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Influence as the key to consent? Swedish director generals’ perceptions of reporting requirements

Influence as the key to consent? Swedish director generals’ perceptions of reporting requirements Performance measurements have become a prominent part of government steering of public agencies. At the same time, they are increasingly criticized for creating heavy administrative burdens. The purpose of this paper is to argue that consent on part of the heads of agencies is vital for making performance measurement an efficient tool for not only control but also organizational learning.Design/methodology/approachThe paper reports a survey with a nearly total sample of Swedish Director Generals.FindingsFindings suggest that Director Generals who feel that they are able to influence the goals and indicators of their agencies are significantly more willing to consent to the government’s reporting requirements.Originality/valueThe paper suggests that a more encompassing, interactive and participatory process might increase agency consent with reporting requirements. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Journal of Public Sector Management Emerald Publishing

Influence as the key to consent? Swedish director generals’ perceptions of reporting requirements

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Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
© Emerald Publishing Limited
ISSN
0951-3558
DOI
10.1108/ijpsm-08-2018-0193
Publisher site
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Abstract

Performance measurements have become a prominent part of government steering of public agencies. At the same time, they are increasingly criticized for creating heavy administrative burdens. The purpose of this paper is to argue that consent on part of the heads of agencies is vital for making performance measurement an efficient tool for not only control but also organizational learning.Design/methodology/approachThe paper reports a survey with a nearly total sample of Swedish Director Generals.FindingsFindings suggest that Director Generals who feel that they are able to influence the goals and indicators of their agencies are significantly more willing to consent to the government’s reporting requirements.Originality/valueThe paper suggests that a more encompassing, interactive and participatory process might increase agency consent with reporting requirements.

Journal

International Journal of Public Sector Management – Emerald Publishing

Published: May 1, 2019

Keywords: Performance measurement; Reporting requirements; Director Generals

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