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Nature Breaks Down: Hume's Problematic Naturalism in Treatise I iv

Nature Breaks Down: Hume's Problematic Naturalism in Treatise I iv Hume Studies , pp. 225-243 1. Readers of Hume, even those who call attention to the depth and variety of his skeptical excursions,1 now happily admit that Hume is, in crucial respects, a "naturalist." A naturalist is, broadly, someone who emphasizes the natural (as opposed on the one hand to the abstractly rational, and on the other hand to the supernatural) sources of our beliefs, attitudes, and practices; and Hume surely is at least this kind of naturalist. But understanding Hume's naturalism to include only this general explanatory commitment obscures as much as it reveals, I will argue, about the text of Treatise I iv, where Hume examines (and seems to fall prey to) various skeptical "systems of philosophy."2 To understand that part of the Treatise (and to understand Hume better overall), we must, I will argue, understand Hume's shifting allegiances to different kinds of naturalism.3 Space for seeing different kinds of naturalism in Hume opens up when we notice that, while naturalism in general is a neutral and descriptive enterprise, Hume's talk of nature and its role in our cognition often takes a celebratory and normative turn. For instance, when introducing his discussion of the belief in http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Hume Studies Hume Society

Nature Breaks Down: Hume's Problematic Naturalism in Treatise I iv

Hume Studies , Volume 26 (2) – Jan 26, 2000

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Publisher
Hume Society
Copyright
Copyright © Hume Society
ISSN
1947-9921
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Abstract

Hume Studies , pp. 225-243 1. Readers of Hume, even those who call attention to the depth and variety of his skeptical excursions,1 now happily admit that Hume is, in crucial respects, a "naturalist." A naturalist is, broadly, someone who emphasizes the natural (as opposed on the one hand to the abstractly rational, and on the other hand to the supernatural) sources of our beliefs, attitudes, and practices; and Hume surely is at least this kind of naturalist. But understanding Hume's naturalism to include only this general explanatory commitment obscures as much as it reveals, I will argue, about the text of Treatise I iv, where Hume examines (and seems to fall prey to) various skeptical "systems of philosophy."2 To understand that part of the Treatise (and to understand Hume better overall), we must, I will argue, understand Hume's shifting allegiances to different kinds of naturalism.3 Space for seeing different kinds of naturalism in Hume opens up when we notice that, while naturalism in general is a neutral and descriptive enterprise, Hume's talk of nature and its role in our cognition often takes a celebratory and normative turn. For instance, when introducing his discussion of the belief in

Journal

Hume StudiesHume Society

Published: Jan 26, 2000

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