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The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared

The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared Don Garrett Hume Studies, Volume 33, Number 2, November 2007, pp. 257-288 (Article) Published by Hume Society For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/383364/summary Access provided at 17 Feb 2020 18:14 GMT from JHU Libraries Hume Studies Volume 33, Number 2, November 2007, pp. 257-288 The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared DON GARRETT "Justice" is Hume's most common term for respect for property. On Locke's view, the obligation to respect property is an original moral obligation imposed through a divinely instituted natural law that exists prior to and independent of human conventions. Hume expresses his disagreement with views like Locke's by calling justice an "artificial virtue"—meaning by this that it is only "by means of an artifice or contrivance" that it produces the moral approbation that constitutes it as a virtue (T 3.2.1.1; SBN 477).1 In his discussion of justice in A Treatise of Human Nature3.2.1-4, he begins by arguing that justice (which he also calls "equity" and "honesty") is "artificial" before going on to explain the origin of the convention on which it depends and why adherence to that convention is regarded as virtuous.2 Central to http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Hume Studies Hume Society

The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared

Hume Studies , Volume 33 (2) – Jan 26, 2011

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Publisher
Hume Society
ISSN
1947-9921

Abstract

The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared Don Garrett Hume Studies, Volume 33, Number 2, November 2007, pp. 257-288 (Article) Published by Hume Society For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/383364/summary Access provided at 17 Feb 2020 18:14 GMT from JHU Libraries Hume Studies Volume 33, Number 2, November 2007, pp. 257-288 The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared DON GARRETT "Justice" is Hume's most common term for respect for property. On Locke's view, the obligation to respect property is an original moral obligation imposed through a divinely instituted natural law that exists prior to and independent of human conventions. Hume expresses his disagreement with views like Locke's by calling justice an "artificial virtue"—meaning by this that it is only "by means of an artifice or contrivance" that it produces the moral approbation that constitutes it as a virtue (T 3.2.1.1; SBN 477).1 In his discussion of justice in A Treatise of Human Nature3.2.1-4, he begins by arguing that justice (which he also calls "equity" and "honesty") is "artificial" before going on to explain the origin of the convention on which it depends and why adherence to that convention is regarded as virtuous.2 Central to

Journal

Hume StudiesHume Society

Published: Jan 26, 2011

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