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An Annotated Explanation of Articles 1 and 2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

An Annotated Explanation of Articles 1 and 2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing... COMMENTARY Gary N. Horlick* By chance, I served as head of Import Administration at the US Department of Commerce from 1981 to 1983. Until 1980, the Treasury Department was responsible for administration of US countervailing duty cases, and after World War II Treasury decided it would not countervail any subsidies except for export subsidies. Most export subsidies that Treasury countervailed did not present difficult methodological issues: If Mexico, for example, gave a 10% bonus on the value of exports (the so-called CEDI), then it was quite simple to determine that there was a subsidy and that the value was 10%. No other country in the world used countervailing duties at that point, so as a result there had been very little thinking or work on the valuation of subsidies.1 Treasury could get away with this because it was widely believed that such decisions could not be subject to judicial review in the US In 1979, Congress revised the US countervailing duty law in the wake of the GATT Tokyo Round Subsidies Code and successfully pressured the Carter Administration to move responsibility for CVD Administration to the Commerce Department, which was expected to be more protectionist (which it was http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Global Trade and Customs Journal Kluwer Law International

An Annotated Explanation of Articles 1 and 2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

Global Trade and Customs Journal , Volume 8 (9) – Sep 1, 2013

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Kluwer Law International
Copyright
Copyright © Kluwer Law International
ISSN
1569-755X
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Abstract

COMMENTARY Gary N. Horlick* By chance, I served as head of Import Administration at the US Department of Commerce from 1981 to 1983. Until 1980, the Treasury Department was responsible for administration of US countervailing duty cases, and after World War II Treasury decided it would not countervail any subsidies except for export subsidies. Most export subsidies that Treasury countervailed did not present difficult methodological issues: If Mexico, for example, gave a 10% bonus on the value of exports (the so-called CEDI), then it was quite simple to determine that there was a subsidy and that the value was 10%. No other country in the world used countervailing duties at that point, so as a result there had been very little thinking or work on the valuation of subsidies.1 Treasury could get away with this because it was widely believed that such decisions could not be subject to judicial review in the US In 1979, Congress revised the US countervailing duty law in the wake of the GATT Tokyo Round Subsidies Code and successfully pressured the Carter Administration to move responsibility for CVD Administration to the Commerce Department, which was expected to be more protectionist (which it was

Journal

Global Trade and Customs JournalKluwer Law International

Published: Sep 1, 2013

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