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A new framework using biform game for cost optimisation of distribution networks

A new framework using biform game for cost optimisation of distribution networks The present work focuses on the demand decision making problem for regional distribution centres sharing the same product families. Each centre orders quantities to be distributed from production units. Our approach suggests a biform game to maximise the benefits of each centre and minimise the end of cycle market induced supply to demand deviations. We start by an independent demand forecasting under uncertainty. Once the demand is met, the centres enter a collaboration phase where coalitions are created and products are exchanged, in order to achieve the core stability of the actual game. If not met, we try to achieve the same objectives using individual rationality through an adapted approach based on Shapley value analysis for each possible coalition. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Journal of Information and Decision Sciences Inderscience Publishers

A new framework using biform game for cost optimisation of distribution networks

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Publisher
Inderscience Publishers
Copyright
Copyright © Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
ISSN
1756-7017
eISSN
1756-7025
DOI
10.1504/IJIDS.2020.106727
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The present work focuses on the demand decision making problem for regional distribution centres sharing the same product families. Each centre orders quantities to be distributed from production units. Our approach suggests a biform game to maximise the benefits of each centre and minimise the end of cycle market induced supply to demand deviations. We start by an independent demand forecasting under uncertainty. Once the demand is met, the centres enter a collaboration phase where coalitions are created and products are exchanged, in order to achieve the core stability of the actual game. If not met, we try to achieve the same objectives using individual rationality through an adapted approach based on Shapley value analysis for each possible coalition.

Journal

International Journal of Information and Decision SciencesInderscience Publishers

Published: Jan 1, 2020

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