Abstract Lionel Robbins is mainly known for An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, where he allegedly illustrated the neoclassical epistemology of economics, based on mechanistic maximizing behaviours of atomistic individuals whose aggregation results in the social order. Despite Robbins’s attempts to make it clear that this was not his concept of how the society works, this misrepresentation of his thought perpetuated in the methodological debates of the 1960s and is still dominant today. The aim of the paper is to challenge this caricature and illustrate the complex idea of social order held by Robbins, based on individual and collective processes of choices and a multilayer system of public institutions. 1. Introduction The celebrations for the 75th anniversary of the Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science in 2007 marked an important step in recognizing some shortcomings in the interpretation of Robbins’s contributions to the understanding of the nature of economics, to the concept of economics and political economy and to the way he thought of welfare economics (Colander, 2009; Backhouse, 2009; Backhouse and Medema, 2009; Falgueras-Sorauren, 2009; Hands, 2009; Maas, 2009; Masini, 2009A, 2009B; Scarantino, 2009). Nevertheless, some aspects still deserve further enquiry. First of all, it is apparently not yet clear enough how distant Robbins’s thinking was from social atomism and from a praxeology simply based on individual maximizing choices: some of his critics suggested (Fraser, 1932; Knight, 1934B; Parsons, 1934; Daly, 1940) that Robbins considered society just an aggregate of individual atoms. Second, the legal framework required to support the smooth operation of the market is not in itself enough to make a society stable, and the role of a multilayered system of collective institutions is crucial to guarantee the long-term sustainability of the social order as a whole. Given the focus on social order, this paper is intended also as a contribution to the debate on ‘ontological thinking in economics’, following the suggestion and encouragement of Arena and Lawson (2015, p. 990) and the symposium held in Nice in the summer of 2013, whose proceedings were partially published in this journal (vol. 39, no. 4). As they write: ‘How an ordered social world emerges and is maintained where everything is seemingly in process (and subject to increasing entropy) is clearly ultimately relevant to all forms of social analysis’ (Arena and Lawson, 2015, p. 990). My argument here is that it is even more important in the case of Robbins, as the ‘ontological preconceptions’ attached to him in the economic literature are completely misguiding, and should therefore be challenged. The aim of this paper is to illustrate Robbins’s multifaceted concept of social order and contribute to a better understanding of his works. It is our belief that one crucial source of misunderstanding of his thought derives from a persisting and almost exclusive reference to Robbins’s (1932, 1935) An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science and other writings on economic methodology (such as Robbins, 1938B). In order to understand Robbins’s idea of social order, a wider set of references is needed, ranging at least from 1932 to the 1960s, although concentrating mainly on his works published just before the Second World War. In contrast to his master Cannan and most of his contemporary colleagues, Robbins hardly ever tackled the topic of social order explicitly. Nevertheless, a more and more precise idea of social order permeates all his writings, slowly acquiring a central place in the evolution of his thought. The key work in which Robbins deals with the subject is Economic Planning and International Order (Robbins, 1937A), a rather neglected volume in the economic literature that deserves greater attention (Howson, 2011, pp. 299 ff). In his Autobiography, Robbins (1971, p. 150) recalls how the 1937 book (which was actually written in the summer of 1935, consisting, as it does, of some lectures he gave at the Institut des Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva) was ‘essentially an essay in what may be called Political Economy, as distinct from Economics in the stricter sense of the word’ (Robbins, 1937A, p. vii). In that book, Robbins makes use of the ‘technical apparatus of analytical Economics; but it applies this apparatus to the examination of schemes for the realization of aims whose formulation lies outside Economics; and it does not abstain from appeal to the probabilities of political practice when such an appeal has seemed relevant’ (Robbins, 1937A, pp. vii–viii). We shall see in the next sections that a reflection on ‘political economy’, being linked to the structure and nature of the institutions required in society, is essential, for Robbins, to fully understand the general concept of social order. In the first section, we shall consider the Essay, trying to highlight the nature of individual choices, and of the legal framework required to coordinate them through the market. In the second section, we shall explore Robbins’s other writings, to highlight how collective choices emerge and fit into the social order. In the third section, we focus on the multilayered institutional framework required to support the social order and guarantee its sustainability in the long run. The final section concludes. 