Do Diplomats Matter in Foreign Policy? Sir Percy Loraine and the Turkish-British Rapprochement in the 1930s

Do Diplomats Matter in Foreign Policy? Sir Percy Loraine and the Turkish-British Rapprochement in... Abstract This article scrutinizes the role of diplomats in foreign policy by focusing on the case of Sir Percy Loraine, British ambassador to Turkey (1934–1939). Accordingly, the article first introduces an agent-centered framework claiming that the ability of diplomats to make their mark on foreign policy is contingent upon how they fare in overcoming two types of dilemmas on diplomatic duty: the mandate dilemma and the allegiance dilemma. The article then discusses how Loraine overcame these dilemmas with a particular focus on his mediating role in the establishment of bilateral economic and political partnership. Overall, the article argues that diplomats can make a difference in the conduct of foreign policy by influencing not only the host government but their own government as well, provided that they find a balance between following orders and using own discretion and between their loyalty to the government they represent and responsibility to the receiving government. This article seeks to answer the overriding question of whether diplomats can make a difference in the conduct of foreign policy acting within the limits of their own authority. The role of diplomacy in the application of foreign policy has long been a crucial point of reference in scholarly debates (Satow 1922; Nicholson 1954; Bull 1977; Watson 1982; Berridge 2015). Traditionally prescribed as an essential recipe for dealing with the outside world by peaceful means rather than with the use of force (Bull 1977, 156; Watson 1982, 2), diplomacy is considered by contemporary scholars as “the infrastructure of world politics,” enabling “representation and governing among recognized polities” (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2011, 530). Diplomatic studies is now considered by many as an emerging subfield of International Relations (IR) in need of theoretical development (Sharp 1999; 2009; Murray et al. 2011; Bjola 2013; Bjola and Kornprobst 2013; Holmes 2013; Rathbun 2014). For its part, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), as an established subfield of IR, has already proved to be a persistent approach to explain world politics through human agency (Hudson 2005; Thies and Breuning 2012). Reflecting an agent-centered reading of IR, FPA claims, “all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups” (Hudson 2005, 1). Therefore, who leads matters in foreign policy depending on whether a state is governed by a predominant leader such as Saddam Hussein of Iraq, a single group such as the Politburo of the Soviet Union, or a coalition of autonomous actors such as the coalition governments in Western democracies (Hermann 2001, 56–57; Hermann et al. 2001; Dyson 2006; Kaarbo and Beasley 2008). Not only leaders but also high-ranked bureaucrats, including ministers, national security advisers, joint chiefs of staff, and the director of national intelligence, play various roles in the foreign policy decision-making process (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 16–17). Besides, scientists can also play a role at some stages of foreign policy decision-making (Macdonald 2015). Yet the role of diplomats remains largely uncharted territory. This is partly due to the predominant scholarly tendency to treat diplomatic studies and FPA as two distinct fields of research (Bjola 2013), though foreign policy and diplomacy are not mutually exclusive. Diplomacy facilitates the conduct of foreign policy through representation and negotiation. Scholars of FPA rather consider diplomats remote from the government's decision-making process since diplomats “do not have the benefit of sitting in the meetings where the new policy has been worked out” (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 277). Scholars of diplomacy, on the other hand, often highlight the features of an “ideal diplomat” in the execution of diplomatic duties, but they rather neglect in their investigations the question of how influential these “ideal” diplomats are in the execution of foreign policy (Satow 1922; Nicholson 1954; 1964; Bull 1977; Sofer 1997; Roberts 2009). The article aims to remedy this gap and brings together the two allegedly separate fields of research, namely, FPA and diplomacy, underscoring the need to take the role of diplomats in FPA seriously. With this motivation, inspired by the FPA's agent-centered approach, it proposes a two-stage framework to explain diplomats’ influence on foreign policy. Accordingly, the article brings together two main dichotomies highlighted in the scholarly literature; namely, the dichotomy of “imperative mandate” vs. “free mandate” by Jönsson and Hall (2005) and the duality of “one-sided vs. mid-space” diplomacy by Constantinou (2013). It claims that the ability of diplomats to make their mark on foreign policy is contingent upon how they fare in overcoming two types of dilemma on diplomatic duty: the “mandate dilemma,” the tension between following orders and using their own discretion; and the “allegiance dilemma,” the difficulty of finding a balance between their loyalty to the government they represent and responsibility to the government they are accredited to. The article investigates the credibility of this framework relying on a historical case study based upon archival research conducted at the UK National Archives between July and September 2015. The records of official correspondence between the Foreign Office and British diplomats serving in foreign embassies are stored in the National Archives at Kew Gardens, London, and open to public access. Some documents are available in digital format and can be downloaded free of charge from the computers in the National Archives campus. The majority of the documents however are only available in hard copy, which researchers are permitted to read and photograph. For the purposes of this article, the records entitled “Loraine papers” and coded as “FO 1011,” comprising all official correspondences between the Foreign Office and Sir Percy Loraine (1916–1949), were investigated with a special focus on his term in Ankara (1934–1939). A total of one hundred documents, thirty of which were available in downloadable format, were copied, and slightly less than a third of the collected data most relevant to the research were used in the article. In order to check the validity of the arguments raised in the British texts, it is necessary to consult with Turkish sources as well. However, the archives of the Turkish Foreign Ministry are closed to public access. Instead, minutes of the Turkish Parliament's plenary sessions, memoirs of Turkish bureaucrats, and Turkish press have been scrutinized as supplementary sources to offer a viable account of the Turkish perspective. Accordingly, the article takes a closer look into the case of Sir Percy Loraine, British ambassador to Turkey (1934–1939), focusing on his efforts to revitalize Turkish-British relations on the eve of the Second World War. Loraine was assigned to Turkey when extremist political forces in Europe, such as Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, were on the rise. The devastating economic and political impact of the Great Depression diminished the credibility of diplomacy, while unilateral action and use of force became a norm rather than exception in world politics (Gülmez 2017). A common belief among politicians in the 1930s was that “foreign policy was too important to be left in the hands of professional diplomats” (Craig 1952, 145). Turkish-British relations were not at their zenith either. Sworn enemies during the First World War (1914–1918) and Turkey's War of Independence (1919–1923), there was an evident lack of trust between Britain and Turkey after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The disagreement over the legal status of Mosul in Northern Iraq increased tension between Britain and Turkey in the mid-1920s (Coşar and Demirci 2006). Moreover, Britain persistently opposed Turkey's admission to the League of Nations, delaying its membership until 1932 (Barlas and Yılmaz 2016, 7). Nevertheless, the simmering German and Italian threats over Europe forced both states to look for potential allies in the mid-1930s. Turkey sought to diminish its economic dependence on Germany and establish a resolute defensive bloc against Italian revisionism in the Mediterranean (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 26). Britain, on the other hand, was afraid of losing Turkey to the emerging Axis front, as this would not only shift the balance of power in the Middle East and the Balkans in favor of the Axis but also considerably jeopardize Britain's connection with the East (Gülmez 2017, 43–45). In such a troubling political context, Loraine was given a difficult task of repairing the Turkish-British relations damaged by the decades of war. The article is organized into four sections. The first section introduces a two-stage framework to explain the role of diplomats in foreign policy. Accordingly, the ability of diplomats to make an important effect on foreign policy depends largely on their ability to exert influence upon both their own government and the government they are assigned to. Such an influence requires diplomats to overcome both the mandate dilemma and the allegiance dilemma they experience on duty. The second and the third sections analyze how Loraine overcame these dilemmas with a particular focus on his mediating role in the realization of the British financial and military assistance to Turkey and the unofficial visit by the king of England to Istanbul. The paper concludes by explaining how Loraine's efforts were received in Ankara and London and how the framework informed by Loraine's case could be relevant for contemporary practice of diplomacy. Overall, focusing on Sir Percy Loraine's meticulous efforts to befriend the old enemies, the paper claims that diplomats’ agency matters in foreign policy and bilateral relations in particular, provided that they are able to find a balance between following orders and using own discretion and between their loyalty to the government they represent and responsibility to the government they are assigned to. Diplomats’ Role in Foreign Policy: Overcoming Dilemmas Through mediation and persuasion, diplomats can influence foreign policy in three main ways.1 First, they can affect the decisions and actions of their own government. Second, they can exert influence upon the decisions and actions taken by the target state. Finally, provided that they shape the decisions and actions of both governments, they can influence the outcomes of cooperation or conflict in bilateral relations. Having such a remarkable impact on the conduct of foreign policy requires diplomats to develop a certain capability to help minimize friction between their own state and the government they are accredited to by exerting influence upon both governments’ policies (Bull 1977, 165). In order to do this, they need to reconcile two types of dilemma they experience in their assigned posts, namely, the “mandate dilemma” and the “allegiance dilemma.” The “mandate dilemma” primarily revolves around the problem of whether diplomats’ actions should be based on official instructions or personal initiatives. The “allegiance dilemma,” on the other hand, poses the question of whether diplomats should only remain loyal to their own government or whether they also bear responsibility to the host governments. As legal representatives of states abroad, the overarching challenge for diplomats is whether they must only act under the instructions of their sovereigns (imperative mandate) or whether they should be able to use their own discretion as they see fit in the pursuit of the interests of the sovereign (free mandate) (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 101). The main problem here is that if diplomats merely rely on the instructions of the government without employing their own discretion, they are prone to be considered “as ‘mere’ agents, as subordinate substitutes for those who sent them” (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 101). Besides, adopting a purely passive attitude often results in missed opportunities in the execution of diplomatic duties abroad. Especially, during the time of slow communications, diplomats “so terrified” of exceeding their instructions, rather than using own initiative to resolve an issue or strike a deal, preferred to spend their time writing “brilliant reports on situations that had entirely altered by the time their despatches arrived” (Nicholson 1954, 82). Therefore, diplomats may sometimes resort to free mandate, for instance, giving an immediate response to a question asked by the host government without waiting for instructions from their sovereigns, out of concern that either the failure to respond would reveal an image that the capital has no valid policy regarding the issue, or they would miss an important opportunity (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 288–89). However, if diplomats only rely on their own discretion in the conduct of diplomatic duties to the point of defying the official instructions, then they run the risk of being rebuked, replaced, or even fired (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 102–3). The employment of full discretion sometimes reflects an impression that diplomats tend to pursue their own policy rather than that of their government, and they thus pay the price for it. For instance, Lord Stratford Canning, British ambassador to Constantinople (1842–1858), known as “Büyük Elçi” (Great Ambassador) by the Ottomans for his great influence over the Sultan, was held responsible for the outbreak of the Crimean War as he allegedly defied his orders and convinced the Sultan of the necessity of a war with Russians (Nicholson 1954, 81). He was relieved of his duties at the embassy and forced to retire. Similarly, Harold Stassen, US representative at the 1957 London Arms Control Negotiations, ignored his instructions and advanced a proposal to the Russians without consulting the French and the British representatives, out of the belief that he could easily strike a deal with the Russian delegates (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 284). Stassen was removed from his post because of the incident. Jönsson and Hall (2005, 108) argue that the ideal position for diplomats is somewhere in between since they neither prefer being “merely mouthpieces, nor do they desire total latitude and responsibility.” Therefore, diplomats need to remedy this dilemma by not only executing governmental instructions but also using their own discretion when opportunity materializes. With this motivation, first, it must be established that diplomats should “always carry out the instructions that [they receive] from [their] sovereign,” except for unjust acts such as instigating an assassination (Nicholson 1954, 68). They should also be willing to play a role in the development of bilateral relations, taking personal initiatives in the execution of the pre-determined duties, namely, information-gathering, communication, representation, and negotiation. For instance, they can organize formal or informal meetings between statesmen to bring two governments to a negotiation table and facilitate the signature of economic and political partnership agreements. They hence strengthen intergovernmental communication and stimulate