra n 66. See also, generally, Turano, supra n 39. Mibenge also identified failures of international tribunals in recognizing the depth and breadth of the harm suffered by women during armed conflict. Chiseche Salome Mibenge, Sex and International Tribunals: The Erasure of Gender from the War Narrative (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 95 Oosterveld, supra n 42. 96 Ibid., 122. 97 Ibid., 127. 98 Rosemary Grey and Laura J. Shepherd, ‘“Stop Rape Now?”: Masculinity, Responsibility, and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,’ Men and Masculinities 16(1) (2012): 115–135. See also, R. Charli Carpenter, ‘Recognizing Gender-Based Violence against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations,’ Security Dialogue 37(1) (2006): 83–103. 99 Grey and Shepherd, supra n 98. 100 Chris Dolan, ‘Letting Go of the Gender Binary: Charting New Pathways for Humanitarian Interventions on Gender-Based Violence,’ International Review of the Red Cross 96(894) (2014): 486. For a contrary opinion, see, Jeanne Ward, ‘It’s Not About the Gender Binary, It’s About the Gender Hierarchy: A Reply to “Letting Go of the Gender Binary”,’ International Review of the Red Cross 98(901) (2016): 275–298. 101 Jamie J. Hagen, ‘Queering Women, Peace and Security,’ International Affairs 92(2) (2016): 314. See also, Laura J. Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg, ‘Trans-Bodies in/of War(s): Cisprivilege and Contemporary Security Strategy,’ Feminist Review 101(1) (2012): 5–23. 102 Hagen, supra n 101 at 327. 103 Ibid. 104 UNHCHR, supra n 29 at para. 4. 105 Ibid. 106 Josh Scheinert, ‘Is Criminalization Criminal?: Antisodomy Laws and the Crime against Humanity of Persecution,’ Tulane Journal of Law and Sexuality 24 (2015): 99–144; Charles Barrera Moore, ‘Embracing Ambiguity and Adopting Propriety: Using Comparative Law to Explore Avenues for Protecting the LGBT Population under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,’ Minnesota Law Review 101 (2016): 1287–1330. 107 SG Report on WPS, 2016, para. 64. 108 Ibid., para. 5. 109 Ibid., para. 46. 110 Ibid., referring to SG Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 2016. 111 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,’ S/2017/249 (2017). 112 Ibid. 113 See, e.g., SG Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 2016. 114 Ibid., para. 14; ‘Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Report of the Secretary-General,’ UN Doc. S/2015/203 (23 March 2015). 115 SG Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 2016. 116 SG Report on WPS, 2016. 117 ‘Resolution Adopted by the HRC 17/19 on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,’ A/HRC/RES/17/19 (2011); ‘Resolution Adopted by the HRC 27/32 on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,’ A/HRC/RES/27/32 (2014). 118 Ibid. 119 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Living Free and Equal: What States Are Doing to Tackle Violence and Discrimination against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex People (2016). 120 Cai Wilkinson and Anthony J. Langlois, ‘Special Issue: Not Such an International Human Rights Norm? Local Resistance to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights – Preliminary Comments,’ Journal of Human Rights 13(3) (2014): 249–255. 121 USA, Violence against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, secs. 1–1264, 127 Stat. 54 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ‘VAWA 2013’]. 122 Ashley LeBrun, ‘Are We There Yet? – VAWA 2013: Same-Sex Legal Acceptance,’ Seton Hall Legislative Journal 39(1) (2015): 101–124. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 IACoHR, supra n 31. 126 Hagen, supra n 101 at 316. 127 According to the Victims’ Unit, 1,818 victims are registered for their victimization in the context of the armed conflict on the basis of the category of LGBTI persons, and 56,639 refused to identify their gender (victims can register under the category of men, women, LGBTI or refuse to identify). ‘Registro Único de Víctimas (RUV),’ http://rni.unidadvictimas.gov.co/RUV (accessed 26 November 2017). 128 IACoHR, ‘Chapter V Follow-Up of Recommendations Issued by the IACHR in Its Country or Thematic Reports,’ Annual Report 2014, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2014/docs-en/Annual2014-chap5-Colombia.pdf (accessed 26 November 2017), para. 298; Colombia Diversa, Caribe Afirmativo and Santamaría Fundación, Cuerpos excluidos, rostros de impunidad. Informe de violencia hacia personas LGBT en Colombia (2015). See also, Historical Memory Group, Aniquilar la diferencia: Lesbianas, gays, bisexuales y transgeneristas en el marco del conflicto armado colombiano (2015). 