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Lloyd Fields Hume Studies, Volume 14, Number 1, April 1988, pp. 161-175 (Article) Published by Hume Society DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0507 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/388690/summary Access provided at 17 Feb 2020 18:36 GMT from JHU Libraries 161 For Hume, to hold a person morally respon- sible for an action is morally to approve of him or to blame him in virtue of the action. Moreover, as he says in the Treatise of Human Nature, "approbation or blame ... is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred." How must an action be related to a person in order for the person to be held morally responsible for the action? Since to hold a person morally responsible for an action is morally to approve of him or to blame him in virtue of the action, and since moral approval or blame is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred, the first stage in answering this question is to attempt to answer the following more general question: How must an action be related to a person in order for the person to be loved or hated because of the action? This question, in turn, requires
Hume Studies – Hume Society
Published: Jan 26, 2011
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