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Some Counsel on Humean Relations

Some Counsel on Humean Relations SOME CQUHSEL ON HUMEAN RELATIONS In a paper published eight years ago I tried to bring out a neglected feature of Hume's theory of relations, namely the difference between philosophical and natural re1 2 . lations. Now Ijnlay , without referring to my work , has expanded some of its themes in an extremely interesting and, I think, important way. At least he has made me rethink the whole distinction between philosophical and natural relations and, what goes with relation theory, Hume's analytic-synthetic distinction. The strengths of his paper are, embarrassingly, the weaknesses of my own. I did not articulate clearly the connection between relation theory in Hume and the analytic-synthetic distinction. I shall turn to these strengths presently. My focus in this paper, however, will be on a central weakness in Imlay 's; and the point, it turns out, is one I gave full credence to earlier. Imlay does not distinguish what in Hume can and must be dis- tinguished if we are to make any sense (let alone full sense) of his theory of causation. The distinction is betweer, necessity and certainty . In trying to explicate Hume's distinction between intuitive and demonstrative inference on the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Hume Studies Hume Society

Some Counsel on Humean Relations

Hume Studies , Volume 1 (2) – Jan 26, 1975

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Publisher
Hume Society
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Copyright © Hume Society
ISSN
1947-9921
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Abstract

SOME CQUHSEL ON HUMEAN RELATIONS In a paper published eight years ago I tried to bring out a neglected feature of Hume's theory of relations, namely the difference between philosophical and natural re1 2 . lations. Now Ijnlay , without referring to my work , has expanded some of its themes in an extremely interesting and, I think, important way. At least he has made me rethink the whole distinction between philosophical and natural relations and, what goes with relation theory, Hume's analytic-synthetic distinction. The strengths of his paper are, embarrassingly, the weaknesses of my own. I did not articulate clearly the connection between relation theory in Hume and the analytic-synthetic distinction. I shall turn to these strengths presently. My focus in this paper, however, will be on a central weakness in Imlay 's; and the point, it turns out, is one I gave full credence to earlier. Imlay does not distinguish what in Hume can and must be dis- tinguished if we are to make any sense (let alone full sense) of his theory of causation. The distinction is betweer, necessity and certainty . In trying to explicate Hume's distinction between intuitive and demonstrative inference on the

Journal

Hume StudiesHume Society

Published: Jan 26, 1975

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