Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise

Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise Hume Studies Volume 30, Number 2, November 2004, pp. 297-327 A Symposium on Louis E. Loeb, Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise FREDERICK F. SCHMITT In Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise,1 Louis Loeb ascribes to Hume a naturalistic account of justified belief, one on which Hume is fundamentally concerned with the question whether stable belief can be achieved. Loeb's interpretation is systematic, richly explanatory, and powerfully argued. He makes a compelling case that stability plays a central role in Hume's epistemology. Loeb's case is so compelling indeed that anyone who wants to defend an alternative interpretation will now have to assimilate or deflect the massive textual evidence in favor of the stability interpretation. I will argue here that, for some passages Loeb cites in favor of the stability interpretation, a veritistic interpretation explains the text at least as well as the stability interpretation does. 1. The Stability Account of Belief and the Aim of Truth On Loeb's interpretation, a belief is by its nature a steady or infixed disposition to thought, will, passion, and actionÂ--i.e., a disposition steady in its influence on thought, will, etc. (SJ 65-74). The nature http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Hume Studies Hume Society

Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise

Hume Studies , Volume 30 (2) – Jan 26, 2004

Loading next page...
 
/lp/hume-society/loeb-on-stability-and-justification-in-hume-s-treatise-Pcfotep0vW
Publisher
Hume Society
Copyright
Copyright © Hume Society
ISSN
1947-9921
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Hume Studies Volume 30, Number 2, November 2004, pp. 297-327 A Symposium on Louis E. Loeb, Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise FREDERICK F. SCHMITT In Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise,1 Louis Loeb ascribes to Hume a naturalistic account of justified belief, one on which Hume is fundamentally concerned with the question whether stable belief can be achieved. Loeb's interpretation is systematic, richly explanatory, and powerfully argued. He makes a compelling case that stability plays a central role in Hume's epistemology. Loeb's case is so compelling indeed that anyone who wants to defend an alternative interpretation will now have to assimilate or deflect the massive textual evidence in favor of the stability interpretation. I will argue here that, for some passages Loeb cites in favor of the stability interpretation, a veritistic interpretation explains the text at least as well as the stability interpretation does. 1. The Stability Account of Belief and the Aim of Truth On Loeb's interpretation, a belief is by its nature a steady or infixed disposition to thought, will, passion, and actionÂ--i.e., a disposition steady in its influence on thought, will, etc. (SJ 65-74). The nature

Journal

Hume StudiesHume Society

Published: Jan 26, 2004

There are no references for this article.