negotiation. Moreover, they can frequently attend social meetings with foreign leaders and often pay unofficial visits to the top officials of the host government in order to inform them of official policy lines, extract information or comments from them, and convince them of the necessity of a collaboration between the governments. Such maneuvers will not only increase their visibility at foreign courts as representatives of their governments but also facilitate information-gathering and create new opportunities for conducting negotiations and reaching agreement on bilateral matters. Face-to-face diplomacy is highlighted by Holmes (2013, 833) as a crucial method of gaining “experiential belief about the intentions of others.” According to Holmes (2013, 856), face-to-face interactions provide a “mechanism by which individuals can understand each other's intentions from the inside.” Therefore, diplomats’ face-to-face interactions with government officials in foreign courts carry utmost importance for gathering the right information and pursuing the right policy. Remedying the mandate dilemma, however, requires diplomats to know when to use discretion to take which distinctive action for a desired outcome. At this point, the question is whether the personality of a diplomat matters in taking the right initiative. Greenstein (1987) argues that personality matters in politics provided that two primary conditions are met, namely action indispensability and actor indispensability. The former attaches value to the distinctive actions of individuals without which political outcomes would turn out to be very different, while the latter stresses the distinctive beliefs or goals of individuals which lead them to take different courses of action than their counterparts to reach a desired outcome (Greenstein 1987, 41–42). The agency of diplomats, hence, becomes a crucial determinant for shaping foreign policy outcomes, provided that their distinctive personality helps them to take a distinctive action. Having remedied the mandate dilemma, diplomats then should overcome the allegiance dilemma by drawing a balance between their commitment to their own government and their responsibility to the host government. Constantinou (2013, 145) argues that the practice of diplomacy is largely affected by how diplomats position themselves regarding the relations between their own governments and the governments they are assigned to. They either conceive of themselves as “on the side” or “in the middle.” Accordingly, in “one-sided” diplomacy, practitioners primarily promote the interests of their own government and advocate the internally formulated positions. Regarding “mid-space” diplomacy, diplomats rather assume the role of a mediator, bringing two sides together to find an equitable solution to a bilateral problem. Diplomats therefore engage both sides in a “reasoned dialogue” in which state representatives try to persuade each other through an exchange of concessions and moderation of demands to arrive at an outcome of mutual benefit (Rathbun 2014, 4–5). The role of a mediator is generally reserved for a third party that is not directly involved in the dispute since he or she is expected to act impartially to find an equitable solution (Berridge 2015, 252). Nevertheless, diplomats may, at times, assume such a role to oversee an agreement between their own government and the government they are assigned to. Constantinou (2013, 146) argues that the conceptual location of diplomats cannot always remain fixed and static for “the same diplomats may at various times move across both terrains—consciously or unconsciously—in the course of diplomatic activity.” He claims that “[i]n fully discharging one's diplomatic functions, it is never enough for the diplomat to just represent one's side. One must learn to represent—mentally and privately—the other side as well, not merely to sympathize but to empathize” (Constantinou 2013, 155). Cooperation in international relations requires a certain degree of mutual trust, that is, “belief that cooperation will be reciprocated” (Rathbun 2012, 2). However, the persistence of uncertainty within states about each other's motivations forces them not to trust each other (Kydd 2005: 18). To address this problem, they can work on building trust between each other through “costly signaling,” that is, taking “unilaterally conciliatory actions” to prove that they are trustworthy (Osgood 1959, 316; Larson 1997, 5; Kydd 2005, 5). Such unilateral gestures without asking any immediate favor in return will help overcome mistrust, since “images of other states as hostile or untrustworthy tend to lag behind changes in their behavior” (Larson 1997, 5). As a mediator, diplomats can assume the role of a “trust builder,” establishing communication between parties to reduce uncertainty and mistrust. They can work towards persuading both parties to send “costly signals” to each other in order to reassure their willingness to cooperate or fight against a common enemy. Such actions will reduce the uncertainty behind the motivations of the states towards each other and increase their willingness to cooperate (Kydd 2005, 186). A diplomat's mediating role is also in resonance with Putnam's (1988) two-level game perspective of international negotiations. Putnam (1988, 460) emphasizes the existence of simultaneous negotiations at both domestic and international levels in which “decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously.” Here, the chief negotiator, a diplomat in our example, is considered more than merely an honest broker working simply on behalf of his/her constituents since he or she is compelled to find a middle ground between domestic and international demands to reach a mutually acceptable outcome (Putnam 1988, 456–58). According to Nicholson (1963, 122–23), the mediating role of diplomats is rather inescapable since they owe loyalty not only to the government they represent but also to the government to which they are accredited; however, this might lead to the syndrome of localitis or going native. Defined as “[t]he adoption by diplomats of the point of view of the government of the receiving state” (Berridge and Lloyd 2012), localitis is “an occupational hazard” experienced by diplomats who spend too much time in the same part of the world (Berridge 2015, 117). In the best-case scenario, the diplomat “loses touch with sentiments at home”; in the worst-case scenario, he or she acts as a “mouthpiece” for the receiving state rather than his or her own government (Berridge 2015, 117). Overall, the allegiance dilemma indicates that the more a diplomat reflects an image of a one-sided diplomat, the more disenfranchised she or he is likely to become from the outside world, gaining an image of a mere envoy of the sovereign with no capability to influence foreign policy. On the other hand, the more a diplomat reflects the image of a mid-space diplomat, the more she or he will run the risk of being accused of localitis, to the point of betraying her or his own government. Diplomats hence need to reconcile their position as the representative of their own government (one-sided diplomat) and their role as a mediator (mid-space diplomat) in order to exert influence both at home and abroad without being labeled either as impotent or traitor. Bull (1977, 164) prescribes a solution to this dilemma, highlighting the critical role of diplomats “to determine the overlapping interests of two governments, and through reason and persuasion, to bring the parties to an awareness of it.” Therefore, diplomats should work towards convincing their own governments, as well as their host governments, about the necessity of developing a bilateral partnership based on common goals and/or against a common enemy. This via media positioning of diplomats moving across the spectrum of one-sided and mid-space diplomacy can increase their capability to affect the conduct of foreign policy. The article, on the other hand, acknowledges that remedying these dilemmas does not automatically enable diplomats to exert influence on foreign policy since there might also be other determining factors such as the size of the foreign policy decision-making unit, leadership style, and international context. Size matters because it would be easier for diplomats to influence a predominant leader, a single person, than an entire cabinet in charge of foreign policy, and it would be even harder to have an impact on a coalition government with diverging agendas (Hermann 2001). Leadership style matters, too, because, for instance, actions of ideologically driven leaders are primarily based on their “beliefs, attitudes, motives and passions,” which make them less likely to change their decisions (Hermann et al. 2001, 86). On the other hand, it would be relatively easier to influence pragmatic leaders who are rather “flexible and open-minded” (Hermann et al. 2001, 87). Finally, international context matters, as well, because peacetime diplomatic maneuvers are not necessarily applicable on account of the uncertainty and friction of war (McMillan 1992). Admitting their merit, this article nevertheless argues that before taking these factors into account, it is first necessary to establish what diplomats can do to influence foreign policy and how they can do it. The case of Sir Percy Loraine hence stands as a crucial indicator of what diplomats can do to improve bilateral relations in a deteriorating international context and how they can do it. Overcoming the Mandate Dilemma: Loraine's Influences on Turkey Sir Percy Lyham Loraine of Kirkharle, graduate of Eton College (1893–1899) and New College, Oxford (1899–1901), served in the British Diplomatic Service in various roles across Europe and the Middle East including Paris, Rome, Madrid, Warsaw, Budapest, Athens, Tehran, and Cairo before he was sent to Ankara. When assigned to Turkey in December 1933, Loraine was reluctant to leave his post in Egypt. He considered this appointment as a demotion from the post of a “high commissioner in Egypt (where he had been treated almost like royalty),” to a post in “the wilds of Anatolia” (Berridge 2009, 153). His only consolation was that he was appointed to Turkey as an ambassador for the first time in his career (FO 1011/172, 1933–1934). Shortly after his assignment, he experienced the mandate dilemma. The FO criticized Loraine for employing too much detail in his letters to London. He was asked not to send too long reports and to prioritize the issues to write about (FO 1011/174, April 19, 1934, 1–2). Hence, from day one, Loraine was compelled to step away from imperative mandate and resort to free mandate in his correspondence with the FO. He then realized the lack of Turkish trust towards Britain and emphasized in his letters the necessity of winning the hearts of Turks. For instance, he stressed the fact that Britain and France were the only great powers who were not invited to the celebrations of the eleventh anniversary of the Turkish Republic and urged the FO to remedy this problem by raising the British profile in Turkey (FO 1011/174, November 3, 1934, 1). The first opportunity for Loraine to use free mandate came on June 17, 1934, when a banquet was given in Ankara in honor of the Shah of Persia. Loraine found an opportunity to play poker with Atatürk, the Turkish president, until next morning, and this enabled Loraine to establish the first positive contact with the Turkish leader, which British diplomats had been failing to do for years.2 The long poker nights that Loraine spent with Atatürk thereafter proved exceptionally instrumental for Loraine in gaining Atatürk's trust (Berridge 2009, 158). Remedying the mandate dilemma by establishing personal connections with Atatürk and other Turkish statesmen, Loraine quickly became a prominent figure in Turkish political circles. Over the years, he felt confident about his influence on Atatürk. He reported that Atatürk, “for an arch-nationalist, ha[d] become an out-and-out Anglophil” (FO 1011/186, December 15, 1937, 3). Loraine without doubt had an impact on Atatürk since the Turkish leader often consulted with Loraine regarding Turkey's matters with other countries.3 For instance, Loraine was the only foreign diplomat who was given the privilege to sit with Atatürk and discuss foreign policy matters between 11 p.m. and 10 a.m. during a reception on October 29, 1937, to celebrate the fourteenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic (Özdemir 2004, 23). He informed the FO that Atatürk deliberately placed Loraine on his left, constantly referring to him for his personal opinion on various subjects and emphasized how high the level of Turkish-British relations had reached in a short period of time (Sonyel 1989, 177–78). Loraine also reported that Atatürk, furious with France over the dispute of Alexandretta, agreed to see the French diplomats only after Loraine's insistence. “[D]uring the all-night maneuvers on October 29th it was only on my insistence, when he consulted me, that Atatürk invited the French Ambassador to his circle at all,” he wrote (FO 1011/186, December 15, 1937, 4). Britain had not even been invited to the celebrations of the anniversary of the Turkish Republic in 1934; three years later, Loraine managed to become the most popular foreign diplomat during the 1937 celebrations. Loraine considered his assignment to Ankara as a watershed in the development of bilateral relations. He frequently hinted in his official telegrams that partnership between Britain and Turkey particularly started with his term. For instance, in his telegram to Anthony Eden, the British secretary of state, Loraine mentioned a story where a friend told Atatürk; “‘I notice you are drawing a good deal closer to England.’ Atatürk replied, ‘Drawing closer? I have thrown myself into the arms of England’” (FO 954/28A/57, May 8, 1936). Unsure of the authenticity of the story, Loraine told Eden that the story nevertheless correctly reflected the true state of the bilateral relations at the time (FO 954/28A/57, May 8, 1936). Loraine claimed that in Turkey there was “a marked wave of friendliness and confidence towards England,” which began in 1934, after Loraine was assigned to the post, and further developed in 1936, and since then, “relations with England bec[a]me the keystone of the arch of the Turkish foreign policy” (FO 954/28A/57, May 8, 1936; Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 25–26). In the fourth year of his assignment to Ankara, Loraine became certain that Turks had no doubts about Britain's partnership (FO 954/28A/102, February 17, 1938, 2). Loraine was even convinced that Turkey would fight on Britain's side in the case of a war. He assured Eden in his telegram; “in the view of the development that had occurred in Anglo-Turkish relations since my arrival here, there was one real, substantial thing. . . . if, which God forbid, there was to be another war, Turkey would fight on the side of England. . . . That was the rock-bottom for Turkey” (FO 954/28A/89, February 24, 1937). In another correspondence, Loraine told Eden that the Turkish government officially revealed in a cabinet meeting its preference to fight on Britain's side, and this, according to Loraine, represented a decisive moment “in the policy of rapprochement with the United Kingdom that the Turkish Government have been pursuing” since 1934 (FO 954/28A/91, February 28, 1937, 2–3). Overcoming the Allegiance Dilemma: Loraine's Influences on Britain During his time in Ankara, Loraine proved successful in mending the shattered image of Britain in the eyes of the Turks by establishing close dialogue with Turkish leaders and gaining their trust. However, this did not happen overnight. In fact, the Turkish attitude toward the British remained cautious even after the assignment of Loraine to Ankara. Turkey decided to develop bilateral relations with Britain only after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Turks felt increasingly threatened by Italy's relentless revisionism. Atatürk was convinced that Mussolini of Italy aimed to reconstitute the former Roman Empire and that the Ethiopian adventure was the first stage in the process (FO 954/28A/49, April 12, 1936, 4). He told Loraine that the international society had allowed Italy to get away with one successful aggression, but “it would be fatal to all hopes of peace and security if she were allowed to get away with a second one” (FO 954/28A/49, April 12, 1936, 6). Feridun Cemal Erkin (1980: 83), a Turkish diplomat present in the meeting as the interpreter of Ataturk, confirms in his memoir Ataturk's request for developing bilateral partnership against the rising Italian threat, through a treaty of partnership, if necessary. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the changing international context provided an enabling environment for Loraine's diplomatic efforts. It would also be misleading to assume that the realization of bilateral partnership was a unidirectional process in which Loraine simply acted as a one-sided diplomat and persuaded the Turks with his charisma to develop partnership with Britain without giving anything in return. In fact, Loraine was forced to move across the spectrum of one-sided and mid-space diplomacy because, in order to maintain a sustainable influence over the Turks, he had to exert influence over the British government as well. His task was to bring both sides to the awareness that bilateral partnership was never more crucial against the rising Axis threat. Economic Partnership and Financial Assistance Britain proved to be an essential economic partner for Turkey from the mid-1930s onward as Turkish decision-makers were looking for alternative ways to diminish economic dependence on Germany. In this respect, Loraine's initiatives to develop a bilateral economic partnership became a success, particularly in bringing British industry to Turkey, with a considerable number of orders obtained from the Turkish government (Mackie 1939, 449). For instance, Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, a British construction company, was hired as a technical advisor to the Turkish government and given several construction contracts in Turkey thanks to the critical role Loraine played “in securing the successful outcome of . . . negotiations” between the company and the Turkish government (FO 1011/186, January 21, 1937, 1–2). Moreover, he liaised between the two countries when Turkey announced its willingness to purchase twenty-four Blenheim Bombers from Britain (FO 1011/186, April 20, 1937). Loraine was the architect of a £3 million contract between Turkey and Brassert, a British construction company, regarding the construction of the first steel factory in Turkey, despite the fact that Krupp, the German company, had offered a better deal (Waterfield 1973, 210–211). His agency in the realization of the deal was remarkable since he personally attended the opening ceremony of the factory in Karabük together with Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. His participation in the opening ceremony was highlighted in a Turkish daily, Cumhuriyet, as evidence of a strong friendship between Turkey and Britain (Daver 1937, 1). It was deemed unprecedented in the history of the Republic that a foreign ambassador, “particularly a British one,” traveled with Turkey's prime minister and participated in several programs in Anatolia, including Karabük, Kayseri, and Konya (Daver 1937, 1). It was even argued that in Karabük, not only the foundation of an iron and steel plant was laid but also the foundations of Turkish-British friendship (Daver 1937, 1). İnönü, in his speech at the ceremony, claimed that the plant symbolized the burgeoning friendship between two countries and announced Loraine as one of its chief architects (Akşam, April 4, 1937, 7). İnönü further stated; “We, the Turks, consider the policy of showing sympathy to our country with concrete evidence as the most trustworthy policy” and highlighted the Karabük factory as such a concrete evidence of Britain's trustworthiness (Akşam, April 4, 1937, 7). İnönü, hence, confirmed that Turkey considered British efforts in Karabük as a “costly signaling” to build trust in bilateral relations. Karabük could even be considered as an example of “costly signaling” on the side of Turkey as well. Fuad Ağralı, the Turkish minister of finance, confirmed it by stressing that the British firm was granted the opportunity to construct the iron and steel plant even though more favorable terms were offered by other companies because Turkey was willing to establish a strong and long-lasting partnership with Britain (TGNA 1937a, 177). As the case of the Karabük plant would suggest, Loraine could be argued to have played a crucial role as a “trust builder,” personally involved in a process where both governments sent “costly signals” to each other for a promising partnership. Loraine also mediated the negotiations between the two governments regarding the fortification of the Straits. Krupp again had offered a better deal, but after the intervention of Atatürk himself, Turkey sent the Krupp sketch plans to Britain for tender by British firms (Millman 1998, 136). After the British Vickers limited was assigned with the task of manufacturing the guns, Loraine practically acted as a mid-space diplomat forcing his own government to keep their end of the bargain with the Turks. He directly wrote to Oliphant and strongly protested the British Admiralty's order to manufacture 13.5-inch guns for the defense of the Straits instead of 15-inch guns used in the British Royal Navy (FO 1011/191, June 22, 1938). Not only the 13.5-inch guns were outranged by the 15-inch guns, but their shells were inferior as well (FO 1011/191, August 12, 1938, 2). Loraine hence accused the Admiralty of “get[ting] rid of unwanted material” (FO 1011/191, August 12, 1938, 1). The Admiralty gave in to his pressure and agreed to send a number of 15 inch guns in addition to the 13.5 inch ones (FO 1011/191, August 12, 1938, 1). Economic partnership was not the only objective of Loraine, as he also aimed for a strong political partnership with Turkey closely knit through British economic and military assistance. His letters convinced both Foreign Ministers Eden and Halifax after him of the necessity for assisting Turkey financially against a possible German threat. With the aim of tackling the bureaucratic difficulties behind the construction of the steel factory in Turkey and the purchase of British aircrafts, Loraine wrote to Eden hoping to receive his blessing. Emphasizing the fact that Turkey relied in its foreign policy more on Britain than on Russia or France, Loraine argued that Britain had the responsibility to make sure that Turkey would not fall into the orbit of Germany (FO 954/28A/57, May 8, 1936, 2). Loraine claimed that Turkey had provided valuable support to British foreign policy since the breakout of the Ethiopian conflict in 1935, but Britain had failed to return the favor, which might prove costly to British foreign policy: Unfortunately we have not been able to do much to help them in matters that are of immediate interest to them: notably the order for aircraft, and the contract with Brassert's for erecting an iron and steel plant in this country . . . The fact is that in no particular respect yet have we been able to help them, even though on some points many of our own interests should impel us to be helpful. I am therefore a little anxious lest the Turks should one day begin to think that this new Anglo-Turkish friendship is rather a one-sided affair. . . . I do feel rather strongly that we ought to make a bigger effort than we have hitherto put forth to sweeten that friendship on our side and to clinch it (FO 954/28A/57, May 8, 1936, 4). In his reply to Loraine, Eden acknowledged the importance of Turkey to Britain and promised to do all he could to meet her difficulties (FO 954/28A/62, May 18, 1936). The British government soon decided to assist Turkey in the purchase of British aircraft, and this later gave Britain access to top secret information about the inventory of the Turkish air force. Based on the specific orders of Atatürk, Turkish general staff had remained “exceptionally secretive” in its relations with foreign representatives, refusing to provide military attachés any information on the Turkish army and denying their attendance to Turkish military maneuvers (Berridge 2009, 161). Only after Turkey decided to develop its air force with British funds and expertise, did Turkey made an exception for the British. On December 1937, a British air attaché became the first foreign personnel allowed to see “everything” in the Turkish air force, provided that he would not share this information with the attachés of other countries (Berridge 2009, 162). On another occasion, Loraine wrote to the FO regarding the Turkish demand for the construction of two battleships with British assistance. The British government was reluctant to assist Turkey on this occasion due to Turkey's financial difficulty in covering the expenses. Loraine argued that Britain should consider the Turkish demand more than a mere economic transaction but as an ally's call for help against potential security threats that would eventually compromise British security as well: It would seem dismally unfortunate if the financial difficulty stops their order (i.e., the Turkish warship order) being placed. Are we really debarred from using our tremendous money resources, one patent and tangible superiority that we possess over our European rivals, for helping our friends, for creating employment at home, for building up in this instance a friendly navy in a region which represents for us a particularly high degree of political and strategic importance for aiding Turkey to reach a military strength which virtually renders her immune from aggression, and strengthens her influence in the direction of peace and lawful behaviour throughout the Balkan Peninsula and eastward to Iran and Afghanistan? . . . There is so much to gain by letting the Turks have British ships; there is so little to lose . . . [T]he security of our friends contributes to our own security… (FO 1011/191, February 23, 1938, 3–4). Loraine's telegram created a remarkable impact on Viscount Halifax, the British foreign minister, who not only approved the construction of the ships but also supported a British loan of £16 million to be granted to Turkey. Highlighting in his memorandum, “in particular I endorse unhesitantly the words of our ambassador in Angora,” Halifax expressed the concern that Turkey would fall within the German orbit, which would result in the spread of German influence throughout the Middle East, unless Britain did something to prevent it (CAB 24/276/39, May 7, 1938, 2). “It is therefore scarcely too much to say that Turkey has become not the main, but the only, obstacle to the Drang nach Osten,4” Halifax concluded (CAB 24/276/39, May 7, 1938, 2). The King's Visit The visit of King Edward VIII to Istanbul in September 4–6, 1936, was the most popular event of the decade in Turkish-British relations. The visit could be considered a clear example of Loraine's role in the establishment of a bilateral partnership. Loraine overcame both the mandate and the allegiance dilemmas in order to make this visit possible. The king's visit was not a preplanned activity; it was the idea of Loraine himself (free mandate), and Loraine put his own initiative into action by receiving the official approval of the FO (imperative mandate). Loraine then mediated between the king and the Turkish president in order to meet their demands about the details of the visit. He first persuaded the king about the necessity of such a visit to revitalize the bilateral partnership. The king, however, refused to pay an official visit as he was actually on holiday in the Mediterranean with his yacht Nahlin and told Loraine that he had “no clothes even for anything like ceremonial occasions, not even a grey tail coat” (FO1011/185, 1936, 1). Loraine assured the king that there would be no need for ceremonial clothing as Atatürk would welcome him “at the water steps of the Dolma Bagce Palace” (FO1011/185, 1936, 1). Loraine then had to convince Atatürk that the king's visit would be unofficial, and he would come to Istanbul instead of Ankara, the capital city. The king first visited the Dardanelles and then stayed in Istanbul between September 4–6, 1936.5 Loraine praised the visit as a great success sealing the deal for a new era in the bilateral relations (Waterfield 1973, 214). In response, Turkey dispatched its fleet for the first time to a foreign port, Malta, as a symbolic gesture of Turkey's “new policy of openness toward Britain” (Barlas and Yılmaz 2016, 9). The king's visit held a particular meaning to Turkey since he was not only the first English king to ever visit Turkey but also the first European king to come to Turkey after Wilhelm II, the German emperor who had visited Istanbul in 1898 (Özdemir 2004, 69). According to Gönlübol and Sar (2013, 137), the king's visit was highly instrumental in shifting the Turkish perceptions of Britain, as it encouraged Turkish statesmen to abandon their traditional anti-British sentiments. Therefore, confirming Larson (1997), the king's visit played a particular role in mitigating Turkish mistrust towards Britain. Özdemir (2004, 70) argues that the visit not only highlighted the revitalization of the British-Turkish partnership but also helped Turkey to come closer to the emerging anti-German bloc in Europe. Mango (2002, 505), on the other hand, claims that the king's visit became “an important ingredient of the Atatürk legend: the British monarch had come in person to bury the hatchet, disown the legacy of Gladstone and Lloyd George, and pay homage to the new Turkey.” The visit was praised by Turkish statesmen as a crucial determinant for the development of a bilateral partnership. Ataturk, in his address to the parliament, emphasized that the king's visit led to a “special friendship” between himself and the king, which would “without doubt help further develop the already close bilateral relations” (TGNA 1936b, 6). Moreover, the Turkish foreign minister, Aras, sent a personal letter to Loraine thanking him for his sincere role in the preparation and success of such a high-level visit that would no doubt improve bilateral relations (FO1011/185, September 19, 1936). Following the visit, Turkey was represented at the coronation ceremony of the King George VI by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, who, upon his return, expressed that he had witnessed the sincere friendship of the British people in London, which proved that Britain and Turkey had become true friends (TGNA 1937b, 312). The visit also changed certain practices in official correspondence between Turkey and Britain. For instance, shortly after his assignment to Ankara, Loraine asked whether it was possible for the king of England to send an annual message to Atatürk celebrating his birthday (FO 1011/174, November 3, 1934, 3). His request was rejected outright since reciprocal messages on behalf of the king were never sent (FO 1011/174, November 29, 