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Millican’s “Abstract,” “Imaginative,” “Reasonable,” and “Sensible” Questions about Hume’s Theory of Cognition

Millican’s “Abstract,” “Imaginative,” “Reasonable,” and “Sensible” Questions about Hume’s Theory... , pp. 227­242 In a 1998 book symposium, Peter Millican provided excellent critical comments on my Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy (Millican, "Hume on Reason," 141­60), and I am grateful that he has done the same for Hume (Millican, "Skepticism," 40 [this issue]). Many of the new or revised interpretations in the latter book result, directly or indirectly, from his extraordinary stimulus, both in his writings and in person, as a philosophical scholar and interlocutor. His comments range over much of the book, but the majority of them concern chapter 2 ("Principles of Perceptions"), chapter 3 ("The Mind and its Faculties"), chapter 4 ("Sense-Based Concepts"), and chapter 8 ("Morality and Virtue"). In a brief concluding section, he also touches on chapter 9 ("God and Religion"), rightly observing that the source of our main differences about Hume on miracles lie in the crucial role I see Hume giving to his distinction between "proofs" and mere (that is, non-proof) "probabilities." Millican focuses chiefly, however, on abstract ideas, imagination and reason, and the moral sense, and I will limit my replies to those topics. In doing so, I will follow his section divisions. It may be helpful to note from http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Hume Studies Hume Society

Millican’s “Abstract,” “Imaginative,” “Reasonable,” and “Sensible” Questions about Hume’s Theory of Cognition

Hume Studies , Volume 40 (2) – Sep 29, 2014
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Abstract

, pp. 227­242 In a 1998 book symposium, Peter Millican provided excellent critical comments on my Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy (Millican, "Hume on Reason," 141­60), and I am grateful that he has done the same for Hume (Millican, "Skepticism," 40 [this issue]). Many of the new or revised interpretations in the latter book result, directly or indirectly, from his extraordinary stimulus, both in his writings and in person, as a philosophical scholar and interlocutor. His comments range over much of the book, but the majority of them concern chapter 2 ("Principles of Perceptions"), chapter 3 ("The Mind and its Faculties"), chapter 4 ("Sense-Based Concepts"), and chapter 8 ("Morality and Virtue"). In a brief concluding section, he also touches on chapter 9 ("God and Religion"), rightly observing that the source of our main differences about Hume on miracles lie in the crucial role I see Hume giving to his distinction between "proofs" and mere (that is, non-proof) "probabilities." Millican focuses chiefly, however, on abstract ideas, imagination and reason, and the moral sense, and I will limit my replies to those topics. In doing so, I will follow his section divisions. It may be helpful to note from

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Hume Studies – Hume Society

Published: Sep 29, 2014

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