2. Robinson Crusoe, market structure and individual choices One aspect of the Essay worth underlining is the idea of society it expresses. The first issue concerns Robbins’s alleged support (Fraser, 1932; Knight, 1934B; Parsons, 1934; Daly, 1940) for a social dimension conceived as a mere collection of atomistic preferences (i.e. as if individuals were isolated atoms and their choices were all independent from the others’), where man is reduced to a maximizing agent acting on the basis of a mechanistic rational calculus. The major fault of this claim is that the resulting social order would deterministically be given by the sum of individuals’ behavior, which is not Robbins’s vision of society. The whole Essay is actually devoted to opposing any mechanistic concept of individual behavior and to demonstrating that the interactions between human beings change the nature of their individual and collective choices, making it impossible to derive a ‘social’ order relying only on the knowledge of individuals’ preferences. It is true that, to Robbins, scarcity is the central feature of individual choices, suggesting the idea that he might rely on maximization procedures to build his praxeology. Nevertheless, he makes it clear that he is speaking about relative scarcity (Robbins, 1932, p. 45), derived from a comparison between demand and supply, which is systematically changing in time and context. As he writes in the Essay (1932, p. 18): ‘the implications of individual decisions reach beyond the repercussions on the individual… But it is not so easy to trace the effects of this decision on the whole complex of “scarcity relationships”… The exchange relationship is a technical incident’. Individuals cannot be said to be rational agents in the sense of maximizing utility functions, but only for their capacity to adapt to changing environmental conditions; as Robbins argues, ‘conduct is the resultant of conflicting psychological pulls acting within an environment of given material and technical possibilities’ (Robbins, 1932, p. 34). The reason why his anti-deterministic attitude may not be fully understood is probably attributable to the passage where Robbins compares ‘pure Mechanics’ with ‘pure Economics’ (Robbins, 1932, p. 83); but it should be rather manifest that the example is made to underline the gap between the two, to argue that their difference depends on ‘the assumption of scales of relative valuations [which] is the foundation of all subsequent complications’ in economics and which therefore differentiates the two (ibid.). Additionally, the fact that Robbins stresses the importance of individuals in the process of choice can be seen as the result of an atomistic concept of society (‘atomistic individualism’, as Harvey W. Peck [1936, p. 496] has put it), i.e. a society where only isolated individuals exist, and a social body can be conceived as the sum of individual preferences. Actually, Robbins is very explicit in arguing against the use of what we now call horizontal summation, when for example he states: the addition of prices or individual incomes to form social aggregates is an operation with a very limited meaning. As quantities of money expended, particular prices and particular incomes are capable of addition, and the total arrived at has a definite monetary significance. But as expression of an order of preference, a relative scale, they are incapable of addition. Their aggregate has no meaning. (Robbins, 1932, p. 56) For Robbins, an understanding of the way society works cannot be derived from information concerning single individuals. It was exactly on this point, i.e. his claims against the legitimacy of aggregations of individual preferences (Robbins, 1938B), that he criticized the dominant approach to welfare economics (being for this very reason considered a pioneer of the new welfare economics). On this, another point of the Essay that might induce misunderstandings of Robbins’s idea of social order is the use he makes of the metaphor of Robinson Crusoe. As Frank H. Knight (1934A, p. 359) critically observed, ‘a society made up of such individuals is essentially an aggregation of Crusoes, each on a separate economic island’. But as concerns Robinson Crusoe economics, popularized already by John Stuart Mill, Robbins clarifies that it is just a first-step ‘expository device’, exactly as the homo œconomicus is ‘a first approximation used very cautiously at one stage in the development of arguments which, in their full development, neither employ any such assumption nor demand it in any way for the justification of the procedure’ (Robbins, 