1934, 1). It was also stated that regular annual messages were generally regarded as “an empty formality of a routine nature” that would not hold any effect on a realist like Atatürk (FO 1011/174, November 29, 1934, 2). However, after the king's visit, the FO decided to send annual messages to Atatürk, and the practice continued even after Atatürk's death (FO 1011/191, November 17, 1938). Finally, the visit of King Edward VIII to Istanbul softened the attitude of the British press towards the newly established Turkish Republic. For instance, The Times daily had been adamant in continuing to use the name “Constantinople” even five years after the city's name had been officially changed to Istanbul (Özdemir 2004, 273). The daily abandoned its long-standing tradition and decided to use the name “Istanbul” shortly after the king of England visited the city (Özdemir 2004, 273). Conclusion Overall, this article aims to contribute to the FPA literature by introducing a viable framework to explain how and under which conditions the agency of diplomats affects the conduct of foreign policy, relying on the case of Sir Percy Loraine in the 1930s. It hence establishes communication between FPA and diplomatic studies by validating an FPA-inspired framework through the evidence of a historical case study Accordingly, the agency of diplomats matters, especially in the management of bilateral relations since diplomats can exert influence on both the host government and their own government. To do this, they need to overcome both the mandate and the allegiance dilemmas. The story of Sir Percy Loraine as British ambassador to Turkey presents a crucial test-case for the applicability of this argument. Loraine proved successful in his efforts to revitalize the Turkish-British partnership since he managed to overcome both dilemmas. He remedied the mandate dilemma by often generating original ideas to consolidate the bilateral partnership while remaining loyal to official practices. For instance, Loraine was the mastermind behind the king's visit to Istanbul. It was his very idea to organize such a high-level visit to Turkey; yet he also sought an official endorsement. Similarly, he suggested an annual message to Atatürk celebrating his birthday to be sent by the king of England, which was put into practice after the king's visit to Istanbul. However, overcoming the mandate dilemma was not adequate for Loraine to make a remarkable impact upon the bilateral relations. He also had to play a mediating role between the two governments and tried to make both parties realize that it was essential to forge a bilateral partnership. For instance, Loraine wrote to British Foreign Ministers Eden and Halifax regarding the necessity of providing financial and military assistance to Turkey in order to guarantee its support against the Axis front. His efforts paid off since the British government agreed to grant a British loan of £16 million to Turkey and consented to the construction of warships and airplanes for Turkish military. Loraine also exerted influence over the Turkish government that, for instance, enabled British industry to flourish in Turkey and let Britain have access to the inventory of the Turkish air force. Loraine could hence be argued to have overcome the allegiance dilemma by moving across the terrains of one-sided and mid-space diplomacy in his diplomatic activities in Ankara. While advocating the British interests in Turkey, Loraine also sometimes acted as a mid-space diplomat to bring both parties to the negotiating table. Loraine's efforts were highly appreciated in Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Aras emphasized, in his address to the parliament, that friendship was blossoming between Turkey and Britain based on mutual trust thanks to the efforts of Loraine and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden (TGNA 1936a, 331). Besides, Loraine was very popular in the Turkish press. As early as April 1936, he was praised as the architect of a “splendid” friendship between Turkey and Britain thanks to his “sincerity and kindness” (Cumhuriyet, April 27, 1936, 1). Another commentary depicted Loraine as the most successful British diplomat who ever served in Turkey but claimed that it was Ataturk's genius that provided Loraine with the opportunity to shine (Cumhuriyet, January 6, 1938, 5). It was further argued that a previous, similar success in their bilateral relations had only been achieved through the efforts of Stratford Canning, the British ambassador to Constantinople (1842–1858) (Cumhuriyet, January 6, 1938, 5). Even after assigned to Rome, Loraine's diplomatic efforts to keep Italy out of the Second World War were widely discussed in the Turkish press (Cumhuriyet, March 10, 1940, 5). The role Loraine played in the development of relations with Turkey was appreciated in London as well. In a telegram, the FO acknowledged the “great influence” Loraine had in the Turkish government, which rendered his presence in Turkey indispensable for Britain (FO 1011/186, September 27, 1937). In another telegram, it was stated that Loraine's “cordial relations” with the Turkish authorities enabled Britain to “do as much in the way of cultural propaganda as the Turks [we]re prepared to allow,” and this would give Britain an advantage over its competitors (FO 1011/194, March 9, 1938). Confirming Greenstein (1987), Loraine's distinctive personality enabled him to take distinctive actions to reach a desired outcome in bilateral relations. Especially, Loraine's two significant letters to the FO constituted a game changer in the British approach to Turkey, resulting in increased bilateral economic and political partnership. Moreover, organizing the king's visit to Istanbul was another distinctive action that hada remarkable impact on bilateral relations. Therefore, Loraine's personality played a crucial role in stimulating cooperation in bilateral relations, fulfilling both of Greenstein's criteria: action and actor indispensability. Loraine's critical role in the development of bilateral relations is also reflective of Putnam's two-level game approach, in which the negotiator should maneuver between domestic and foreign bodies to reach a mutual agreement. Loraine maneuvered between Turkish and British governments to cooperate against a common enemy although the threat perceptions of the two governments were quite different. While Turkey considered Italy an immediate threat, Britain viewed Germany as the real danger. Loraine, in his two famous letters to the FO, sold the Turkish story to his government by highlighting Germany as a common threat while acknowledging the Turkish concerns about the Italian threat during his discussions with the Turks. As pointed out before, overcoming the dilemmas of diplomatic duty does not automatically guarantee success to diplomats in their efforts to influence foreign policy. One should also consider other factors that may either facilitate or hinder diplomats’ contributions to foreign policy, such as the size of the decision-making unit, leadership style, and international context. Regarding the case of Percy Loraine, these factors provided rather an enabling environment for Loraine's diplomatic efforts. The Turkish president, Atatürk, fit well into the category of a predominant leader having “the authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed” (Hermann 2001, 48). Although Turkey was governed by a single-party regime with a cabinet of ministers and a prime minister, Atatürk still had a strong influence over governmental policies. This made life easier for Loraine since influencing Atatürk would mean influencing Turkish foreign policy. Besides, Atatürk was not guided by clear-cut ideologies; he was rather a pragmatic leader who did not hesitate to forge partnerships with former enemies to stand against new ones. Loraine's success in building rapport with Atatürk has been argued to have inspired the British Diplomatic Service to file a report claiming that “the personality of an ambassador was of vital importance, especially in a country where power was concentrated at the top” (Berridge 2009, 158). Convincing Atatürk was not sufficient to create an impact on British-Turkish relations since Loraine was also required to persuade the British government about the necessity of building partnership with Turkey. The decision-making mechanism in Britain, unlike Turkey, was not concentrated in a single person but rather in the cabinet, where the foreign minister obviously influenced foreign matters. Loraine therefore aimed to draw the attention of British foreign ministers to Turkey. Fortunately for him, Loraine had a powerful ally in the FO making his voice heard in London, Sir Lancelot Oliphant, the senior assistant undersecretary of state. Oliphant was his cousin and the best man at his wedding. “Easily convinced of the ambassador's case, he took up the cudgels on his behalf with the Office of Works, which fell into line without too much difficulty” (Berridge 2009, 154). For instance, Loraine relayed the Turkish request, regarding warships to be built for their navy in British yards, directly to Oliphant, who then notified Loraine through a personal letter that the British Admiralty was “well disposed” to provide such a service (FO 1011/191, February 23, 1938). Finally, international context was rather favorable to Loraine. The rise of the Axis threat following the Great Depression forced both states to look for potential allies against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. This threatening international environment presented a window of opportunity for Loraine to constitute a medium of communication between Britain and Turkey for the establishment of a partnership against a common enemy. Loraine's success in befriending the old enemies has three main dimensions. As exemplified above, he not only shaped the decisions and actions of the British government toward Turkey, but he became influential in the decisions and actions of the Turkish government toward Britain as well. Having exerted influence in the policies of both governments, Loraine hence affected the outcome of cooperation in bilateral relations sealed with a joint declaration on 12 May 1939 to stand against a possible aggression in the Mediterranean. However, one could still question the extent of success in Loraine's efforts to forge a bilateral partnership since Turkey decided to remain neutral in the Second World War, resisting British pressures. It can even be argued that Turkey and Britain never took part in a formal alliance until Turkey joined NATO in 1952.6 Nevertheless, it is remarkable how bilateral relations shifted from hostility to partnership in a short period of time through the joint efforts of Ataturk and Loraine. Bilateral relations came a long way from Turkey's independence war (1919–1923), in which Britain and Turkey were sworn enemies. A strong economic partnership was formed, followed by the joint declaration of 12 May 1939. Then, an Anglo-French-Turkish treaty of mutual assistance was signed on 19 October 1939. As pointed out elsewhere, the primary objective of Turkish foreign policy in the 1930s was to ensure survival through partnerships with almost every major state, including the Soviets, Germany, France, and Britain, while avoiding alliances (Gülmez 2017). Turkey's “aversion from blocs” was even found reasonable by Alexander Cadogan, permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, who wrote to Loraine that he would have taken up a similar attitude himself if he were a Turk, due to “the general political situation” (FO 1011/191, November 18, 1938). Hence, it could be argued that Loraine's efforts were highly instrumental to form a partnership between Turkey and Britain, even though Turkey's foreign policy priorities prevented it from culminating into a formal alliance. Finally, the contemporary practice of diplomacy could be considered quite different from that of the 1930s, especially with advances in information technology, such as social media, offering new tools and troubles for diplomats. Therefore, one could question the applicability of a framework informed by the case of Loraine to contemporary diplomacy. Nevertheless, the causal mechanisms behind the role of diplomats in foreign policy have hardly changed. The necessity of differentiating between latitude and discretion is still valid in contemporary diplomacy. For instance, the controversial decision of John Huntsman, the US ambassador to China, to unofficially attend an anti-government demonstration in Beijing in February 2011 cost him his post, while his successor Gary Locke was praised for visiting his family's ancestral village of Jilong, in Southern China. Similarly, playing a mediator role to build trust between governments is also relevant in today's diplomacy. Accordingly, Locke played a mediating role in decreasing tension in Sino-American relations, both in the Wang Lijun crisis in February 2012 and regarding the escape of the activist Chen Guangcheng's to the US embassy in May 2012.7 Therefore, the article's framework that reveals the causal processes behind diplomats’ roles in foreign policy by relying on a historical example is also relevant for explaining the contemporary practice of diplomacy. Further research is required to better illuminate the role of diplomats in today's foreign policy. Overall, as the case of Sir Percy Loraine indicates, not only who rules but also who represents matters in foreign policy. Loraine stands out as a prominent figure managing the difficult relations between the Turks and the British on the verge of the Second World War. In line with Bull (1977)’s argument, Loraine's success primarily stemmed from his ability to identify the overlapping interests of Britain and Turkey—that is, standing against the rising Axis threat—and persuade both governments about the necessity of collaboration for the sustainable pursuit of these joint interests. Loraine acted as a “trust builder” between Turkey and Britain persuading both parties to send “costly signals” in order to each reassure the other of their willingness to cooperate against a common enemy. He was considered one of the few British diplomats who “maintained the dignity, toughness and realism for which the Foreign Service was formerly famous” (The Round Table 1963, 365). In the words of Sir George Clerk, who served as British ambassador to Turkey between 1926 and 1933, “Loraine combines most of the qualities which make a really successful diplomatist, none of which I have. . . . The friendship so happily established between Turkey and Britain was in very great measure due to Sir Percy's efforts” (Loraine 1943, 12). 1 I thank the anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 2 Loraine wrote to the FO that Atatürk “virtually said – let us wipe out all bitter memories since 1914 and start afresh as good, open, understanding friends”; see, Waterfield (1973, 208-209). 3 Similarly, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras often sought Loraine's advise on how to respond to the policies of the Soviet Union, Italy and Germany towards Turkey. 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Ibid., Session 2 , Volume 19, June 14. The Roundtable. 1963. “Appeasement Reconsidered: Some Neglected Factors.” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs  53 ( 212): 358– 71. CrossRef Search ADS   Thies Cameron G., Breuning Marijke. 2012. “Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations Through Role Theory.” Foreign Policy Analysis  8: 1– 4. Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS   Waterfield Gordon. 1973. Professional Diplomat: Sir Percy Loraine of Kirkharle Bt. 1880–1961 . London: Butler and Tanner. Watson Adam. 1982. Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States . London: Eyre Methuen. © The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Foreign Policy Analysis Oxford University Press

