Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/emerald-publishing/incentive-mechanism-for-a-sustainable-public-distribution-system-g0G0kOuDJq
References (30)
-
K. Abbink (2000)
Fair salaries and the moral costs of corruption -
(2001)
Targeting and efficiency in the public distribution system: case of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra -
J. Gans-Morse, Mariana Borges, Alexey Makarin, Theresa Blankson, Andre Nickow, Dong Zhang (2018)
Reducing Bureaucratic Corruption: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on What WorksPolitical Economy: Structure & Scope of Government eJournal
-
(2013)
Research Area Markets and Choice -
R. Khera (2011)
India's Public Distribution System: Utilisation and ImpactThe Journal of Development Studies, 47
-
E. Demirci, N. Erkip (2017)
Designing an intervention strategy for public-interest goods: The California electric vehicle market caseOmega-international Journal of Management Science, 69
-
M. Justesen, C. Bjørnskov (2012)
Exploiting the Poor: Bureaucratic Corruption and Poverty in AfricaDevelopment Economics: Microeconomic Issues in Developing Economies eJournal
-
Deepak Ahluwalia (1993)
Public distribution of food in India: Coverage, targeting and leakagesFood Policy, 18
-
R. Solow (1979)
Another possible source of wage stickinessJournal of Macroeconomics, 1
-
Exploiting the poor: bureaucratic corruption and poverty in Africa
World Development, 58
-
Richard Sander, E. Williams (2005)
Santa Monica’s Minimum Wage: Assessing the Living Wage Movement’s New FrontierEconomic Development Quarterly, 19
-
Corruption
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108
-
M. Klein (1965)
A NOTE ON WAGE INCENTIVE PLANSInternational Journal of Production Research, 4
-
(2019)
Schemes to systems – the public distribution system: anatomy of India’s food subsidy reforms -
J. Pasternak (2006)
CorruptionEinstein, 15
-
Weihua An, Yesola Kweon (2017)
Do higher government wages induce less corruption? Cross-country panel evidenceJournal of Policy Modeling, 39
-
O. Borcan, Mikael Lindahl, Andreea Mitrut (2012)
The Impact of an Unexpected Wage Cut on Corruption: Evidence from a 'Xeroxed' ExamInstitutions & Transition Economics: Political Economy eJournal
-
George Akerlof (1984)
Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory: Four ViewsThe American Economic Review, 74
-
D. Kahneman, D. Lovallo (1993)
Timid choices and bold forecasts: a cognitive perspective on risk takingManagement Science, 39
-
Praveen Kulshreshtha (2007)
An efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of briberyJournal of Development Economics, 83
-
S. Al-Athel, L. Fadika, I. Láng, Shijun Ma, Margarita Botero, Nagendra Singh, Paulo Noqueira-Nato, S. Ramphal, W. Ruckelshaus, M. Sahnoun, V. Sokolov (1987)
Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: "Our Common Future" -
S. Eilon (1966)
ANOTHER NOTE ON WAGE INCENTIVE PLANS -
Venkatesh Mani, A. Gunasekaran, T. Papadopoulos, Benjamin Hazen, Rameshwar Dubey (2016)
Supply chain social sustainability for developing nations: Evidence from IndiaResources Conservation and Recycling, 111
-
Reducing bureaucratic corruption: interdisciplinary perspectives on what works
World Development, 105
-
The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: a laboratory investigation
Journal of Economic Psychology, 39
-
P. Bardhan (2006)
The economist’s approach to the problem of corruptionWorld Development, 34
-
P. Bardhan (1997)
Corruption and Development: A Review of IssuesJournal of Economic Literature, 35
-
Sheheryar Banuri, Catherine Eckel (2012)
Cracking down on briberySocial Choice and Welfare, 45
-
S. Chakravarty, Glenn Harrison, E. Haruvy, E. Rutström (2011)
Are You Risk Averse over Other People's Money?Southern Economic Journal, 77
-
J. Malcomson (1984)
Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor MarketsJournal of Political Economy, 92
- Publisher
- Emerald Publishing
- Copyright
- © Emerald Publishing Limited
- ISSN
- 1746-5664
- DOI
- 10.1108/jm2-07-2019-0156
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Government distributing rationed goods through a public distribution system often do not reach the deserving citizens primarily due to the practice of corruption. This paper aims to design an incentive mechanism to curtail such corrupt practices.Design/methodology/approachThe incentive mechanism is developed in a principal-agent framework where the information asymmetry is in the form of moral hazard.FindingsThe mechanism designed through this study sufficiently penalizes the agent who receives bribe and incentivizes if desired level of effort is applied.Originality/valueThe paper contributes to the existing literature by developing an incentive mechanism to prevent bureaucratic corruption. Appropriate wages are also quantified in this study.
Journal
Journal of Modelling in Management – Emerald Publishing
Published: Jul 20, 2021
Keywords: Public distribution system; Incentive mechanism; Information asymmetry; Moral hazard; Principal-agent model; Social sustainability