1932, p. 90). Robbins is in fact particularly critical towards Crusoe economics and decides to use the example of Crusoe only because it helps him criticize Cannan’s epistemology of economics as based on the concept of material wealth, as expressed in the second chapter of Wealth (Cannan, 1914), titled The Fundamental Conditions of Wealth for Isolated Man and for Society. Such an idea, observes Robbins (1932, p. 10), applies to ‘the activities of a man isolated completely from society and enquiring what conditions will determine his wealth—that is to say his material welfare’, but cannot be valid when social interaction takes place. This is made clear in particular in his Economic Planning and International Order (Robbins, 1937A): as soon as there is more than one individual planning, the different plans may not harmonize… the result of our separate planning may be disorder and chaos. To avoid this, to secure that social relations involve a greater realization of individual plans rather than their mutual frustration, a coordinating apparatus, a social order, a social plan is necessary. (Robbins, 1937A, p. 4) The ‘social order’ is therefore for Robbins a crucial category for understanding society. Let us now try to understand the nature of such order. The first point to underline is that to achieve this order, ‘spontaneous arrangements between private citizens’ is not enough: ‘some coordinating authority with coercive power’ (Robbins, 1937A, p. 5) is required. The spontaneous forces of the market do not guarantee the existence of such an order: ‘For co-operation to be effective, it must be restrained within suitable limits by a framework of institutions’ (Robbins, 1937A, p. 227). And further on: The idea of coordination of human activities by means of a system of impersonal rules, within which what spontaneous relations arise are conducive to mutual benefit, is a conception, as least as subtle, at least as ambitious, as the conception of prescribing positively each action or each type of action by a central planning authority. (Robbins, 1937A, p. 229) The market exchange is an effective mechanism of interpersonal relations when simple, mechanistic interactions of exchange take place between a few isolated individuals. When interactions become more complex, the market alone is a weak institution for satisfying the crucial needs of individuals. 3. From individual to collective decision-making While the metaphor of an isolated man meeting other isolated men is working, the market exchange may provide efficient results to satisfy their needs. When the population grows bigger, and ‘social interactions’ (Robbins, 1937A, p. vii) among individuals are unavoidable, the operation of the market and the provision of certain basic collective goods might become difficult to attain. Contracts become hard to enforce and collective choices may not be unanimously shared. As Robbins (1937A, p. 230) puts it: ‘The market apparatus has its limits: and outside these limits arise certain generally acknowledged wants which, if they are not satisfied by government action, will either not be satisfied at all or, at best, will be satisfied very inadequately’. In more detailed terms, Robbins explains: ‘in considering the flow of goods and services which constitute the consumption of the citizens it is important to take account of the very considerable proportion of that flow, which even in a Liberal economy is determined by collective decision.’ (Robbins, 1976, p. 12) These goods possess a twofold nature: on the one side, they are indivisible public goods, whose ‘use or service is not confined to particular individuals’ (ibid.); on the other side, there are: certain services which, although available to all citizens or to group of citizens, are individually enjoyed and the benefit of which can therefore be regarded as at least in part discriminate—education, medical care, the relief of poverty and so on. Now the common characteristic of these two groups is not that they are provided by collective organizations but that their availability and volume is the result of collective decision. (ibid.) These ‘services’ require collective decision-making. This is where a political dimension of society comes in: ‘the objectives and organization of this kind of choice are thus political in a much more direct sense than individual choice involving discriminate benefit’ (Robbins, 1976, p. 13). According to Robbins, in order to tackle questions of complexity, social interactions and shared wants, a mere economics perspective is not sufficient; we need to consider a wider set of variables and tools: those of political economy (Robbins, 1937A, p. vii). Part of this was already recognized, in terms of a legal framework, already in the Essay where, anticipating the wider and deeper reflections of the following years, it is underlined how society needs a set of rules governing individual freedom: it is clearly necessary to assume a social order within which the valuations based upon it may show themselves