Do Diplomats Matter in Foreign Policy? Sir Percy Loraine and the Turkish-British Rapprochement in the 1930s

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Abstract

Abstract This article scrutinizes the role of diplomats in foreign policy by focusing on the case of Sir Percy Loraine, British ambassador to Turkey (1934–1939). Accordingly, the article first introduces an agent-centered framework claiming that the ability of diplomats to make their mark on foreign policy is contingent upon how they fare in overcoming two types of dilemmas on diplomatic duty: the mandate dilemma and the allegiance dilemma. The article then discusses how Loraine overcame these dilemmas with a particular focus on his mediating role in the establishment of bilateral economic and political partnership. Overall, the article argues that diplomats can make a difference in the conduct of foreign policy by influencing not only the host government but their own government as well, provided that they find a balance between following orders and using own discretion and between their loyalty to the government they represent and responsibility to the receiving government. This article seeks to answer the overriding question of whether diplomats can make a difference in the conduct of foreign policy acting within the limits of their own authority. The role of diplomacy in the application of foreign policy has long been a crucial point of reference in scholarly debates (Satow 1922; Nicholson 1954; Bull 1977; Watson 1982; Berridge 2015). Traditionally prescribed as an essential recipe for dealing with the outside world by peaceful means rather than with the use of force (Bull 1977, 156; Watson 1982, 2), diplomacy is considered by contemporary scholars as “the infrastructure of world politics,” enabling “representation and governing among recognized polities” (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2011, 530). Diplomatic studies is now considered by many as an emerging subfield of International Relations (IR) in need of theoretical development (Sharp 1999; 2009; Murray et al. 2011; Bjola 2013; Bjola and Kornprobst 2013; Holmes 2013; Rathbun 2014). For its part, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), as an established subfield of IR, has already proved to be a persistent approach to explain world politics through human agency (Hudson 2005; Thies and Breuning 2012). Reflecting an agent-centered reading of IR, FPA claims, “all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups” (Hudson 2005, 1). Therefore, who leads matters in foreign policy depending on whether a state is governed by a predominant leader such as Saddam Hussein of Iraq, a single group such as the Politburo of the Soviet Union, or a coalition of autonomous actors such as the coalition governments in Western democracies (Hermann 2001, 56–57; Hermann et al. 2001; Dyson 2006; Kaarbo and Beasley 2008). Not only leaders but also high-ranked bureaucrats, including ministers, national security advisers, joint chiefs of staff, and the director of national intelligence, play various roles in the foreign policy decision-making process (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 16–17). Besides, scientists can also play a role at some stages of foreign policy decision-making (Macdonald 2015). Yet the role of diplomats remains largely uncharted territory. This is partly due to the predominant scholarly tendency to treat diplomatic studies and FPA as two distinct fields of research (Bjola 2013), though foreign policy and diplomacy are not mutually exclusive. Diplomacy facilitates the conduct of foreign policy through representation and negotiation. Scholars of FPA rather consider diplomats remote from the government's decision-making process since diplomats “do not have the benefit of sitting in the meetings where the new policy has been worked out” (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 277). Scholars of diplomacy, on the other hand, often highlight the features of an “ideal diplomat” in the execution of diplomatic duties, but they rather neglect in their investigations the question of how influential these “ideal” diplomats are in the execution of foreign policy (Satow 1922; Nicholson 1954; 1964; Bull 1977; Sofer 1997; Roberts 2009). The article aims to remedy this gap and brings together the two allegedly separate fields of research, namely, FPA and diplomacy, underscoring the need to take the role of diplomats in FPA seriously. With this motivation, inspired by the FPA's agent-centered approach, it proposes a two-stage framework to explain diplomats’ influence on foreign policy. Accordingly, the article brings together two main dichotomies highlighted in the scholarly literature; namely, the dichotomy of “imperative mandate” vs. “free mandate” by Jönsson and Hall (2005) and the duality of “one-sided vs. mid-space” diplomacy by Constantinou (2013). It claims that the ability of diplomats to make their mark on foreign policy is contingent upon how they fare in overcoming two types of dilemma on diplomatic duty: the “mandate dilemma,” the tension between following orders and using their own discretion; and the “allegiance dilemma,” the difficulty of finding a balance between their loyalty to the government they represent and responsibility to the government they are accredited to. The article investigates the credibility of this framework relying on a historical case study based upon archival research conducted at the UK National Archives between July and September 2015. The records of official correspondence between the Foreign Office and British diplomats serving in foreign embassies are stored in the National Archives at Kew Gardens, London, and open to public access. Some documents are available in digital format and can be downloaded free of charge from the computers in the National Archives campus. The majority of the documents however are only available in hard copy, which researchers are permitted to read and photograph. For the purposes of this article, the records entitled “Loraine papers” and coded as “FO 1011,” comprising all official correspondences between the Foreign Office and Sir Percy Loraine (1916–1949), were investigated with a special focus on his term in Ankara (1934–1939). A total of one hundred documents, thirty of which were available in downloadable format, were copied, and slightly less than a third of the collected data most relevant to the research were used in the article. In order to check the validity of the arguments raised in the British texts, it is necessary to consult with Turkish sources as well. However, the archives of the Turkish Foreign Ministry are closed to public access. Instead, minutes of the Turkish Parliament's plenary sessions, memoirs of Turkish bureaucrats, and Turkish press have been scrutinized as supplementary sources to offer a viable account of the Turkish perspective. Accordingly, the article takes a closer look into the case of Sir Percy Loraine, British ambassador to Turkey (1934–1939), focusing on his efforts to revitalize Turkish-British relations on the eve of the Second World War. Loraine was assigned to Turkey when extremist political forces in Europe, such as Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, were on the rise. The devastating economic and political impact of the Great Depression diminished the credibility of diplomacy, while unilateral action and use of force became a norm rather than exception in world politics (Gülmez 2017). A common belief among politicians in the 1930s was that “foreign policy was too important to be left in the hands of professional diplomats” (Craig 1952, 145). Turkish-British relations were not at their zenith either. Sworn enemies during the First World War (1914–1918) and Turkey's War of Independence (1919–1923), there was an evident lack of trust between Britain and Turkey after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The disagreement over the legal status of Mosul in Northern Iraq increased tension between Britain and Turkey in the mid-1920s (Coşar and Demirci 2006). Moreover, Britain persistently opposed Turkey's admission to the League of Nations, delaying its membership until 1932 (Barlas and Yılmaz 2016, 7). Nevertheless, the simmering German and Italian threats over Europe forced both states to look for potential allies in the mid-1930s. Turkey sought to diminish its economic dependence on Germany and establish a resolute defensive bloc against Italian revisionism in the Mediterranean (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 26). Britain, on the other hand, was afraid of losing Turkey to the emerging Axis front, as this would not only shift the balance of power in the Middle East and the Balkans in favor of the Axis but also considerably jeopardize Britain's connection with the East (Gülmez 2017, 43–45). In such a troubling political context, Loraine was given a difficult task of repairing the Turkish-British relations damaged by the decades of war. The article is organized into four sections. The first section introduces a two-stage framework to explain the role of diplomats in foreign policy. Accordingly, the ability of diplomats to make an important effect on foreign policy depends largely on their ability to exert influence upon both their own government and the government they are assigned to. Such an influence requires diplomats to overcome both the mandate dilemma and the allegiance dilemma they experience on duty. The second and the third sections analyze how Loraine overcame these dilemmas with a particular focus on his mediating role in the realization of the British financial and military assistance to Turkey and the unofficial visit by the king of England to Istanbul. The paper concludes by explaining how Loraine's efforts were received in Ankara and London and how the framework informed by Loraine's case could be relevant for contemporary practice of diplomacy. Overall, focusing on Sir Percy Loraine's meticulous efforts to befriend the old enemies, the paper claims that diplomats’ agency matters in foreign policy and bilateral relations in particular, provided that they are able to find a balance between following orders and using own discretion and between their loyalty to the government they represent and responsibility to the government they are assigned to. Diplomats’ Role in Foreign Policy: Overcoming Dilemmas Through mediation and persuasion, diplomats can influence foreign policy in three main ways.1 First, they can affect the decisions and actions of their own government. Second, they can exert influence upon the decisions and actions taken by the target state. Finally, provided that they shape the decisions and actions of both governments, they can influence the outcomes of cooperation or conflict in bilateral relations. Having such a remarkable impact on the conduct of foreign policy requires diplomats to develop a certain capability to help minimize friction between their own state and the government they are accredited to by exerting influence upon both governments’ policies (Bull 1977, 165). In order to do this, they need to reconcile two types of dilemma they experience in their assigned posts, namely, the “mandate dilemma” and the “allegiance dilemma.” The “mandate dilemma” primarily revolves around the problem of whether diplomats’ actions should be based on official instructions or personal initiatives. The “allegiance dilemma,” on the other hand, poses the question of whether diplomats should only remain loyal to their own government or whether they also bear responsibility to the host governments. As legal representatives of states abroad, the overarching challenge for diplomats is whether they must only act under the instructions of their sovereigns (imperative mandate) or whether they should be able to use their own discretion as they see fit in the pursuit of the interests of the sovereign (free mandate) (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 101). The main problem here is that if diplomats merely rely on the instructions of the government without employing their own discretion, they are prone to be considered “as ‘mere’ agents, as subordinate substitutes for those who sent them” (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 101). Besides, adopting a purely passive attitude often results in missed opportunities in the execution of diplomatic duties abroad. Especially, during the time of slow communications, diplomats “so terrified” of exceeding their instructions, rather than using own initiative to resolve an issue or strike a deal, preferred to spend their time writing “brilliant reports on situations that had entirely altered by the time their despatches arrived” (Nicholson 1954, 82). Therefore, diplomats may sometimes resort to free mandate, for instance, giving an immediate response to a question asked by the host government without waiting for instructions from their sovereigns, out of concern that either the failure to respond would reveal an image that the capital has no valid policy regarding the issue, or they would miss an important opportunity (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 288–89). However, if diplomats only rely on their own discretion in the conduct of diplomatic duties to the point of defying the official instructions, then they run the risk of being rebuked, replaced, or even fired (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 102–3). The employment of full discretion sometimes reflects an impression that diplomats tend to pursue their own policy rather than that of their government, and they thus pay the price for it. For instance, Lord Stratford Canning, British ambassador to Constantinople (1842–1858), known as “Büyük Elçi” (Great Ambassador) by the Ottomans for his great influence over the Sultan, was held responsible for the outbreak of the Crimean War as he allegedly defied his orders and convinced the Sultan of the necessity of a war with Russians (Nicholson 1954, 81). He was relieved of his duties at the embassy and forced to retire. Similarly, Harold Stassen, US representative at the 1957 London Arms Control Negotiations, ignored his instructions and advanced a proposal to the Russians without consulting the French and the British representatives, out of the belief that he could easily strike a deal with the Russian delegates (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 284). Stassen was removed from his post because of the incident. Jönsson and Hall (2005, 108) argue that the ideal position for diplomats is somewhere in between since they neither prefer being “merely mouthpieces, nor do they desire total latitude and responsibility.” Therefore, diplomats need to remedy this dilemma by not only executing governmental instructions but also using their own discretion when opportunity materializes. With this motivation, first, it must be established that diplomats should “always carry out the instructions that [they receive] from [their] sovereign,” except for unjust acts such as instigating an assassination (Nicholson 1954, 68). They should also be willing to play a role in the development of bilateral relations, taking personal initiatives in the execution of the pre-determined duties, namely, information-gathering, communication, representation, and