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Filling the Gaps: Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects

Filling the Gaps: Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects Volume XXV, Numbers 1 and 2 , April/November 1999, pp. 155-170 : Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects In Book I, part iv, section 2 of the Treatise, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Hume presents two different answers to the question of how we come to believe in the continued existence of unperceived objects.1 He rejects his first answer shortly after its formulation, and the remainder of the section articulates an alternative account of the development of the belief. The account that Hume adopts, however, is susceptible to a number of insurmountable objections, which motivates a reassessment of his original proposal. This paper defends a version of Hume's initial explanation of the belief in continued existence and examines some of its philosophical implications. The question of how we acquire the belief in continued existence poses a hard problem for Hume, since he is committed to two theses which severely constrain the answers he can give. The first thesis, indeed the first principle of Hume's science of human nature, is that all of our ideas are derived from impressions (T 7).2 The second is that the sequences of impressions that constitute our acquaintance http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Hume Studies Hume Society

Filling the Gaps: Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects

Hume Studies , Volume 25 (1) – Jan 26, 1999

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Hume Society
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1947-9921
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Abstract

Volume XXV, Numbers 1 and 2 , April/November 1999, pp. 155-170 : Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects In Book I, part iv, section 2 of the Treatise, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Hume presents two different answers to the question of how we come to believe in the continued existence of unperceived objects.1 He rejects his first answer shortly after its formulation, and the remainder of the section articulates an alternative account of the development of the belief. The account that Hume adopts, however, is susceptible to a number of insurmountable objections, which motivates a reassessment of his original proposal. This paper defends a version of Hume's initial explanation of the belief in continued existence and examines some of its philosophical implications. The question of how we acquire the belief in continued existence poses a hard problem for Hume, since he is committed to two theses which severely constrain the answers he can give. The first thesis, indeed the first principle of Hume's science of human nature, is that all of our ideas are derived from impressions (T 7).2 The second is that the sequences of impressions that constitute our acquaintance

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Hume StudiesHume Society

Published: Jan 26, 1999

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