in tendencies to action. […] We assume a legal framework of economic activity. This framework, as it were, limits by exclusion the area within which the valuations of the economic subject may influence their action. It prescribes a region in which one is not free to adopt all possible expedients. (Robbins, 1932, p. 93) A first major question arises on whether economists should contribute to the definition of such a framework. Robbins provides an affirmative answer, but he underlines that the question needs a different perspective from the one of economic science. In the two editions of the Essay, Robbins (1932, 1935) had tried to define economics; the next step was to show what he meant for political economy, as distinguished from economics but based on its tools of analysis (Robbins, 1937A, p. vii). He hints at the difference between the two in several writings, and a specific work is devoted to reconstruct his approach to the two concepts (Masini, 2009A). The point Robbins is making is that economics is the science that studies simple market-exchange relations, whereas political economy is what we need when individual and collective choices require a wider set of institutions to manage their freedom of choice. This is where the economist crosses the boundaries of positive science to enter the realm of normative questions: ‘you cannot build prescriptions on a mere knowledge of positive facts, however systematized and comprehensive’ (Robbins, 1952, pp. 176–77). Given the arbitrary nature of such institutions, which do not derive from simple generalizations that are easily discernable and agreed upon in scientific terms, some kind of value judgment becomes necessary. It is exactly on this point that Robbins, in the second edition of the Essay, makes it clear that, as Mill used to say, ‘a man is not likely to be a good economist if he is nothing else’ (Robbins, 1935, p. 150). It is a duty of the economists to provide both analytical tools that help understand economic generalizations and, on the basis of their scientific knowledge, a guidance to achieve alternative goals. The crucial point is that economists must be able to discern the positive from the normative content of their advice, in order to clarify to their audience that their opinions as political economists cannot claim any scientific status. As it is well known, according to Robbins, a ‘science’ can be defined as such only if it is neutral towards ends. The core of economic science is a set of generalizations on the operation of some economic variables in the market; but these should be set apart from ethics and value judgments. Given that an understanding of the market is insufficient to comprehend social interaction, political economy is required to deal with areas concerning judgments and prescriptions relating to collective choices, to the satisfaction of shared needs through a political decision-making process; as Robbins (1976, p. 3) argues, ‘it is a discussion of principles of public policy in the economic field’. According to Robbins, the classical liberals were aware of this. Smith’s metaphor of the invisible hand actually implied a strong set of institutions both to enact and enforce strict rules to assure that individual freedom could not be socially detrimental, and to provide some crucial services (public goods) for the better operation of society as a whole. Robbins (1952, pp. 55 ff; 1963, pp. 40 ff) tried hard to show that the ideas of laissez-faire and minimal-State attributed to the classical liberals were actually a grotesque caricature of their thought and should be framed within their historical context, characterized by a few public goods to be provided. As he argues: ‘as time goes on, although the prime desiderata remain unchanged, the environment of opportunity and proximate objectives alters’ (Robbins, 1976, p. 10). In the Introduction to his Political Economy Past and Present, Robbins quotes from book four of Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, where he specifies two goals for political economy: ‘to provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves’ (Robbins, 1976, p. 1), which is the legal framework required to support the market, and ‘to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign’ (ibid.). And, further on, ‘political economy thus conceived is essentially a search for solutions to problems of policy’ (Robbins, 1976, p. 3). We will return to this in the next section, showing that Robbins’s critique to the classical liberals was based on their assumption that the national sovereign might always be the only, monopolistic provider of public goods and welfare, which was no longer true in the 1930s. In his book of 1937—which draws a lot from Cannan’s (1914),Wealth and An Economists’ Protest (Cannan, 1927), in particular from chapter 3 of the former on The Social Order and the chapter on International Anarchy from an Economic Point of View in the latter—Robbins meant to reply to those who accused him of supporting social atomism