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Ronald J. Glossop Hume Studies, Volume 2, Number 1, April 1976, pp. 1-16 (Article) Published by Hume Society For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/389488/summary Access provided at 17 Feb 2020 18:40 GMT from JHU Libraries Is Hume A "Classical Utilitarian"? The central notion of utilitarianism is that a right kind of action or a virtuous quality of character is one which in the long run promotes the welfare of society or, as it is frequently stated, which promotes the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But when we try to use the utilitarian concept as a guide for evaluating various possible ultimate distributions of goods among the members of a society, we find there are alternative ways of making this goal more precise. I intend to review briefly five different ways in which the utilitarian goal can be stated more precisely. Then I will consider which one of these more precise formulations most accurately reflects what Hume seems to have had in mind when he spoke of "public utility" or "the good of mankind" or "the true interests of mankind" (ICPM, p. 13) or "public interest and utility "(ICPM, p. 34). II The most effective way of illustrating
Hume Studies – Hume Society
Published: Jan 26, 2011
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