Strategic illegal insider trading prior to price sensitive announcements

Strategic illegal insider trading prior to price sensitive announcements Purpose – Using data for actual insider trading cases prosecuted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the paper aims to investigate whether insiders trade strategically to avoid detection. Design/methodology/approach – The paper analyzes actual insider trades prior to price sensitive announcements. Findings – It is found that insiders are more likely to trade on high volume days, which indicates an effort to hide their trades. Further, insider trading raises the number of days with abnormally high trading volume only slightly, again indicating that insiders are avoiding attracting attention. No evidence is found that insider trading intensity increases on the insider trading day closest to the announcement day. The hypothesis that index returns for insider trading days and non‐trading days are the same cannot be rejected, which is consistent with insiders avoiding detection. For stocks sold by insiders, returns are higher for insider trading days than for non‐insider trading days. Hence, insiders are selling on days when the market is up, which tends to hide their trading. But for stocks bought by insiders, returns are significantly higher on insider trading days than on non‐insider‐trading days, indicating that in this case insiders may attract unwanted attention. Originality/value – The research may be useful to those attempting to detect insider trades. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Financial Crime Emerald Publishing

Strategic illegal insider trading prior to price sensitive announcements

Loading next page...
 
/lp/emerald-publishing/strategic-illegal-insider-trading-prior-to-price-sensitive-nijMajYkto
Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 Emerald Group Publishing Limited. All rights reserved.
ISSN
1359-0790
DOI
10.1108/13590791111147460
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Purpose – Using data for actual insider trading cases prosecuted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the paper aims to investigate whether insiders trade strategically to avoid detection. Design/methodology/approach – The paper analyzes actual insider trades prior to price sensitive announcements. Findings – It is found that insiders are more likely to trade on high volume days, which indicates an effort to hide their trades. Further, insider trading raises the number of days with abnormally high trading volume only slightly, again indicating that insiders are avoiding attracting attention. No evidence is found that insider trading intensity increases on the insider trading day closest to the announcement day. The hypothesis that index returns for insider trading days and non‐trading days are the same cannot be rejected, which is consistent with insiders avoiding detection. For stocks sold by insiders, returns are higher for insider trading days than for non‐insider trading days. Hence, insiders are selling on days when the market is up, which tends to hide their trading. But for stocks bought by insiders, returns are significantly higher on insider trading days than on non‐insider‐trading days, indicating that in this case insiders may attract unwanted attention. Originality/value – The research may be useful to those attempting to detect insider trades.

Journal

Journal of Financial CrimeEmerald Publishing

Published: Jul 19, 2011

Keywords: Insider trading; Stock markets; Financial information

References

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.


DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

Search

Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly

Organize

Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.

Access

Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

DeepDyve

Freelancer

DeepDyve

Pro

Price

FREE

$49/month
$360/year

Save searches from
Google Scholar,
PubMed

Create folders to
organize your research

Export folders, citations

Read DeepDyve articles

Abstract access only

Unlimited access to over
18 million full-text articles

Print

20 pages / month

PDF Discount

20% off