and of lacking any conception of collective bodies with their related problems of (collective) choice. As is known, Robbins was also very much influenced by the growing awareness of the urgency to provide a global public good such as peace in a moment when a new world war was becoming plausible. As Robbins (1937A, pp. 238–39) writes: ‘without order, no economy: without peace, no welfare’. We will also return on this point in the next section. The book (Robbins, 1937) should be understood as an attempt to contribute to the ‘socialist calculation debate’ and the debate about the future of liberalism, demonstrating that, even from the liberal perspective, society is not made up only of isolated individuals. The explicit focus of the volume is the explanation of a very different concept of planning from the way it was generally used at those times, and the illustration of alternative approaches to it. Planning, for Robbins, should be considered—at the social level—in the same way as the process concerning individual choices: ‘to plan is to act with purpose, to choose; and choice is the essence of economic activity’. Planning also means a path towards the achievement of particular goals: ‘the essence of a plan is that it is an attempt to shape means to ends’ (1937A, p. 224). Each individual has goals to pursue. But problems of coordination may arise from the fact that choice implies the use of scarce means: as soon as there is more than one individual planning, the different plans may not harmonize […] the result of our separate planning may be disorder and chaos. To avoid this, to secure that social relations involve a greater realization of individual plans rather than their mutual frustration, a co- ordinating apparatus, a social order, a social plan is necessary, […] a co-ordinating apparatus with coercive power. (Robbins, 1937A, pp. 4–5) This is where the ‘social order’ comes in. Collective political institutions provide the venue for collective choices and a system to enforce the decisions taken: ‘the mere absence of violence is not a sufficient condition for the efficient working of free enterprise. For co-operation to be effective it must be restrained within suitable limits by a framework of institutions’ (Robbins, 1937A, p. 227). Drawing again from Cannan (1914, pp. 72 ff), according to Robbins such institutions stem from the existence of ‘shared wants’ that can be satisfied collectively in a more efficient way than individually (Robbins, 1937A, p. 230). For this, a legal framework is not enough; we need governmental action. This is not a matter of economic but political design and imagination: ‘the first need of the world is not economic but political revolution… it is necessary that the national states should surrender certain rights to an international authority’ (Robbins, 1937A, p. 245). Let us now illustrate the nature of such multilayered institutions. 4. Multilayered decision-making process and constitutional order Given a framework of potential conflict—peace is the most difficult global public good to provide, as Robbins (1939B, p. 99) himself suggests—the defense of territories and of people requires the maximum effort of the community, with some enforcing capacity: ‘to create lasting harmony, authority is essential’ (Robbins, 1963, p. 149). From a historical perspective, in the last centuries this role was played by sovereign States, exchanging citizens’ security and other fundamental public goods with military service and taxes. During the nineteenth century, the State becomes the only institutional framework within which collective public goods are provided; but history has proved that nation-states have been only a step in the evolution of the production of collective public goods and in the satisfaction of shared human wants. Interdependence has grown in economic (as well as political, social, cultural) relations. The first era of globalization at the end of the nineteenth century, and the related increasing interdependence among States, weakened the capability of monolithic, absolute and exclusive sovereign states to achieve the objectives emerging from a national decision-making process. It is in this area where the concept of sovereignty is most important for economics, as Robbins argued in many of his post-1937 writings (Robbins, 1939A, 1939B, 1940). Sovereignty (that is allegedly exclusively national in focus), i.e. the loyalty of citizens towards a (single) public authority, inherently weakens (instead of strengthening) the social order, both within and outside national boundaries, as it makes enemies of citizens of different nations. Exclusive or, as Robbins (1963, p. 147) writes, ‘inviolable’ sovereignty is the key cause of international conflict and this, in turn, destroys the market and both collective sub-national and supranational institutions, in the effort to defend the integrity of the national territory (Robbins, 1937A, 1937B, 1939A, 1939B, 1940). Interdependence implies potential conflict and a systematic effort to