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Bridging the Gap between Similarity and Causality: An Integrated Approach to Concepts

Bridging the Gap between Similarity and Causality: An Integrated Approach to Concepts A growing consensus in the philosophy and psychology of concepts is that while theories such as the prototype, exemplar, and theory theories successfully account for some instances of concept formation and application, none of them successfully accounts for all such instances. I argue against this ‘new consensus’ and show that the problem is, in fact, more severe: the explanatory force of each of these theories is limited even with respect to the phenomena often cited to support it, as each fails to satisfy an important explanatory desideratum with respect to these phenomena. I argue that these explanatory shortcomings arise from a shared assumption on the part of these theories, namely, they take similarity judgements and application of causal knowledge to be discrete elements in a theory of concepts. I further propose that the same assumption carries over into alternative theories offered by proponents of the new consensus: pluralism, eliminativism, and hybrid theories. I put forth a sketch of an integrated model of concept formation and application, which rejects this shared assumption and satisfies the explanatory desiderata I discuss. I suggest that this model undermines the motivation for hybrid, pluralist, and eliminativist accounts of concepts.1 Introduction2 The Similarity-Based Approach and the Importance of Theory  2.1 The similarity-based approach  2.2 The selection desideratum  2.3 Causal knowledge as satisfying the selection desideratum3 The Theory-Based Approach and the Importance of Similarity  3.1 The theory-based approach  3.2 The range desideratum  3.3 Similarity as satisfying the range desideratum4 An Integrated Approach to Concepts  4.1 An integrated model  4.2 The integrated theory versus hybrid theories of concepts5 Conclusion http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Oxford University Press

Bridging the Gap between Similarity and Causality: An Integrated Approach to Concepts

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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
ISSN
0007-0882
eISSN
1464-3537
DOI
10.1093/bjps/axw039
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

A growing consensus in the philosophy and psychology of concepts is that while theories such as the prototype, exemplar, and theory theories successfully account for some instances of concept formation and application, none of them successfully accounts for all such instances. I argue against this ‘new consensus’ and show that the problem is, in fact, more severe: the explanatory force of each of these theories is limited even with respect to the phenomena often cited to support it, as each fails to satisfy an important explanatory desideratum with respect to these phenomena. I argue that these explanatory shortcomings arise from a shared assumption on the part of these theories, namely, they take similarity judgements and application of causal knowledge to be discrete elements in a theory of concepts. I further propose that the same assumption carries over into alternative theories offered by proponents of the new consensus: pluralism, eliminativism, and hybrid theories. I put forth a sketch of an integrated model of concept formation and application, which rejects this shared assumption and satisfies the explanatory desiderata I discuss. I suggest that this model undermines the motivation for hybrid, pluralist, and eliminativist accounts of concepts.1 Introduction2 The Similarity-Based Approach and the Importance of Theory  2.1 The similarity-based approach  2.2 The selection desideratum  2.3 Causal knowledge as satisfying the selection desideratum3 The Theory-Based Approach and the Importance of Similarity  3.1 The theory-based approach  3.2 The range desideratum  3.3 Similarity as satisfying the range desideratum4 An Integrated Approach to Concepts  4.1 An integrated model  4.2 The integrated theory versus hybrid theories of concepts5 Conclusion

Journal

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science – Oxford University Press

Published: Sep 1, 2018

References

  • Causal Status as a Determinant of Feature Centrality
    Ahn
  • Effect of Theory-Based Feature Correlations on Typicality Judgments
    Ahn
  • A Hybrid Model of Categorization
    Anderson
  • Context-Independent and Context-Dependent Information in Concepts
    Barsalou
  • Perceptual Symbol Systems
    Barsalou
  • Foundational Questions about Concepts: Context-Sensitivity and Embodiment
    Bloch-Mullins