Epistemic Justification and Methodological Luck in Inflationary Cosmology

Epistemic Justification and Methodological Luck in Inflationary Cosmology Abstract I present a recent historical case from cosmology—the story of inflationary cosmology— and on its basis argue that solving explanatory problems is a reliable method for making progress in science. In particular, I claim that the success of inflationary theory at solving its predecessor’s explanatory problems justified the theory epistemically, even in advance of the development of novel predictions from the theory and the later confirmation of those predictions. © The Author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Oxford University Press

Epistemic Justification and Methodological Luck in Inflationary Cosmology

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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science.
ISSN
0007-0882
eISSN
1464-3537
D.O.I.
10.1093/bjps/axy014
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract I present a recent historical case from cosmology—the story of inflationary cosmology— and on its basis argue that solving explanatory problems is a reliable method for making progress in science. In particular, I claim that the success of inflationary theory at solving its predecessor’s explanatory problems justified the theory epistemically, even in advance of the development of novel predictions from the theory and the later confirmation of those predictions. © The Author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited.

Journal

The British Journal for the Philosophy of ScienceOxford University Press

Published: Jan 22, 2018

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