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HUME'S SCEPTICAL ARGUMENT AGAST REASON section of Treatise entled Of scepticism regard to reason Kume considers md as reflectg s own activies, monors m as re, is and n adjusts drawg m accordance md prciples and strategies. ^ What discovers ferences, errs. light of this knowledge, and accordance rational prciples of epistemic probabilies, adjusts s response to any ference makes from one of ty to one epistemic probabily of a degree somewhat less than ty. But this rational adjustment is self consequence of an ference, which will be subject to same qualifications. By repeatg this process, seems all ty reduces to probabily and all probabily to zero. Hume's argument begs this way: Our reason must be consider 'd as a kd of cause, of which truth is natural effect; but such-a-one as by _ irruption of or causes, and by constancy of our mental pors, may frequently be prevented. By this means all knowledge degenerates to probabily; and this probabily is greater or less, accordg to our experience of veracy or decefulness of our understandg, and accordg to simplicy or tricacy of question. 2 is important to be clear on logical structure of this argument. Consider an actual
Hume Studies – Hume Society
Published: Jan 26, 1983
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