negotiation. For instance, they can organize formal or informal meetings between statesmen to bring two governments to a negotiation table and facilitate the signature of economic and political partnership agreements. They hence strengthen intergovernmental communication and stimulate negotiation. Moreover, they can frequently attend social meetings with foreign leaders and often pay unofficial visits to the top officials of the host government in order to inform them of official policy lines, extract information or comments from them, and convince them of the necessity of a collaboration between the governments. Such maneuvers will not only increase their visibility at foreign courts as representatives of their governments but also facilitate information-gathering and create new opportunities for conducting negotiations and reaching agreement on bilateral matters. Face-to-face diplomacy is highlighted by Holmes (2013, 833) as a crucial method of gaining “experiential belief about the intentions of others.” According to Holmes (2013, 856), face-to-face interactions provide a “mechanism by which individuals can understand each other's intentions from the inside.” Therefore, diplomats’ face-to-face interactions with government officials in foreign courts carry utmost importance for gathering the right information and pursuing the right policy. Remedying the mandate dilemma, however, requires diplomats to know when to use discretion to take which distinctive action for a desired outcome. At this point, the question is whether the personality of a diplomat matters in taking the right initiative. Greenstein (1987) argues that personality matters in politics provided that two primary conditions are met, namely action indispensability and actor indispensability. The former attaches value to the distinctive actions of individuals without which political outcomes would turn out to be very different, while the latter stresses the distinctive beliefs or goals of individuals which lead them to take different courses of action than their counterparts to reach a desired outcome (Greenstein 1987, 41–42). The agency of diplomats, hence, becomes a crucial determinant for shaping foreign policy outcomes, provided that their distinctive personality helps them to take a distinctive action. Having remedied the mandate dilemma, diplomats then should overcome the allegiance dilemma by drawing a balance between their commitment to their own government and their responsibility to the host government. Constantinou (2013, 145) argues that the practice of diplomacy is largely affected by how diplomats position themselves regarding the relations between their own governments and the governments they are assigned to. They either conceive of themselves as “on the side” or “in the middle.” Accordingly, in “one-sided” diplomacy, practitioners primarily promote the interests of their own government and advocate the internally formulated positions. Regarding “mid-space” diplomacy, diplomats rather assume the role of a mediator, bringing two sides together to find an equitable solution to a bilateral problem. Diplomats therefore engage both sides in a “reasoned dialogue” in which state representatives try to persuade each other through an exchange of concessions and moderation of demands to arrive at an outcome of mutual benefit (Rathbun 2014, 4–5). The role of a mediator is generally reserved for a third party that is not directly involved in the dispute since he or she is expected to act impartially to find an equitable solution (Berridge 2015, 252). Nevertheless, diplomats may, at times, assume such a role to oversee an agreement between their own government and the government they are assigned to. Constantinou (2013, 146) argues that the conceptual location of diplomats cannot always remain fixed and static for “the same diplomats may at various times move across both terrains—consciously or unconsciously—in the course of diplomatic activity.” He claims that “[i]n fully discharging one's diplomatic functions, it is never enough for the diplomat to just represent one's side. One must learn to represent—mentally and privately—the other side as well, not merely to sympathize but to empathize” (Constantinou 2013, 155). Cooperation in international relations requires a certain degree of mutual trust, that is, “belief that cooperation will be reciprocated” (Rathbun 2012, 2). However, the persistence of uncertainty within states about each other's motivations forces them not to trust each other (Kydd 2005: 18). To address this problem, they can work on building trust between each other through “costly signaling,” that is, taking “unilaterally conciliatory actions” to prove that they are trustworthy (Osgood 1959, 316; Larson 1997, 5; Kydd 2005, 5). Such unilateral gestures without asking any immediate favor in return will help overcome mistrust, since “images of other states as hostile or untrustworthy tend to lag behind changes in their behavior” (Larson 1997, 5). As a mediator, diplomats can assume the role of a “trust builder,” establishing communication between parties to reduce uncertainty and mistrust. They can work towards persuading both parties to send “costly signals” to each other in order to reassure their willingness to cooperate or fight against a common enemy. Such actions will reduce the uncertainty behind the motivations of the states towards each other and increase their willingness to cooperate (Kydd 2005, 186). A diplomat's mediating role is also in resonance with Putnam's (1988) two-level game perspective of international negotiations. Putnam (1988, 460) emphasizes the existence of simultaneous negotiations at both domestic and international levels in which “decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously.” Here, the chief negotiator, a diplomat in our example, is considered more than merely an honest broker working simply on behalf of his/her constituents since he or she is compelled to find a middle ground between domestic and international demands to reach a mutually acceptable outcome (Putnam 1988, 456–58). According to Nicholson (1963, 122–23), the mediating role of diplomats is rather inescapable since they owe loyalty not only to the government they represent but also to the government to which they are accredited; however, this might lead to the syndrome of localitis or going native. Defined as “[t]he adoption by diplomats of the point of view of the government of the receiving state” (Berridge and Lloyd 2012), localitis is “an occupational hazard” experienced by diplomats who spend too much time in the same part of the world (Berridge 2015, 117). In the best-case scenario, the diplomat “loses touch with sentiments at home”; in the worst-case scenario, he or she acts as a “mouthpiece” for the receiving state rather than his or her own government (Berridge 2015, 117). Overall, the allegiance dilemma indicates that the more a diplomat reflects an image of a one-sided diplomat, the more disenfranchised she or he is likely to become from the outside world, gaining an image of a mere envoy of the sovereign with no capability to influence foreign policy. On the other hand, the more a diplomat reflects the image of a mid-space diplomat, the more she or he will run the risk of being accused of localitis, to the point of betraying her or his own government. Diplomats hence need to reconcile their position as the representative of their own government (one-sided diplomat) and their role as a mediator (mid-space diplomat) in order to exert influence both at home and abroad without being labeled either as impotent or traitor. Bull (1977, 164) prescribes a solution to this dilemma, highlighting the critical role of diplomats “to determine the overlapping interests of two governments, and through reason and persuasion, to bring the parties to an awareness of it.” Therefore, diplomats should work towards convincing their own governments, as well as their host governments, about the necessity of developing a bilateral partnership based on common goals and/or against a common enemy. This via media positioning of diplomats moving across the spectrum of one-sided and mid-space diplomacy can increase their capability to affect the conduct of foreign policy. The article, on the other hand, acknowledges that remedying these dilemmas does not automatically enable diplomats to exert influence on foreign policy since there might also be other determining factors such as the size of the foreign policy decision-making unit, leadership style, and international context. Size matters because it would be easier for diplomats to influence a predominant leader, a single person, than an entire cabinet in charge of foreign policy, and it would be even harder to have an impact on a coalition government with diverging agendas (Hermann 2001). Leadership style matters, too, because, for instance, actions of ideologically driven leaders are primarily based on their “beliefs, attitudes, motives and passions,” which make them less likely to change their decisions (Hermann et al. 2001, 86). On the other hand, it would be relatively easier to influence pragmatic leaders who are rather “flexible and open-minded” (Hermann et al. 2001, 87). Finally, international context matters, as well, because peacetime diplomatic maneuvers are not necessarily applicable on account of the uncertainty and friction of war (McMillan 1992). Admitting their merit, this article nevertheless argues that before taking these factors into account, it is first necessary to establish what diplomats can do to influence foreign policy and how they can do it. The case of Sir Percy Loraine hence stands as a crucial indicator of what diplomats can do to improve bilateral relations in a deteriorating international context and how they can do it. Overcoming the Mandate Dilemma: Loraine's Influences on Turkey Sir Percy Lyham Loraine of Kirkharle, graduate of Eton College (1893–1899) and New College, Oxford (1899–1901), served in the British Diplomatic Service in various roles across Europe and the Middle East including Paris, Rome, Madrid, Warsaw, Budapest, Athens, Tehran, and Cairo before he was sent to Ankara. When assigned to Turkey in December 1933, Loraine was reluctant to leave his post in Egypt. He considered this appointment as a demotion from the post of a “high commissioner in Egypt (where he had been treated almost like royalty),” to a post in “the wilds of Anatolia” (Berridge 2009, 153). His only consolation was that he was appointed to Turkey as an ambassador for the first time in his career (FO 1011/172, 1933–1934). Shortly after his assignment, he experienced the mandate dilemma. The FO criticized Loraine for employing too much detail in his letters to London. He was asked not to send too long reports and to prioritize the issues to write about (FO 1011/174, April 19, 1934, 1–2). Hence, from day one, Loraine was compelled to step away from imperative mandate and resort to free mandate in his correspondence with the FO. He then realized the lack of Turkish trust towards Britain and emphasized in his letters the necessity of winning the hearts of Turks. For instance, he stressed the fact that Britain and France were the only great powers who were not invited to the celebrations of the eleventh anniversary of the Turkish Republic and urged the FO to remedy this problem by raising the British profile in Turkey (FO 1011/174, November 3, 1934, 1). The first opportunity for Loraine to use free mandate came on June 17, 1934, when a banquet was given in Ankara in honor of the Shah of Persia. Loraine found an opportunity to play poker with Atatürk, the Turkish president, until next morning, and this enabled Loraine to establish the first positive contact with the Turkish leader, which British diplomats had been failing to do for years.2 The long poker nights that Loraine spent with Atatürk thereafter proved exceptionally instrumental for Loraine in gaining Atatürk's trust (Berridge 2009, 158). Remedying the mandate dilemma by establishing personal connections with Atatürk and other Turkish statesmen, Loraine quickly became a prominent figure in Turkish political circles. Over the years, he felt confident about his influence on Atatürk. He reported that Atatürk, “for an arch-nationalist, ha[d] become an out-and-out Anglophil” (FO 1011/186, December 15, 1937, 3). Loraine without doubt had an impact on Atatürk since the Turkish leader often consulted with Loraine regarding Turkey's matters with other countries.3 For instance, Loraine was the only foreign diplomat who was given the privilege to sit with Atatürk and discuss foreign policy matters between 11 p.m. and 10 a.m. during a reception on October 29, 1937, to celebrate the fourteenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic (Özdemir 2004, 23). He informed the FO that Atatürk deliberately placed Loraine on his left, constantly referring to him for his personal opinion on various subjects and emphasized how high the level of Turkish-British relations had reached in a short period of time (Sonyel 1989, 177–78). Loraine also reported that Atatürk, furious with France over the dispute of Alexandretta, agreed to see the French diplomats only after Loraine's insistence. “[D]uring the all-night maneuvers on October 29th it was only on my insistence, when he consulted me, that Atatürk invited the French Ambassador to his circle at all,” he wrote (FO 1011/186, December 15, 1937, 4). Britain had not even been invited to the celebrations of the anniversary of the Turkish Republic in 1934; three years later, Loraine managed to become the most popular foreign diplomat during the 1937 celebrations. Loraine considered his assignment to Ankara as a watershed in the development of bilateral relations. He frequently hinted in his official telegrams that partnership between Britain and Turkey particularly started with his term. For instance, in his telegram to Anthony Eden, the British secretary of state, Loraine mentioned a story where a friend told Atatürk; “‘I notice you are drawing a good deal closer to England.’ Atatürk replied, ‘Drawing closer? I have thrown myself into the arms of England’” (FO 954/28A/57, May 8, 1936). Unsure of the authenticity of the story, Loraine told Eden that the story nevertheless correctly reflected the true state of the bilateral relations at the time (FO 954/28A/57, May 8, 1936). Loraine claimed that in Turkey there was “a marked wave of friendliness and confidence towards England,” which began in 1934, after Loraine was assigned to the post, and further developed in 1936, and since then, “relations with England bec[a]me the keystone of the arch of the Turkish foreign policy” (FO 954/28A/57, May 8, 1936; Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 25–26). In the fourth year of his assignment to Ankara, Loraine became certain that Turks had no doubts about Britain's partnership (FO 954/28A/102, February 17, 1938, 2). Loraine was even convinced that Turkey would fight on Britain's side in the case of a war. He assured Eden in his telegram; “in the view of the development that had occurred in Anglo-Turkish relations since my arrival here, there was one real, substantial thing. . . . if, which God forbid, there was to be another war, Turkey would fight on the side of England. . . . That was the rock-bottom for Turkey” (FO 954/28A/89, February 24, 1937). In another correspondence, Loraine told Eden that the Turkish government officially revealed in a cabinet meeting its preference to fight on Britain's side, and this, according to Loraine, represented a decisive moment “in the policy of rapprochement with the United Kingdom that the Turkish Government have been pursuing” since 1934 (FO 954/28A/91, February 28, 1937, 2–3). Overcoming the Allegiance Dilemma: Loraine's Influences on Britain During his time in Ankara, Loraine proved successful in mending the shattered image of Britain in the eyes of the Turks by establishing close dialogue with Turkish leaders and gaining their trust. However, this did not happen overnight. In fact, the Turkish attitude toward the British remained cautious even after the assignment of Loraine to Ankara. Turkey decided to develop bilateral relations with Britain only after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Turks felt increasingly threatened by Italy's relentless revisionism. Atatürk was convinced that Mussolini of Italy aimed to reconstitute the former Roman Empire and that the Ethiopian adventure was the first stage in the process (FO 954/28A/49, April 12, 1936, 4). He told Loraine that the international society had allowed Italy to get away with one successful aggression, but “it would be fatal to all hopes of peace and security if she were allowed to get away with a second one” (FO 954/28A/49, April 12, 1936, 6). Feridun Cemal Erkin (1980: 83), a Turkish diplomat present in the meeting as the interpreter of Ataturk, confirms in his memoir Ataturk's request for developing bilateral partnership against the rising Italian threat, through a treaty of partnership, if necessary. