Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

INVESTOR PROTECTION AND THE COWBOY STEREOTYPE A CRITICAL VIEW

INVESTOR PROTECTION AND THE COWBOY STEREOTYPE A CRITICAL VIEW The 1986 Financial Services Act FSA, operational since the end of April 1988, was an Act designed to protect investors from cowboys such as life insurance salesmen whose interests do not extend beyond their commission cheques, and offshore investment companies who fail to keep proper accounts. This image lies in sharp contrast to the large established institutions who, under the avowedly selfregulatory regime, have important responsibilities for ensuring high standards among their staff and representatives. In this brief polemic we explore the validity of this contrast since we do not believe it is simply stereotypical cowboys who threaten the investor, and question whether, even within the limited terms of this stereotype, the Act can be seen as effective in the sphere of collective investment products. In providing this account we draw upon our academic research into the financial services industry. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Managerial Finance Emerald Publishing

INVESTOR PROTECTION AND THE COWBOY STEREOTYPE A CRITICAL VIEW

Managerial Finance , Volume 16 (5): 2 – May 1, 1990

Loading next page...
 
/lp/emerald-publishing/investor-protection-and-the-cowboy-stereotype-a-critical-view-NXyncFPjDL

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
Copyright © Emerald Group Publishing Limited
ISSN
0307-4358
DOI
10.1108/eb013654
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The 1986 Financial Services Act FSA, operational since the end of April 1988, was an Act designed to protect investors from cowboys such as life insurance salesmen whose interests do not extend beyond their commission cheques, and offshore investment companies who fail to keep proper accounts. This image lies in sharp contrast to the large established institutions who, under the avowedly selfregulatory regime, have important responsibilities for ensuring high standards among their staff and representatives. In this brief polemic we explore the validity of this contrast since we do not believe it is simply stereotypical cowboys who threaten the investor, and question whether, even within the limited terms of this stereotype, the Act can be seen as effective in the sphere of collective investment products. In providing this account we draw upon our academic research into the financial services industry.

Journal

Managerial FinanceEmerald Publishing

Published: May 1, 1990

There are no references for this article.