escape problems of collective action at a supranational level. The most dangerous conflicts are therefore not dependent on scarcity, but on a system of monopolistic competition in the market for international peace (Masini 2007), so that peace is both the most necessary and at the same time most difficult good to be provided globally (Robbins, 1939B, p. 99). The territorial dimension of states is not a good in itself (Robbins, 1939A, pp. 104 ff), but it becomes such when sovereignty is attributed only to states and the access to resources can be restricted arbitrarily (Robbins, 1937B, 1939A, 1939B). Imperialism and colonialism are an attempt to escape the trap of territorial constraints when customs matter (Robbins, 1937B, pp. 123 ff). From this point of view, ‘there is no conceivable repartition of earth’s surface which would be permanently satisfactory’ (Robbins, 1937B, p. 128). Hence the need for a supranational juridical framework and institutions that, just like national authority coordinates individual freedom, bringing conflicts within the framework of law and the police, may enforce international rules even against the will of single nation-states; as Susan Howson notices, for Robbins centralization of power is ‘incompatible with democracy’ (Howson, 2011, p. 301). As we suggested earlier, Robbins argued that classical economists were well aware that coercion is crucial to the survival of the social order; the problem is that such awareness ended at the borders of each nation-state: liberalism […] was not laissez-faire in the popular sense of the term—it demanded a strong state. The rule of law, so conspicuous a feature of the liberal conception, could not be maintained without an effective apparatus of coercion. The famous harmony of individual actions was only a harmony because legal restraints and institutions created an arena in which it might emerge. (Robbins, 1963, p. 135) This is the reason why Robbins (1963, p. 144) wonders: Why then were so little interested in combating such powers in the hands of national authorities? Why this facile optimistic reliance on reason and persuasion unassisted by appropriate institutions? Why this tendency to regard the nation as something ultimate? Irrespective of their intrinsically anti-monopolistic view of power, classical liberals supported the monopoly of power in the hands of nation-states, relying on free trade as an instrument of peace-keeping at the global level. The reason is that they considered ‘that the nation was but a temporary expedient pending the creation of a wider spirit of world solidarity’ (Robbins, 1963, p. 144). And further: ‘the early nationalist struggles were struggles against domination and discrimination’ (Robbins 1963, p. 145). But, Robbins claims: ‘if there is to be liberty, there has to be order. This is just as true of the relations between individuals and groups of individuals living in different states as it is of similar relations within states. And if there is to be order, then there must also be authority’ (Robbins, 1963, p. 149). He then goes on to explain: whereas within national areas such an apparatus, however imperfect, existed, between national areas there was no apparatus at all. Within the national areas they relied upon the coercive power of the state to provide the restraints which harmonized the interests of the different individuals. Between the areas they relied only upon demonstration of common interest and the futility of violence: their outlook here, that is to say, was implicitly not liberal but anarchist. But the anarchist position is untenable. (Robbins, 1937A, p. 241) This not only concerns ‘political economy’, but it is a question of constitutional relevance. The idea of a social order requiring coercive power implies first of all a legal framework where market relations and individual plans are carefully and credibly ruled through ‘an apparatus of international co-ordination and coercion’ (Robbins, 1939B, p. 100). Planning has nothing to do with the collectivist allegiance to the control of all relevant variables and resources; it is—on the contrary—a juridical architecture that helps shape and guarantee freedom of choice. When we use the term constitutional relevance, we mean that a supreme fundamental juridical framework must be established to achieve what Robbins considers the ultimate goal, which is something very similar to the federal constitution of the USA, signed in Philadelphia in 1787: Independent sovereignty must be limited… we cannot afford to rely on spontaneous goodwill as our only safeguard against catastrophe. There must be an international framework of law and order, supported by solid sanctions which prevent the emergence of those policies which are eventually responsible for conflict. We do not need a unitary world state; such an organization would be neither practicable nor desirable. But we do need a federal organization; not a mere confederation of sovereign states as was the League of Nations, but a genuine federation which