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A Humean Pattern of Justification

A Humean Pattern of Justification George J. Nathan Hume Studies, Volume 9, Number 2, November 1983, pp. 150-170 (Article) Published by Hume Society DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0524 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/389190/summary Access provided at 17 Feb 2020 18:45 GMT from JHU Libraries 150. Interpretations of Hume have tended to fall into two categories: naturalistic and sceptical. Those which fall into the former category see Hume as letting justification rest upon a system of natural beliefs which can neither be supported nor overthrown by reason. Those in the latter category see Hume's point as being essentially negative, that all attempts at justification either within or without a framework of natural belief are doomed. My aim in this paper is to argue that neither naturalistic nor sceptical interpretations do justice to Hume. Instead closer attention must ' be paid to a general pattern- of justification which Hume uses, a pattern which does not rely on "natural beliefs" and which, obviously, since it is a pattern of justification, is not sceptical. My approach will be to avoid either of these two extremes by concentrating on a pattern of justification which equates justification with rationality. However, in order to do this, it will be necessary, first of http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Hume Studies Hume Society

A Humean Pattern of Justification

Hume Studies , Volume 9 (2) – Jan 26, 2011

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Publisher
Hume Society
ISSN
1947-9921

Abstract

George J. Nathan Hume Studies, Volume 9, Number 2, November 1983, pp. 150-170 (Article) Published by Hume Society DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0524 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/389190/summary Access provided at 17 Feb 2020 18:45 GMT from JHU Libraries 150. Interpretations of Hume have tended to fall into two categories: naturalistic and sceptical. Those which fall into the former category see Hume as letting justification rest upon a system of natural beliefs which can neither be supported nor overthrown by reason. Those in the latter category see Hume's point as being essentially negative, that all attempts at justification either within or without a framework of natural belief are doomed. My aim in this paper is to argue that neither naturalistic nor sceptical interpretations do justice to Hume. Instead closer attention must ' be paid to a general pattern- of justification which Hume uses, a pattern which does not rely on "natural beliefs" and which, obviously, since it is a pattern of justification, is not sceptical. My approach will be to avoid either of these two extremes by concentrating on a pattern of justification which equates justification with rationality. However, in order to do this, it will be necessary, first of

Journal

Hume StudiesHume Society

Published: Jan 26, 2011

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