Selling yourself: a preliminary analysis of political candidates as marketers and entrepreneurs

Selling yourself: a preliminary analysis of political candidates as marketers and entrepreneurs PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to view political candidates as products in a market competing over quality via advertising. Consequently, the Austrian argument against restrictions on product advertising can be applied to political markets as well. The foremost conclusion is a disproportionately negative effect of campaign finance restrictions on lesser-known incumbents and third-party candidates. A counterargument is also presented that campaign finance restrictions may solve a prisoner’s dilemma.Design/methodology/approachThe author provides an initial test of these hypotheses with data from US Senate races occurring before and after the passage of the McCain-Feingold Act of 2002.FindingsEmpirical results show a strong incumbency advantage, but no disproportionate harm to lesser-known candidates or third parties from the passage of the act.Originality/valueThe paper provides a new perspective on the role of the political candidate and purpose of campaign advertising. The first pass empirics suggest, however, that only a major revision in campaign advertising rules could significantly alter the predictors of challenger vote shares. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Enterpreneurship and Public Policy Emerald Publishing

Selling yourself: a preliminary analysis of political candidates as marketers and entrepreneurs

Loading next page...
 
/lp/emerald-publishing/selling-yourself-a-preliminary-analysis-of-political-candidates-as-r1P0TbU4f2
Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
Copyright © Emerald Group Publishing Limited
ISSN
2045-2101
DOI
10.1108/JEPP-D-18-00028
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to view political candidates as products in a market competing over quality via advertising. Consequently, the Austrian argument against restrictions on product advertising can be applied to political markets as well. The foremost conclusion is a disproportionately negative effect of campaign finance restrictions on lesser-known incumbents and third-party candidates. A counterargument is also presented that campaign finance restrictions may solve a prisoner’s dilemma.Design/methodology/approachThe author provides an initial test of these hypotheses with data from US Senate races occurring before and after the passage of the McCain-Feingold Act of 2002.FindingsEmpirical results show a strong incumbency advantage, but no disproportionate harm to lesser-known candidates or third parties from the passage of the act.Originality/valueThe paper provides a new perspective on the role of the political candidate and purpose of campaign advertising. The first pass empirics suggest, however, that only a major revision in campaign advertising rules could significantly alter the predictors of challenger vote shares.

Journal

Journal of Enterpreneurship and Public PolicyEmerald Publishing

Published: Sep 3, 2018

There are no references for this article.

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.


DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

Search

Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly

Organize

Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.

Access

Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

DeepDyve

Freelancer

DeepDyve

Pro

Price

FREE

$49/month
$360/year

Save searches from
Google Scholar,
PubMed

Create folders to
organize your research

Export folders, citations

Read DeepDyve articles

Abstract access only

Unlimited access to over
18 million full-text articles

Print

20 pages / month

PDF Discount

20% off