takes over from the states of which it is composed, those powers which engender conflict. (Robbins, 1939B, pp. 104–5) This also implies that a collective identity exists and must be guaranteed together with the identities of each individual and each State. To Robbins, society is a complex system of interconnected and concentric groups developing around individuals, from local bodies to the world as a whole. Following his teacher Cannan (1914, 1927), each such concentric body is responsible for the satisfaction of collective needs and wants and has collective choices to make, ruled according to a bottom-up principle for the allocation of competences that we would now call ‘subsidiarity’ (Robbins, 1937B, pp. 254–55). As Robbins puts it: ‘the smaller the area of administration the better, when it is a matter of organizing what may be called communistic relief (that is, of supplementing the principle of family responsibility)… the wider the area of administration, the more equitable the burden of taxation, the more economical the distribution of resources’ (Robbins, 1937B, p. 255). And, concerning states: ‘the national states must learn to regard their functions as the functions of international local government’ (Robbins, 1939A, p. 105). Given the different extent of shared wants, a multilayer system of territorially concentric governing bodies should be created in order to provide collective goods. Some of them will be local in nature and require local governments; others may be more efficiently provided on a national or international basis. There are goods and functions which require different levels of governing bodies, ‘which demand the activities of different national authorities. Others, the provision of water for instance, probably involve the jurisdiction of areas of intermediate size. And the coordination of such activities where they overlap again involves a hierarchy of decentralized governmental bodies’ (Robbins, 1937B, p. 253). The crucial question is then: ‘what kind of authority’ (Robbins, 1963, p. 149) is he supporting for this multilayer system? As we have suggested, Robbins thinks that a federal structure would guarantee that each governmental level has its independent and concurrent juridical powers on each branch for which it is responsible. As he writes: ‘neither Staatenbund, nor Einheitsstaat, but Bundesstaat’ (Robbins, 1937A, p. 245). For this reason, the proposal of an institutional framework based on a federal structure forming the founding social contract in a multilevel world, where nation-states, just like single individuals, lose their exclusive sovereignty and legitimacy to make collective choices, is the focus of several of his writings (Robbins, 1937B, 1939A, 1939B, 1940). This institutional multilayered order is crucial to guarantee the functioning of both the economic (market) and the political (public institutions) processes of individual and collective choices, and to avoid their collapse into major conflicts, thus allowing the long-run sustainability of the social order itself. From this point of view, it should be underlined how profoundly different was his idea of constitutional federalism (Masini, 2012)—aimed at assigning powers to different layers of government according to efficiency, extent of spillover effects and externalities, subsidiarity—from market preserving federalism, as advocated by most of his fellow mates of the neoliberal thought collective, like ‘Hayek, Friedman, and Buchanan’ (Gill, 1998, p. 727; Harmes, 2007, p. 418), aimed at reducing the overall degree of public intervention in the economy (Masini, 2012, 2016). 5. Concluding remarks Robbins’s liberal order has often been misunderstood as social atomism based on a deterministic game of maximizing agents in a sort of institutional vacuum. This is probably due to a misunderstood reception of his works; to his belonging to the global ‘neoliberal thought collective’ (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009), that was increasingly dominated by a market-preserving idea of multilayered federal system of institutions; and to some ambiguous passages from his early writings (Robbins, 1932, 1934, 1935) that might easily induce misunderstandings and cause a prejudice against his later works. We have seen that this simplistic picture is not coherent with what Robbins considered the nature of society, made of complex needs and wants that require both a market preserving legal framework and concentric collective institutions, from those which are closest to the individuals to those who embrace all humankind, where choices are made and enforced. This became increasingly clear to Robbins, especially from 1935 onward, when he became aware of the potential dangers brought about by the approaching conflict and by the lack of any attempt to compromise between collectivism and radical liberalism. This is why the questions concerning the nature of the social order and its sustainability become a matter of urgency and a central (although not explicit) feature