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A central claim of Longino's contextual empiricism is that scientific inquiry, even when “properly conducted”, lacks the capacity to screen out the inºuence of contextual values on its results. I'll show first that Longino's attack against the epistemic integrity of science suffers from fatal empirical weak- nesses. Second I'll explain why Longino's practical proposition for suppressing biases in science, drawn from her contextual empiricism, is too demanding and, therefore, unable to serve its purpose. Finally, drawing on Bourdieu's sociological analysis of scientific communities, I'll sketch an alternative view of scientific practice reconciling a thoroughly social view of science (such as Longino's) with a defense of its epistemic integrity.
Perspectives on Science – MIT Press
Published: Jun 1, 2006
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