Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared Don Garrett Hume Studies, Volume 33, Number 2, November 2007, pp. 257-288 (Article) Published by Hume Society For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/383364/summary Access provided at 17 Feb 2020 18:14 GMT from JHU Libraries Hume Studies Volume 33, Number 2, November 2007, pp. 257-288 The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared DON GARRETT "Justice" is Hume's most common term for respect for property. On Locke's view, the obligation to respect property is an original moral obligation imposed through a divinely instituted natural law that exists prior to and independent of human conventions. Hume expresses his disagreement with views like Locke's by calling justice an "artificial virtue"—meaning by this that it is only "by means of an artifice or contrivance" that it produces the moral approbation that constitutes it as a virtue (T 3.2.1.1; SBN 477).1 In his discussion of justice in A Treatise of Human Nature3.2.1-4, he begins by arguing that justice (which he also calls "equity" and "honesty") is "artificial" before going on to explain the origin of the convention on which it depends and why adherence to that convention is regarded as virtuous.2 Central to
Hume Studies – Hume Society
Published: Jan 26, 2011
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.