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Abstract. This paper shows that the sanctions policy of the EU is characterized by three inconsistencies. They relate to the selection of countries against which sanctions are imposed, the triggers for autonomous European sanctions and the use of exemptions. Whereas no pattern can be discerned concerning the first two aspects, the misuse of exemptions for political reasons also adds to inconsistent European policies. This paper argues that although norms and values play a role in the EU's sanctions policy, more often than not they are upstaged by security and economic interests. As none of the underlying reasons for the inconsistencies (e.g. predominance of national interests, diverging views on the viability of sanctions) will disappear anytime soon, the sanctions policy of the EU will continue to oscillate between interests, norms and values.
European Foreign Affairs Review – Kluwer Law International
Published: May 1, 2009
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