Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/emerald-publishing/higher-education-and-progressive-taxation-equity-efficiency-and-eRrsRRjb0o
References (7)
-
Dieter Bos (1980)
The Democratic Decision on Fees versus TaxesKyklos, 33
-
D. Ulph (1977)
On the optimal distribution of income and educational expenditureJournal of Public Economics, 8
-
P. Lambert (1989)
The Distribution and Redistribution of Income -
G. Johnson (1984)
Subsidies for Higher EducationJournal of Labor Economics, 2
-
T. Romer (1975)
Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income taxJournal of Public Economics, 4
-
Jerry Green, E. Sheshinski (1975)
A Note on the Progressivity of Optimal Public ExpendituresQuarterly Journal of Economics, 89
-
J. Creedy, P. Francois (1990)
Financing higher education and majority votingJournal of Public Economics, 43
- Publisher
- Emerald Publishing
- Copyright
- Copyright © Emerald Group Publishing Limited
- ISSN
- 0144-3585
- DOI
- 10.1108/01443589210021406
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Examines, using a simple model, the choice of appropriatecontributions of taxes and fees used to finance higher education. Atwoperiod model is developed in which individuals in cohort invest inhigher education in the first period, and the interdependences betweeneducational choice and the tax system are considered. The implicationsof majority voting and the maximization of a social welfare function,allowing for a tradeoff between equity and efficiency, are examined inprogressive and proportional tax systems.
Journal
Journal of Economic Studies – Emerald Publishing
Published: Apr 1, 1992