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Hume on the Abstract Idea of Existence: Comments on Cummins' "Hume on the Idea of Existence" Fred Wilson Hume Studies, Volume 17, Number 2, November 1991, pp. 167-201 (Article) Published by Hume Society DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.1991.0007 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/391085/summary Access provided at 17 Feb 2020 18:30 GMT from JHU Libraries Hume on the Abstract Idea of Existence: Comments on Cummins' "Hume on the Idea of Existence"1 Fred Wilson Hume's views on the concept ofexistence: this is one ofthe more obscure parts of Hume's philosophy. Professor Cummins has done a valuable service simply by trying to unravel some of the puzzles; it is still more valuable for shedding as much light as it does on the issues. There are nonetheless problems with the interpretation that he develops, and I would like to bring out some of these. I will address three questions: (a)What, more precisely, is the (abstract) idea of existence? (b)What is the notion of"necessity" as Hume would use it in connection with the notion that something exists "necessarily," or, contrarily, "contingently"? (c)Does it follow from the fact that whatever thing we conceive we conceive as existent that every thing necessarily exists? In order to answer
Hume Studies – Hume Society
Published: Jan 26, 2011
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