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Relationship between prestige signals and over-subscription ratio

Relationship between prestige signals and over-subscription ratio The purpose of this paper is to examine whether initial public offering (IPO) over-subscription is a function of firm’s prestige signals conveyed by third parties with reputational capital such as underwriter, auditor and independent non-executive board member.Design/methodology/approachThe relationship between prestige signals and over-subscription ratio (OSR) of IPOs is analysed using a cross-sectional regression based on a sample of 393 IPOs issued between January 2000 and December 2015.FindingsThe results indicate that IPOs underwritten by reputable underwriters have lower OSR than those underwritten by non-reputable underwriters. While issuer engages reputable underwriter to certify firm quality to reduce information asymmetry, the action brings with it lower initial returns for its IPO. Investors interpret the signal conveyed by issuer’s choice of underwriter from under-pricing perspective and respond accordingly by reducing IPO demand. This implies that investors regard under-pricing as a more valuable signal than firm quality signal associated with underwriter reputation. The findings also indicate that over-subscription increases in IPOs that have above average initial returns and higher institutional participation. Issuing firms that go public in a period of high IPO volume are associated with low OSR.Originality/valueThis is the first paper to examine the relationship between the prestige signals and OSR of IPOs in the Malaysian context. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Journal of Managerial Finance Emerald Publishing

Relationship between prestige signals and over-subscription ratio

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Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
© Emerald Publishing Limited
ISSN
1743-9132
DOI
10.1108/ijmf-02-2018-0067
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether initial public offering (IPO) over-subscription is a function of firm’s prestige signals conveyed by third parties with reputational capital such as underwriter, auditor and independent non-executive board member.Design/methodology/approachThe relationship between prestige signals and over-subscription ratio (OSR) of IPOs is analysed using a cross-sectional regression based on a sample of 393 IPOs issued between January 2000 and December 2015.FindingsThe results indicate that IPOs underwritten by reputable underwriters have lower OSR than those underwritten by non-reputable underwriters. While issuer engages reputable underwriter to certify firm quality to reduce information asymmetry, the action brings with it lower initial returns for its IPO. Investors interpret the signal conveyed by issuer’s choice of underwriter from under-pricing perspective and respond accordingly by reducing IPO demand. This implies that investors regard under-pricing as a more valuable signal than firm quality signal associated with underwriter reputation. The findings also indicate that over-subscription increases in IPOs that have above average initial returns and higher institutional participation. Issuing firms that go public in a period of high IPO volume are associated with low OSR.Originality/valueThis is the first paper to examine the relationship between the prestige signals and OSR of IPOs in the Malaysian context.

Journal

International Journal of Managerial FinanceEmerald Publishing

Published: Jul 31, 2019

Keywords: Initial public offering; Information asymmetry; Fixed-price mechanism; Over-subscription ratio; Prestige signals

References