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Volume 36, Number 2, 2010, pp. 236239 Thomas Holden. Spectres of False Divinity: Hume's Moral Atheism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xvi + 246. ISBN 978-0-19-957994-5, Cloth, $50.00. The main thesis developed and defended in this superb book is that Hume implicitly "denies the existence . . . of a morally assessable god" (8), not just the existence of an overall "morally praiseworthy god" (8). Holden characterizes these as "strong" and "weak" moral atheism, respectively (79). While the idea of Hume as a moral atheist is not new, Holden's case for that proposition makes two new and important contributions to the discussion of the issue. The first is his detailed piecing-together of points made by Hume in various writings into two arguments for "strong" moral atheism and his attribution of the arguments to Hume. He calls them the "argument from sentimentalism" and the "argument from motivation," respectively. Both arguments are based in Hume's moral psychology, but there is no text in which he either endorses them or even sets them forth as such. In light of this lack of direct textual support, Holden's painstaking reconstruction of the two arguments and his convincing case for seeing both
Hume Studies – Hume Society
Published: Jan 27, 2010
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