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Unnatural Religion: Indoctrination and Philo's Reversal in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Unnatural Religion: Indoctrination and Philo's Reversal in Hume's Dialogues Concerning... Many interpretations of Hume&apos;s <i>Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion</i> have labored under the assumption that one of the characters represents Hume&apos;s view on the Design Argument, and Philo is often selected for this role. I reject this opinion by showing that Philo is inconsistent. He offers a decisive refutation of the Design Argument, yet later endorses this very argument. I then dismiss two prominent ways of handling Philo&apos;s reversal: first, I show that Philo is not ironic either in his skepticism or in his theistic reversal. Second, I reject the suggestion that the Design Argument is a natural belief, since it differs significantly from causal and external world beliefs. Finally, I argue that the control the Design Argument exerts is the product of a youthful indoctrination that prevents Philo from consistently maintaining his skeptical position. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Hume Studies Hume Society

Unnatural Religion: Indoctrination and Philo&apos;s Reversal in Hume&apos;s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Hume Studies , Volume 32 (1) – Jan 26, 2011

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Publisher
Hume Society
ISSN
1947-9921

Abstract

Many interpretations of Hume&apos;s <i>Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion</i> have labored under the assumption that one of the characters represents Hume&apos;s view on the Design Argument, and Philo is often selected for this role. I reject this opinion by showing that Philo is inconsistent. He offers a decisive refutation of the Design Argument, yet later endorses this very argument. I then dismiss two prominent ways of handling Philo&apos;s reversal: first, I show that Philo is not ironic either in his skepticism or in his theistic reversal. Second, I reject the suggestion that the Design Argument is a natural belief, since it differs significantly from causal and external world beliefs. Finally, I argue that the control the Design Argument exerts is the product of a youthful indoctrination that prevents Philo from consistently maintaining his skeptical position.

Journal

Hume StudiesHume Society

Published: Jan 26, 2011

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