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Managerial overconfidence, firm transparency, and stock price crash risk

Managerial overconfidence, firm transparency, and stock price crash risk The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze whether and how managerial overconfidence affects stock price crash risk.Design/methodology/approachBased on a large sample of Chinese non-state-owned firms from 2000 to 2012, this study employs methods including multiple linear regression model, Heckman two-stage treatment effect procedure, firm fixed effects model and event study to clarify the causality relationship between managerial overconfidence and crash risk.FindingsThe authors find that firms with overconfident managers (chief executive officer or board chairs) are more likely to experience future stock price crashes than firms with non-overconfident managers. The effect of overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with low transparency, suggesting that firm opacity facilitates overconfident managers’ bad news hoarding activities, which, in turn, increases stock price crash risk. The authors also show evidence that overconfident managers tend to disclose good news in a timely manner.Originality/valueThe authors add to the growing literature on stock price crash risk. Specifically, the authors find that the cognitive bias of board chair plays an important role in the bad news hoarding activities, thereby increasing the likelihood of stock price crash. This study also contributes to the literature that addresses the effects of managerial overconfidence on corporate finance issues. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png China Finance Review International Emerald Publishing

Managerial overconfidence, firm transparency, and stock price crash risk

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Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
© Emerald Publishing Limited
ISSN
2044-1398
DOI
10.1108/cfri-01-2019-0007
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze whether and how managerial overconfidence affects stock price crash risk.Design/methodology/approachBased on a large sample of Chinese non-state-owned firms from 2000 to 2012, this study employs methods including multiple linear regression model, Heckman two-stage treatment effect procedure, firm fixed effects model and event study to clarify the causality relationship between managerial overconfidence and crash risk.FindingsThe authors find that firms with overconfident managers (chief executive officer or board chairs) are more likely to experience future stock price crashes than firms with non-overconfident managers. The effect of overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with low transparency, suggesting that firm opacity facilitates overconfident managers’ bad news hoarding activities, which, in turn, increases stock price crash risk. The authors also show evidence that overconfident managers tend to disclose good news in a timely manner.Originality/valueThe authors add to the growing literature on stock price crash risk. Specifically, the authors find that the cognitive bias of board chair plays an important role in the bad news hoarding activities, thereby increasing the likelihood of stock price crash. This study also contributes to the literature that addresses the effects of managerial overconfidence on corporate finance issues.

Journal

China Finance Review InternationalEmerald Publishing

Published: Jun 18, 2020

Keywords: China; Managerial overconfidence; Stock price crash risk; Firm transparency; M12; G14; G34

References