Eliminative pluralism and integrative alternatives: the case of SPECIES

Eliminative pluralism and integrative alternatives: the case of SPECIES Abstract Pluralisms of various sorts are popular in philosophy of science, including those that imply some scientific concept X should be eliminated from science in favour of a plurality of (typically more specific) concepts X1, X2, … Xn. This paper focuses on influential and representative arguments for such eliminative pluralism about the concept species. The main conclusions are that these arguments fail, that all other extant arguments also fail, and that this reveals a quite general dilemma, one that poses a defeasible presumption against many eliminative pluralisms about various scientific concepts. The paper ends by outlining a novel integrative alternative in defence of species. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of <italic>British Society for the Philosophy of Science</italic>. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Oxford University Press

Eliminative pluralism and integrative alternatives: the case of SPECIES

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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
ISSN
0007-0882
eISSN
1464-3537
D.O.I.
10.1093/bjps/axx057
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract Pluralisms of various sorts are popular in philosophy of science, including those that imply some scientific concept X should be eliminated from science in favour of a plurality of (typically more specific) concepts X1, X2, … Xn. This paper focuses on influential and representative arguments for such eliminative pluralism about the concept species. The main conclusions are that these arguments fail, that all other extant arguments also fail, and that this reveals a quite general dilemma, one that poses a defeasible presumption against many eliminative pluralisms about various scientific concepts. The paper ends by outlining a novel integrative alternative in defence of species. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of <italic>British Society for the Philosophy of Science</italic>. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com

Journal

The British Journal for the Philosophy of ScienceOxford University Press

Published: Nov 28, 2017

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