Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Josep Tribó, I. Gutiérrez (2004)
Private benefits extraction in closely-held corporations: the case for multiple large shareholders
E. Fama (2007)
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm Author ( s ) :
M. Firth, Peter Fung, Oliver Rui (2005)
Firm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top Management Turnover in a Transitional EconomyEmerging Markets Economics: Firm Behavior & Microeconomic Issues eJournal
Z. Hongjun
Gaoji Guanli Renyuan Genghuan Yu Jingying Yeji (“Top management turnover and operating performance”)
Sanford Grossman, O. Hart (1980)
The free-rider problem and the theory of the corporation
Morten Bennedsen, Daniel Wolfenzon (2000)
The balance of power in closely held corporationsJournal of Financial Economics, 58
E. Fama
Agency problems and the theory of the firm
E. Lehmann, J. Weigand
Does the governed corporation perform better? Governance structures and the market for corporate control in Germany
E. Fama, M. Jensen (1983)
Separation of Ownership and ControlThe Journal of Law and Economics, 26
Francis Bloch, U. Hege (2003)
Multiple Shareholders and Control ContestsCorporate Finance: Governance
R. Porta, Florencio Silanes, Andrei Shleifer (1998)
Corporate Ownership Around the WorldCorporate Finance and Organizations eJournal
Z. Mubin, F. Conglai
Guanliceng Biangeng Yu Kongzhiquan Shichang Zhili Xiaoli De Shizheng Yanjiu – Yi Zhizaoye Shangshi Gongsi Weili (“An empirical study of management turnover and the market governance effect of controlling power – based on listed firms in the manufacturing industry”)
S.J. Grossman, O.D. Hart
Takeover bids, the free‐rider problem, and the theory of the corporation
Erik Lehmann, Jürgen Weigand (2000)
Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in GermanyJournal of Financial Abstracts eJournal
A. Gomes, W. Novaes
Sharing of control versus monitoring
Z. Hongjun
Dagudong Biangeng Yu Gaoji Guanli Renyuan Biangeng: Jingying Yeji De Zuoyong (“Change of large shareholders and top management turnover: the impact of operating performance”)
C. Xinyuan, W. Hui
Gudong Zhiheng Yu Gongsi Jiazhi: Moxing Ji Jingyan Shuju (“Balance of power among shareholders and corporate value: model and empirical evidence”)
G. Yuchi
Gongsi Jixiao Yu Gaoceng Genghuan (“Company performance and top management turnover”)
H. Yuxiang, S. Yan, S. Yinhong, W. Shujuan
Guquan Zhiheng Yu Gongsi Zhili Yanjiu (“Balance of power among shareholders and corporate governance research”)
Jerold Warner, R. Watts, Karen Wruck (1988)
Stock prices and top management changesJournal of Financial Economics, 20
Z. Jingwen, Y. Zengbiao
Guquan Zhiheng Yu Gongsi Jingying Yeji (“Balance of power among shareholders and company operating performance”)
Armando Gomes, Walter Novaes (2005)
Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance MechanismCorporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal
Rafael Porta, Florencio López‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1996)
Law and FinanceJournal of Political Economy, 106
H. Manne (1965)
Mergers and the Market for Corporate ControlJournal of Political Economy, 73
Z. Hongjun, W. Hui
‘Guquan Zhiheng’ Keyi Gaishan Gongsi Zhili Ma? – Hongzhi Keji Gufen Youxian Gongsi Kongzhiquan Zhizheng De Anli Yanjiu (“Can ‘balance of power among shareholders’ improve corporate governance? – a case study of the competition for controlling power at WholeWise Sci.&Tech.”)
C. Xuegang
Da Gudong Biangeng, Gongsi Zhili Yu Gongsi Jixiao – Laizi Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi De Jingyan Shuju (“Change of large shareholders, corporate governance and company performance – data from listed firms in China”)
S. Jianfeng
Jingzichanbeilv, Shiyinglv Yu Gongsi Chengzhangxing – Laizi Zhongguo Gushi De Jingyan Zhengju (“Net value of assets, PE ratio and company growth – data from Chinese stock market”)
S. Kaplan (1994)
Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United StatesJournal of Political Economy, 102
R. Porta, Florencio Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1999)
Investor Protection and Corporate GovernanceChicago Booth: Fama-Miller Working Paper Series
Z. Peipei, X. Xinping
Kongzhiquan Zhuanyi Zhong De Gaoceng Genghuan Yu Gongsi Jixiao (“Top management and company performance during the transfer of controlling power”)
X. Liping, X. Yu, C. Gongmeng
Guquan Jizhongdu He Guquan Zhiheng Jiqi Dui Gongsi Jingying Jixiao De Yingxiang (“Impact of shareholding concentration and power balance among shareholders on a firm's operating performance”)
S. Yifeng, C. Shuyu, H. Juanjuan
Touzizhe Falv Baohu, Suoyouquan Jiegou Yu Kunjing Gongsi Gaoceng Guanli Renyuan Biangeng (“Legal protection for investors, ownership structure and top management turnover of companies in difficulty”)
Z. Yan, Z. Hongmei
Woguo Gongsi Neibu Zhili Dui Gaoceng Biangeng Yingxiang De Shizheng Yanjiu (“An empirical study of the impact of corporate inside governance on top management turnover in China”)
M. Pagano, A. Röell (1998)
The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go PublicQuarterly Journal of Economics, 113
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1986)
Large Shareholders and Corporate ControlJournal of Political Economy, 94
A. Coughlan, Ronald Schmidt (1985)
Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigationJournal of Accounting and Economics, 7
M. Weisbach (1988)
Outside directors and CEO turnoverJournal of Financial Economics, 20
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the shareholding of the largest shareholder and other large shareholders could exert a good stimulating effect within a firm's corporate governance structure and what impact the balance of power among large shareholders could have on top management turnover. Design/methodology/approach – This paper has investigated 787 firms publicly listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and checked the relation between power balance of firms' block shareholders and their top management turnover. Findings – The paper's empirical results show that there is a U‐shaped relationship between the proportions of shareholding of a firm's largest shareholder and its top management turnover, that is, the controlling shareholder could impose either negative or positive effect for different types of equity ownership. We also find that the proportion of shares held by other block shareholders is significantly and positively related to the turnover of management and the monitoring effect of other large shareholders is strong. Furthermore, duality of chairman and CEO shows a significant negative effect on firms's top management turnover. Originality/value – The paper usefully shows that under the institutional background of relatively weak legal protection for medium and small investors in China, centralized shareholding by large shareholders in listed firms, or the so‐called mechanism of power balance among block shareholders, has the ability to effectively supervise and restrain the corporate governance of a firm, replace ineffective managers and thus improve its whole management performance.
China Finance Review International – Emerald Publishing
Published: Oct 2, 2010
Keywords: China; Corporate governance; Corporate ownership; Shareholders; Chairmen; Chief executives
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.