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the changing international context provided an enabling environment for Loraine's diplomatic efforts. It would also be misleading to assume that the realization of bilateral partnership was a unidirectional process in which Loraine simply acted as a one-sided diplomat and persuaded the Turks with his charisma to develop partnership with Britain without giving anything in return. In fact, Loraine was forced to move across the spectrum of one-sided and mid-space diplomacy because, in order to maintain a sustainable influence over the Turks, he had to exert influence over the British government as well. His task was to bring both sides to the awareness that bilateral partnership was never more crucial against the rising Axis threat. Economic Partnership and Financial Assistance Britain proved to be an essential economic partner for Turkey from the mid-1930s onward as Turkish decision-makers were looking for alternative ways to diminish economic dependence on Germany. In this respect, Loraine's initiatives to develop a bilateral economic partnership became a success, particularly in bringing British industry to Turkey, with a considerable number of orders obtained from the Turkish government (Mackie 1939, 449). For instance, Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, a British construction company, was hired as a technical advisor to the Turkish government and given several construction contracts in Turkey thanks to the critical role Loraine played “in securing the successful outcome of . . . negotiations” between the company and the Turkish government (FO 1011/186, January 21, 1937, 1–2). Moreover, he liaised between the two countries when Turkey announced its willingness to purchase twenty-four Blenheim Bombers from Britain (FO 1011/186, April 20, 1937). Loraine was the architect of a £3 million contract between Turkey and Brassert, a British construction company, regarding the construction of the first steel factory in Turkey, despite the fact that Krupp, the German company, had offered a better deal (Waterfield 1973, 210–211). His agency in the realization of the deal was remarkable since he personally attended the opening ceremony of the factory in Karabük together with Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. His participation in the opening ceremony was highlighted in a Turkish daily, Cumhuriyet, as evidence of a strong friendship between Turkey and Britain (Daver 1937, 1). It was deemed unprecedented in the history of the Republic that a foreign ambassador, “particularly a British one,” traveled with Turkey's prime minister and participated in several programs in Anatolia, including Karabük, Kayseri, and Konya (Daver 1937, 1). It was even argued that in Karabük, not only the foundation of an iron and steel plant was laid but also the foundations of Turkish-British friendship (Daver 1937, 1). İnönü, in his speech at the ceremony, claimed that the plant symbolized the burgeoning friendship between two countries and announced Loraine as one of its chief architects (Akşam, April 4, 1937, 7). İnönü further stated; “We, the Turks, consider the policy of showing sympathy to our country with concrete evidence as the most trustworthy policy” and highlighted the Karabük factory as such a concrete evidence of Britain's trustworthiness (Akşam, April 4, 1937, 7). İnönü, hence, confirmed that Turkey considered British efforts in Karabük as a “costly signaling” to build trust in bilateral relations. Karabük could even be considered as an example of “costly signaling” on the side of Turkey as well. Fuad Ağralı, the Turkish minister of finance, confirmed it by stressing that the British firm was granted the opportunity to construct the iron and steel plant even though more favorable terms were offered by other companies because Turkey was willing to establish a strong and long-lasting partnership with Britain (TGNA 1937a, 177). As the case of the Karabük plant would suggest, Loraine could be argued to have played a crucial role as a “trust builder,” personally involved in a process where both governments sent “costly signals” to each other for a promising partnership. Loraine also mediated the negotiations between the two governments regarding the fortification of the Straits. Krupp again had offered a better deal, but after the intervention of Atatürk himself, Turkey sent the Krupp sketch plans to Britain for tender by British firms (Millman 1998, 136). After the British Vickers limited was assigned with the task of manufacturing the guns, Loraine practically acted as a mid-space diplomat forcing his own government to keep their end of the bargain with the Turks. He directly wrote to Oliphant and strongly protested the British Admiralty's order to manufacture 13.5-inch guns for the defense of the Straits instead of 15-inch guns used in the British Royal Navy (FO 1011/191, June 22, 1938). Not only the 13.5-inch guns were outranged by the 15-inch guns, but their shells were inferior as well (FO 1011/191, August 12, 1938, 2). Loraine hence accused the Admiralty of “get[ting] rid of unwanted material” (FO 1011/191, August 12, 1938, 1). The Admiralty gave in to his pressure and agreed to send a number of 15 inch guns in addition to the 13.5 inch ones (FO 1011/191, August 12, 1938, 1). Economic partnership was not the only objective of Loraine, as he also aimed for a strong political partnership with Turkey closely knit through British economic and military assistance. His letters convinced both Foreign Ministers Eden and Halifax after him of the necessity for assisting Turkey financially against a possible German threat. With the aim of tackling the bureaucratic difficulties behind the construction of the steel factory in Turkey and the purchase of British aircrafts, Loraine wrote to Eden hoping to receive his blessing. Emphasizing the fact that Turkey relied in its foreign policy more on Britain than on Russia or France, Loraine argued that Britain had the responsibility to make sure that Turkey would not fall into the orbit of Germany (FO 954/28A/57, May 8, 1936, 2). Loraine claimed that Turkey had provided valuable support to British foreign policy since the breakout of the Ethiopian conflict in 1935, but Britain had failed to return the favor, which might prove costly to British foreign policy: Unfortunately we have not been able to do much to help them in matters that are of immediate interest to them: notably the order for aircraft, and the contract with Brassert's for erecting an iron and steel plant in this country . . . The fact is that in no particular respect yet have we been able to help them, even though on some points many of our own interests should impel us to be helpful. I am therefore a little anxious lest the Turks should one day begin to think that this new Anglo-Turkish friendship is rather a one-sided affair. . . . I do feel rather strongly that we ought to make a bigger effort than we have hitherto put forth to sweeten that friendship on our side and to clinch it (FO 954/28A/57, May 8, 1936, 4). In his reply to Loraine, Eden acknowledged the importance of Turkey to Britain and promised to do all he could to meet her difficulties (FO 954/28A/62, May 18, 1936). The British government soon decided to assist Turkey in the purchase of British aircraft, and this later gave Britain access to top secret information about the inventory of the Turkish air force. Based on the specific orders of Atatürk, Turkish general staff had remained “exceptionally secretive” in its relations with foreign representatives, refusing to provide military attachés any information on the Turkish army and denying their attendance to Turkish military maneuvers (Berridge 2009, 161). Only after Turkey decided to develop its air force with British funds and expertise, did Turkey made an exception for the British. On December 1937, a British air attaché became the first foreign personnel allowed to see “everything” in the Turkish air force, provided that he would not share this information with the attachés of other countries (Berridge 2009, 162). On another occasion, Loraine wrote to the FO regarding the Turkish demand for the construction of two battleships with British assistance. The British government was reluctant to assist Turkey on this occasion due to Turkey's financial difficulty in covering the expenses. Loraine argued that Britain should consider the Turkish demand more than a mere economic transaction but as an ally's call for help against potential security threats that would eventually compromise British security as well: It would seem dismally unfortunate if the financial difficulty stops their order (i.e., the Turkish warship order) being placed. Are we really debarred from using our tremendous money resources, one patent and tangible superiority that we possess over our European rivals, for helping our friends, for creating employment at home, for building up in this instance a friendly navy in a region which represents for us a particularly high degree of political and strategic importance for aiding Turkey to reach a military strength which virtually renders her immune from aggression, and strengthens her influence in the direction of peace and lawful behaviour throughout the Balkan Peninsula and eastward to Iran and Afghanistan? . . . There is so much to gain by letting the Turks have British ships; there is so little to lose . . . [T]he security of our friends contributes to our own security… (FO 1011/191, February 23, 1938, 3–4). Loraine's telegram created a remarkable impact on Viscount Halifax, the British foreign minister, who not only approved the construction of the ships but also supported a British loan of £16 million to be granted to Turkey. Highlighting in his memorandum, “in particular I endorse unhesitantly the words of our ambassador in Angora,” Halifax expressed the concern that Turkey would fall within the German orbit, which would result in the spread of German influence throughout the Middle East, unless Britain did something to prevent it (CAB 24/276/39, May 7, 1938, 2). “It is therefore scarcely too much to say that Turkey has become not the main, but the only, obstacle to the Drang nach Osten,4” Halifax concluded (CAB 24/276/39, May 7, 1938, 2). The King's Visit The visit of King Edward VIII to Istanbul in September 4–6, 1936, was the most popular event of the decade in Turkish-British relations. The visit could be considered a clear example of Loraine's role in the establishment of a bilateral partnership. Loraine overcame both the mandate and the allegiance dilemmas in order to make this visit possible. The king's visit was not a preplanned activity; it was the idea of Loraine himself (free mandate), and Loraine put his own initiative into action by receiving the official approval of the FO (imperative mandate). Loraine then mediated between the king and the Turkish president in order to meet their demands about the details of the visit. He first persuaded the king about the necessity of such a visit to revitalize the bilateral partnership. The king, however, refused to pay an official visit as he was actually on holiday in the Mediterranean with his yacht Nahlin and told Loraine that he had “no clothes even for anything like ceremonial occasions, not even a grey tail coat” (FO1011/185, 1936, 1). Loraine assured the king that there would be no need for ceremonial clothing as Atatürk would welcome him “at the water steps of the Dolma Bagce Palace” (FO1011/185, 1936, 1). Loraine then had to convince Atatürk that the king's visit would be unofficial, and he would come to Istanbul instead of Ankara, the capital city. The king first visited the Dardanelles and then stayed in Istanbul between September 4–6, 1936.5 Loraine praised the visit as a great success sealing the deal for a new era in the bilateral relations (Waterfield 1973, 214). In response, Turkey dispatched its fleet for the first time to a foreign port, Malta, as a symbolic gesture of Turkey's “new policy of openness toward Britain” (Barlas and Yılmaz 2016, 9). The king's visit held a particular meaning to Turkey since he was not only the first English king to ever visit Turkey but also the first European king to come to Turkey after Wilhelm II, the German emperor who had visited Istanbul in 1898 (Özdemir 2004, 69). According to Gönlübol and Sar (2013, 137), the king's visit was highly instrumental in shifting the Turkish perceptions of Britain, as it encouraged Turkish statesmen to abandon their traditional anti-British sentiments. Therefore, confirming Larson (1997), the king's visit played a particular role in mitigating Turkish mistrust towards Britain. Özdemir (2004, 70) argues that the visit not only highlighted the revitalization of the British-Turkish partnership but also helped Turkey to come closer to the emerging anti-German bloc in Europe. Mango (2002, 505), on the other hand, claims that the king's visit became “an important ingredient of the Atatürk legend: the British monarch had come in person to bury the hatchet, disown the legacy of Gladstone and Lloyd George, and pay homage to the new Turkey.” The visit was praised by Turkish statesmen as a crucial determinant for the development of a bilateral partnership. Ataturk, in his address to the parliament, emphasized that the king's visit led to a “special friendship” between himself and the king, which would “without doubt help further develop the already close bilateral relations” (TGNA 1936b, 6). Moreover, the Turkish foreign minister, Aras, sent a personal letter to Loraine thanking him for his sincere role in the preparation and success of such a high-level visit that would no doubt improve bilateral relations (FO1011/185, September 19, 1936). Following the visit, Turkey was represented at the coronation ceremony of the King George VI by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, who, upon his return, expressed that he had witnessed the sincere friendship of the British people in London, which proved that Britain and Turkey had become true friends (TGNA 1937b, 312). The visit also changed certain practices in official correspondence between Turkey and Britain. For instance, shortly after his assignment