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- Publisher
- Emerald Publishing
- Copyright
- Copyright © Emerald Group Publishing Limited
- ISSN
- 0307-4358
- DOI
- 10.1108/eb013688
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of UK merger policy based upon the allocative effects of Monopoly and Mergers Commission MMC decisions. For some time now evidence has been available concerning the ineffectiveness of MMC decisions in reducing product market concentration see Simpson and Shaw 1986, 1989. So, if the reduction of market concentration is not a systematic result of decisions of the MMC, it is interesting to ask what have been the discernible effects of the MMC's activities and what revised objectives might be formulated for that body
Journal
Managerial Finance – Emerald Publishing
Published: Jun 1, 1991