of his reflection, in particular in the late 1930s. Society, for Robbins, should be considered and built as a multilayered system of evolving decision-making patterns of both individual and collective choices. In order to guarantee that such a complex system does not degenerate into a homo-homini-lupus state of nature (both among individuals and States), i.e. if what Robbins considers a true liberal social order is to be built and safeguarded, a constitutional set of rules and institutions is necessary where individual and collective choices are neither detrimental to one another nor to greater communities, up to the whole of humankind. The market is not a virtual place for deterministic mechanics but a discovery process of individual choices; political institutions are the organizations where a never-ending discovery process of collective choices takes place; but both can determine an efficient social order only within a constitutional set of decision-making rules structured as a multilayered system of institutions. Society is the result of these processes within such constitutional order. It can be argued that, in the end, such order is merely a legal framework, which has nothing to do with politics. Again, some lines where Robbins refers explicitly to a ‘legal order’ suggest this interpretation might have some sense. Nevertheless, Robbins extensively and explicitly deals with the issue concerning sovereignty and the exercise of power. From this point of view, the legal framework cannot be interpreted only in terms of binding rules, but also of collective bodies where shared sovereignty is exercised, which is an eminently political problem. A further, important remark is required: if the social order is far from this ideal solution—given that it is not a spontaneous order but a rational construct, a complex system of laws and bodies with enforcing authorities—what are the conditions for its emergence and stability? The first such condition is the safeguard of the underlying economic and political processes where individual and collective choices take place: a competitive market and a democratic political system. The second is a (multilayered) constitutional order that allows the operation of the economic (market) and political (institutions) processes, with enforceable capability to avoid conflicts. A final question deserves some more lines. Does this very different picture we are suggesting of Robbins bring about a radical change in the judgment we should make of Robbins’s role in the intellectual debates on the future of liberalism that characterized the inter-war period and the early decades after WWII? His idea of social order is definitely far from the concept many of his colleagues of the ‘neoliberal thought collective’ held, but of course we are not suggesting that Robbins was not a liberal only because he recognized the place that collective choices and bodies have within the society. Robbins was a genuine neo-liberal in the pluralistic meaning that should be attached to the early intellectual reflections of the inter-wars period, making an attempt to found liberalism on more solid and robust bases. Actually, his contributions help us understand that neoliberalism lost the much more pluralistic attitude towards the role of public authorities in the economy that characterized its origins. Robbins’s idea of the social order is, in our opinion, a testimony of a far-sighted attitude towards the way liberalism could effectively survive the manifold attacks of the twentieth century. Bibliography Arena , R. and Lawson , T . 2015 . Introduction , Cambridge Journal of Economics , vol. 39 , no. 4 , 987 – 92 , doi: 10.1093/cje/bev040 Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Backhouse , R. E . 2009 . 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(ed.), Peaceful Change , London , Macmillan Robbins , L. C . 1938A . Live and dead issues in the methodology of economics , Economica , vol. 5 , no. 19 , 342 – 52 Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Robbins , L. C . 1938B . Interpersonal comparisons of utility: a comment , Economic Journal , vol. 48 , no. 192 , 635 – 41 Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Robbins , L. C . 1939A . The Economic Basis of Class Conflicts , London , Macmillan Robbins , L. C . 1939B . The Economic Causes of War , London , Jonathan Cape Robbins , L. C . 1940 . Economic aspects of federation , pp. 167 – 86 in Channing-Pearce , M . (ed.), Federal Union. A Symposium , London , Jonathan Cape Robbins , L. C . 1952 . The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Political Economy , London , Macmillan Robbins , L. C . 1963 . Politics and Economics: Papers in Political Economy , London , Macmillan Robbins , L. C . 1971 . Autobiography of an Economist , London , Macmillan Robbins , L. C . 1976 . 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Cambridge Journal of Economics – Oxford University Press
Published: Sep 1, 2018
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