to Ankara, Loraine asked whether it was possible for the king of England to send an annual message to Atatürk celebrating his birthday (FO 1011/174, November 3, 1934, 3). His request was rejected outright since reciprocal messages on behalf of the king were never sent (FO 1011/174, November 29, 1934, 1). It was also stated that regular annual messages were generally regarded as “an empty formality of a routine nature” that would not hold any effect on a realist like Atatürk (FO 1011/174, November 29, 1934, 2). However, after the king's visit, the FO decided to send annual messages to Atatürk, and the practice continued even after Atatürk's death (FO 1011/191, November 17, 1938). Finally, the visit of King Edward VIII to Istanbul softened the attitude of the British press towards the newly established Turkish Republic. For instance, The Times daily had been adamant in continuing to use the name “Constantinople” even five years after the city's name had been officially changed to Istanbul (Özdemir 2004, 273). The daily abandoned its long-standing tradition and decided to use the name “Istanbul” shortly after the king of England visited the city (Özdemir 2004, 273). Conclusion Overall, this article aims to contribute to the FPA literature by introducing a viable framework to explain how and under which conditions the agency of diplomats affects the conduct of foreign policy, relying on the case of Sir Percy Loraine in the 1930s. It hence establishes communication between FPA and diplomatic studies by validating an FPA-inspired framework through the evidence of a historical case study Accordingly, the agency of diplomats matters, especially in the management of bilateral relations since diplomats can exert influence on both the host government and their own government. To do this, they need to overcome both the mandate and the allegiance dilemmas. The story of Sir Percy Loraine as British ambassador to Turkey presents a crucial test-case for the applicability of this argument. Loraine proved successful in his efforts to revitalize the Turkish-British partnership since he managed to overcome both dilemmas. He remedied the mandate dilemma by often generating original ideas to consolidate the bilateral partnership while remaining loyal to official practices. For instance, Loraine was the mastermind behind the king's visit to Istanbul. It was his very idea to organize such a high-level visit to Turkey; yet he also sought an official endorsement. Similarly, he suggested an annual message to Atatürk celebrating his birthday to be sent by the king of England, which was put into practice after the king's visit to Istanbul. However, overcoming the mandate dilemma was not adequate for Loraine to make a remarkable impact upon the bilateral relations. He also had to play a mediating role between the two governments and tried to make both parties realize that it was essential to forge a bilateral partnership. For instance, Loraine wrote to British Foreign Ministers Eden and Halifax regarding the necessity of providing financial and military assistance to Turkey in order to guarantee its support against the Axis front. His efforts paid off since the British government agreed to grant a British loan of £16 million to Turkey and consented to the construction of warships and airplanes for Turkish military. Loraine also exerted influence over the Turkish government that, for instance, enabled British industry to flourish in Turkey and let Britain have access to the inventory of the Turkish air force. Loraine could hence be argued to have overcome the allegiance dilemma by moving across the terrains of one-sided and mid-space diplomacy in his diplomatic activities in Ankara. While advocating the British interests in Turkey, Loraine also sometimes acted as a mid-space diplomat to bring both parties to the negotiating table. Loraine's efforts were highly appreciated in Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Aras emphasized, in his address to the parliament, that friendship was blossoming between Turkey and Britain based on mutual trust thanks to the efforts of Loraine and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden (TGNA 1936a, 331). Besides, Loraine was very popular in the Turkish press. As early as April 1936, he was praised as the architect of a “splendid” friendship between Turkey and Britain thanks to his “sincerity and kindness” (Cumhuriyet, April 27, 1936, 1). Another commentary depicted Loraine as the most successful British diplomat who ever served in Turkey but claimed that it was Ataturk's genius that provided Loraine with the opportunity to shine (Cumhuriyet, January 6, 1938, 5). It was further argued that a previous, similar success in their bilateral relations had only been achieved through the efforts of Stratford Canning, the British ambassador to Constantinople (1842–1858) (Cumhuriyet, January 6, 1938, 5). Even after assigned to Rome, Loraine's diplomatic efforts to keep Italy out of the Second World War were widely discussed in the Turkish press (Cumhuriyet, March 10, 1940, 5). The role Loraine played in the development of relations with Turkey was appreciated in London as well. In a telegram, the FO acknowledged the “great influence” Loraine had in the Turkish government, which rendered his presence in Turkey indispensable for Britain (FO 1011/186, September 27, 1937). In another telegram, it was stated that Loraine's “cordial relations” with the Turkish authorities enabled Britain to “do as much in the way of cultural propaganda as the Turks [we]re prepared to allow,” and this would give Britain an advantage over its competitors (FO 1011/194, March 9, 1938). Confirming Greenstein (1987), Loraine's distinctive personality enabled him to take distinctive actions to reach a desired outcome in bilateral relations. Especially, Loraine's two significant letters to the FO constituted a game changer in the British approach to Turkey, resulting in increased bilateral economic and political partnership. Moreover, organizing the king's visit to Istanbul was another distinctive action that hada remarkable impact on bilateral relations. Therefore, Loraine's personality played a crucial role in stimulating cooperation in bilateral relations, fulfilling both of Greenstein's criteria: action and actor indispensability. Loraine's critical role in the development of bilateral relations is also reflective of Putnam's two-level game approach, in which the negotiator should maneuver between domestic and foreign bodies to reach a mutual agreement. Loraine maneuvered between Turkish and British governments to cooperate against a common enemy although the threat perceptions of the two governments were quite different. While Turkey considered Italy an immediate threat, Britain viewed Germany as the real danger. Loraine, in his two famous letters to the FO, sold the Turkish story to his government by highlighting Germany as a common threat while acknowledging the Turkish concerns about the Italian threat during his discussions with the Turks. As pointed out before, overcoming the dilemmas of diplomatic duty does not automatically guarantee success to diplomats in their efforts to influence foreign policy. One should also consider other factors that may either facilitate or hinder diplomats’ contributions to foreign policy, such as the size of the decision-making unit, leadership style, and international context. Regarding the case of Percy Loraine, these factors provided rather an enabling environment for Loraine's diplomatic efforts. The Turkish president, Atatürk, fit well into the category of a predominant leader having “the authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed” (Hermann 2001, 48). Although Turkey was governed by a single-party regime with a cabinet of ministers and a prime minister, Atatürk still had a strong influence over governmental policies. This made life easier for Loraine since influencing Atatürk would mean influencing Turkish foreign policy. Besides, Atatürk was not guided by clear-cut ideologies; he was rather a pragmatic leader who did not hesitate to forge partnerships with former enemies to stand against new ones. Loraine's success in building rapport with Atatürk has been argued to have inspired the British Diplomatic Service to file a report claiming that “the personality of an ambassador was of vital importance, especially in a country where power was concentrated at the top” (Berridge 2009, 158). Convincing Atatürk was not sufficient to create an impact on British-Turkish relations since Loraine was also required to persuade the British government about the necessity of building partnership with Turkey. The decision-making mechanism in Britain, unlike Turkey, was not concentrated in a single person but rather in the cabinet, where the foreign minister obviously influenced foreign matters. Loraine therefore aimed to draw the attention of British foreign ministers to Turkey. Fortunately for him, Loraine had a powerful ally in the FO making his voice heard in London, Sir Lancelot Oliphant, the senior assistant undersecretary of state. Oliphant was his cousin and the best man at his wedding. “Easily convinced of the ambassador's case, he took up the cudgels on his behalf with the Office of Works, which fell into line without too much difficulty” (Berridge 2009, 154). For instance, Loraine relayed the Turkish request, regarding warships to be built for their navy in British yards, directly to Oliphant, who then notified Loraine through a personal letter that the British Admiralty was “well disposed” to provide such a service (FO 1011/191, February 23, 1938). Finally, international context was rather favorable to Loraine. The rise of the Axis threat following the Great Depression forced both states to look for potential allies against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. This threatening international environment presented a window of opportunity for Loraine to constitute a medium of communication between Britain and Turkey for the establishment of a partnership against a common enemy. Loraine's success in befriending the old enemies has three main dimensions. As exemplified above, he not only shaped the decisions and actions of the British government toward Turkey, but he became influential in the decisions and actions of the Turkish government toward Britain as well. Having exerted influence in the policies of both governments, Loraine hence affected the outcome of cooperation in bilateral relations sealed with a joint declaration on 12 May 1939 to stand against a possible aggression in the Mediterranean. However, one could still question the extent of success in Loraine's efforts to forge a bilateral partnership since Turkey decided to remain neutral in the Second World War, resisting British pressures. It can even be argued that Turkey and Britain never took part in a formal alliance until Turkey joined NATO in 1952.6 Nevertheless, it is remarkable how bilateral relations shifted from hostility to partnership in a short period of time through the joint efforts of Ataturk and Loraine. Bilateral relations came a long way from Turkey's independence war (1919–1923), in which Britain and Turkey were sworn enemies. A strong economic partnership was formed, followed by the joint declaration of 12 May 1939. Then, an Anglo-French-Turkish treaty of mutual assistance was signed on 19 October 1939. As pointed out elsewhere, the primary objective of Turkish foreign policy in the 1930s was to ensure survival through partnerships with almost every major state, including the Soviets, Germany, France, and Britain, while avoiding alliances (Gülmez 2017). Turkey's “aversion from blocs” was even found reasonable by Alexander Cadogan, permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, who wrote to Loraine that he would have taken up a similar attitude himself if he were a Turk, due to “the general political situation” (FO 1011/191, November 18, 1938). Hence, it could be argued that Loraine's efforts were highly instrumental to form a partnership between Turkey and Britain, even though Turkey's foreign policy priorities prevented it from culminating into a formal alliance. Finally, the contemporary practice of diplomacy could be considered quite different from that of the 1930s, especially with advances in information technology, such as social media, offering new tools and troubles for diplomats. Therefore, one could question the applicability of a framework informed by the case of Loraine to contemporary diplomacy. Nevertheless, the causal mechanisms behind the role of diplomats in foreign policy have hardly changed. The necessity of differentiating between latitude and discretion is still valid in contemporary diplomacy. For instance, the controversial decision of John Huntsman, the US ambassador to China, to unofficially attend an anti-government demonstration in Beijing in February 2011 cost him his post, while his successor Gary Locke was praised for visiting his family's ancestral village of Jilong, in Southern China. Similarly, playing a mediator role to build trust between governments is also relevant in today's diplomacy. Accordingly, Locke played a mediating role in decreasing tension in Sino-American relations, both in the Wang Lijun crisis in February 2012 and regarding the escape of the activist Chen Guangcheng's to the US embassy in May 2012.7 Therefore, the article's framework that reveals the causal processes behind diplomats’ roles in foreign policy by relying on a historical example is also relevant for explaining the contemporary practice of diplomacy. Further research is required to better illuminate the role of diplomats in today's foreign policy. Overall, as the case of Sir Percy Loraine indicates, not only who rules but also who represents matters in foreign policy. Loraine stands out as a prominent figure managing the difficult relations between the Turks and the British on the verge of the Second World War. In line with Bull (1977)’s argument, Loraine's success primarily stemmed from his ability to identify the overlapping interests of Britain and Turkey—that is, standing against the rising Axis threat—and persuade both governments about the necessity of collaboration for the sustainable pursuit of these joint interests. Loraine acted as a “trust builder” between Turkey and Britain persuading both parties to send “costly signals” in order to each reassure the other of their willingness to cooperate against a common enemy. He was considered one of the few British diplomats who “maintained the dignity, toughness and realism for which the Foreign Service was formerly famous” (The Round Table 1963, 365). In the words of Sir George Clerk, who served as British ambassador to Turkey between 1926 and 1933, “Loraine combines most of the qualities which make a really successful diplomatist, none of which I have. . . . The friendship so happily established between Turkey and Britain was in very great measure due to Sir Percy's efforts” (Loraine 1943, 12). 1 I thank the anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 2 Loraine wrote to the FO that Atatürk “virtually said – let us wipe out all bitter memories since 1914 and start afresh as good, open, understanding friends”; see, Waterfield (1973, 208-209). 3 Similarly, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras often sought Loraine's advise on how to respond to the policies of the Soviet Union, Italy and Germany towards Turkey. 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Foreign Policy AnalysisOxford University Press

Published: Sep 29, 2017

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