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The Moral Self and the Indirect Passions

The Moral Self and the Indirect Passions Susan M. Purviance Hume Studies, Volume 23, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 195-212 (Article) Published by Hume Society For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/382933/summary Access provided at 17 Feb 2020 18:24 GMT from JHU Libraries Hume Studies Volume XXIII, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 195-212 The Moral Self and the Indirect Passions SUSAN M. PURVIANCE David Hume1 and Immanuel Kant are celebrated for their clear-headed rejection of dogmatic metaphysics, Hume for rejecting traditional metaphysical positions on cause and effect, substance, and personal identity, Kant for rejecting all judgments of experience regarding the ultimate ground of objects and their relations, not just judgments of cause and substantiality. Nevertheless, each argues that practical activity is not compromised by the rejection of metaphysical claims that others had taken to be crucial. Kant and Hume thought that political and moral life did not depend upon theoretical knowlege of the nature of the self, free will, or knowledge of the true motives of actions or the character of the agent. Because the grounds of morality and politics were too important to leave to the mercies of speculative metaphysics, each moved their foundations to higher ground, insulating the grounds of practical activity from the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Hume Studies Hume Society

The Moral Self and the Indirect Passions

Hume Studies , Volume 23 (2) – Jan 26, 2011

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Publisher
Hume Society
ISSN
1947-9921

Abstract

Susan M. Purviance Hume Studies, Volume 23, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 195-212 (Article) Published by Hume Society For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/382933/summary Access provided at 17 Feb 2020 18:24 GMT from JHU Libraries Hume Studies Volume XXIII, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 195-212 The Moral Self and the Indirect Passions SUSAN M. PURVIANCE David Hume1 and Immanuel Kant are celebrated for their clear-headed rejection of dogmatic metaphysics, Hume for rejecting traditional metaphysical positions on cause and effect, substance, and personal identity, Kant for rejecting all judgments of experience regarding the ultimate ground of objects and their relations, not just judgments of cause and substantiality. Nevertheless, each argues that practical activity is not compromised by the rejection of metaphysical claims that others had taken to be crucial. Kant and Hume thought that political and moral life did not depend upon theoretical knowlege of the nature of the self, free will, or knowledge of the true motives of actions or the character of the agent. Because the grounds of morality and politics were too important to leave to the mercies of speculative metaphysics, each moved their foundations to higher ground, insulating the grounds of practical activity from the

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Hume StudiesHume Society

Published: Jan 26, 2011

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