This study investigated the effects of arbitration condition and risktaking propensity upon bargaining behavior. Negotiators anticipating finaloffer arbitration settled more contracts, resolved more contract issues, and conceded more than did negotiators anticipating conventional arbitration. Contrary to our hypothesis, low risktaking propensity dyads did not settle significantly more contract issues under finaloffer arbitration than they did under conventional arbitration. Union negotiators made significantly greater concessions during the 30 minute prearbitration bargaining period and conceded a greater total amount than did management negotiators. Possible explanations for these findings are presented.
International Journal of Conflict Management – Emerald Publishing
Published: Feb 1, 1992
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