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Subjects participated in a threeperson negotiation exercise, in which they had to form two or threeway coalitions to receive resources. The effects of power position high, medium, low, distribution norms contribution, need, and task meeting structure caucus, joint on the distribution of resources were examined. Most coalition theories assume that the power position of the players calls into play different levels of entitlement which will determine the allocation of resources. There has, however, been little attempt to manipulate entitlement, in the form of distribution norms, separately from power structure. In the research reported here, threeperson groups contained a high, medium, and low power player. The dominant group distribution norm was manipulated as either contributionbased or needbased. Task meeting structure was manipulated by beginning each group meeting with either a threeway meeting between all players joint or a series of oneonone meetings caucus. As predicted, groups that began by caucusing had a higher incidence of twoway agreements than groups that began with joint meetings. The task meeting structure interacted with power position such that caucusing increased the high power player's outcome, while the joint meeting structure increased the low power player's outcome. In addition, the distribution norm interacted with power position such that the contributionbased norm increased the outcomes of high power players, while the needbased norm increased the outcomes of the low power players.
International Journal of Conflict Management – Emerald Publishing
Published: Jan 1, 1993
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