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‘Sovereignty of Parliament’ under the Grundgesetz : How the German Constitutional Court Discovers Parliamentary Participation as a Means of Controlling European Integration

‘Sovereignty of Parliament’ under the Grundgesetz : How the German Constitutional Court Discovers... Katharina BERNER* In the course of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, critical voices have increasingly questioned the prominent role of two actors, namely the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and the German Parliament, the Bundestag.1 In the heat of the crisis, the then Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti put it this way: I can understand that they must show consideration for their parliament. But at the end of the day, every country in the European Union has a parliament as well as a constitutional court. And of course each government must orient itself according to decisions made by parliament. But every government also has a duty to educate parliament.2 Such critique openly alludes to the Court's line of judgments on parliamentary participation in European Union (EU)-related matters. Serving the principle of democracy, parliamentary participation as such is certainly desirable. Yet, foreign affairs necessarily entail reduced parliamentary competences in favour of executive decision-making; this is equally true for EU-related matters, albeit to a lesser extent. Striking a balance between parliamentary participation and legitimate Research Fellow at the Chair for Public Law, Public International Law and European Law, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.The author can be contacted at mail@katharinaberner.de. E.g. Dietmar Hipp http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png European Public Law Kluwer Law International

‘Sovereignty of Parliament’ under the Grundgesetz : How the German Constitutional Court Discovers Parliamentary Participation as a Means of Controlling European Integration

European Public Law , Volume 19 (2) – Jun 1, 2013

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Kluwer Law International
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1354-3725
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Abstract

Katharina BERNER* In the course of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, critical voices have increasingly questioned the prominent role of two actors, namely the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and the German Parliament, the Bundestag.1 In the heat of the crisis, the then Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti put it this way: I can understand that they must show consideration for their parliament. But at the end of the day, every country in the European Union has a parliament as well as a constitutional court. And of course each government must orient itself according to decisions made by parliament. But every government also has a duty to educate parliament.2 Such critique openly alludes to the Court's line of judgments on parliamentary participation in European Union (EU)-related matters. Serving the principle of democracy, parliamentary participation as such is certainly desirable. Yet, foreign affairs necessarily entail reduced parliamentary competences in favour of executive decision-making; this is equally true for EU-related matters, albeit to a lesser extent. Striking a balance between parliamentary participation and legitimate Research Fellow at the Chair for Public Law, Public International Law and European Law, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.The author can be contacted at mail@katharinaberner.de. E.g. Dietmar Hipp

Journal

European Public LawKluwer Law International

Published: Jun 1, 2013

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