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Maximum impact for minimum subsidy: reverse auctions for universal access in Chile and India

Maximum impact for minimum subsidy: reverse auctions for universal access in Chile and India Purpose – The purpose of this article is to discuss how minimum subsidy auctions have been implemented in Chile and India for Internet and mobile phone infrastructure to and identify lessons for governments considering reverse auctions as a tool. In a minimum subsidy auction (also known as a reverse auction), the government starts by offering the maximum funds available for a given public project; the company requiring smallest subsidy wins. Design/methodology/approach – The article investigates several case studies of subsidy auctions in both Chile and India. Findings – When firms compete for subsidies in reverse auctions, they have incentives to get the most result for the least funds. This furthers the government’s goal to achieve maximum public policy impact with minimum budget. Originality/value – For developing countries, very little research has been done on implementation of auctions in the communications sector. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Info Emerald Publishing

Maximum impact for minimum subsidy: reverse auctions for universal access in Chile and India

Info , Volume 16 (5): 13 – Aug 5, 2014

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References (81)

Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
none
ISSN
1463-6697
DOI
10.1108/info-06-2013-0037
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to discuss how minimum subsidy auctions have been implemented in Chile and India for Internet and mobile phone infrastructure to and identify lessons for governments considering reverse auctions as a tool. In a minimum subsidy auction (also known as a reverse auction), the government starts by offering the maximum funds available for a given public project; the company requiring smallest subsidy wins. Design/methodology/approach – The article investigates several case studies of subsidy auctions in both Chile and India. Findings – When firms compete for subsidies in reverse auctions, they have incentives to get the most result for the least funds. This furthers the government’s goal to achieve maximum public policy impact with minimum budget. Originality/value – For developing countries, very little research has been done on implementation of auctions in the communications sector.

Journal

InfoEmerald Publishing

Published: Aug 5, 2014

Keywords: Developing countries; Regulation; Broadband networks; Auction; Universal service

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