Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Reason and Feeling in Hume's Action Theory and Moral Philosophy: Hume's Reasonable Passion (review)

Reason and Feeling in Hume's Action Theory and Moral Philosophy: Hume's Reasonable Passion (review) Volume XXV, Numbers 1 and 2, April/November 1999, pp. 266-269 DANIEL J. SHAW. Reason and Feeling in Hume's Action Theory and Moral Philosophy: Hume's Reasonable Passion (Studies in the History of Philosophy, vol. 49). Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998. xxiv + 153. ISBN 0-77348282-2, $79.95, cloth. Generally speaking, there are two ways to oppose another philosopher's view. You can argue against itÂ--for example, by finding counterexamples, showing that it entails various unpalatable or absurd conclusions, or by raising objections to the arguments offered in its support. Or you can offer an alternative account of the issue in question. These two sorts of responses are, of course, complementary, and Hume uses both in his attempt to reveal the errors of traditional approaches to ethics. While Hume's negative arguments against ratio- nalist moral theoriesÂ--including the related attacks on the role of reason in motivation (T II iii 3) and in our moral judgments (T III i 1)Â--are justly famous, they have been criticized on a number of grounds. Hume has been charged with mischaracterizing the position of his rationalist opponents, with violating some of his own positions on the structure of reason and the passions, and with relying on http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Hume Studies Hume Society

Reason and Feeling in Hume's Action Theory and Moral Philosophy: Hume's Reasonable Passion (review)

Hume Studies , Volume 25 (1) – Jan 26, 1999

Loading next page...
 
/lp/hume-society/reason-and-feeling-in-hume-s-action-theory-and-moral-philosophy-hume-s-OZXfp8hhzO
Publisher
Hume Society
Copyright
Copyright © Hume Society
ISSN
1947-9921
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Volume XXV, Numbers 1 and 2, April/November 1999, pp. 266-269 DANIEL J. SHAW. Reason and Feeling in Hume's Action Theory and Moral Philosophy: Hume's Reasonable Passion (Studies in the History of Philosophy, vol. 49). Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998. xxiv + 153. ISBN 0-77348282-2, $79.95, cloth. Generally speaking, there are two ways to oppose another philosopher's view. You can argue against itÂ--for example, by finding counterexamples, showing that it entails various unpalatable or absurd conclusions, or by raising objections to the arguments offered in its support. Or you can offer an alternative account of the issue in question. These two sorts of responses are, of course, complementary, and Hume uses both in his attempt to reveal the errors of traditional approaches to ethics. While Hume's negative arguments against ratio- nalist moral theoriesÂ--including the related attacks on the role of reason in motivation (T II iii 3) and in our moral judgments (T III i 1)Â--are justly famous, they have been criticized on a number of grounds. Hume has been charged with mischaracterizing the position of his rationalist opponents, with violating some of his own positions on the structure of reason and the passions, and with relying on

Journal

Hume StudiesHume Society

Published: Jan 26, 1999

There are no references for this article.