129 ‘Comunicado Conjunto 82: Enfoque de género en acuerdos de paz de La Habana,’ 24 July 2016, http://equipopazgobierno.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/Paginas/comunicado-conjunto-82-enfoque-genero-acuerdos-paz-habana-cololmbia.aspx (accessed 26 November 2017). 130 For instance, gender-specific provisions were included in the agreement’s points 1 (integral rural reform), 2 (political participation), 4 (drugs) and 5 (victims). Point 5 provides for the creation of a working group on gender within the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition. Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, ‘Debunking the Myths about “Gender Ideology” in Colombia,’ WOLA, 25 October 2016, https://www.wola.org/analysis/debunking-myths-gender-ideology-colombia/ (accessed 26 November 2017); ‘ABC Preguntas y respuestas sobre enfoque de genero en los acuerdos de paz,’ 23 July 2016, http://equipopazgobierno.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/declaraciones/Paginas/abc-preguntas-respuestas-enfoque-genero-acuerdos-paz-habana-colombia.aspx’ (accessed 26 November 2017). 131 UN, press release, ‘United Nations Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura, Commends the Signing of the Colombian Peace Agreement and Calls for Women to Remain at the Forefront in its Implementation,’ Cartagena, 27 September 2016; UN, ‘Press Release of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura, to Commemorate the National Day for the Dignity of Women Victims of Sexual Violence in the Internal Armed Conflict in Colombia,’ Havana, 26 May 2015; SG Report on WPS, 2016; ‘Agenda of the 7793rd Meeting on Women and Peace and Security,’ UN Doc. S/PV.7793 (25 October 2016). 132 Julia Symmes Cobb and Nicholas Casey, ‘Colombia Peace Deal Is Defeated, Leaving a Nation in Shock,’ New York Times, 2 October 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/world/colombia-peace-deal-defeat.html (accessed 27 November 2017). 133 Lina M. Céspedes-Báez, ‘Gender Panic and the Failure of a Peace Agreement,’ American Journal of International Law 110 (2016): 183–187. 134 Equipo Paz Gobierno and Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, ‘Notas Sobre los Cambios, Ajustes y Precisiones del Nuevo Acuerdo Final para la Terminacion del Conflicto y la Construccion de la Paz Estable y Duradera,’ Havana, 13 November 2016, http://equipopazgobierno.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/NOTAS-SOBRE-LOS-CAMBIOS-AJUSTES-PRECISIONES-NUEVO-ACUERDO-FINAL.pdf (accessed 27 November 2017). 135 See, e.g., pp. 11, 22, 25, 43 and 47 of the new agreement compared to pp. 9, 18, 21, 38 and 41 of the previous agreement; pp. 79, 117 and 234 compared to pp. 72, 105 and 207; and p. 193 of the new agreement. For an online tool comparing the previous and new agreements, see, http://equipopazgobierno.presidencia.gov.co/acuerdos/Paginas/acuerdos-mesa-conversaciones-gobierno-farc.aspx (accessed 27 November 2017). 136 VAWA 2013, secs. 3(a)(18) and 3(b)(4). 137 As noted in recent human rights reports on Colombia. See, ‘Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/31/3/Add.2 (23 June 2016); ‘Observaciones finales sobre el séptimo informe periódico de Colombia,’ UN Doc. CCPR/C/COL/CO/7 (17 November 2016). 138 Céspedes-Báez, supra n 133 at 183–184. 139 Jamie J. Hagen, ‘Queering Women, Peace and Security in Colombia,’ Critical Studies on Security 5(1) (2017): 127. 140 Comunicado Conjunto No. 18, ‘Instancia Especial para contribuir a garantizar el enfoque de género en la implementación del Acuerdo Final,’ Bogota, 11 April 2017, http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/documentos-y-comunicados-conjuntos/Paginas/Comunicado-Conjunto-No-18.aspx (accessed 27 November 2017); ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Colombia,’ S/2017/539 (23 June 2017). © The Author(s) (2017). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email journals.permissions@oup.com

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International Journal of Transitional JusticeOxford University Press

Published: Mar 1, 2018

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