“Whoa! It’s like Spotify but for academic articles.”

Instant Access to Thousands of Journals for just $40/month

Try 2 weeks free now

Outside director‐shareholder agency conflicts: evidence from bank consolidation

Purpose – Takeovers create a potential conflict of interest between target shareholders and directors. While mergers generally create value for the target shareholders, their directors will typically lose their board seats and likely face a financial loss or loss of prestige. The purpose of this paper is to examine evidence to support or refute that directors may act in their own best interests at the expense of shareholders. Design/methodology/approach – The authors reason that if directors act in their own best interests, then acquiring firms will seek targets with older board members who are closer to director retirement and are therefore less reluctant to give up their board seats. The paper uses data of 528 banks between 1999 and 2004 to estimate logistic regressions controlling for variables relevant to takeover probability. In the hypotheses, the authors test for the significance of the average director age on a board. Findings – The paper finds a highly positive significant relation between the average age of a board of directors and the probability of takeover. Furthermore, this variable is more robust and has greater explanatory power in predicting takeover targets than all other financial, ownership and governance variables commonly controlled for and included in this study. This suggests that older directors are less prone to agency problems and more willing to make decisions that will likely result in the loss of their board seat. Practical implications – These findings have important policy implications on director retirement policies such as director age versus term limits. The results also have implications on the use of director golden parachutes. Finally, the authors highlight a strategic consideration for acquiring firms seeking takeover targets. Originality/value – This paper is the first, to the best of the authors' knowledge, to document board age as an important governance characteristic. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Corporate Governance Emerald Publishing
Loading next page...

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.

DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy unlimited access and
personalized recommendations from
over 12 million articles from more than
10,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $40/month

Try 2 weeks free now

Explore the DeepDyve Library

How DeepDyve Works

Spend time researching, not time worrying you’re buying articles that might not be useful.

Unlimited reading

Read as many articles as you need. Full articles with original layout, charts and figures. Read online, from anywhere.

Stay up to date

Keep up with your field with Personalized Recommendations and Follow Journals to get automatic updates.

Organize your research

It’s easy to organize your research with our built-in tools.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from Springer, Elsevier, Nature, IEEE, Wiley-Blackwell and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

Simple and Affordable Pricing

14-day free trial. Cancel anytime, with a 30-day money-back guarantee.

Monthly Plan

  • Read unlimited articles
  • Personalized recommendations
  • Print 20 pages per month
  • 20% off on PDF purchases
  • Organize your research
  • Get updates on your journals and topic searches


Best Deal — 25% off

Annual Plan

  • All the features of the Professional Plan, but for 25% off!
  • For the normal price of 10 articles elsewhere, you get one full year of unlimited access to articles.

billed annually