Loading next page...
/lp/ou_press/bridging-the-gap-between-similarity-and-causality-an-integrated-yLZOt5hy1j
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Copyright
- © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
- ISSN
- 0007-0882
- eISSN
- 1464-3537
- DOI
- 10.1093/bjps/axw039
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
A growing consensus in the philosophy and psychology of concepts is that while theories such as the prototype, exemplar, and theory theories successfully account for some instances of concept formation and application, none of them successfully accounts for all such instances. I argue against this ‘new consensus’ and show that the problem is, in fact, more severe: the explanatory force of each of these theories is limited even with respect to the phenomena often cited to support it, as each fails to satisfy an important explanatory desideratum with respect to these phenomena. I argue that these explanatory shortcomings arise from a shared assumption on the part of these theories, namely, they take similarity judgements and application of causal knowledge to be discrete elements in a theory of concepts. I further propose that the same assumption carries over into alternative theories offered by proponents of the new consensus: pluralism, eliminativism, and hybrid theories. I put forth a sketch of an integrated model of concept formation and application, which rejects this shared assumption and satisfies the explanatory desiderata I discuss. I suggest that this model undermines the motivation for hybrid, pluralist, and eliminativist accounts of concepts.1 Introduction2 The Similarity-Based Approach and the Importance of Theory 2.1 The similarity-based approach 2.2 The selection desideratum 2.3 Causal knowledge as satisfying the selection desideratum3 The Theory-Based Approach and the Importance of Similarity 3.1 The theory-based approach 3.2 The range desideratum 3.3 Similarity as satisfying the range desideratum4 An Integrated Approach to Concepts 4.1 An integrated model 4.2 The integrated theory versus hybrid theories of concepts5 Conclusion
Journal
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science – Oxford University Press
Published: Sep 1, 2018
@Phil_Robichaud
@deepthiw
@JoseServera