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PERCHANCE TO DREAM: A REPLY TO TRAIGER1 In "Hume on Memory and Causation" I argued Hume took s memory to be relative s corresponding to define descriptions general form " complex impression cause a particular (original) and which posive exactly My (or closely) was based resembles m, " primarily where (mental 'm' a called variable ranging over posive s argument Hume's formal crerion, images). upon what i.e. , Hume's contention , unlike imagination, memory preserves " same order and form wh original impressions" (T9), preserves " original order and posion s s" (T85). Saul Traiger has recently taken exception to my interpretation Hume, suggesting my interpretation suffers from at least four defects. First, my Traiger maintains re evidence while requires to remember Hume took some s memory to be simple, account Hume dreams y or all complex. h Secondly, allow he maintains my interpretation will not contents imaginings, and Traiger contends th provides at least prima facie evidence against my interpretation. Thirdly, he maintains my account formal crerion not sufficient to dtinguh s memory from s imagination. raes several questions regarding reference s memory. Finally, he temporal I do not believe any Traiger's points modification my account. require
Hume Studies – Hume Society
Published: Jan 26, 1985
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