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The role of corporate governance in R&D intensity of US‐based international firms

The role of corporate governance in R&D intensity of US‐based international firms Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study the influence of corporate governance and internationalization on research and development (R&D) investments in US‐based international firms. Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws from agency theory to examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms and internationalization on R&D intensity by the use of longitudinal data from 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000 in a sample of large, manufacturing US firms with international operations. Findings – The paper finds that CEO total compensation is positively associated with R&D intensity, whereas equity voting power, insider ownership, and duality are negatively associated. Research limitations/implications – The findings regarding insider ownership confirms agency theory, in that agents will tend to make decisions to maximize their own utility and thus would be expected to reject R&D investments. In terms of duality, the augmented discretion that CEOs assume when they also hold the chairmanship position may reduce the monitoring function of the board, making it easier for the CEO to avoid engaging in short‐term risky ventures. Additionally, CEOs are likely to demand larger salaries when faced with risky decisions because their employment stability and reputation are at stake. Practical implications – Boards concerned with firm innovation should focus their decisions on CEO salaries on total compensation rather than on short‐term performance. Total compensation may motivate CEOs to commit to R&D investments that lead to innovations despite the risk of failure and detrimental impact on short‐term profits. Firms should be cautious in granting ownership to board members. Although ownership often stimulates commitment to strategic decisions, over‐involvement of board insiders may result in risk aversion, leading to decreases in R&D efforts. Originality/value – This paper extends the literature by integrating agency theory and organization learning in a comprehensive framework, showing that governance and internationalization play a significant role in firm R&D intensity. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Journal of Commerce and Management Emerald Publishing

The role of corporate governance in R&D intensity of US‐based international firms

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References (72)

Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 Emerald Group Publishing Limited. All rights reserved.
ISSN
1056-9219
DOI
10.1108/10569211011057236
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study the influence of corporate governance and internationalization on research and development (R&D) investments in US‐based international firms. Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws from agency theory to examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms and internationalization on R&D intensity by the use of longitudinal data from 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000 in a sample of large, manufacturing US firms with international operations. Findings – The paper finds that CEO total compensation is positively associated with R&D intensity, whereas equity voting power, insider ownership, and duality are negatively associated. Research limitations/implications – The findings regarding insider ownership confirms agency theory, in that agents will tend to make decisions to maximize their own utility and thus would be expected to reject R&D investments. In terms of duality, the augmented discretion that CEOs assume when they also hold the chairmanship position may reduce the monitoring function of the board, making it easier for the CEO to avoid engaging in short‐term risky ventures. Additionally, CEOs are likely to demand larger salaries when faced with risky decisions because their employment stability and reputation are at stake. Practical implications – Boards concerned with firm innovation should focus their decisions on CEO salaries on total compensation rather than on short‐term performance. Total compensation may motivate CEOs to commit to R&D investments that lead to innovations despite the risk of failure and detrimental impact on short‐term profits. Firms should be cautious in granting ownership to board members. Although ownership often stimulates commitment to strategic decisions, over‐involvement of board insiders may result in risk aversion, leading to decreases in R&D efforts. Originality/value – This paper extends the literature by integrating agency theory and organization learning in a comprehensive framework, showing that governance and internationalization play a significant role in firm R&D intensity.

Journal

International Journal of Commerce and ManagementEmerald Publishing

Published: Jun 29, 2010

Keywords: Corporate governance; Research and development; Globalization; United States of America

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