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Elizabeth Ashford Hume Studies, Volume 31, Number 1, April 2005, pp. 63-92 (Article) Published by Hume Society DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0177 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/383275/summary Access provided at 17 Feb 2020 18:11 GMT from JHU Libraries Hume Studies Volume 31, Number 1, April 2005, pp. 63-92 ELIZABETH ASHFORD Introduction There is a long-standing debate over whether or not Hume's moral theory1 should be viewed as some version of utilitarianism.2 Among opponents of a utilitarian reading, many contrast the subtlety and psychological plausibility of Hume's ac- count of morality with what they take to be utilitarianism's failure both to capture the complexity of morality and to be suited to the nature of human beings.3 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord is, in my view, one of the most incisive and forceful advocates of this position.4 He interprets Hume as an exponent of what he calls the "Bauhaus theory" of ethics. The Bauhaus theory avoids a commitment to a single overarching moral principle by which to solve all moral questions. On this view, the virtues are each well-suited to solving a particular problem which we find col- lectively salient when we take up the general point of view, " and different problems may demand
Hume Studies – Hume Society
Published: Jan 26, 2011
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